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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the social implications of a neoliberal ‗rights-based‘, 
fisheries management system introduced in New Zealand on 1 October 1986 in 
the form of the Quota Management System (QMS) using Individual Transferable 
Quotas (ITQs).  Ongoing biological and economic monitoring has endeavoured to 
ensure the status of fish and the well-being of the industry but relatively little 
social research on the fishermen and their communities. This thesis begins to 
address this discrepancy. 
It considers four ―components‖, The Fishing, now Seafood, Industry (corporates), 
Fisheries Management (MAF/MFish), which have more market and national 
perspectives respectively, often influenced by international considerations, while 
social implications impinge more particularly on Fishermen and their 
Communities, both generally having more local perspectives.  
Communities, mainly Waiheke Island (my own community) but with reference to 
Coromandel, and Leigh, that had been active in the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery 
before the QMS, were selected, initially as case studies but later as less distinctive 
variants.  
The dissertation argues that permitting the ‗Big Boats‘ on the coast constructed a 
crisis which was aggravated by loan schemes. The exclusion of the part-timers 
and aggregation of quota to the corporates has deprived coastal communities. 
Once they had access to fish through rights of propinquity and usufruct for 
livelihood and food. Now access to fish is commodified and controlled by 
corporates supplying an international market. Some fishermen retained their own 
quota, are passionate and debt free: others are contractors and financially marginal 
so that what was once an expressive vocation is now a more instrumental and in 
many cases marginal job. For social justice the QMS must provide better 
livelihoods for fishermen and better access to fresh locally caught fish at a fair 
affordable price for local consumers, especially in coastal communities.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter will set out the objectives of this research, indicate the style of 
presentation, discuss the nuances of the essential terminology used, describe the 
‗components‘ of the study  – fishermen, communities, corporate and management 
(MAF / Mfish). It will concentrate on the first two, before reviewing literature on 
rights-based fisheries and its manifestation in New Zealand in the form of the 
Quota management System (QMS). It will then describe the Hauraki Gulf fishery. 
The introduction will conclude by outlining the structure of this dissertation. 
Before the 1980s neo-liberal fervour of Rogernomics, New Zealand had a 
relatively high level of government involvement in a welfare state ideology. The 
fishing industry was numerically dominated by owner-operators (See e.g. Boyce 
et al. 1986), and these supported and were in turn supported by their communities. 
Following the election in 1984 the Labour Government implemented a rights-
based policy system characterised by privatisation, market forces and deregulation 
and introduced the QMS. Power shifted so fisheries are now predominantly in the 
hands of a few vertically integrated private and Māori corporations and the 
industry re-branded itself as the Seafood Industry.  
AIMS AND GOALS OF THIS RESEARCH  
This dissertation is primarily concerned with the social implications of the QMS 
for fishermen and their communities in the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery. It 
therefore seeks to show the change in the ethos of fishermen and the identity of 
their communities before and after the introduction and give them ―voice‖ that has 
generally been disregarded in the literature. This focus will be contextualised by 
re-examining the causes of the coastal crisis and the social implications of the 
1983 Fisheries Act and 1986 Fisheries Amendment Act that led to the QMS.  
Since this dissertation is concerned with changes over 30 years, with Think Big 
and Neo-liberal ideologies, before and after the QMS with a methodology that 
varied over time it utilises a mosaic rather than a linear progression of data. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) / Ministry of Fisheries (Mfish) 
policy toward large-scale companies (the corporates) contrasted with that for 
small-scale coastal fishermen or smaller yet, part-timers, and their communities, 
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that can be used to establish change before and after the introduction of rights-
based fishing with the QMS and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). The main 
focus then is on the fishermen and communities in one fishery, snapper in the 
Hauraki Gulf. The dissertation is situated, in the debates over the consequences of 
ideological shifts in approaches to resource management.  
Much of the literature on the QMS is by those responsible for its introduction and 
ongoing management (See: Chapter 2 Dominant Ideology: Neo-liberal), assumes 
the ascendency of neo-liberalism, and presents the perspectives of the big 
companies (corporates) and/or the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF)/ 
Ministry of Fisheries (Mfish). This literature is not ideologically neutral and 
generally is weighted towards the biological and economic aspects of fisheries, 
externalising social aspects, and advocates in favour of the QMS
2
. This 
dissertation is unashamedly more critical of neo-liberalism, aims to redress this 
ideological bias and address the paucity of social literature on the social 
implications of the QMS for fishermen and their communities. 
I am more concerned with the expressive, the emotional, the subjective that 
denotes the unique character of fishermen and commercial fishing; what makes it 
different, what makes it special, rather than more objective, statistical and 
instrumental aspects. So will elucidate the ethos of commercial fishing before the 
QMS for both commercial fishermen and their communities and seek to evaluate 
those changes and give ―voice‖ to the fishermen and their communities.  
 Most of the empirical data on the fishery before the QMS is from my previous 
research and from experience on Waiheke Island. Since, however, the majority of 
Waiheke fishermen sold their quota Waiheke was no longer involved in 
commercial fishing. To get more comprehensive coverage of the social 
implications for the Gulf data from Coromandel and Leigh has been used (Figures 
1, 2).  
 
                                                 
2
  Some, mainly by academics and conservationists is, critical e.g. Rees (2004, 
2006) but then as a Senior Strategic Projects Analyst for the Office of the Chief Executive 
with the Ministry of Fisheries/Te Tautiaki i nga tini a Tangaroa is highly laudatry 
(Winder and Rees 2010). 
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Figure 1. New Zealand: main place names in the text. (Source: Max Oulton) 
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Figure 2: The Hauraki Gulf. Note: Locations of the three communities Waiheke, 
Coromandel and Leigh.  (Source: Max Oulton)  
UNTANGLING TERMINOLOGY 
Understandings of the social changes are hindered by conceptual and 
methodological tensions and ambiguities so it is useful to clarify some of the key 
concepts employed in this research. 
Fisheries occur at the intersection between the human social system and the 
marine ecosystem. They are one of the mediators and expressions of the 
people/sea relationship. Both systems are complex, dynamic, chaotic and open; 
seemingly fragmented and contradictory. While both systems contain an empirical 
reality, the way in which they are perceived depends on ideological and/or 
  
5 
theoretical perspectives (van Ginkel
3
 1999 19 22).  Two disciplines - biology and 
economics, often conflated as bio-economics - have dominated later 20th century 
fisheries‘ management. The broader ecological and social sciences have been less 
significant, but have grown in importance in the last decade.  
Ecologically, from a biological perspective, the marine ecosystem is a vast 
complex network of food chains: species in predator or prey relationships in 
diverse interrelated communities undergoing processes of reproduction, maturity, 
and mortality, in diurnal, seasonal, climatic and other cycles. However, from the 
simpler perspective of the fisheries science used by MAF / Mfish, the status of 
single species populations can be determined by a variety of surveys, complex 
statistics, mathematical equations, computational analyses, and computer 
modelling.   
From an economic perspective the marine ecosystem represents a source of 
supply, with marine protein and product harvested under rights-based fishing by 
venture capitalists (Massey 2003). The social system provides the market which 
creates demand for marine product with an emphasis on economic efficiency.  
The terms ‗social‘, ‗economic‘ and ‗political‘ each include dimensions of the 
others. Davis and Bailey state, for example, that, ―for humans property is as much 
an expression of social and political, as it is economic, relationships‖ (Davis and 
Bailey 1996 253). To ensure conceptual clarity, so that social does not just 
conflate to, or subsume the other terms, it will be defined following the New 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ―(5a) Of or pertaining to society or its 
organisations as a natural or ordinary condition of human life. (5b) … Of or 
pertaining to the mutual relationships of human beings or a class of human beings 
connected with the functions and structures necessary to membership of a group 
or society‖ (O.E.D. 1973, 1993). In practical terms this dissertation emphasises 
the social while recognising there may be economic and/or political implications.  
                                                 
3
   Although I have long been aware of the interrelationship between the social 
system and ecosystem and the social context of the fishing grounds, Van Ginkel‘s work, 
especially this paper, not only resonates with my perspective but extends and expresses it 
with exceptional cogency.   
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The term ‗social implications‘ is used for this research instead of the more usual 
terms, ‗social impacts‘, and ‗social consequences‘ in the social impact literature 
(e.g., Burge 2004) to avoid the assumption of negative connotations associated 
with change. My concern is that the subjects of this research are recognised as 
people, often with conflicting attributes, aspirations and emotions. They are not 
the abstract entities of neo-classical economics. My approach lies firmly within 
the tradition of social anthropology with its emphasis on social interrelationships 
and human geography, aspiring to ―the development of critical thinking about 
issues involving the interrelationships among people and nature, in places‖ 
(Johnson et al. 2000).  
In most countries, fisheries management involves consideration of fisheries 
biology, industry economics and management of fishermen (Miller and van 
Maanen 1979). Internationally, Copes presented a system for comparing ―major 
fisheries management systems in industrialized countries‖ arguing that, "[t]he 
value of any management system lies in meeting society's policy objectives for 
fisheries management, consisting of acknowledged goals in three areas, widely 
accepted by political consensus. These are resource conservation, economic 
efficiency, and social considerations" (Copes 2002 1).  Social consideration is 
essential (Crean and Symes 1996 197; NMFS 2001) and has been explicitly 
incorporated into the USA‘s Magnuson Fisheries Management Act (Nielander and 
Sullivan 2000).  This can however, underplay the lived experience of fishing or 
even the perspectives of communities where poetic, folkloric or anthropologically 
informed views record, nostalgically salt etched seafarers, pursuing the occupation 
of their forebears, operating small grimed workboats and contending with lines or 
nets in a hostile environment to feed the local community (See for example Boeri 
and Gibson 1976 11-22).  Romanticised or not, the lived experience, the ethos, of 
fishing plays an important part in the cultural sense; the identity, of being a 
community or society.  
Yet, traditionally in New Zealand fisheries management considerable attention 
has been given to biology, in the form of ongoing fisheries science research
4
 and 
                                                 
4
  See for example MAF FARDs or MAF / Mfish scientist‘s papers and reports 
published in NZ Journal of Fresh and Saltwater Research, 
http://www.rsnz.org/publish/nzjmfr/2008/ (Accessed 11 August 2008). 
  
7 
annual single species stock assessments (e.g. Annala et al. 1999
5
), and to 
economics (e.g. the bi-annual NZFIB / SeaFIC Economic Reviews e.g. Peacey 
1996) but with relatively little attention given to social science. The need for a 
changed management regime arose from the belief that the stocks were being 
over-fished. In consequence fisheries scientists increased their biological research 
to determine the status of the stocks and the level of fishing they could sustain. 
The Fishing Industry Board monitored and facilitated economic development for 
the industry. The third disciplinary perspective, the social implications for 
fishermen and their communities was considered only briefly, at least during the 
lead up to the introduction of ITQs and it was recognised by some that the change 
would bring significant social pain (See: Fairgray 1985; Hawkey 1994; Holmes 
1998 below). 
With the fervour of New Zealand State Sector Reform, the policy makers 
implemented a ‗pure‘ economic system rather than ensuring social justice for 
fishermen
6
 and their communities. Social aspects were considered externalities 
(Helgason and Palsson 1997), and, neo-liberal bio-economic NZ fisheries 
managers expressing the zeitgeist of the time argued for, ―the sanctity of the 
policy and let the chips fall where they may‖ (Clark and Duncan 1986 1287 ). 
They ignored the social consequences. The social implications for fishermen, their 
                                                 
5
  The Ministry of Fisheries and MAF before it produced annual Reports from 
Fishery Assessment Plenaries: stock assessments and yield estimates. Similar information 
is now available  http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/SOF/default.htm (Accessed 4 September 
2008). 
6
   ―Fishers‖ is the politically correct, gender neutral and academic terminology. 
The term ―fishermen‖ will, however, be used throughout this research. Both men and 
women who fish commercially seem to prefer to be called fishermen. It is their identity 
and this dissertation is concerned with identity and changes in it. Nadel-Klein and Davis 
quoted a female informant,  " I am a fisherman and mean fisherman [emphasis ours]. I'm 
not a fish person or a fisherette or any of those strange words. The word says what I do, I 
fish. The word has been around a long time and it deserves respect" (Nadel-Klien and 
Davis 1988 29). This view is reinforced by Allison (1988) and by Davis (Davis 1996). It 
was also the consensus reached when debated on an Internet email list Fishfolk 
(fishfolk@mit.edu). While fisher is the academic terminology I will adhere to the 
expressed wishes of those I write about unless quoting or the context requires otherwise. 
 
7
  Alex Duncan, no relation to me. 
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families and communities have had little attention. This dissertation partly 
addresses that gap. 
Initially it seemed that the social implications would become apparent from a 
relatively straightforward social impact assessment (SIA) but it became evident 
that the issues were more complex and the direction evolved. Informants asserted 
that the social implications of changes made before the QMS, such as the 
exclusion of the part-timers were greater than those of the QMS and made 
establishing a baseline considerably more difficult, if not impossible.  
In addition, relationships, similarities and differences, and entanglements among 
the communities meant that rather than separate cases I was really studying just 
one: the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery. I did not set out to do a discourse analysis 
but the significance of different perspectives on the part-timer issue became 
strikingly apparent, so elucidating just how this ‗problem‘ had been discursively 
constructed required analysis. 
I take bureaucracy to mean formal institutional structures and mechanisms of the 
departmental organisation and staff members involved in monitoring and 
management of the fisheries, the degree of regulation and the amount of 
paperwork required of fishermen and others reporting the catch. 
COMPONENTS 
Van Ginkel‘s seminal overview of the issues of fisheries management advocates 
understanding the multiplicity of forces working upon on ecosystems and cultures 
noting that ―[i]n a globalising world, ecological, economic, social and political 
interdependencies have but reinforced the impact of external factors on socio-
cultural entities defined as geographically bounded wholes‖ (van Ginkel 1999 20). 
The real world is not clear-cut entities but rather conglomerates of blurred 
boundaries. Heuristically, however, four collectivities, or ‗components‘ will be 
considered here:  the larger companies -‗corporates‘ which process, distribute and 
market the fish; the government administration; ‗management‘ which manages the 
fisheries and fishermen and their communities (See Figure 3 for an overview of 
the basic context). 
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Figure 3: The main components considered in this research. 
From my perspective, fishermen cast off from communities to fish on the fishing 
grounds to make a livelihood by catching fish for food for subsistence and for 
sale. Fishing corporates, however, can be seen as somewhat impersonal 
organisations, rather than individuals, extracting resources for processing and 
arguably value-adding, distribution and marketing globally. They contend with 
independent fishermen, owner-operators, for access to the fishing grounds. Given 
the pejorative perspective the media have portrayed of the fishing industry (as 
opportunistic hunters and rapists pillaging the ecosystem (Minnegal et al 2003 
65)) the corporates have rebranded the seafood industry and fishermen as farmers 
or ranchers (Talley, 1999) who ‗harvest‘ the stocks. The administrative agency 
monitors stock levels, establishes policy and ensures compliance.   
Since the social implications for fishermen and their communities are the focus of 
this dissertation and the social concepts are both ambiguous and contested, 
fishermen and communities as used in this research require elaboration. 
Fishermen 
In the literature fishermen have been classified or typologised in a variety of 
ways: subsistence (Akroyd Walshe et al. 2002), part-time or pluriactive (Symes 
2001 7), family (Christensen and Raakjær 2006 263 264; Minnegal et al. 2003 
10 
 
53), traditional (See for example Firth 1966; Cordell 1989; Miller and van 
Maanen 1979 31 32), rapacious maximisers
8
 (van Ginkel 1999 19), hunters 
(Talley 1999), rugged individualists/entrepreneurs (Jentoft and Davis 1993 1; 
Stella 1996 191), innovative (Symes 2001 7, 8), businessmen utilitarians 
(Christensen and Raakjær 2006 266; Hamilton 54; Davis 1991 13; St Martin 2006 
172) and charter fishermen
9
 (Rennie, 2000; Rennie and Thompson 2004, 2007). 
For the present research some of these terms may relevantly describe fishermen 
throughout the period while others may be more applicable either before or after 
the QMS was introduced.  
Commercial fishermen
10
 traditionally catch and transfer fish (through sales) from 
the marine ecosystem into the social (and political-economic) system. The 
communities in which they live and which facilitate their enterprise are the prime 
focus of social concern. Fishermen were seen as having all the skills, knowledge 
and wiles identified in the international literature as being ―pitched against the 
unpredictable and physically challenging‖ ocean (Davis and Bailey 1996 255). 
Such a shared perception gives fishermen a sense of social and emotional identity 
and status, a community of occupation, and influences their relationships both at 
sea and with kith and kin and community members. Academic research 
substantiates this perception. Courtland Smith, for example, ―found that fishermen 
optimize such occupational objectives as independence, challenge, lack of 
regimentation, and being outdoors‖ (Smith 1981181). 
Administratively in New Zealand after the QMS, commercial fishermen fall into 
three categories: 
                                                 
8
  None of the fishermen I knew, worked with or interviewed fit this category or 
even came near. Indeed many knew and practiced the conservation issues to the extent 
they were able and were as concerned as I, even as a Greenpeace Fisheries consultant.    
9
  Charter fishermen here is used in the sense of fishermen skippering their vessels 
for parties of recreational fishermen, not skippers of overseas vessels chartered by the 
bigger fishing companies to catch their deepwater quota. 
10
  Unless otherwise stated the term fishermen means ‗commercial fishermen‘ 
where the intention is to sell or exchange fish as opposed to ‗recreational fishers‘ who 
fish for recreation, sport and/or food for themselves, their families and their friends.  
  
11 
  owner-operators who run their own boats and own sufficient quota11 to be 
able to operate their enterprise relatively independently  
 Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE)-dependent fishermen who frequently 
own their own boats, but have to lease ACE from other fishermen, quota 
brokers or fishing companies, and  
 share fishermen who are employed by the companies to operate company 
boats and fish company-owned quota.  
Communities 
The Dictionary of Human Geography defines ‗community‘ as ―a social network 
of interacting individuals, usually concentrated into a defined territory‖ (Johnson 
et al. 2000). The literature on communities is extensive, but the concept remains 
difficult to define (Jacob and Jepson 2000 211). There are tensions between those 
who focus on agglomerations or aggregations of people (Ramsey and Smit 2002 
369) or collectivities (Frazer 2000 178) and those with concern for the emotional 
and expressive. Here, communities are ―fundamentally important to the human 
experience, representing the personally meaningful physical, social and 
psychologically – emotional territories within which people are born, encultured, 
marry and establish families, and perform the role of producers and consumers 
and finally elders and ancestors‖ (Davis and Bailey 1966 267). There is tension 
between those who see geographically bounded communities of place like Sharp 
et al. (2000 25) and those who emphasise more dispersed communities of interest 
or occupation, or who see the concept as an integrated whole where ―a community 
could be understood in entirely non-spatially specific terms, such as a 
physiological state of ‗togetherness‘ or identification. Therefore members of the 
‗community‘ could be widely geographically dispersed‖ (Brookfield, et al. 2005 
57).  
                                                 
11
  In order to fish, the fisherman must have Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) to 
cover all the species caught. ACE is derived from quota. If the fisherman does not own 
quota he must buy ACE, colloquially this is referred to as ‗leasing‘.  For technical details 
see: http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/ace/ (Accessed 11 July 2006). 
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This perspective supports Johnson‘s premise (1996) that ―community is not a 
fixed entity. It reflects and is composed of its context:  social, cultural, political, 
and economic. … community is socially constructed: that which humans identify 
as community is not a fixed universal. By the same token, the social 
representation that is community changes because its core is never completely 
unambiguous. In some situations the ties that bind cannot even be articulated‖ 
(Johnson 1996 http://www.uoguelph.ca/~rsphd/qualifying_exams/djohnson.htm. 
(Accessed 5 August 2003)). Thus within a community of place there may be a 
myriad of other communities: of interest, of occupation, of status, overlapping 
with blurred indeterminate boundaries. Just which are pertinent depends on the 
context of enquiry. 
The focus here is on the emotional and the expressive, consequently community 
means people who interact and relate to each other, people involved in gender 
roles and relationships of power (politics) - in individual, group, organisational 
and institutional power - people who have a ‗sense of place‘ and shared identity. 
This includes people who self identify as belonging to certain communities or 
who are identifiable by someone else based on their expressions. The 
communities here are not clearly bounded collectives, but in a state of flux as a 
result of external (for example, unsympathetic local governance, developers or a 
fluctuating housing market) and internal (for example, changing generational 
values) pressures and opportunities. Communities are taken as dynamic, not static, 
agglomerations. My concern is that while the core is easily self-identified and 
identified by others, certainty dissipates toward and beyond the periphery
12
. One 
of my themes of concern is that neo-liberalism has increasingly individualised 
social relations, weakening the community bonding but community resistance 
may produce a countervailing trend
13
. 
                                                 
12
  Essentially this is the same definitional issue as ―Who are the Maori?‖  The 
definition has become those with any or all of certain genetic inheritance, social or 
cultural identity, particular tribal or land affiliations with or without self-identity as such.  
13
  On Waiheke Island, for example, the efforts to counter the Proposed District Plan 
(e.g. Gulf News 8 May 2008 1, 11; Editorial: Who we want to be. Gulf News 20 August 
2009 3), the granting of the contract for rubbish collection not to Cleanstream, the 
community-owned waste management trust operating a leading recycling scheme but to 
the Australian corporate TPI despite questionable economy, recycling and sustainability 
  
13 
Likewise, nationally, Kiwi heritage and culture stands in contradistinction to the 
trends of globalisation and the western world generally. Beliefs such as, that all 
New Zealanders own the fish, not just those who fish them commercially (e.g. 
Mills 1978 99), the values of self-sufficiency and sustainability, innovation, DIY 
(―do it yourself‖),  ―man alone‖ (Mulgan, 1949), and the quirkiness of popular 
culture (See Wolf and Barnett 2007) contribute to the distinctiveness of New 
Zealand communities.  
Before the changes in fisheries management systems in the 1980s, New Zealand's 
coastal communities were more than ‗just‘ where fishermen lived14. They 
provided the emotional and social support of and for their families, their crew, 
and, generally, a large proportion of the equipment and skill required for 
provisioning, maintenance and repair. Communities were also a large part of their 
fishermen's market while fishermen provided fresh healthy basic food. The issue 
now is to what, if any, extent communities and community identity has changed in 
reponse to rights-based fishing. 
The sense of community is one that can be ascribed by the observer and claimed 
by members. This enables and encompasses the self-expression, the interest, the 
ascribable, the geographical and the claimed. Thus the consequences and 
implications of the rights-based fisheries management can be seen in their 
multifarious forms, rather than constrained to possibly over-simplistic categories, 
abstract from the realities of those who live with and through them.  
Corporates 
The dominant commercial players in the fishing industry, particularly the larger 
vertically integrated companies, are referred to in this dissertation as ‗corporates‘ 
including Leigh Fisheries, the only remaining fishing company in the three 
specific communities studied. Only one corporate, Sanford, is listed on the stock 
                                                                                                                                     
(e.g. Gulf News 2 April 2009 1, 2 July 2009 1, 10, 9 July 2009 13) [another example of 
corporate takeover of community resources], or the governance proposals for the 
Auckland Super City (e.g. Gulf News 2 April 1).  
14
 Jentoft (2000) argues that there is an interrelationship between communities and 
the fisheries resource of mutual benefit. Likewise there is between fishermen and their 
communities.   
14 
 
exchange so the others are private companies. With the introduction of the quota 
management system, these companies gained considerable control of quota and 
thereby much greater access to fish (Stewart and Callagher 2002) and marketing 
(Coriolis 2005 25). The new system allowed companies to buy up or, in New 
Zealand parlance, ‗aggregate‘ the quota. Since the QMS there has been 
considerable consolidation
15
 through take-overs and mergers. The industry is 
represented by the Seafood Industry Council Ltd. (SeaFIC), a company owned by 
about 2500 New Zealand seafood industry enterprises
16
.  
Before the Quota Management System both Waiheke and Leigh had Co-
operatives. After its introduction, however, Waiheke Fishing Co-op collapsed 
whereas Leigh Fisheries expanded. 
Management (MAF / MFish) 
Since the mid-nineteenth century New Zealand fisheries were managed by various 
committees and bureaux representing several government departments under a 
variety of Acts, until the Marine Department became responsible in the mid 1940s 
(Johnson and Haworth 2004 55 156 resp.). In the early 1970s, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) (Haworth 2008 125) was established and in 
1995 the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) became a standalone entity
17
 with a brief 
―to ensure that fisheries are used in a sustainable way and that we (New Zealand) 
have a healthy aquatic ecosystem. That way, all New Zealanders can get the best 
value from this resource‖ (Mfish 200818). 
Both the corporates and MAF/MFish are part of the wider complex social system 
of the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery and are entangled within it, but fishermen and 
their communities are the prime focus of this dissertation. These ‗components‘ are 
                                                 
15
 For the situation before the QMS see Boyce et al. 1986 especially chapters 1-3.  
16
  See: http://www.seafood.co.nz/sc-about (accessed 12 November 2008). 
17
  See Rennie, 2002 and Johnston and Haworth, 2008 for a fuller description of the 
nature of the changes in administration of New Zealand‘s fisheries over the latter half of 
the 20
th
 century. 
18
  See: http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/default.htm  (Accessed 18 July 2008). 
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driven to a greater or lesser extent by different ideologies shaping their objectives 
and orientations and therefore tend to have different perspectives 
RIGHTS-BASED FISHERIES 
The term ‗rights-based fisheries management‘ came to my attention with 
the FishRights99 Conference in Fremantle, organised by the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 1999 (See Shotton 2000; 2001).  From an 
anthropological perspective, although in keeping with the concept of property 
rights, the term seemed a euphemism for the negation of traditional human and 
community rights explicit in the literature on common property (See for example, 
Ostrom 1990).   
In this dissertation, ‗rights-based‘ fisheries management stands for formal, de jure 
rights and is exemplified by New Zealand‘s QMS using Individual Transferable 
Quotas
19.  New Zealand‘s approach is used as a model and flagship in 
international forums for promoters of rights-based fishing (Hersoug 2002; Newell 
et al. 2005 437; Thompson 1992 25; SeaFIC n.d.). 
However, as Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi (2004 1415), argue, it seems that: 
"the label ‗rights-based approach‘ has become the latest designer item to be seen 
to be wearing," and it needs to be seen in a broader more diverse context of World 
Bank and other agencies‘ development practices. The introduction of rights-based 
fishing management could make way for particular industry sectors or 
communities to gain access to or dominance of a nation‘s fisheries to the 
detriment of the subsistence, artisan and small-scale fishermen who feed the bulk 
of the world's coastal populations. 
In fisheries management, Iceland first introduced privatised fishing rights in the 
herring fishery and Canada used a similar approach in the form of Enterprise 
Allowances for its offshore fisheries. New Zealand, however, was the first country 
to make comprehensive use of ITQs in commercial fisheries with the introduction 
of the QMS on 1 October 1986.  
                                                 
19
  ITQs, are  defined on page 41. 
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Since then the ‗missionaries‘ (Herzog 2002 62), primarily the New Zealand 
fisheries managers who had been responsible for introducing the QMS, have 
convinced other countries that ITQs offer the solution to the global fisheries crisis 
(FAO 2006 29). Since their introduction, proponents regard ITQs as the solution, 
often the only solution to the problems of fisheries (e.g. Davis, 1996, 97; Ostrom, 
1999 493; Apostle, McCay and Mikalson, 2002, 11; Rees, 2004, 1; St Martin 
2004 533; St. Martin 2007 528; Copes 1986; Mansfield 2004 32).  
Some, though, who favour property rights approaches, do see their limitations 
(Mansfield 2004 32). Others are critical of the property rights approaches 
stemming from Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons‘, on both theoretical and 
practical grounds, (See, for instance, Palsson and Helgason 1996; Symes 1998 6; 
Brookfield et al. 2005). Brookfield et al. (p59), in particular, argue that if this 
policy [by implication policy rights] creates political constraints on fisheries-
dependent communities then ―certain features of fisheries management policies 
'wittingly or unwittingly‘ buttress the competitive advantage of large-scale fishing 
enterprises operating on a full-time basis, over small-scale,‖ often owner-operator 
operations. They claim that licensing and quota allocations often ―discriminate 
against part-time and, therefore, small-scale fishing,‖ and that ―policies on fleet 
reduction, licences and quotas, have all, ‗intentionally or otherwise, tended to 
favour the more specialised, large-scale and industrialised sectors of the fishing 
fleets at the expense of the small-scale inshore fleets‘‖. Indeed, Symes (2001 3), 
has argued that EU regulators (in this case) have virtually written off the inshore 
sector. Only those fisheries-dependent communities capable of accommodating 
large vessels will succeed in attracting the custom of these 'corporate' fishers. 
Communities that rely upon smaller independent fishers may face a terminal 
decline (Brookfield et al. 2005 59).  
Rights-based fishing has now been introduced in part or full in Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Iceland, Namibia, the Netherlands, Mozambique, Greenland, Portugal, 
Mexico, and the United States while Peru, Argentina and Morocco were in the 
process of introducing them (Arnason, n.d.). Understanding the social 
consequences of rights-based fisheries management for fishermen and their 
communities is therefore overdue and is important for making informed decisions 
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on the utility, appropriateness of adopting and responding to using individualised 
property rights as the foundation for fisheries management. 
The international literature on the social implications of ITQ is sparse and either 
speculative or presents relatively early information (e.g. Palsson and Petursdottir 
1997, Jentoft 1993). Apostle et al.‘s (2002) study is one of the few works by 
social scientists dealing with a mature ITQ fishery. The literature that has emerged 
suggests that the introduction of ITQ systems may lead to: 
 quota aggregated to corporates (Stewart and Callagher, 2002) 
 major reduction in the numbers of owner-operators (Stevens 1999a, 
1999b) 
 corporate ownership taking wealth out of the community (Yandle 2001 29) 
 crew being disadvantaged (Yandle 2001 30) 
 unemployment (Palsson and Petursdottir, 1997 53) 
 exacerbated equity problems within the community (Helgason and 
Palsson, 1997, Apostle et al. 2002) 
 changed fishing behaviour (Apostle et al. 2002 121; Boyd and Dewees 
1992 187) 
 changed and additional pressures on family relationships (Davis 1996 110) 
 loss of fishermen from commercial fishing (Stevens 1999b; Holmes 1998) 
and 
 loss of coastal fishing community authenticity (Jentoft, 1993). 
Unfortunately, despite its flagship status, there has been relatively little social 
research on the impacts of ITQ on New Zealand fishermen or their communities 
and almost no peer reviewed literature on the social consequences of rights-based 
fishing in New Zealand. A substantive, empirically-based analysis of the social 
implications of this form of management in New Zealand will have significance 
for both New Zealand and the international community. 
Indeed, with the notable exceptions of Dewees (e.g. 1989, 1998, 1997, 2007), 
Holmes (1988), Rennie and Holmes (1998), Knight (2007), Yandle and Dewees 
(2000) and more institutionally Harworth (2008) the literature on the New 
Zealand experience has barely touched on the impact on fishermen and 
communities from the introduction of ITQs. 
18 
 
However, the requisite reference indicators and regular measurements that would 
enable changes to be comprehensively assessed either did not exist then or are 
beyond the logistics of encompassing within a single doctorate dissertation. 
Although the QMS is an exemplar of neo-liberal theory its effects in a real world 
context where neo-liberalism has been adopted across the society cannot be 
evaluated because its impacts are intertwined with other aspects of societal change 
(See for example Symes 2000 3). The theoretical impacts of the QMS dominate 
the literature. However, during this research it emerged that the impacts of an 
earlier re-regulation of the industry, the removal of part-timers, may have had 
significant consequences, leaving an indelible imprint on the subsequent reforms, 
so that the apparent social changes actually reflect a combination of both policies.  
Accordingly, the approach adopted was to explore the discursive development of 
social changes in fisheries based on a diversity of available sources (as discussed 
in Chapter 3 Methodology).  
DESCRIPTION OF QMS  
There are many descriptions of the operation of the QMS system using ITQs (See, 
for example, Clark, et al. 1988b; Clark and Duncan 1986; Crothers 1988; Falloon 
1993; Hersoug 2002; Sharp 1997; Shotton 1999 2001) and, despite the paucity of 
social research, it is perhaps the most described fisheries management system in 
the world (Hersoug 2002 53).  
Rennie (pers com) explains: ITQ in New Zealand is a right to harvest a particular 
proportion of the total allowable commercial catch (TACC) of a particular species 
from a particular area (QMA).  The actual amount that can be taken on an annual 
basis is referred to as the Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE).  Thus the quota might 
not change, but if the TACC is changed, then the amount of the species able to be 
caught in the specific year also changes, but remains the same proportion of the 
TACC.  
Put simply, quota applies to an amount of a particular species of fish that an 
individual may harvest from a particular Quota Management Area (QMA) (See 
Figures 4 & 5). The ITQ owned ―has legal standing as a title in perpetuity and is 
divisible, transferable, leasable, and bankable. Commercial landings must be 
matched in direct one to one proportion with a holding of quota. Two quota 
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markets operate; ownership (perpetuity) and lease (annual) title" (Batstone and 
Sharp 2003 497). 
The QMS was introduced 1 October 1986 for 26 species. By 1994 Annala (1996 
44) noted 30 species in 179 different fishstocks and now there are 97 species in 
629 stocks in the QMS (Walker
20
 pers com., 14 October 2008).  
Unlike fisheries management using input controls the QMS sets the output, the 
weight of fish caught. This is determined by fisheries scientists in consultation 
with industry scientists and representatives of other stakeholder groups
21
. After 
consultation with the stakeholders, the Minister of Fisheries sets a total allowable 
catch (TAC) which is then allocated to Maori and recreational fisheries with the 
remainder to the commercial fishery as the total allowable commercial catch 
(TACC) for each fish stock
22
 in each quota management area (QMA) (See Annala 
1996 51 for the Stock Assessment process).  
The TACC was then divided into quota
23
. To fish commercially a fisherman 
required a fishing permit and a licensed fishing boat and individual transferable 
quota (ITQ) or ACE for each stock in each QMA likely to be caught. The initial 
allocation of quota was made on the basis of fishing history reduced where 
necessary by two tender rounds to buy back quota to match the sustainable TACC 
                                                 
20
  Scott Walker, Socio-economic analyst, Ministry of Fisheries.  
21
 In the mid 1990s there were a number of working groups some for one of the 
high value prime stocks (e.g. orange roughy or snapper), others for collections of stocks, 
(e.g. the inshore group or deepwater). Maori were entitled to attend, but did not for good 
reason. The fishing industry was represented by FIB and later SeaFIC scientific 
consultants with international consultants for the big stocks such as orange roughy and 
hoki. Recreational fishers were represented by the Recreational Fishing Council and 
conservationists by the Royal Forest and Bird Society (Barry Weeber) and me from 
Greenpeace. The working groups reported to an annual plenary which confirmed 
recommendations of the TACs, allocations and TACCs for the Minister.   
22
  A fish stock was believed to be the proportion of a given species that bred in a 
particular area. The 10 QHAs were amalgamated or divided into an area that contained 
one stock. See Figure 3 of NZ FMAs / QHAs and Figure12 snapper QHAs.  
23
   See Fishserve (http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/quota/index.aspx) for the 
derivation of quota shares from TACC. 
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estimated by MAF scientists. An individual‘s quota could be owned or 
transferred, that is leased or sold, in whole or part.  After 1996, to simplify the 
transfer process, Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) was derived annually from 
quota. Fishermen who didn‘t own quota for all the fish they intended catching had 
to buy or, in colloquial terms, ‗lease‘ ACE for the shortfall. ACE-dependent 
fishermen are those who have to buy ACE for virtually all the fish they intend 
catching. 
All fish caught have to be landed and, in the event a fisherman catches fish 
covered by the QMS for which he does not have quota, there are mechanisms to 
balance catch against quota such as: to ‗lease‘ or purchase more ACE or Quota, 
using CAAQs and FAAQs (Catching or Fishing Against Another‘s Quota), Overs 
and Unders (an allowance to catch or carry-over to the next fishing year up to 10 
percent of the next year‘s quota) and deemed values, the penalty set low enough to 
provide incentive to land the fish but high enough to prevent fishermen targeting 
that species (See: Sanchirico et al. 2005). This made quota balancing complex and 
after 1996 some of the provisions to balance ACE were changed and in 2001 a 
new system of catch balancing was introduced. 
Fishermen had to land all the fish they caught to Licensed Fish Receivers (LFRs). 
A wharf seller‘s license allowed direct sales to the public during the hours for 
which the fisherman was licensed. Sales were further restricted to no more than 
10kg per person per day. Both the fishermen and the LFRs (independently) had to 
comply with a stringent
24
 reporting regime thus generating the two ‗paper trails‘ 
which were compared for monitoring and compliance purposes.   
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  I am sure that if the technology was available, every fish would have to be bar 
coded as it came out of the water. 
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Figure 4: New Zealand General Fishery Management Area (FMAs
25
) 
(Map reprinted courtesy Mfish: www.fish.govt.nz) 
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  FMAs are the basis of Quota Management Areas (QMAs). 
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THE HAURAKI GULF  
This section is mainly concerned with the Hauraki Gulf fishery in the lead up the 
introduction of ITQs. The three case study communities, Waiheke, Coromandel 
and Leigh are all in the Hauraki Gulf where traditionally snapper was the 
predominant commercial and recreational, target species. 
The Hauraki Gulf (See Figure 2) is a semi-enclosed sea on the north east coast of 
New Zealand's North Island between the Coromandel Peninsula and the islands to 
the north. For administrative purposes the actual boundaries have been delineated 
in various ways at various times. In his history of the Gulf's predominant fishery, 
snapper, Larry Paul notes: 
If its seaward limit is taken as the 100m contour line (the continental shelf 
edge is at 150m), the Hauraki Gulf covers about 9000km
2
 (about 2700 
square miles), of which about one-third comprises shallow harbours and 
bays less than 25m deep. For various reasons not all this area is productive 
fishing ground (Paul 1977 15). 
In their 1972 review of New Zealand fisheries Watkinson and Smith state ―the 
New Zealand snapper (Chrysophrys auratus) is the most important marine fish in 
New Zealand's commercial fisheries landings‖ and essentially the Hauraki Gulf, 
―covers the major snapper fishery, providing one-third to one-half of New 
Zealand's total landings‖ (Watkinson and Smith 1972 10). Snapper has remained 
both a primary target and valuable coastal species but its proportion of the total 
New Zealand catch has declined since the 1970s. 
The major port for the fishing industry has been the Viaduct Basin in Auckland's 
Waitemata Harbour. Leigh should be added to Paul‘s designation of Thames and 
Coromandel as secondary ports (Paul 1977 15). Historically the bays and estuaries 
have also been bases for the fishermen from the numerous coastal towns and 
villages around the coasts of the Hauraki Gulf.  
Hauraki Gulf Geomorphology 
Harris (1993) provides a detailed description of the formation of the Gulf some 20 
million years ago from the Waitemata inland sea. Volcanic activity, sediments 
from the land mass, emergence, distortions and sea level rise were all involved in 
producing the present physical and faunal characteristics. In addition the physical 
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setting of climate, sealevel, tidal regime, coastal currents and wind waves all 
influenced the fisheries in the present Hauraki Gulf (Harris 1993). 
More poetically Mitcalf describes the physical Gulf as ―(a) sunken rift valley, with 
the scarp of the Moehau and Coromandel Ranges along the Eastern fault and the 
… Ranges along the Western, the Gulf shallows imperceptibly into the Firth of 
Thames‖ and indicates its social significance; "Sea and land intertwined, a 
thousand miles of coastline, offering all that a people could desire, from sea to 
forest, from fishing camp to pa‖ (Mitcalfe 1980 8 10). 
Snapper Biology 
Biologically, snapper, the dominant commercial species in the Hauraki Gulf is 
scientifically named Chrysophrys auratus, belonging to the ubiquitous family 
Sparidae or Porgies (sea breams) and the Order of perch-like Perciformes (Froese 
and Pauly) but in New Zealand has been renamed Pagrus auratus (Froese and 
Pauly 2007; Annala et al 1999 408) 
The Fishing Industry Board's Guide Book to New Zealand commercial fish 
species presents the ―basic facts‖ on snapper as:  
Snapper Chrysophrys auratus … occurs around New Zealand and 
Australia with a very similar species in Japan. … [It is the] [o]nly species 
of sea bream family found in New Zealand. …. Very important 
commercially. … A moderate resource capable of an annual yield of about 
8,000 tonnes. A very popular food fish. Flesh white, medium texture. 
Suitable for most cooking methods, including smoking. In season, October 
- December, has excellent roes; very suitable for smoking‖ (FIB 1990 
107). 
"Snapper are demersal fish found down to 200m but are most abundant in 15-
60m. They are the dominant fish in northern inshore communities and occupy a 
wide range of habitats, including rock reefs, areas of sand and mud bottom. They 
are widely distributed in the warmer areas of NZ, being most abundant in the 
Hauraki Gulf. Snapper are serial spawners... over an extended season during 
spring and summer" (Annala et al. 1999). Figure 5 shows the Mfish division of 
snapper stocks inro QMAs. 
―Snapper is slow growing and long lived …. [r]ecruitment of young fish 
into the catch occurs at about age 4-6 years‖ (Paul and Elder 1979 77) and 
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varies with the average temperature and climatic conditions of the 
spawning season (November December (Annala et al 1999 411 412). 
Paul and Elder refute Hauraki Gulf fishermen's belief that there is a resident 
population boosted by a migratory stock in the schooling season (Paul and Elder 
1979 77). 
During my Viaduct research (See Box 1) most fishermen believed they should not 
be allowed to fish during the snapper spawning season (school or schooling 
season) and used the analogy of a farmer culling his breeding stock. Scientists on 
the other hand indicated that climatic and ecosystem factors had more influence 
on size of the snapper stocks than fishing mortality (SeaFIC 1997 12). Some 
snapper could be caught year round but the big schools and catches would start at 
the entrance to the Gulf and then circulate through it. During the present research 
it became clear that environmental factors, particularly type of seabed and food 
type affected the appearance of snapper. 
Greg Bishop, Leigh Fisheries CEO said,  
The best caught and quality fish was out there in the (Gulf). Snapper is 
coloured and conditioned on its habitat. Fish caught right up north will be 
dark because they feed on kelp. Fish in Auckland will be what we call 
golden because they live around sand. Fish caught down in Thames will be 
a grayish colour because they live in either the mangroves and feed on 
crabs.  (Greg Bishop pers. com. 8 February 2007). 
History 
Dr Larry Paul (1977)
26
 reviewed the history of the fleet and landings of the 
commercial fishery for snapper in the Hauraki Gulf. Prior to colonisation, the 
fishery had provided important food supplies for Māori. Commercial fishing, 
―developed slowly in the late nineteenth century, the principal fishing methods for 
snapper being hand-lining, set netting, and beach seining from small sailing and 
rowing boats in the sheltered south-western Gulf close to Auckland‖ (Paul 1977 
18).  
Right at the end of the nineteenth century, the steam trawlers, the first of the ‗big 
boats‘,‘ entered the fishery and were almost immediately accused of overfishing 
the Gulf. Smaller commercial fishers and amateurs petitioned Parliament 
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  Snapper scientist, Fisheries Research Division (FRD), MAF.  
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and trawling was excluded from the Gulf until ―in a new attempt to encourage 
trawling and strengthen the local industry the trawl limit was moved closer to 
shore in the Kawau Island and Colville Bay areas in 1907‖ (Paul 1977 19). For 
details of this small-boat / ―big boat‖ conflict and Albert Sanford‘s27 efforts to 
dominate the domestic market see the Ayson Reports (1901, 1904), the Hefford 
Reports (1928 1929 1930) and Godfrey (1929)
28
.  
Danish seining was introduced in late 1923 as an alternative method for smaller 
uneconomic steam trawlers but just a year later the Firth of Thames was closed to 
Danish seining. Even so it was adopted quickly by many ―oil engined‖10-12m 
launches and numbers increased to 30 by the end of the 1920s. Claims they were 
depleting snapper and flounder stock meant such seining was excluded from the 
Firth, and the inner and the central Gulf (Paul 1977 21).  
The Depression, the Second World War, the opening of the Australian market, 
and the alleged disorganization and fragmentation of the fishing and fish-
exporting industry meant that returns on fishing fluctuated through the years. With 
varying costs and changing economic factors, fishing methods also varied and 
Danish seiners converted to trawling. Landings fell to the low of 1942, peaked in 
1946-47 then dropped again until 1953-56 before rising steadily until the 1970s 
(Paul 1977 20-32). 
Management Before the QMS 
Paul (1977) distinguished three periods in the development of regulations in the 
Gulf and noted two forms of restrictions, mesh sizes and closures of the inshore 
fishing areas: ―A large portion of the harbours, bays, and trawlable in-shore 
grounds around northern New Zealand were closed to trawlers, either seasonally 
or permanently by 1971. Essentially the same grounds were also closed to Danish 
seiners, with complex seasonal variations for different sizes of vessel in Hauraki 
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  Founder of Sanford Ltd. now one of New Zealand‘s largest companies (Titchener 
1981). 
28
  One of the surprises of my Viaduct research project was reading the Annual 
reports of the early Marine Department Fisheries Inspectors, Ayson and Hefford, 
outlining the same ―Big Boat‖ small boat conflict that was then prevalent. 
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Gulf. Both forms of regulation are aimed at protecting snapper on known 
spawning and nursery grounds and at preventing serious competition between 
different groups of fishermen‖ (Paul 1977 34). See Figure 6 for exclusion zones as 
of 1982 and 1991. 
 
 
Figure 5: Snapper Quota Management Areas (QMAs) 
(Source: Mfish, reprinted with permission. www.fish.govt.nz). 
Rick Boyd, a Fisheries Management Division (FMD) scientist at MAF, Auckland, 
also refers to three phases in his review of resource management in the Hauraki 
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Gulf at the Fin Fish conference in 1983. The first was closed areas between 1902-
1977, the second beginning in 1977 with the introduction of a catch quota, an 
upper limit on total catches and the third when the Gulf became a Controlled 
Fishery 1 March 1983 (See also Director-General, MAF, 29).  Boyd noted that 
each new measure was met with opposition and debate giving an indication of 
social concern. Indeed he refers to the two aspects which seemed to dominate 
MAF policy during the time of my Viaduct research: concern for fishermen but 
also maintaining the existing pattern of exploitation with the mass fishing and 
power methods of trawling and seining despite the better returns and conservation 
especially of iki jimi long-lining (See: Duncan, L. 1983). Putting forward MAF's 
perspective Boyd stated ―obviously the process of management requires difficult 
decisions, because the livelihood of individual fishermen is at stake. In the 
Hauraki Gulf, where there is a diversity of fishermen using different methods, 
there has been the additional problem of trying to ensure that management 
decisions do not unduly upset the allocation of the resource‖ (Boyd 1983 63).  
Boyd argued that decisions had not been taken until they were unavoidable. The 
second phase, for example, ―was the result of a failure by managers and the 
fishing industry to accept the difficult decision at that time -- that effort controls 
were needed‖ and, as the industry expanded following removal of controls in 
1963, little thought given to ―the time when our fisheries would be fully exploited, 
and a new forms of control would be needed‖ (Boyd 1983 63 64). Thus 
suggesting management was ad hoc for short-term benefits. 
Howard presented the perspective of a small (family) fisherman when he noted 
that management in practice and on ―paper‖ was different. His fishing had never 
been stopped because the quota had been reached. It had not been enforced and 
had done nothing to save the fish. In addition, he alleged, like fishermen reported 
in the Gulf News, ―a significant proportion of the fleet disregarded the boundaries 
for types of fishing‖ (Boyd 1983 66). Donohue implied that ―the concept of 
minimum sustainable whinge had applied‖ to which Boyd answered that ―his 
philosophy was … to make decisions and recommendations that upset people the 
least and still achieved sustainable catches or similar goals‖ (Boyd 1983 66). 
Paul concludes that ―[m]ost of the fluctuations in snapper landings are due to 
recorded changes in the industry‖ (Paul 1977 50), but there were two significant 
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events. The first of these in the 1950s could have been the result of environmental 
changes and the second event particularly in 1960, 1962 and 1968 ―resulting from 
spawning seasons when the air temperatures were warmer than average‖. 
Fluctuation in the catch and fishing effort was, he felt, inevitable but ―a sudden 
and permanent decline in catches is … unlikely‖ (Paul 1977 50).   
 
 
Figure 6: Hauraki Gulf method exclusion zones (lines) 1981, 1992.  (Source:  
Max Oulton) 
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Status of the Hauraki Gulf Fishery 
The Director-General MAF reported in 1983 that "[t]he Hauraki Gulf is one of the 
most important inshore fisheries in New Zealand and had been the subject of 
management measures and controls over the last 60 years‖ (Director-General 
MAF 29). While Paul and Elder (1979 76) concur they argue ―it had a long 
history of problems. Some but not all of these have resulted from overfishing‖.  
In the early 1970s, the heyday of the Gulf fishery, Paul writes, ―snapper 
contributed about one-third by weight of total wetfish landings: 277 397 cwt (14 
092 tonnes) at a landed value of $2 157 286. It has nearly always ranked first in 
marine fish landings. In 1971, 139 334 cwt (7078 tonnes), almost exactly half of 
the New Zealand snapper landings, was taken from the Hauraki Gulf and landed 
at Auckland, Thames and Coromandel. Boats from these ports, however, also 
worked fishing grounds beyond the Hauraki Gulf, and in 1971 they landed a total 
of 165 433 cwt (8405 tonnes) of snapper from the Gulf and other grounds‖ (Paul 
1977 11). 
By the end of the decade (1970s), though, the issue was: ―how to reduce fishing 
effort to that which will allow the stock to recover to a level capable of sustaining 
the allowed quota. It is a socio-economic problem. … too many fishermen for the 
available fish and a conflict between methods‖ (Paul and Elder 1979 76). The 
Hauraki Gulf Advisory Committee had been set up and the Fisheries Management 
Division of MAF was ―preparing a paper … which set out the pros and cons of 
declaring the Auckland snapper fishery and its associated fisheries, fully 
controlled (Paul and Elder 1979 77). 
Certainly management in the Gulf was complex and particular choices, of where, 
for example to draw the lines, were driven by the ―political and social pressure put 
on the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries by various interest groups‖ (Elder 
and Taylor 79), such as those for commercial fishermen using the different 
methods (primarily pair trawling, single trawling, Danish seining, long-lining, set 
netting) or amateur fishermen. 
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
To clarify; this dissertation attempts a multilevel (large scale to small scale), 
interdisciplinary (anthropological, sociological and geographic), symbolic 
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(ideology, identity) versus power relations (politics) using a mosaic of data 
sources but the difficulties of presentation have been compounded by the linear 
nature of theses. 
To reiterate, three disciplines, biology, economics and social science are 
associated with fisheries management. In New Zealand the first two get 
significant attention so are not detailed here so focus is on the third which has 
been generally neglected. This dissertation, therefore, attempts to redress the 
balance from the ideologies (perspectives) of four components, MAF / MFish the 
administration, the corporates, certain Hauraki Gulf fishermen and their 
communities before, during the transition and after the introduction of the QMS. 
The dissertation concentrates particularly on the fishermen who are embedded in 
their families and, to an extent relate to the communities through them.  
This Introduction has outlined the issue and approach taken by the research to this 
mosaic of data, ideologies and components, to fishermen‘s ethos and their 
communities‘ identity before and after the QMS raising issues relating to the 
social implications of this policy. Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical approach of 
the research arguing that ideology shapes perspective and behaviour at both the 
large scale and the small, and is experienced as ethos and expressed as identity. 
The globally dominant ideology, neo-liberalism, under which rights-based fishing 
as implemented by the Quota Management System using Individual Transferable 
Quotas was introduced, is examined. Chapter 2 also encompasses a general 
literature review and a more specific account of fisheries and the QMS/ITQs in 
New Zealand. Chapter 3 presents the methodology used in this research for 
studying the Hauraki Gulf fishermen and their communities. Chapter 4 discusses 
background issues providing a critique of the usual explanation for the need to 
restructure New Zealand‘s coastal fishery. It contends that the introduction of the 
‗big boats‘ and Rural Bank loans under the ‗Think Big‘ policy were responsible 
for the crisis and contrasts this attitude with MAF‘s perspective toward the 
exclusion of part-time fishermen and rural communities. Data from the 
submissions to the Waitangi Tribunal hearing at Te Hapua are used here since I 
was unable to find and interview local part-time fishermen
29
. Chapters 5, 6, and 7, 
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  The last, indeed only Waiheke part-time fisherman I could find (See background photo 
Figure 24) died several years previously. 
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present empirical material to show the distinctiveness of commercial fishing for 
the period before the QMS, the transition period when QMS was implemented, 
and the contemporary situation, respectively. They draw primarily on my 
experience on Waiheke with supplementary material from Coromandel and Leigh 
to show the experience of Hauraki Gulf fishermen and communities more 
comprehensively under the QMS. Chapter 8 discusses the findings and draws 
conclusions on the social implications of rights-based fisheries management in 
New Zealand.  
32 
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Chapter 2: Community Ichthyology: The Science 
of Community Fish 
―Don't say in the years to come you would have lived your life differently 
if only you'd heard this story - you've heard it now” King 2003. 
 
"Seafood is among the most traded food commodity world wide" Børresen, 2006 
1. 
This dissertation contends that ideology, in this case rights-based or neo-liberal, 
shapes social perception and awareness of the larger environment and impels 
regular activity within it. Thus the manner in which fisheries managers perceive 
and utilize the ecosystem, its resources and features is shaped by ideology. 
Therefore the crux of assessing the social implications of rights-based fisheries 
management in New Zealand involves determining the changes, particularly for 
fishermen and their communities, from the introduction of the neo-liberal rights-
based ideology (Rogernomics) to fisheries management. 
This chapter will outline the nature of ideology and, how it is experienced by 
fishermen as ethos and expressed as identity by their communities. It will 
delineate the major features of neo-liberalism, the globally dominant political-
economic ideology, and its expression in the fishing industry in general. This 
theoretical framework will enable analysis of the empirical data set out in 
subsequent chapters (5, 6, 7) that will expand on the social implications of the 
local rights-based manifestation of neo-liberalisation in the QMS. The dissertation 
is concerned with the social implications brought about by the change to neo-
liberalism so this ideology, its effects for the fishing industry and the four 
components , the corporates, fisheries management, fishermen and their 
communities will be discussed before reviewing the literature on social aspects of 
New Zealand fisheries and the QMS. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Fisheries occur as complex interactions between marine ecosystems and social 
systems
30
. When a fisheries management system is changed, ideally attention is 
given to three disciplines: biology/ecology to look after the fish stocks, economics 
to facilitate the industry and social science to ensure the well-being of fishermen 
and their communities (Gilden 1999; Degnbol et al. 2006, Jentoft 2006 673,674).  
The ecosystem, its utilization and activities are perceived through the ―rules‖, the 
belief in how things are as shaped by the ideology. For fishermen this will be the 
―laws of nature‖ of the marine ecosystem and their species (snapper) as 
experienced first hand and filtered by the discipline of biology, the legal regime 
and its regulations promulgated by MAF/Mfish, the market and its economics as 
expressed by primarily the corporates and the more local social influences of their 
families, friends and community. Empirical data will therefore be analysed by 
delineating fishermen‘s ethos from the ways they experience these ―rules‖, the 
identity as expressed by the community and the implications of changes following 
the introduction of the neo-liberalism and rights-based QMS. 
 
IDEOLOGY 
Ideology is a key social attribute that shapes the perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviour of individuals and groups, organisations and institutions. Ideologies 
may be chaotic, fragmentary and contradictory, and expressed in beliefs and 
values
31
 (See: van Ginkel 1999 22).  The notion of ideology as belief system or 
worldview (Olsen et al. 1992) has been grounded by Gramsci's analysis of 
ideology and the politics of hegemony (Simon 1991) and has been developed by 
more recent writers and critics (e.g. Howarth 2000; Finlayson et al. 2005; Gill 
2003). Significant among these have been Clegg's (1979; 1989) analyses of the 
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 See Barrett (2001 7, 8) for discussion of this relationship but more specifically 
applied to terrestrial ecosystems.  
31
  I have been strongly influenced by the assumption that there is some truth in the claim 
un the film ―What the Bleep…‖ that our eyes take in some 5000 bits of information per 
second but our brains are aware of only about 2000. The filtered involved is, I contend, 
indicative of the cogency of ideology. 
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development of power and the more coherent and contemporary perspective of 
theorists such as Dubbink (2003) and van Dijk (1998).  
Individuals, groups and organisations construct their notion of society, their places 
within it, and their interactions with, and behaviour toward, other groups through 
ideology.  Thus the nature of governance, compliance and response are influenced 
by ideology. Individuals and social systems are driven by ideologies (van Ginkel 
1999 22). An ideology is important, therefore, because it  
provides people with rules of practical conduct and moral behaviour, and 
is equivalent to a religion understood in the secular sense of a unity of 
faith between a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of 
conduct (Simon 1991 59).  
These are not abstract concepts, but ―are very specific basic frameworks of social 
cognition, with specific internal structures, and specific cognitive and social 
functions" (van Dijk nd 4). The ideology of being an individual (e.g. fisherman) 
influences the group (fishermen, community) and shapes, even controls their 
shared evaluations and distinctive group opinions as well as the individual‘s 
attitudes, knowledge and self-expression. Hence, for example, New Zealand 
fishermen may share a similar attitude toward the regulators of the fishery, 
MAF/MFish, or may share a consensus as to the state of their fishery. While their 
individual models or mental representations of ‗reality‘ ―are unique and personal 
and controlled by the biographical experiences of social actors‖ (van Dijk nd 3) 
their ideology as a whole influences those of the group and community and are in 
turn shaped by the dominant ideology. Thus the influence of ideology is two-way: 
the ideologies of governments and institutions, the top levels, influence groups 
and industries and in turn communities, families and individuals. And vice versa, 
personal experience influences perception and this to a lesser extent, influences 
the ‗higher levels‘.  The extent to which a particular ideology can become 
hegemonic, permeating, dominating and becoming Gramsci‘s (1971) ‗organising 
principle‘ for every day life, the ‗common sense‘ of a society, can determine the 
structuring of power in that society. 
Ethos and Identity 
The concept of ideology is, however, frequently conflated with either or both 
ethos and identity. Dictionary.com, for example, defining ethos refers to ―the 
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underlying sentiment that informs the beliefs, customs, or practices of a group or 
society; dominant assumptions of a people or period‖ (Dictionary.com) or 
AlphaDictionary, ―the characteristic set of beliefs and attitudes that guides the 
behaviour of individuals, groups, institutions, and nations‖. Both these definitions 
are, for the present purpose, more in keeping with ideology. Closer to fisheries 
Zulaika, guided by Bateson, defines the pivotal concept of his work on the ethos 
of deep-sea fishermen, as "The expression of culturally standardised system of 
organization of the instincts and emotions of individuals‖ (Zulaika 1981 34). 
Again this definition may be confused with that of ideology.  
Likewise there is confusion with the definition of identity; Castells, for example 
stressing the organisation of felt experience, notes ―Identity is people's source of 
meaning and experience‖ (Castells 1997 6). MacInnes recognises both personal 
cognition and membership: Identity means ―a personal sense of coherence over 
time‖ and ―membership of a social category‖ (MacInnes 1994 533). He states 
further that ―[u]nderstanding Identity starts out from the recognition that 'identity 
offers a way of thinking about the links between the personal and the social'. It is 
'relational', about 'marking difference', 'locating and transgressing boundaries', it is 
fluid and historically specific, but '[u]ncertainty about identity may lead people to 
lay claim to essential truths in their search for security and stability'‖ (MacInnes 
2004 533). More actively as Jamieson et al. note, ―fishing is an identity performed 
by doing‖ (Jamieson et al. 2009) or heuristically more useful for community 
members, Hazlehurst (1994) defines identity as  
A description of an individual's organization of experience. … individuals 
come to have a sense of who they are which is constructed through 
embodied experiences in real situations. These situations are themselves 
structured by the practices in which the individuals participate. Identity, in 
this sense, is about reflection upon—and action taken in accordance 
with—learned and perceived order in the world and one's place (both 
perceived and desired) in it. It entails construing past experiences and 
organizing ongoing behavior in order to evaluate—and demonstrate—who 
one is and where, in the world, one fits. (Hazlehurst1994).  
While these definitions provide empirically recognizable signifiers they may again 
be confused with the concepts of ideology or ethos. For the present work, 
therefore, identity will be taken as the expression of ideology. 
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DOMINANT IDEOLOGY: NEO-LIBERAL 
Since the 1970s, neo-liberalism has become the globally dominant ideology, 
implemented in New Zealand as Rogernomics and the ideologial underpinning of 
the QMS.  Harvey‘s (2005) Brief History of Neoliberalism attributes the re-
establishing of the conditions for capital accumulation, to neo-liberalism and the 
restoration of the power of a narrowly defined capitalist class, resulting in a severe 
increase in social inequality (Harvey 2005 19 159).  
Perspectives on neo-liberalism range from Shaik‘s (2004) supportive assessments, 
while others are more neutral and academic such as Sholt (2005) Who examines 
the sources and processes of neo-liberal globalization, or Dicken‘s analyses of 
global economic processes (Dicken 1997; Dicken et al 1997) or Whatmores 
studies of neo-liberalism‘s application to the agro-food business (Whatmore 1995; 
Whatmore and Thoren 1997; Phillips 2006) and, more specifically, Barret‘s 
(2001) investigation of the dialectic between globalization and communities.  
More polemical opponents of neo-liberalism and globalisation such as Bello 
(2001), Korten (e.g. 1995), Klein (1999; 2007), Kingsnorth (2003) and Napoleoni 
(2008) are yet more critical.  
Privatisation, market forces and government deregulation 
The key features in neo-liberalism are privatisation, market forces and 
government deregulation, contending that 
[H]uman well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices (Harvey 2005 2).  
The crux of neo-liberalism is that eventually the sum total of all individual 
economic choices, the ‗invisible hand‘, will reward those who focus on the market 
to the greater or lesser exclusion of social life and the community, with economic 
rationality for higher profits and penalises those who don‘t. ―The effect of this 
selection process on the economy is an increase in productive efficiency and a 
corresponding increase in gross economic rents‖ (Helgason and Palsson 1997 
460). 
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As Ben-Yami (2003) suggests, the ―implied outcome of such ‗free play‘ is that 
any financial profit derived from a common, fully, partly, or quasi-privatized 
resource, would somehow trickle down and redistribute itself all over the society". 
Thus "the messy political environment can be avoided and all distribution 
questions solved by market forces as soon as the private rights to fish become a 
commodity" (Wiber 2000 272).  
While the state has the role of establishing and guaranteeing the necessary 
institutions, the monetary system, security of property rights and markets, neo-
liberalism requires that it also minimise its interference in the market. Proponents 
of neo-liberalism claim that private enterprise is more efficient than the 
bureaucratization of the public service and therefore delivers goods and services at 
lower cost to the public. Thus if the state withdraws or the public service is 
deregulated better use is made of resources and all members of society benefit. 
Some, though, regard neo-liberalism as economist-driven ―tunnel vision‖ 
(Degnbol et al. 541 2006), and claim its proponents ―garner their power and 
popularity via the elimination of any alternative" (St Martin 2007 528). In 
addition there is a discrepancy between the theory and practice and benefits are 
skewed (e.g. Mansfield 2004b 565; Harvey 2005 19; Monbiot 2007).  
Consequences of Neo-liberalism 
For companies, profit maximisation generally means increasing profits 
by lowering costs and increasing efficiency and productivity. Consequently if 
profit can be made then whatever is necessary to achieve it is applied. For 
example:  
Economists refer to the externalization of costs as the tendency to make 
third parties bear the burden of negative outcomes and consequences of 
business decisions … Hence capital's ability to make communities bear the 
burden of the costs of its operations (Barrett 2001 12 fniii3).  
The role of the state therefore includes the removal of hidden community 
subsidies and ensuring that companies bear the full cost of their activities; that 
they internalise their externalities. The market will then ensure more efficient 
allocation and use of those resources.  To a significant degree this means that 
formerly ‗free‘ goods (e.g. water, fish) must be brought within the market 
economy, and commodified (Harvey 2005, Agrawal and Gibson 1999), a concept 
  
39 
which Mansfield (2004) terms enclosure by privatising environmental services 
and goods. 
Accompanying the increased scale of companies and the push for liberalisation 
has been a move to corporatisation that ―entails separation of management from 
the owners while transforming an entity into a body with limited liability having 
perpetual succession". It allows "significant benefits to the entity as well as to the 
economy as a whole. Primarily, it extends the rights, duties and privileges of a 
natural person to a legal entity". Essentially corporatisation provides a structure 
for financial dealings and operating in the market. Thus, it has been argued that 
corporatisation ―is quintessential for economic progress‖ (Hassan 2003).  
Companies therefore diversify the supply chain and maximise profits from the 
increased prices offered by improved access to international markets. The 
multinational agro-food industry, for example, has increasingly gained control of 
the harvesting, processing, distribution and marketing of world's food supply 
including fish products. This has led to conflict between the corporates, traditional 
fishermen and fishing communities. 
Brookfield et al (2005 58) argue:  
Corporatisation is turning a once strong link between a fisheries-dependent 
community and the local fishing fleet into a more diluted one. Within 
North Shields, for example, only 10 per cent of the total catch landed at 
the port is attributable to the local fleet. The community's real link seems 
to be with the whole fish catching sector rather than with the local fleet in 
particular. In the future, given the fishing industry's growing spatial 
detachment, fisheries dependent-communities will have to become 
engaged in a process of inter-community competition if they are to attract 
visiting vessels to land their catches and sell their fish in the local fish 
market. 
This tension is further explained by Copes (1999 99):  
Since the beginning of civilization fisherfolk of coastal communities have 
commonly laid claim to adjacent coastal fish stocks. ... Their perceived 
rights to these resources are justified by the sustained use they have made 
of them. At the same time, deepening economic dependence of coastal 
people on their fishery resources has intensified their need to maintain and 
defend these rights, which are now being challenged in many parts of the 
world by a combination of two developments. One is the growth in power 
and ambition of industrial corporations in the fisheries sector. Necessarily, 
these corporations have dominated offshore and distant water fishing 
operations - drawing on their ability to mobilize the required technology 
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and to finance the large scale of operations involved. However, in their 
drive for greater market share and enhanced security of raw material 
supplies, corporations increasingly are seeking to extend their dominance 
also over resource-rich coastal fisheries.   
The commodification and privatisation of natural resources (e.g. fish) is also one 
of the logical outcomes of a neo-liberal agenda (Harvey 2004 e.g. 160; 2003). In 
the process the value of these ‗goods‘ is seen only in terms of their exchange 
value.  With increased exchange opportunities and increased demand comes an 
increased need for standardisation of products (Stutz 2004), thus reducing the 
individuality of mass commodities.  Whether demand or processors has driven 
standardisation remains a subject of debate (cf for instance, Stutz 2004; Jaffe and 
Gertler 2006).  Consequently, "the globalized fisheries commodity market has 
replaced the give and take reciprocity of the informal community economy" 
(Appadurai 1986 12-13 in Anderson 1979 14).  
Following Appadurai, Bestor notes that from a structural view the complex 
network of commodity chains forms a world trade in seafood products (Bestor 
2002 80).  Fish, however, have had more than just economic significance for 
society and communities.  
For the purposes of this dissertation neo-liberalism is regarded as an ideology and 
globalisation as the outcome. Globalization refers to the global economic 
transformation through the interaction of trans-national corporations (Dicken 1997 
xiv) and states on the basis of market forces for profit without, I believe, apparent 
concern for communities or the environment. Globalisation is closely supported 
by increased and unrestricted financial flows maximising differential advantages 
ostensibly for the ―greatest good for the greatest number‖ (Dicken 1997 xiv; 
Gudeman 2001 22)
32
. 
Some (e.g. Dicken, Peck and Tickell 1997) suggest the terms neo-liberalism and 
globalization are interchangeable and conclude: ―Corporations are free to act 
solely on the basis of profitability without regard to national or legal 
consequences. Relationships, both individual and corporate, are defined entirely 
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  While concern for neo-liberalism and globalization in this dissertation tends to 
be on the economic such features as the Internet and communication must be 
acknowledged. 
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by the market. There are no loyalties to place and community" (Dicken, Peck and 
Tickel 1997 160).  
Within the globalisation literature, the agri-food industry is seen as a major sector. 
Most of the literature on the agro-food industry is concerned with agriculture and 
terrestrial food products but just as the industry has shifted from the numerical 
domination of family farms to agri-business enterprises, so too have the processes 
of catching fish, processing, distributing and marketing seafood followed similar 
trends under neo-liberalism. The corporatization of fisheries is just one segment of 
the corporate control of food in the sense of control of access to the raw material 
or, especially with respect to aquaculture, also the control of production, 
commoditization, distribution and marketing. 
Similarly, as a result of the corporate control of the distribution of seafood, there 
has been considerable reduction in the availability of fresh, especially locally 
caught fish, and greatly reduced ability of consumers to clean fillet and cook it, a 
deskilling of the population. Arguably this is a consequence of processing 
efficiency rather than consumer demand (Jaffe and Gertler 2006).    
NEO-LIBERALISM IN FISHERIES 
Traditionally fisheries were exploited according to rules and practices that were 
appropriate locally and culturally for the fishermen concerned. Refuting claims 
that rights-based methods such as ITQs are the only means of ensuring sustainable 
fisheries (St Martin 2006 182), social scientists and maritime anthropologists in 
particular have been at pains to show that there are many indigenous and 
traditional forms of both formal and informal fisheries management that have 
maintained sustainable fish stocks. These tend to be relatively localised and may 
be based on extended families, clans, tribes and/or communities. They indicate a 
wide variety of circumstances and mechanisms, often based on kinship or status 
considerations with fishing grounds owned, named and marked in various ways 
(See for example Cordell 1990; Johannes and MacFarlane 1991; Ruddle 1994; 
Bavinck 2001 112; or in more familiar Western fisheries: Andersen 1979, St 
Martin 2001). In such fisheries the problems such as open access, over 
capitalisation which neoliberalism addresses have arisen as a result of 
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development or as a consequence of encroaching industrialised or developing 
fisheries.   
Implications of Neoliberalism (& ITQs) for the components 
Increasingly as neo-liberalism has become the dominant ideology, its effects are 
being felt off shore. The introduction of market forces, property rights and state 
withdrawal from fisheries has had different implications and has been differently 
implemented by the four components of particular relevance for this dissertation. 
Fisheries Management  
Mansfield (2006 29) argues that the confluence of features of fisheries, 
particularly ―open access, intractable problems, and ineffective regulation" has 
provided the basis for property rights to be presented as the solution by neo-
liberals. Accounts of the introduction of neo-liberal approaches to fisheries, in 
particular property rights, typically note, ―[e]verybody's property is nobody's 
property‖ (Gordon 1954 135). Scott's argument is that ―the solution to the 
commons problem is "sole ownership" of fisheries (Scott, 1955)‖, reflecting 
Hardin's mantra of the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968) (Mansfield 2004 
315). In refutation, Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop assert ―Hardin conflates 
"common property with everybody's property. Rather, common property should 
be seen as 'property in common'‖ (Jentoft 2004 97 98) as opposed to there being 
no property rights at all.  
To counter the growing hegemony of property rights proponents, common 
property researchers demonstrated that traditional and indigenous fisheries were 
generally well managed and, at least until the intrusion of offshore corporate 
fishing, distant-water fishing vessels or government development, were not open 
access (e.g. Ostrom (1999) or more comprehensively the International Association 
for the Study of the Commons (IACS n.d.).  
Impacts of Property-rights-based: ITQs  
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), are the right to take a certain quantity of a 
certain species of fish from a certain area. Ownership of ITQs is not ownership of 
the fish, before they are caught, but the ownership (the privatisation), of the 
catching rights. As such they are a form of property rights developed from, and 
are an expression of, neo-liberal ideology. More related to the perspectives of 
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corporates than to those of communities, the reported and theoretical impacts of 
implementation are:  
highly dependent on gross simplifications… impose a variety of costs on 
society … [create] social inequalities…between large and small operators, 
between licence holders and crew, and between generations of fishermen 
… tend to become geographically concentrated, removing a key condition 
for the survival of many coastal communities. … [create] a ‗new 
fisherman‘, less rooted in community, and a community where social 
relations are structured according to the principles of the market and not 
those of civil society (Jentoft 2004 99).  
And further 
Inequity and socially perverse distributional effects ….simplistically 
presented…. risk to employment and living standards in the fishing 
dependent regions …. lead to job losses, changing social relations of 
production and changing social structures within the community ….  To 
sell the fishing vessel and its quota is to deprive future generations of their 
economic, social and cultural patrimony (Symes 1998 6). 
Brookfield et al. (2005 59) have also found that privileging corporate enterprise 
over small-scale and part-time fishermen meant less inshore investment and 
resulted in the ―gradual erosion of the economic vitality of many Scottish coastal 
and rural communities with a dependence upon the fishing sector‖. Neo-liberalism 
through the introduction of [property] rights-based fishing [ITQs] has also 
changed the ethos and attitude of fishermen. Fishermen who were once 
cooperative are now competitive and seen as capitalists (St Martin 2007). 
Corporates 
ITQs derive from the neo-liberal economic theory that also drives corporatization. 
They are therefore grist to the mill of corporate lawyers and accountants, 
especially, by comparison with the fishermen, many of whom struggled with 
paper work and just wanted to fish. 
Under neo-liberalism corporates focus on competitive profitability, ―growth 
dynamic: revenue-seeking strategies and … cost-driven strategies‖ (Barrett 2001 
6) while smaller fishermen‘s attentions tend to be on fish as elusive quarry. Their 
communities dealt with the day-to-day exigencies of existence. In a transition to a 
new neo-liberal ideology favouring privatisation and market-forces, the big 
companies, already vertically integrated, corporatised and market-oriented, were 
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poised to compete in the quota market and an increasingly neo-liberally globalised 
arena. 
Researchers (e.g. Belgrave et al 2000 8; Mansfield 2001; Rees 2004; Rees 2008 
172; Townsend 1998 205; Winder 1997) confirm that the larger, especially 
vertically integrated corporations have financial and marketing advantage and are 
generally in a better position than fishermen or communities to understand the 
implications, take up and control the property rights involved. They have more 
flexible structures and processes than government and greater access to capital 
(human and financial) than local communities.
33
 By being driven to maximize 
profit, fisheries corporates are typically involved in international markets and thus 
have closer relationships than fishermen or their communities with the agri-food 
industry (See e.g. van Vleit 2000). Their size and professional staff often means 
corporates are better able than fishermen or communities to access and lobby 
higher levels of fisheries policy and management agencies and to leverage finance 
to achieve their desired outcomes. 
Rights-based fishing has allowed quota to be bought, from skippers and fishermen 
by outsiders, or aggregated in corporates or enabled passing ―control over all 
aspects of the fishing enterprise to land-based 'speculators' and 'profiteers'. Thus, 
the resistance of the former may partly be viewed as a reaction to the symbolic 
and financial devaluation of their labour and a diminished sense of agency‖ 
(Helgason and Palsson 1997 467). Often quota owners have no loyalty to the 
community and its resource base so that they may withdraw fishery assets such as 
boats or processing plants from the community. Consequently community 
security, indeed, viability, may be seriously eroded. 
Fishermen  
Commercial fishing is more than the knowledge and skill required to hunt and 
harvest a mobile quarry in the marine ecosystem; obtaining and utilising neo-
liberal ITQs necessitates a certain business acumen which in turn changes the 
regime from an artisanal vocation to a more structured and professionalised 
career. 
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competition, retructuring, attitude [corporate] and mileux. 
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Since economic rights are critical in a neo-liberal system, following Deetz (1994), 
it would be expected that ideological change in fishermen‘s work would occur to 
express new economic and employment arrangements. The fishing ethos would 
change from a dominant freedom, hunting ‗out there‘, to a more structured and 
accountable, supplying seafood commodity to meet corporate interests. Quota 
allocation would shift from the fisherman and crew with best fishing expertise, to 
those acquiring most quota through the market.  
Where initial allocation of quota went to the fishermen with biggest catch history, 
subsequent commercial activity in the quota market would alter that significantly. 
Consequently the competitive basis of relations between boats would also change 
from fishing skill to commercial skill and show notably between quota owners 
and those who are ACE-dependent. This would reinforce skipper / crew 
hierarchies and shift emphasis from a primary focus on fishing skills to quota 
acquisition ability in a more dominantly commercial market. 
Two of the many typologies of fishermen in the literature, particularly 
representative of the changed regime and related to the implications of neo-
liberalism, indeed mark the ―polar extremes‖ of a continuum of fishermen types. 
Part-time (or pluri-active) rural community fishermen or rugged individualist 
owner-operators epitomise community fisheries while corporatized utilitarian, 
rights-based fishermen represent the neo-liberal order.  
Part-time or Pluri-active 
In many rural coastal areas, inshore fishing may seasonally provide an essential 
economic component making up the shortfall from farming or other rural 
activities. Such part-time or pluri-active fisheries may be part of a wider 
household economy (Johnson et al. 2005 85) and provide a buffer economy 
available to augment the lows in other regional economic sectors for the benefit of 
coastal economies (Symes 2001 7). They may be flexibly exploring new methods 
or products, opening market niches and supplying local markets (Symes 2001 7 
8).  
Rugged Individualists or Utilitarians 
Frequently researchers have noted that fisheries globalisation has changed 
fishermen from being rugged individualists operating flexibly in a traditional, 
family or community setting to more utilitarian, self-interested business oriented 
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maximisers (See e.g. Davis 1991 13; Jentoft and Davis 1993 1; St Martin 2006 
172; 2007 542; Stella 1996 191).   
Johnson et al. (2005 73) are critical of classifications such as small-scale versus 
industrial and argue that three characteristics,  ―the social organisation of 
production, the technological intensity of fishing, and the closely related attributes 
of space and time‖, provide scales that take more appropriate account of 
differences in fisheries than mere dichotomies. While small-scale fisheries may be 
increasing their technology and integrating with global markets, researchers 
suggest they still retain resilience, adaptability, and continued distinctiveness from 
the industrial sector so given their continued ―non-capitalist relations of 
production‖ they would be better termed semi-industrial (Johnson et al. 2005 75).  
Recent research shows that for fishermen, leasing quota has more severe 
consequences on incentives than previously considered. Pinkerton and Edwards 
(2009) seminal paper notes that the fishermen who lease quota, [in New Zealand 
ACE-dependent fishermen] do not have the alleged conservation incentives. 
Rather the incentives for conservation, increased efficiency and economic security 
apply only to quota owning fishermen. Indeed, lessees are squeezed ―between 
what [they] must pay to lease the quota and what [they are] paid for [their] catch. 
Therefore, the assumption that ‗the market value of the ITQs reflects the market‘s 
perception of the net present value of the future stream of net economic returns 
from the fishery‘ applies only to the value of the fishery to quota owners and not 
to vessel operators who lease quota‖ and confirm the marginality of lessee, [or 
ACE-dependent], fishermen (Pinkerton and Edwards 2009 2). While written for 
New England the principles, if not the details, apply to the QMS. 
Communities 
Neoliberal implications vary since "[c]ommunities should not be treated as 
unchangeable. Communities are maintained, constructed and changed as part of 
continuous processes of social change. At present globalisation interferes with 
local development through worldwide processes of integration" (Floysand and 
Lindkvist 2000 2). 
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By contrast:  
The ideal of community as a pure copresence of subjects to one another 
receives political expression in a vision of political life that privileges local 
face-to-face direct democracy. Critics of welfare capitalist society 
repeatedly invoke such a model of small group relations as a political 
ideal. The anarchist tradition expresses these values most systematically, 
but they retain their form in other political soils as well. This model of  
[community] politics as founded in face-to-face relations poses as the 
alternative to the impersonality, alienation, commodification, and 
bureaucratization of governance in existing mass societies (Young 1990 
232).  
In many cases, as corporates increasingly exploited coastal and even inshore 
fisheries neo-liberalism meant that fishing communities previously dependent on 
these commercial fisheries were progressively excluded and had to find or 
increase other economic enterprises such as charter fishing and the visitor 
industry. So where before the community members took themselves and 
community for granted now they had to self-consciously seek ‗identity‘ or brand 
the community, like Akaroa's
34
 emphasis on French historicism, to attract outside 
clients (See Lien 2003 111).  
Under conditions of capital-intensive accumulation, followed by increased top-
down regulation of the fishing industry in the 1970s and 1980s, van Vliet noted 
that: 
European fishermen have become deskilled…. Lack of future prospects 
fostered an atmosphere of frustration, despair and alienation in what was 
an increasingly marginalised sector. Certainly in those regions where 
fishing is a cornerstone of the economy and a determinant of its cultural 
identity, the danger from the current development is a vicious circle in 
which the economic basis for communities and regions is placed in doubt, 
the people dependent on fishing see no future in the industry and 
investments to secure a future do not take place (van Vliet 2000 161). 
Thus communities once unselfconsciously active in the fisheries for a significant 
proportion of their socio-economic wellbeing now have to overcome frustrations 
and despair and attract alternative sources of income. Small-scale coastal fleets 
are downsizing and corporates have much of the quota but many are not running 
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  A harbour community on Bank‘s Peninsular in the South Island. 
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rurally based fleets so rural maritime jobs are decreasing
35
. Where alternative 
resources such as forestry or farming are not available, or under pressure, 
increasing involvement in tourism may be a solution. For those who had been 
involved in fisheries, marine tourism such as chartering or seafood tourism offer 
basic possibilities. Since tourists and clients must be attracted, community identity 
becomes an issue as rival towns brand themselves to gain necessary market share. 
Where communities lose access to the fishery, the fishermen, as accountable 
economic actors, become displaced from the give and take of reciprocity within 
their community (See St. Martin 2006).  
Dependent Fishing Communities 
Copes (1997b) observes that the traditional rights of coastal communities to the 
fisheries in adjacent waters were established through propinquity and usufruct 
which in turn increased economic dependence on coastal stocks and the need to 
maintain and defend their rights. Social scientists are very aware that access to 
fisheries is important for social justice and equity of community members, (See 
for example, Davis 1996; Davis and Bailey 1996; Copes 1997). They also know 
of the diversity of social organisation, structure and relationships both among and 
within communities and while economists and ITQ proponents may not ―deny the 
existence of social relations … per se, they minimize the role of such factors in 
economic affairs by assigning them to the category of 'externalities' - mere 
economic noise‖ (Helgason and Palsson 1997 460).  
The extent to which communities are or have been economically and social 
dependent on the fisheries has been debated, especially for the US fisheries where 
as Jodice and Norman (n.d. 2) note, "'The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) defines ‗fishing community‘ as a 
community that is ―substantially dependent on or substantially engaged in the 
harvest or processing of fishery resources to meet social and economic needs, and 
includes fishing vessel owners, operators, and crew and United States fish 
processors that are based in such community' (MSFCMA 16 U.S.C. 1802 
§3(17))". 
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  Fishing boats still need to be repaired and maintained and this could occur 
wherever they are based but, as will be shown, the fleet is declining and decaying as 
many fishermen become more marginalised. 
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Van Vliet found that in previously dependent communities, when fishing becomes 
economically and socially marginalised, the people become alienated resulting in 
a vicious circle and those who were involved previously now see no future (van 
Vleit 2000 157).  Communities have different histories, environments, and 
degrees and types of access to resources so differ in their dependence on the 
fisheries and their response to exclusion. Jodice and Norman (n.d.3) cite 
Brookfield et al‘s analysis of the concept of fisheries dependence in their 
comparison of four UK communities and found they now "existed on a continuum 
between 'real' and 'virtual' dependence, where the fishing industry is part of the 
waterfront destination to varying degrees". They note that the introduction of 
tourism may raise the issue of the authenticity of what is promoted (Jentoft 1993) 
and therefore the reality of the community identity (Brookfield et al 2005). This is 
in addition to the increased inter-community competition‖ (Brookfield et al. 2005 
58). 
Jodice and Norman indicate that the alternatives such as tourism can have 
detrimental effects on the community and the marine environment, such as 
competition for waterfront access and harbour congestion, but these might be 
mitigated by coastal tourism to enhance the economic sustainability of the local 
fishing industry (Jodice and Norman n.d. 2).  
Social Implications 
McCay and Jentoft reach the crux of this research focus on social implications of 
ITQs when they, quoting Polyani and Habermas, argue that the market ―penetrates 
and redefines social relations, which become basically instrumental and utilitarian. 
Social interaction is strategic and ego-centered. As community life evolves 
according to the logic of the market place, it assumes a character pointed out by 
Polanyi: 'Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations 
are embedded in the economic system.' Thus Jurgen Habermas' (1984) argument 
that ‗the daily lives of human beings are increasingly being dominated by money 
transactions and bureaucratic control‘‖ (McCay and Jentoft 1998 26). 
So the expressive aspects in fishermen's ethos, their identity, independence and 
freedom 'out there' contending with the big marine environment, hunting elusive 
prey becomes (closer to being) just instrumental operators, micro-managed at the 
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beginning of the commodity chain. As fish have become products for an 
international market, fishermen are no longer providing food for their 
communities and their livelihoods have become mere employment. 
Thus the beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of people, communities and groups are 
strongly influenced by their ideologies. The dominant ideology in the global 
market is neo-liberalism and its variants, stressing privatisation, market forces and 
deregulation. In fisheries, emphasis on property rights has facilitated the access to 
fish by corporates - their commodification, processing and distribution in the 
international market. It has been suggested that fishermen become increasingly 
utilitarian maximisers in attitude and concomitantly, detached from meaningful 
interaction with their communities.  
FISHERIES IN NEW ZEALAND 
This section reviews the literature on New Zealand fisheries, first in terms of an 
overview then indicates social and the historical context prior to the introduction 
of the QMS, reviews the literature on fishing communities generally then more 
particularly in the Northland region before considering the literature on ITQs.  
The social literature on fisheries is sparse and New Zealand is no exception. Until 
relatively recently there have not been good general overviews of New Zealand 
fisheries. Bulletins such as Slack (1969) or Watkinson and Smith (1972) provided 
an introduction by outlining the production and economics of each coastal fishery 
and the general structure of the industry overall. Boyce et al. (1986) outlined a 
geographical perspective on the industry as it was just before the introduction of 
ITQs. These studies, backed by the overview statistics such as those in the annual 
New Zealand Official Yearbooks (e.g. Department of Statistics 1979, 1985-86, 
1987-88), amount to the only early, substantive, broad picture analyses. 
For an outsider, appreciation of fisheries in New Zealand is scattered through an 
extensive literature. The dearth is now relieved by three recent publications. 
Johnson and Haworth's (2004) Hooked giving an historical overview of the New 
Zealand Fishing industry, Hersoug's (2002) Unfinished Business evaluating the 
last 15 years of New Zealand fisheries management and Haworth‘s (2008) Tides 
of Change, outlining the history of the New Zealand Federation of Commercial 
Fishermen. 
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Makarios (1996; 1997; 1999) presents episodes on fishermen, their families and 
communities, fishing vessels and companies, to provide snapshots of the history 
of New Zealand commercial fishing and show independent coastal fishers tend to 
be individualists at best. Paul Titchener (1981) provides a hagiography of the first 
hundred years of New Zealand's second largest and now only publicly listed 
company, Sanford Limited. Paul Powell (1976) captures the efforts and ethos of 
mainly rock lobster fishermen in Fiordland while Kirk Hargreaves (1998) presents 
portraits of some 20 of the most quirky coastal fishermen he has observed. Peter 
Stevens, more than any other author has outlined the contemporary (1999) ethos 
and issues for commercial fishing and fishermen of New Zealand‘s regional and 
secondary ports such as the Far North, Gisborne and Timaru (Stevens 1999c-i).  
The only significant ethnographic research is that of Hal and Marlene Levine, 
reporting participant observation research into, mainly rock lobster, fishing on 
Stewart Island (Levine and Levine 1987). A smattering of novels provides some 
flavour, but it is difficult to identify where reality ends and fiction begins (e.g., 
Billington 2000; Hawes 2000; Hansen 1997).  
New Zealand Fishing Communities 
Traditionally communities had rights to coastal fisheries and consequently 
fisheries have influenced the social fabric of these communities. Communities 
have changed over time and in some communities the QMS has been one of the 
drivers of that change. This section indicates the situation in some rural coastal 
communities, explores the literature on New Zealand fishing communities in more 
detail and the social implications, ascribed to the QMS for fishermen and for their 
geographic communities, as a result of the introduction of rights-based 
management and particularly the aggregation of quota to the bigger companies. 
Prior to the 1984 Labour government and the imposition of neo-liberalism, 
ideology in New Zealand was an uneven blend of colonialism and the welfare 
state epitomised by the interventionist stance of the Muldoon led National 
government (1975-1984). As Berg and Roche (1997 147) state, New Zealand was 
an "expansive welfare state and a heavily regulated export-orientated economy". 
Le Heron and Pawley (1996 2) termed the lead up period of the 1950s and '60s the 
"long-boom" – ―usually characterised as one of relative social and economic 
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stability and optimism…. grounded within the myth of an egalitarian and 
harmonious society" which they iconised with the ubiquity of the Edmonds Cook 
Book.  
For rural and coastal New Zealand, however, the period was not as universally 
benign.  Parkes (1979 95), for instance, found that, most coastal communities 
(such as rural Hokianga, Rawene, Leigh and Omapere) were ―poverty pockets‖ of 
people ―who depend on shellfish, fish, wild pig and farm animals for their protein 
source supplemented from home gardens. …Rural communities get by on 
incredibly small incomes. …including family benefit36. … (T)hey managed by 
finding most of their own food and having rent-free shelter‖ (Parkes 1997 95). 
School fees and family exigencies meant a dependence on plural activities 
including part-time fishing and an informal economy of community exchange. 
Commercial fishing, fishing for sale and exchange in the community was 
therefore extremely important buffer against poverty in small rural coastal 
communities.  Yet despite this importance under neoliberalism the interests of the 
corporates dominated.  
Idealised perceptions of communities, such as the image of the community of 
rugged individualist fishermen, may mask injustice and inequity. In their 
ethnography of a Stewart Island fishing village the Levines found such a 
contradiction between community solidarity and competitive fishing that this 
seemed to be the case (Levine and Levine 1987). With the possible exception of 
Halfmoon Bay, Stewart Island (Levine and Levine 1987) few, if any, communities 
in New Zealand were totally dependent on fisheries. Fisheries did however 
contribute significantly to their community economy and in some cases continue 
to do so. 
Generally traditional fishing rights have been seen as stretching back into distant 
history. Minnegal et al (2003), however, show that fisheries in Victoria have 
relatively shallow time depth. The fisheries of Māori Iwi considerably pre-date 
those of New Zealand Pakeha communities that, like those of Australia, are 
                                                 
36
  A social welfare payment for each child which in the 1970s could be 
‗capitalised‘ with the New Zealand Housing Corporation as the deposit on the first family 
home. 
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comparatively brief. Nevertheless, the importance of these community rights of 
access and usufruct before the introduction of ITQs, can be gleaned from 
spasmodic references in histories such as those by Makarios (Makarios 1996; 
Makarios 1997; Makarios 1999), Cormack and Orwin (1997) and Johnson and 
Haworth's (2004) more comprehensive history.  
Fishermen in the communities on the New Zealand coast often came from 
different cultural backgrounds and, in different communities, used different 
methods, with different styles of vessels often more particularly suited to local 
waters, concentrating on different species (Johnson and Haworth 2004 163-171; 
Makarios 1996; 1997; 1999).  
Māori fishing and communities have been well-documented elsewhere (e.g., 
Waitangi Tribunal reports. See Waitangi Tribunal Reports Wai 22; Wai 27).  
Pakeha-dominated identifiable communities in the literature include: Italians from 
Island Bay lining groper in Cook Strait, Dalmations on the Kaipara dory netting 
mullet in the inlets, and Waiheke fishermen using converted launches to longline 
snapper in the Hauraki Gulf. In addition to those built in New Zealand fishing 
boats sailed or were freighted from all round the world. Boats have been run solo, 
or with a skipper and a permanent or casual crew member(s), who may be self 
taught, apprenticed to kin or ticketed through the Ministry, the fisheries schools or 
the Polytechs. Overseas there may be considerable diversity in fisheries. Sharp 
indicates, for example, in one particular fishery, on just one boat there might be as 
many as ―five distinctly different language-cultures‖ (Sharp, Fishfolk, 20 Jan 
2005) or eight different ethnicities (Sharp, Fishfolk, 22 Mar 2002). So too in New 
Zealand there seems to have always been considerable diversity in the fisheries, 
the fishermen, the vessels, the methods and the communities involved with the 
New Zealand fishing industry.  
Northland 
Perhaps because Fairgray‘s (1985, 1986) survey of Northland provided the only 
baseline social information for the QMS much of the subsequent social research 
on New Zealand fisheries has been done has tended to be for this region.  
In a research essay Hawkey (1994) appraised fishery culture and conflict for the 
Northland region, finding that many small communities are dependent on fishing 
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for revenue, as a major food source and that indeed fishing has strong multiplier 
effects (Hawkey 1994 21). He notes that despite the Quota Appeal Authority (See:  
Peter Stevens: QAA) increasing quota over and above the Total Allowable 
Commercial Catch TACC (Hawkey 1994 24), fishers had difficulties with quota 
that led to high grading and dumping, poaching and a black market and 
consequently increased enforcement (Hawkey 1994 25 26). He also found that 
commercial and recreational fishers reciprocated the views that the other was 
taking more fish than they were entitled to (Hawkey 1994 26). He attributed the 
difficulties to the attempt to meet the QMS goals of sustainability and efficiency 
simultaneously (Hawkey 1994 26). The social and economic consequences, were 
he felt, ―probably more acute for Northland because … fishing has historically 
been an important source of livelihood, employment and income in Northland. A 
factor that exacerbated the impact of the QMS implementation in Northland was 
the lack of alternative employment‖ (Hawkey 1994 27). Indeed, Hawkey feels that 
the ―implementation of the QMS for Northland was nothing short of disaster" 
(Hawkey 1994 28).  Hersoug (2002 57) acknowledges Hawkey‘s perception but  
concurs more with the proponents‘ perspective, noting that equity issues were 
strongly raised in the general ITQ literature but did not feature strongly in New 
Zealand (Hersoug 2002 58). He does, however, consider that the most important 
socio-economic effect has been the creation of employment (Hersoug 2002 58). It 
is not clear to me, though, whether this is the result of new opportunities in the 
deepwater and aquaculture replacing major losses in the coastal fisheries. 
Subsequently there seems to have been a shift of employment as processing went 
offshore firstly onto deepwater factory vessels the majority of which were foreign 
chartered with foreign crews and then for processing in foreign countries. 
Nicola Holmes, picked the three most fishery dependent communities from 
Fairgray‘s studies, Totara North, Houhora and Mangonui, for her research 
(Holmes 1998 4). She argued that essentially the privatisation of state assets 
(fisheries) would result in ―extensive reconstruction of relationships between the 
economic, cultural and political factors…‖ (Holmes 1998 7). The most important 
factor she identified was changes in employment of both skippers and crew and 
she found that with loss of quota many small fishers lost their livelihood. 
Consequently she expected many of the small processing plants in rural 
communities would disappear (Holmes 1998). 
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Holmes (1998) also reports that wives of fishermen often took over the paperwork 
involved. That seems to be a typical pattern. Certainly the wife of the skipper 
whose boat I worked on in 1982 (and others I was familiar with) before ITQs were 
introduced, was both a partner in the firm and provided shore liaison. Holmes 
notes, however, that the increase in, and complexity of, paperwork, was such that 
it became too burdensome and many sold out for that reason. 
Owner-operators used to pride themselves as hunters and frequently asserted, 
despite constrictions of weather, uncertainties of catch and often extreme work 
hours, that they preferred the ―freedom‖ of being at sea to the restrictions of bills 
and expectations ashore (See, for example, Smith 1981). With ITQs, however, 
Yandle notes, ―We're more efficient at running businesses - made us better 
businessmen, but less efficient fishermen (Yandle 2001 89 Auckland Survey #24). 
As well as Yandle‘s informants who could cope better with paperwork and stayed 
in the industry, others found the new regime burdensome. In addition to the 
hassles with paperwork, independent fishermen also had to contend with cost 
recovery, and lighthouse and conservation levies. As one said in 1995, ―There is 
not a big future for the small guy, with 60 percent of the fish going as taxes, 
lighthouse fees, MAF fees, you name it. And now DOC
37
 … comes in for a piece 
too. The guy that has got to lease snapper, he is not going to stay in‖ (Duncan L. 
1995 17). 
It seems that the change from ―hunters‖ to ―farmers‖ with the burden from 
increased costs and changing job descriptions resulted in more owner-operators 
selling their quota than might have been anticipated. Certainly Talley expressed 
surprise at the rapidity with which owner-operators exited: 
I, like many others in the industry, never envisaged that fishermen would 
sell their quota-rights in the way they did immediately after the QMS was 
introduced and catch-history rights became tradable. This massive 'sell-
down' of quota caught many operators by surprise and contributed to a 
major and rapid restructuring of the NZ industry (Talley 1999, 2). 
Loss of quota by an owner-operator can mean his/her becoming ACE-dependent, 
or even loss of employment (Hawkey 1994). 
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  The Department of Conservation 
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MANAGEMENT 
The major architects of the QMS system appeared to be theoreticians and 
proponents more concerned with implementing a ―pure‖ system than ensuring 
social justice for fishermen and their communities (See for instance Clark and 
Duncan 1986). Surprisingly, later McClurg (1997 100) was to state, "I am not 
aware of any community impact studies carried out either prior to, or subsequent 
to, the establishment of the QMS. Rather than an oversight, I believe this reflected 
the youth of the New Zealand fishing industry and the fact that, by and large there 
were not long standing communities solely dependent on fishing for their 
existence". Boyd and Dewees (1992 195) went further claiming that, they are ―not 
aware of any significant negative social and economic impacts on small fishery 
dependent communities as a consequence of ITQs‖, but in the absence of official 
follow up admit this is conjecture. 
Contrasting the rights-based QMS with the greater level of community 
consultation under the Resource Management Act (RMA), Rennie notes that the 
1983 fisheries management plan (FMPs) provisions would have allowed public 
participation in fisheries management and potentially greater consideration of 
social implications. He suggests that once these were abandoned in favour of the 
QMS the public was progressively excluded from fishery decisions (Rennie and 
Holmes 1998; Rennie 1998). Subsequently, the 2005 amendments to the RMA 
advantaged quota holders significantly relative to the aquaculture industry but 
further reduced the ability of communities to determine the uses of local marine 
areas (Rennie 2006). 
Introduction of ITQs 
Hersoug, an outside observer could argue in 2002 that the literature on fisheries 
management in New Zealand with ITQs has been patchy (Hersoug 2002). Indeed 
overseas practitioners could claim ―that for 2 decades New Zealand has been very 
busy implementing the QMS but that there has been very few qualitative 
assessments and very little data‖ (Anderson 2002b).  
Affiliation of Authors 
The literature on fisheries in New Zealand reflects particular perspectives that 
appear to have shaped the outcomes of their analyses: Generally administrators 
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and industry representatives are proponents, for example, Crothers (1988, 2000), 
Alex Duncan (1983), Clark, Major, (e.g. Clark, Major and Mollet 1988),  Falloon 
(1993), Harte (2000) McClurg(1997), indeed 'missionaries' (according to Hersoug, 
2002 62) with ―proselytising zeal‖ (Symes 2000 1) for ITQs.  Critical evaluation 
has been left to academic grey literature, (e.g. Wallace 1998, nd (1997?), Gaffney 
1997, Hawkey 1994, Duncan L. 1993) which has raised environmental and social 
concerns. Non-exploitative stakeholders and environmental advocates (e.g. Monk 
and Hewison
38
 1994) are opponents on ideological (against property rights) and 
environmental grounds; Wallace
39
 and Weeber
40
 (2003) provide both ideological 
and practical recognition that ITQs are not a panacea for the real issues of fishery 
management. Weeber particularly, was concerned that ITQs create barriers to 
protection of maritime areas due to lack of protection of habitat and other species 
such as marine mammals and seabirds that come with the industry arguing on the 
basis of property rights for continued fishing at high Total Allowable Commercial 
Catch (TACCs) levels.  Weeber is also an advocate of conservation of fish stocks. 
Those with backgrounds in the Department of Conservation, Rennie
41
, for 
example, are arguably skewed in favour of advocating conservation and inclusion 
of a wider range of stakeholders in decisionmaking (e.g.in planning). It should be 
noted that while personal ideology or perspectives may not be reflected by their 
employment, most probably they have been drawn to employment in particular 
careers in which they feel ideologically comfortable and that this in turn may 
reinforce the orientation of those institutions and of the people
42
. As with the other 
―categories‖ in this dissertation the strength of such affiliations may vary with 
time and issue.  
Peter Pearce (1991), a Canadian economist, whose paper with Maloney (Maloney 
and Pearce 1979) was instrumental in the system's inception, has also been a 
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  Then in Greenpeace. 
39
  Chairperson of ECO, an environmental umbrella organisation and School of 
Government, Victoria University of Wellington. 
40
  Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society.  
41
  Rennie worked in four government departments, primarily the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Department of Conservation between 1982 and 1994. 
42
  Though with a tighter employment situation now, perhaps less than in the past.  
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repeat consultant to MAF and therefore likely to have had continued influence. He 
was keynote speaker at the IIFET2002 Conference in Wellington. Annala (1996) 
was a fisheries scientist and manager of fisheries research with MAF and the 
Ministry of Fisheries where he was responsible for the fish stock sustainability 
assessment process. Sullivan and Hore (Annala, Sullivan & Hore, 1999) were 
with MAF and are now with NIWA
43
. Fisheries scientist Boyd (Boyd & Dewees, 
1992) was a fisheries manager with MAF at the inception of the system and later a 
consultant with Ika Fisheries Consultants. Dewees, however, is a US academic 
biologist with a continuing interest in the effects of ITQ on skipper fishing 
behaviour. Clark (1993) was with MAF and then NZFIB, and Alex Duncan (Clark 
& Duncan, 1986) was with NZFIB, and later part of the Fisheries Legislation 
Task Force (Wheeler, Bradford et al. 1991). Crothers (1988) was with MAF at the 
inception of ITQ and remains with MFish
44
. Davies (1992) was a South African 
academic then a manager with MAF Auckland that is a similar trajectory for 
Townsend (Townsend 1998) an American academic and proponent of rights-
based management who joined MFish in 2007. Cullen (Cullen and Memon 1990) 
is an economist and Memon a geographer and planner variously at Otago and now 
Lincoln Universities. Bess (1999 2005) was at the School of Business, Nelson 
Polytechnic and now MFish.  Harte (1999 2000) was with SeaFIC.  I (Duncan, L. 
1995) was an anthropologist, formerly fishing crew, Greenpeace observer and 
conservationist. Feldman (1998) was a recreational fisher whereas Major (Clark, 
Major & Mollet, 1988) was with FIB prior to the system's beginning and with 
MAF Policy to start the ITQ system.  Clark and Major effectively "swapped" 
positions. Falloon (1993) was seconded from Treasury to MAF Policy, Mace 
(Sissenwine & Mace, 1992) was a New Zealand fisheries scientist (MAF) and 
subsequently worked for NOAA/NMFS
45
 in the US but is now senior scientist 
with MFish and Sissenwine was a US fisheries scientist NOAA/NMFS who has 
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  National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA): Clark, I., P. 
Major and N. Mollet, 1988 (Accessed 17 July 2010). 
44
  Until his retirement during the course of this research. 
45
  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is a US federal 
agency focused on the condition of the oceans and the atmosphere.  The National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) is the section of NOAA responsible for offshore living marine 
resources and their habitat.  
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had stock assessment contracts with MAF. McClurg (1997) managed MAF Policy 
in the early 1990s and had studied at Lincoln University in a programme where 
Sharp (1997 1998) (now at Auckland University) was an economist. Rennie (1989 
2000) was with DOC then did a masters thesis on fisheries development at 
Memorial University, Newfoundland, was on staff and did an aquacultural PhD at 
University of Waikato and moved to Lincoln University in 2007, Wallace (1997) 
is a Victoria University of Wellington political economist and award-winning 
conservationist.  Le Heron (Le Heron and Pawson 1996) and Winder (1997) a 
Canadian, are Auckland University economic geographers involved with 
Auckland University PhD students, Massey and Rees (2004) who are both now 
with MFish. 
The affiliations of most of the authors as staff or former staff of the then Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), the fishing industry associations (the Fishing 
Industry Board (FIB), now SeaFIC), Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) or 
University
46
, are such that they present mainly the top down perspectives of 
government, the seafood industry, conservationists and the universities. The 
bottom up perspectives of fishers and their communities, have not been well 
addressed in the research literature. Clement (2000) does discuss the perceptions 
held by the Orange Roughy Company of orange roughy quota holders, but this is 
a deepwater fishery so most
47
 stakeholders are corporates, and Arbuckle (MAF, 
Challenger, and then back to MAF) and Drummond (2000) do similarly for the 
Challenger Scallop Enhancement Company
48
. To find richer views and 
perspectives of fishers it seems necessary to move away from the academic 
literature to the popular press (e.g. newspapers and magazines such as Seafood 
New Zealand and related books (e.g, Hargreaves, 1998). Indeed, the success or 
otherwise of the QMS appears to reflect as much the organisatonal views and 
orientation of the authors as it does any objective measurements (See Appendix 
2).  
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  See Appendix 2  
47
  Crew, for example, are not considered stakeholders.  
48
  An inshore fishery, so a mix of corporate and individual members. 
60 
 
ITQs: Neoliberalism: Property rights  
Ownership of the fish stocks within the EEZ was not clear at the outset of the 
QMS implementation. Clark (1993 341) believed that whether owned or not they 
were ―in the stewardship of the government … (with) a responsibility to conserve 
and above all, manage the resource …  the creation of property rights and their 
allocation is the most appropriate way of discharging the responsibility‖. Allen49 
(1983 23), perhaps the only commentator to express community disquiet over the 
potential of ITQs, asserted ―valuable rights which have been regarded as 
something belonging to the community as a whole, are alienated to individuals. … 
a transferable system will lead to monopolies obtaining control over large parts of 
the resource‖.  Essential elements were, however, ―the creation of property rights 
(ITQs); their tradability; a reduction of governmental intervention, with any such 
intervention being accomplished through market forces rather than through 
regulatory interference; and the matching of effort to the resource in such a way as 
to allow the industry to develop with inbuilt economic efficiency while 
maximizing returns to the nation‖ (Clark and Duncan 1986 109). Crothers noted 
that under the Law of the Sea and a Westminster style government, ―[f]rom a 
constitutional and legal standpoint, it is important to under-stand that the 
transferable right is a harvesting right, not a property right‖ (Crothers 1988 10), 
which reassured non-exploitative sectors of the public but disconcerted the 
industry.  
The advantages of using a property rights approach were that ―owners are 
confronted with the economic consequences of their behaviour. … And 
management decisions … are reflected immediately in the market value of the 
property right. Rights owners face incentives to maximize the present and future 
values of their harvesting rights‖ (McClurg n.d. 1996 91-92).  Scott‘s (in Shotton 
2000 6) features of property such as duration, security, exclusivity, and 
transferability increase the value of the right, provide incentives toward husbandry 
and investment to improve returns and compliance with obligations so as to 
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―increase economic and social benefits by allowing for industry rationalisation, 
while providing returns, increase economic efficiency‖ (Edwards 2001 1). 
However, the QMS did not initially clearly resolve the issue of property rights, 
especially with the first version of ITQ. Doug Kidd, the Minister of Fisheries 
(1990 – 1995), felt ―[t]he great failing of the system was in the definition of the 
property right - it was not clearly defined. Perhaps more importantly it was not 
proportional‖. The system was, he felt, ―a classic case of a property rights-based 
fishery providing the right incentives to take a long term view of fish stocks and 
providing the confidence to invest enormously in the catching, processing and 
marketing sectors‖ (Kidd 2000 5). The solution, achieved with ―the Accord‖ in 
1989 (See Appendix 3) was changing ITQ from fixed tonnages, to clearly 
specified rights (enacted in legislation) to harvest proportional amounts to TACC.  
ACEs were created to define the actual annual tonnage available to be caught.  
Objectives of ITQs 
Social goals were included among long-term biological and economic objectives 
expressed in the consultation meetings leading up to the introduction of ITQs. 
Namely that ―[t]here should be maximum freedom for fishermen to decide when, 
where and how to fish and there should be stable fishing communities‖ (Duncan, 
A. 1983 1). Subsequent decisions, commentaries and reflections appear, however, 
to have ignored these. Generally, two, sometimes three, objectives have been 
given for the introduction of the QMS. Conservation and economic objectives are 
most frequently cited (e.g. Clark 1993; Clark, et al. 1988b; Annala 1996; Hersoug 
2002; Connor 2001b). Alex Duncan (1983), writing at the time, adds objectives 
from the usually ignored, social dimension while Sissenwine and Mace (2002) 
give three.  
However, even within the apparent agreement there are significant variations. 
Clark and Duncan, for instance, note that ―even though economic objectives were 
cited as a reason for introducing controls…. For fin fisheries, it was gradually 
realized that economic as well as biological objectives were necessary for 
effective management, and that the management program had to be improved in 
order to achieve these objectives‖ (Clark and Duncan 1986 108). Clearly, in their 
view economic objectives emerged after the biological. Fishermen realised stock 
depletion meant their operations were becoming economically unviable, and 
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lobbied through the Federation
50
 for industry restructuring that would let the 
stocks rebuild.  
Sissenwine and Mace (2002 29) argue that, ―ITQ management was implemented 
to address overfishing, overcapitalization, and excess government regulation", and 
Hersoug (2002 29) emphasised that, ―QMS was introduced to reach two major 
goals: economic efficiency and biological sustainability‖. Sinner and Fennemor 
analysed statements of policy to determine why market based instruments were 
adopted (Sinner and Fenemor 2005 14). It appears therefore that, with the 
intention also of simplifying government regulation and intervention (i.e., 
improving the efficacy of fisheries management or reducing bureaucratic 
interference in the market place, depending on perspective), biological 
sustainability and, subsequently, economic efficiency were the primary reasons 
for introducing ITQs in New Zealand.  
Corporate Perspective (SeaFIC) 
From the practical experience of running Talleys Fisheries
51
, Peter Talley argues 
that, like other industry CEOs he was initially suspicious of ITQ‘s apparent 
restriction on purchasing of fish to supply their processing plants and also 
concerned at the government revenue gathering potential of resource rentals. He 
had, however, not anticipated fishermen‘s ―massive 'sell-down' of quota‖. From 
his perspective it was the direct interaction between fish and fishermen that 
creates the property right so they should receive free access. Following their 
eventually successful fisheries claim in 1992 Māori argued they should not have 
to pay resource rentals for access to their own resources and supported the 
industry‘s case for cost recovery replacing resource rentals (Talley 1999/2000).  
For the industry the government‘s reluctance to pay compensation when settling 
claims by other resource users, such as recreational fishers and conservationists, 
meant the industry‘s property rights were ―being gradually eroded by 
'environmental creep'‖ (Talley 1999). ITQs, not having the same recognition and 
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  The New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen. 
51
  Talleys Fisheries operated on the coasts of mainly the South Island. Peter Talley 
was also CEO of Amaltal in the deepwater one of New Zealand‘s ―Big Three‖ 
companies. In addition he was on the executive and at times President of the Fishing 
Industry Association. 
  
63 
security as terrestrial property, were felt detrimental to industry. Having property 
rights meant fishermen (quota owners) worked more collectively to enhance 
sustainability, but to ensure fishing was as economical as possible they also 
wanted the right to manage their assets. The contestability of science was a step in 
this direction. Talley was, though, critical of the biological orientation of science 
and wanted ―focus on improving profitability and market-acceptability of the 
products we produce‖ (Talley 2000).  
Combining the insights of the Business School
52
 and SeaFIC, Bess and Harte 
(2000) regarded property rights as bundles of rights for transferring resources. The 
advantage of the QMS was that market mechanisms led to ―a more efficient fit 
between fishing capacity and available fish stocks‖ but the risk was that ―failure to 
further develop the property rights-based management system would incline most 
harvesters to adopt short-term perspectives towards fisheries management‖ (Bess 
and Harte 2000 332). The seafood industry wanted these property rights 
developed further but had confidence for the future since ―at every major crisis 
point the property rights-based fisheries management system has emerged 
stronger and better specified‖ (Bess and Harte 2000 332). Indeed Bess attributed 
the success of the New Zealand fishing industry in international markets to secure 
property rights that also ―provided individual firms with opportunities to enhance 
their competitiveness by reconfiguring value chain activities from harvesting to 
marketing‖ (Bess in Shotton 2000). 
Recent Academic Commentators 
In terms of diachronic social science, only Dewees offers a long term, socially 
focused analysis of fishermen‘s attitudes toward their commercial and economic 
operations. Dewees visited New Zealand in 1986, 1995 and in 2005-6 during 
which he interviewed a sample of 62 Auckland region commercial fishermen and 
company personnel and 14 MAF staff in 1986, then re-interviewed 55 fishermen 
in 1995 and 31 from the same group in 2005-6 (University of Waikato seminar
53
; 
Dewees 1989 131). In the latter survey he was able to determine ―what had 
happened to 21 others who were part of the original sample …[but] he was unable 
                                                 
52
  School of Business, Nelson Polytechnic Te Whare Wananga o Te Tau Ihu 
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  Chris Dewees, Seminar at University of Waikato, 1 May 2006. 
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to determine the current status of 10 of … [his] original sample‖ (Dewees 2007 1). 
In addition, his then PhD student, Tracey Yandle administered his questionnaire 
in interviews with the same set of industry informants in 1999 (Yandle 2001 iv). 
Both also had discussions with MAF/MFish, FIB/SeaFIC and other key 
informants. 
MAF/MFish considers the resulting corpus of research (Dewees 1987, 1989, 
1997, 2007, 2008
54
; Boyd and Dewees 1992; Yandle and Dewees 2000; Yandle 
2001) as social monitoring that contributes to understanding some of the impacts 
of fisheries policies on some impacted groups, but that it does not give a complete 
picture of the impacts (Jonathan Peacey, pers com 2006). It does not cover the 
implications of ITQs for communities, nor, like this present work, for crew 
members. 
Dewees‘, and Yandle‘s, purpose was to evaluate both the positive and the 
negative claims made for the QMS. They found that market-based regulation was 
neither the panacea nor the curse some claimed but rather a policy tool with mixed 
―strengths and weaknesses that create important and long-lasting changes on the 
fishing industry, fishing community, and regulatory community associated with 
it‖ (Yandle and Dewees 2000). The survey research emphasis was instrumentalist, 
as Dewees had previously been a Fisheries Extension Officer (Dewees, University 
of Waikato Seminar 1 May 2006).   
Dewees found that of his informants, after six months operation of the QMS, 100 
per cent MAF staff but only 56 per cent fishermen felt the system would be 
successful (Dewees 1989 131). After 20 years QMS operation ―about one-third of 
them are still in the fishing industry. Twelve of the 17 who own fish quota still 
fish their quota. Five lease out their quota rather than fishing, while four sold their 
quota and only fish quota leased from other quota owners‖ (Dewees 2007 1). The 
remainder had left the industry for other jobs, retired, were deceased or overseas 
(Dewees 2007 2). Of those still in the industry six of his 13 fishermen were 
reducing their commitment or exiting, seven were maintaining their level while 
the two corporates were expanding (Dewees 2007 3).  
                                                 
54
  References Dewees 1987 and 2008 have not been sighted. 
  
65 
All appeared pessimistic about the current and future fisheries economic situation 
although they ranked conditions better than those pre-QMS (Dewees 2007 4): 
―Interviewees were relatively evenly split on their own economic situation and 
retirement security. A slight majority felt that QMS was compatible with their 
beliefs about fisheries management and that New Zealand is better off under 
QMS. Three-quarters feel that QMS conserves fish stocks and makes it more 
difficult for young to enter. A majority disagrees that QMS fishing is safer‖. 
Among the benefits that informants claimed of the QMS, were conservation, 
improved business planning and that quota was an asset. Some of the detriments 
cited were ―Draconian regulations and enforcement, QMS complexity, insecurity 
of quota asset, company control, loss of community infrastructure and various 
bureaucratic issues‖ (Dewees 2007 7).  
For Massey and Rees (2004) the QMS is the result of contradictory trends, 
ideologically driven neoliberal reforms on the one hand and sustained social 
opposition to the appropriation of natural resources on the other. They further note 
that the Fisheries Act 1996 resonates with the free market environmentalism of 
the RMA (Massey and Rees 2004 31, 27) and that property rights to single species 
are preventing moves to ecosystem management (Massey 2003). Rees reviews the 
neo-classical [concatenated here with neo-liberal] basis for the QMS, outlining the 
theory, rationale, assumptions, incentives and contradictions in the 
implementation of the system, concluding that the: 
QMS has achieved positive resource outcomes including the preservation 
of commercial species. It has sent signals to firms concerning the status of 
species. These signals are such that companies appear to be acting 
responsibly and fishing within the TACC. QMS has resulted in companies 
fishing beyond New Zealand's waters or investing beyond the quota 
system. These moves may have reduced pressure on over extended wild 
stocks but they also place more of the seafood industry beyond the domain 
of QMS and into other regulatory frameworks. The challenge for fisheries 
management and the seafood industry in the future will be to unite the 
demands of multiple stakeholders and maintain stocks and sustain 
performance and productivity gains (Rees 2004 87).  
To determine whether ITQs are harvesting rights or property rights, Connor 
compared the discourses in the US where ITQs are legally characterised as 
revocable privileges, in Australia as Statutory Fishing Rights and New Zealand 
where full blown property rights language is used. He argued normatively that 
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"ITQs should be defined as full and unattenuated (as far as possible) property 
rights - permanent, transferable, divisible, subject to registration of third party 
interests, etc. They should be subject to compensation when appropriate but not 
for changes in TACs or other sustainability management actions. ITQs are rights 
in fishing, rather than in the fish themselves and ownership of fish stocks is vested 
in the state (e.g. the current model in New Zealand‖. He concluded ―There is no 
doubt that pressure is mounting for rights systems for fisheries management to 
evolve‖ (Connor 2001a 2 15). Yandle similarly sees a strong bundle of property 
rights, ITQs, for example, as being ―the foundation‖ and ―necessary‖ for the 
development of a co-management regime‖ (Yandle 2002 61). 
However, early claims that the QMS could achieve a balance between competing 
objectives of conservation and property right security have been contested (Page 
1994 2) with Winder (1997 327) commenting. ―Neither the Canadian nor the New 
Zealand fisheries policies recognise that it is new technology in the hands of 
corporations that places pressure on the fisheries‖.  This tension remains.  Quota 
became a bigger asset than either boats or plant for individual fishermen or fishing 
companies, but the allocation of other spatial rights, such as for aquaculture or 
marine reserves reduced the security of the ITQ right (Gibbs 2007 113, 116). 
Knight, an Otago academic notes that ―Conservation-minded fishermen play an 
important role in the fishery viewed as a socio-ecological system‖ but questions 
the contention ―that private property rights encourage conservation through the 
self-interest of owners … (since) establishing those property rights has meant the 
exclusion of the conservation-minded fishermen‖ (Knight 2007). Thus ITQs fit 
the neoliberal mould of (privatized) property rights and in being transferable, 
subject to market forces.  
Outcome of the Introduction of ITQs  
Three forms of outcome will be considered, biological, economic and social. 
Biologically, Sissenwine and Mace argued that in 1992 ―there is little evidence of 
improvement in the condition of the fisheries resources‖ (Sissenwine and Mace 
1992 147) and note that, ―[t]he scientific basis for assessing fish stocks, setting 
TACs, and evaluating the overall performance of the ITQ system is generally 
inadequate‖ (Sissenwine and Mace 1991 155). In 1994 Annala, however, argued 
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that ITQs had resulted in ―improved biological status of the resource‖ (Annala 
1996 46). Industry attributes the alleged sustainability of New Zealand fish stocks 
to the QMS (e.g. SeaFIC n.d.; Vela n.d.). Massey, however, argues the embedded 
property rights prevent management moving from single species to ecosystem 
based management, ―the only viable tool for preserving biodiversity in the marine 
environment‖ (Massey 2003 107 108). 
Biologically, Sissenwine and Mace (1991) were critical of the basis of stock 
assessment, questioned the efficacy of the buyback
55
 and queried the linkage 
between stock assessments and TAC setting noting the increased risk of stock 
collapse. Indeed, the data is just not present to evaluate the biological, economic 
and administrative efficiency objectives of the QMS (Hersoug 2002 49-64). 
Consequently, Annala's (1996) declaration of its success may have been more a 
judgment based on his personal experience as manager of the research division 
rather than a robust empirical analysis. More than a decade since its introduction 
there was still considerable uncertainty over the stock status of all but the major 
commercial coastal species (Wallace 1997 19; Hersoug 2002 57 214) 
The economic effects of the QMS on the New Zealand fishing industry have been 
described as an enormous increase in the export of seafood, rationalisation of 
fishing effort, and a reduction in vessel numbers (but not in the mid-range fleet) 
(Rees 2005 143).  Rees (2004) ascribes these outcomes to increased 
competitiveness and the enabling of a New Zealandisation of the offshore fishery. 
Certainly the perception of MAF and the industry is that the QMS has improved 
economic outcomes, but Annala admits hard information is lacking (Annala 1996 
46). Hersoug also notes that ―little has been done by New Zealanders themselves 
in terms of more academic research into the working (and the success) of the 
QMS system‖ and indeed could assert "there is a paradox that a management 
system so bent on empirical evidence and the use of rationality in shaping and 
implementing management measures has so little in terms of systematic evidence 
to prove the outcomes of the QMS" (Hersoug 2002 4, 61). Rees could, however, 
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conclude that results have been mixed. Sanford, his example, ―expanded sales 
tenfold…. Both profits and earnings before tax increased significantly. … The 
QMS promoted the development of new species and products. … [but] 
Productivity and profitability have not increased steadily as there have been 
periods of uncertainty and fluctuating fortunes as competitiveness varies‖ (Rees 
2004 86). An overview of New Zealand‘s food industry was more pessimistic 
finding that ―The export value per kilo of New Zealand‘s seafood is down or flat‖ 
(Coriolis 2005 34).  
Although the ITQ system is based on qualitative measures to supposedly ensure 
accountability, Hersoug finds that to assess economic performance, ―there are no 
reliable statistics covering the most essential indicators‖ (Hersoug 2002 50). 
Although there are numerous possible economic indicators, few are covered by 
time series and others are not available through ―commercial sensitivity‖ 
(Hersoug 2002 50). After careful analysis of those that are available, including, 
profitability, quota prices, competitiveness, aggregation, fleet structure, ―capacity 
creep‖, he found that ―overcapitalisation is still a problem in New Zealand 
fisheries‖ (Hersoug 2002 54). He summed up by saying "most fisheries 
economists are uncritical about the improved economic performance of the QMS 
… there is little evidence to support the widely held assumption that the 
efficiency, competitiveness and profitability of the industry has increased" under 
the QMS (Hersoug 2002 54). 
With the possible exception of Akroyd, et al. (1999) no analysis has been done as 
to the efficiency of fisheries management. As indicated by the level of litigation, 
the industry still expresses dissatisfaction with excessive bureaucratic interference 
and inability to achieve full compliance leading to fudge factors in TACC setting 
to allow for poaching. I clearly remember the CEO of one of the corporates 
asserting, during one of the 1990s stock assessment plenaries I attended on behalf 
of Greenpeace, that the QMS had not taken account of the number of court cases 
involved as the industry asserted its rights.  
Prior to the ―Sealord settlement‖ (Māori Fisheries Act 1989 and the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992)
56, addressing Māori concerns 
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and court cases over setting TACCs, inquiries into possible corruption, and still 
unresolved competing uses for marine space
57
 and fish were very costly.  
Certainly major cases in the High Court, such as Orange Roughy (Greenpeace v 
Minister of Fisheries CP 492/93), snapper 1 [SNA1] (NZ Federation of 
Commercial Fishermen v Minister of Fisheries, decision 24 April 1995) or 
kahawai (NZ Recreational Fishing Council versus the Minister of Fisheries 2007 
CIV-2005-404-4495) are indicative of the litigation. The Mfish (2004) Briefing to 
the Minister states ―[t]he fisheries sector is characterised by conflict between 
various participants who have competing values and objectives. The contentious 
nature of the issues is demonstrated by the level of litigation with over 20 cases, 
mostly by way of judicial reviews, currently on the books‖ (MFish 2004 3). 
Hersoug (2002) notes that while most see economics as having been the prime 
factor in the ITQs introduction, in practice economic measures and economists are 
entirely absent from the stock assessment process which is instead dominated by 
biologists and lawyers (Hersoug 2002 55). He is referring to lawyers‘ involvement 
in litigation when industry is dissatisfied with the stock assessment outcomes.  
Aside from a few comments, the literature makes little reference to the social 
implications of the QMS. Alex Duncan did note one criterion: ―There Should Be 
Stable Fishing Communities‖ (Duncan, A. 1983 1). Crothers (1988) states that it 
was clear ITQs  
would have significant social implications for the fishing industry, its 
down-stream operations, and in some cases, whole communities…. [and] 
concluded that an effort reduction strategy, which sought to maintain the 
inshore fisheries in areas where fishing was important to the local 
community, would lessen the negative consequences of change. The 
downside to this conclusion was, of course, that the industry restructuring 
pain would be shifted elsewhere, either geographically or economically. … 
The social pain caused by the restructuring would have occurred 
irrespective of which management regime was implemented to reduce 
fishing effort, and indeed, if the government had done nothing (Crothers 
1988 12).  
As noted previously, the ―purist‖ market decision took precedence over the social 
awareness (Clark and Duncan 1986 129). Crothers and Harte (1999) in examining 
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compliance did consider social and psychological aspects but Boyd and Dewees 
(1992), and McClurg (1997), indicate that they know of no adverse social 
implications for fishing communities. 
Rennie, from his background in Newfoundland where community impacts were a 
key feature in fishery decisions, recalls being told by MFish in the early 1990s 
(when he orally raised the issue of communities with them) that the Department of 
Conservation (Doc) had ―no mandate to raise arguments on behalf of fishing 
communities‖. Subsequently DOC arguments used communities (like charter boat 
tourism) only as a means to get other Ministries involved in debates with MFish 
when DOC had concerns over the impacts of the QMS or measures for fisheries 
regulation (Rennie pers com 8 September 2008).  
Stan Crothers, one of the architects of the QMS, was one of just a few 
commentators to raise social issues. He noted that the social dimension has often 
been ignored in the development of fisheries policy and, in 1999, warned that, 
"[w]ithout an understanding of the social dimension of fisheries management, 
government is unlikely to structure policy to promote fisheries management in a 
way that is ecologically sound, socially acceptable and politically supported. … 
[and] an attempt to remedy one aspect of a fisheries issue may, if it ignores the 
social context of the issue, reduce the likelihood of achieving its desired outcome‖ 
(Crothers 2000). This appears to demonstrate the benefits of hindsight. However, 
social impact assessment was well established, and indeed required as part of the 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures adopted by a cabinet 
minute in 1974 and although without legal force, was required by government 
departments. Consequently, such an oversight is hardly excusable (Wallace 1995). 
The possibility of social consequences were largely ignored in the introduction of 
the QMS. 
Some social objectives for the QMS seem, therefore, to have been included in the 
early deliberations but these have been dropped or subsumed within the economic 
objectives. Despite claims to the contrary, there are still unresolved tensions 
between economics and biological/ecosystem considerations and their historical 
alignments on one side or the other still taint commentators.  
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This chapter has developed a theoretical framework linking ideology with ethos 
and identity for the analysis of empirical data, delineated the salient features of 
neo-liberalism as an ideology and their implications for the components of 
fisheries considered here and reviewed the literature on social aspects of New 
Zealand fisheries and the QMS. The following chapter will outline 
methodological issues for this purpose.  
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Chapter 3: Baiting Fish Hooks: Methodology  
This project covers a time span of approximately thirty years coinciding roughly 
with my return to New Zealand in 1978 with an urge to begin small-scale fishing 
and the present 2010. So at a personal level it covers the period of my observation 
and interest. Fortuitously this also happens to coincide with a growing perception 
of stock depletion in the coastal fishery resulting in the QMS and the subsequent 
social outcomes.  
POSITIONALITY 
All research reflects a degree of the researchers‘ personality and either implicitly 
or explicitly a position from which the research is undertaken. I considered 
becoming a commercial fisherman in the late 1970s (See Boxes 1 & 4 pages 73 & 
139 resp.) and had a stint as a deckhand in the early 1980s but then more publicly, 
I had conservation oriented contracts in the late 1980s and early 1990s from 
Greenpeace and later facilitated a Waiheke Island marine reserve application (Te 
Matuku) for the Royal New Zealand Forest and Bird Society. Consequently, I 
assumed that I had a reputation with the fishing industry as biased and this would 
be a serious impediment to interviewing fishermen and other industry people. My 
bottom line is concern for conservation, but also for fishermen, especially small-
scale and local fishing cultures. Simplistically - no fish means no fishermen; 
serious losses to both the environment and to the community. It cuts both ways. 
For many fishermen and industry personnel I am probably too pro-conservation, 
and for many conservationists too pro-fishermen and pro-fishing culture. 
Inevitably this research reflects my personal interests and concerns so is 
deliberately reflexive. A conscious attempt has been made to recognise and 
present the different perspectives of informants and the different components 
(Corporates, MAF / Mfish, Fishermen and their Communities). In consequence 
informants have been quoted at length, to tell their own story in a way that 
conveys their lived experience, perspectives and nuances of the issues, ethos and 
identity.  It is hoped that this will redress the comparatively little ―voice‖ 
fishermen and community people have had in the politics of fish to date. 
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On Waiheke, I might also be judged biased. I have been aligned with the pro-
conservation, pro-―leftie‖ group -- that loose conglomerate we used to call ―the 
Alternatives‖ in contrast to the more pro-development ―Capitalists‖ -- so to 
establish a more ―objective‖ or academic stance and counter any garbled accounts 
that would be generated by an enthusiastic ―rumour-mill‖, I published an article in 
the local weekly, the Gulf News. 
I felt an article outlining the research proposal would allow potential informants to 
contact me or, at least, would introduce the research letting them know what was 
intended. In addition it would reach those I didn't know about and so otherwise 
wouldn't contact but instead of being inundated only two people contacted me. 
Both were, however, extremely important sources of information. 
In addition there were still friends and informants on the Island from my Viaduct 
study and other names and contacts were obtained from Gulf News articles. As 
friends and acquaintances heard of my research, a number expressed views or 
experiences about fish or commercial fishing on the Island which often led to 
more formal interviews or to other contacts in Coromandel, Leigh and a few 
elsewhere. 
At Coromandel a former colleague and long time friend, Wendy Pond, provided 
local knowledge and assisted with contacts, helping arrange interviews with 
community representatives. While at Leigh, Professor Bill Ballantine, of 
Auckland University‘s Marine Laboratory, did likewise.  I purchased a mini van 
to provide transport, accommodation and also study space for field work on the 
‗mainland‘ but both these people provided access to power and water; basic living 
essentials that gentrified such camping. 
As well as fishermen and people associated with the communities, I interviewed 
key informants, most of whom were involved when the QMS was introduced, 
representing the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) now the Ministry of 
Fisheries (MFish)
58
, the New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen and 
the fishing industry.  With just one exception (―it was too long ago‖) none of the 
people I approached refused my request for an interview and generally appeared 
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to be unconcerned over my past activities in relation to the fisheries.  
Consequently I believe that the previous experience was much more of an aid than 
a hindrance for the research. 
Box 1: My main experiences on Commercial Fishing boats.  
During the Viaduct research trips were made with fishermen in the Hauraki Gulf 
on their boats using each of the different methods for snapper: set netting, 
longlining, Danish seining, single and pair trawling. I then joined Aksel Larsen on 
his Danish seiner Diana trolling for albacore out of Westport and Greymouth on 
the West Coast of the South Island (WCSI), dhan lining for hapuka (groper) off 
the Hokianga, handlining for bluefin tuna under the trawl wires of hoki trawlers 
and longlining for ling and shark before returning to the Hauraki Gulf for snapper. 
While with Greenpeace I led the seals observer group and did trips on Amaltal‘s 
Voyager for hoki in Cook Strait and Sealord‘s Will Watch for hoki off the WCSI, 
the east coast Stewart Island (then the first (NZ) commercial exploration for 
orange roughy in what became the Puysegur fishery) before returning to Nelson. 
 
 
IDEAL METHODOLOGY 
Ideally, participant observation of inshore and coastal commercial fishing might 
be conducted in such a way that local and national perspectives throughout that 
time could be observed and analysed. That hasn‘t happened, though, as outlined 
later in this chapter.  I have been involved and observed commercial fishing from 
a variety of perspectives through the period and draw on that for the present study 
(Box 1). 
Given the constraints of family responsibilities and resources, the case study 
method, using interviews in accessible and affordable communities, was most 
appropriate.  The alternative, and more familiar, participant observation - staying 
in a fishing community, hanging around the wharves and landing places, 
observing the fishermen their crews and boats, getting to know them, their boats, 
their interactions with the industry, and the community and those around, was not 
an option. One of the strengths of interviews with a researcher located outside of 
the powerful groups involved with fisheries, by comparison with participant 
observation, is that informants, as individuals, have the courage to express in an 
interview what they feel and are able to resist persuasion by nearby peers at the 
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time. Whereas even in a one to one situation, with a fisheries officer for example, 
they do not want to disagree with a person in power or may be more flexible. This 
dissertation is based, therefore on interviews and sufficient observation on the 
wharves and in the communities to "place" the present situation within more 
detailed experience of the past. 
In addition there are often constraints on, unavailability of, and uncertainty 
regarding fishing industry data allegedly for reasons of commercial secrecy, 
privacy or cost. Rees reports (Rees 2003 113), for example, an under-stated level 
of the concentration of rights ownership due to the formation of shell and proxy 
companies to evade legislative restrictions on quota aggregation. Thus, when 
looking at the implications of rights-based fishing on communities, I could not 
know who in a community might have a partnership or be otherwise involved as 
an investor in a corporate, or the degree of power a quota owner might have over a 
community.  
METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapter contends that the introduction of the neoliberal Quota 
Management System has had profound social implications for fishermen and their 
communities. By exploring the changes in fisheries communities over the period 
since the introduction of the QMS it was intended to shed light on the processes, 
mechanisms and social implications of implementing a neoliberal agenda and 
adopting a rights-based approach to broader resource management.  Initially the 
research was conceived as comprising a straight forward Social Impact 
Assessment (SIA) using case studies of three accessible fishery communities. 
SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (S.I.A): METHODS 
OF ASSESSING COMMUNITY SOCIAL IMPACTS 
Social impact assessment requires a relevant, clear baseline or set of reference 
indicators and ongoing effective, robust monitoring of these indicators. In the 
United States the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) ―holds that social 
impact assessment (SIA) is an essential part of the fishery management process 
and improves fishery conservation and management decision-making…. [where] 
SIAs focus on the human environment of the fisheries‖ (NMFS 2001). They call 
  
77 
for ―quantitative probabilities‖ in preference to qualitative data and provide 
operational guidelines for the purpose.  NMFS with specific reference to fisheries 
calls for: 
First, the size and demographic characteristics of the fishery-related work 
force residing in the area; these determine demographic, income, and 
employment effects in relation to the work force as a whole, by 
community and region. Second, the cultural issues of attitudes, beliefs and 
values of fishermen, fishery-related workers, other stakeholders and their 
communities. Third, the effects of proposed actions on social structure and 
organization; that is, on the ability to provide necessary social support and 
services to families and communities. Fourth, the non-economic social 
aspects of the proposed action or policy; these include life-style issues, 
health and safety issues, and the non-consumptive and recreational uses of 
living marine resources and their habitats. In addition to these four 
variables, one other variable is related to MSA actions. This social factor 
is the historical dependence on and participation in the fishery by 
fishermen and communities, reflected in the structure of fishing practices, 
income distribution and rights (NMFS 2001 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/OperationalGuidelines/OGsoci
al_impact_assess.htm). 
Likewise the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation and 
Commonwealth of Australia handbook for Fisheries SIAs (Schirmer and Casey 
2005 24) suggests using common indicators including:  
• total population, population change over time 
• labour force participation 
• unemployment 
• key types of employment (by industry, sector or other category) 
• dependency ratios 
• median age 
• income 
• education 
• proportion of population employed in fishing-related activities 
• economic diversity of local economy 
• household expenditure 
• other indicators such as home-ownership levels 
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The general literature on community impact assessment, a variant on SIA, also 
suggests [instrumental] indicators in terms of changes in population, demographic 
structure, occupations, and community social structure, and adds infrastructural 
resources (e.g. Burdge 2004; Taylor et al. 1999; Baines and McClintock 2000).   
The outcomes of SIAs are a major advance on the neglect of social science when 
the QMS was introduced and implemented. Indeed they are critical for 
understanding the impacts of fisheries management policies on fishermen and 
their communities. But in using such indicators SIAs give major emphasis to an 
instrumental approach and the neglect of the emotional and aspirational, the more 
expressive aspects of interest to this dissertation. 
While both instrumental and expressive approaches are necessary others have 
employed statistical analysis on aspects of the NZ fishery (e.g. Connor 2000, 
2001ab; Dewees 1987, 1989, 1997, 2007; Cullen and Memon 1990; Memon and 
Cullen 1992). The expressive, on the other hand has, to a greater extent, been 
neglected but is, I believe, necessary for an understanding of social change and its 
implications. These include concepts such as community resistance (Mittleman 
and Chin 2000), community resilience (Blount 2007; Berkes and Folk 1998), 
entanglements of power (Sharp et al. 2000) or social capital (Bodin and Crona 
2007; Wiber et al. 2008), which do not show up in the suggested SIA indicators 
but require more empathy and closer communication.  
Sensitised during my Masters research (Duncan 1970) to the difficulties of 
defining and specifying indeterminate expressive categories by Sellin and 
Wolfgang‘s (1964) seminal work on the measurement of delinquency I have 
avoided statistical research. Expressive concepts require a close and detailed 
understanding of the relevant community/ies as it/they change over time perhaps 
best gained by diachronic participant observation such as Firth‘s classic research 
of Tikopia (Firth 1936; 1959) and Malay fishermen (Firth 1946; 1966).  
In addition, by comparison with other fishing community studies (See for 
example, Hall-Arber et al. 2001) the number of fishermen and boats remaining are 
probably too small for statistical validity. More generally social change or social 
impacts on the community of fishermen will in this research be assessed in terms 
of changing attitudes and ethos by evaluating typologies which in many cases 
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arose from larger scale, sometimes interdisciplinary, research projects like those 
of Davis and others in St Georges Bay (See, for example Davis and Jentoft n.d.) 
or in Chedabucto Bay (Davis and Wagner 2006). On a smaller scale, fieldwork 
studies have assessed related variables such as ―deep identity‖(Minnegal et al 
2003), or gender relationships (Stella 1996).  
In New Zealand possible categorical typologies of fishermen include human (e.g. 
part-timers/full timers, gear type, male/female, vertically integrated or not, 
ethnicity, big boat/small boat, skipper/crew/shore processor) or spatial emphases 
(ecosystem, inshore, coastal and deepwater). Before the QMS, administratively 
MAF used primarily the categories of part-time or full time fishermen, and owner-
operators (where the fisherman ran his own boat) versus share fishermen (who ran 
company owned boats). After the introduction of the QMS the categories became 
quota owners and ACE-dependent fishermen where the former owned sufficient 
quota to operate their own enterprise and the latter had to buy (colloquially – 
lease) ACE in order to fish.  
In the Hauraki Gulf the distinction between inshore/coastal does not seem useful 
for the present purpose so the relevant categories for Hauraki Gulf fishermen, 
used are part-time or full-time, owner-operators, family, traditional, and lifestyle 
fishermen. Part-timers fished either for only part of the year (e.g. the snapper 
schooling season or not in the winter) or were primarily employed in another 
occupation compared with those who were kept fully occupied by fishing. Owner-
operators, who could be further classified as family fishermen (where two or more 
generations of sons follow their father into fishing), ‗traditional‘ fishermen (who 
followed the common career path of crewing soon after leaving school and 
worked their way until they owned and operated their own boat) and lifestyle 
fishermen (where those in another job change and become full time fishermen for 
lifestyle reasons). These may then be further categorised as conservationist 
fishermen (whose prime concern is the environment and the ethos of small boats 
where fishing is a means of working at sea) versus more utilitarian fishermen 
(whose prime interest is in earning income). Such categories are not mutually 
exclusive. For gear types the main distinction would be between ‗passive 
methods‘ (e.g. longlining and set-netting) versus the ‗power methods‘ (e.g. Danish 
seining or trawling). Most of the boat-owning fishing companies are urban based 
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so the category of share fishermen may not be relevant to this community based 
research. Focus was therefore on owner-operators before the QMS and similar or 
different changes in ethos and identity between quota owning and ACE-dependent 
fishermen. 
The work of two main researchers is relevant for New Zealand. Connor‘s work on 
the changes in boat numbers and their fishing capacity as a result of the QMS 
(Connor 2000) and Dewees (See: Recent Academic Commentators) work on 
skipper behaviour (Dewees 1987; 1989; 1997; 2007). Connor‘s work is primarily 
an economic analysis of changes in the fishing fleet and quota ownership not the 
social issues of concern here. Likewise Dewees attention is based more closely on 
an instrumental analysis than the expressive issues being addressed in this 
dissertation.  
Retrospective Ethnography 
Since returning to New Zealand in 1977, I have been interested and involved in 
the fisheries so have used the available opportunities to observe and accumulate 
information. Consequently my methodology drew on some of that material and 
the methodologies used in gathering it. I still have my field notes from the 
Viaduct Research, notes and vivid memories of the time on the Danish seiner 
Diana, working with Greenpeace which included observer trips and participation 
in MAF stock assessments, and a collection of trade journals and newspaper 
clippings. These have been drawn on to supplement data gathered more 
specifically for this research and are specifically identified as such where this 
occurs.  
The constraints on such data are that while a deckhand I was observing and 
participating as an aspiring fisherman with mixed feelings toward MAF edicts. As 
a Greenpeace contractor while empathising in many aspects with fishermen my 
brief was for conservation. Consequently my notes reflect these differences in 
perspective and purpose. Clearly my knowledge of and subjective engagement 
with Waiheke was considerably greater than for the other two communities. 
Consequently my time, contacts and access to information was much greater but 
constrained by alliances with conservationists and those who oppose larger-scale 
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development. Though my time in the other two communities was considerably 
briefer it was not burdened by the baggage of community involvement. 
In the past I studied as a ethnographic researcher and consequently much of my 
note taking reflected those skills and experience and are therefore arguably more 
robust as a data source than would be those of someone unfamiliar with such 
methods, even if not taken for the purposes of this dissertation.  
While ideologically I have supported small-scale fishing culture and conservation 
persistently, the shifting purpose and varying perspective means there are 
significant implications of the use of such data. When collected it was not 
connected with specific reference to this current research objective and therefore 
has significant gaps. It does, however, provide a valuable source of information 
and has been drawn on in a similar manner to participant observation data. In 
effect, therefore, I have used a retrospective participant observation of the fishing 
industry, my experience living in Waiheke, sharpened by a concern for case 
studies and more formal interview techniques.  
The alternative, and more formal participant observation, was not an option due to 
family commitments. It could have been done in Waiheke except that there have 
been no commercial fishing boats based on the Island since the earliest stages of 
the QMS.  
CASE STUDY 
Although case studies are widely used in social science research (Ragin and 
Becker 1992), there are assumptions and controversy as to just what a case is; 
whether theoretical or empirical (Ragin 1992 3), whether pre-existing or 
determined (constructed) in the course of the study, selected randomly or for their 
unique qualities (Ragin and Becker 1992 Front Note).  Ragin (1992 2) suggests 
that ―[a]t a minimum, most social scientists believe that their methods are 
powerful enough to overwhelm the uniqueness inherent in objects and events in 
the social world. The idea of comparable cases is implicit in the boundary 
between dominant forms of social science and other types of discourse about 
social life‖. He notes that social science conventionally defines cases by 
emphasising boundaries and time periods.  
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The roughly thirty-year time period covered by my research is applicable for my 
choice of communities. To an extent these are also recognizably bounded 
communities but, as my research found, strictly speaking boundaries are generally 
not sharp. Since Waiheke is an island there is a clearcut land/sea demarcation but 
in practice such a definite boundary does not apply to Coromandel where for 
administrative, practical and even emotional purposes the Coromandel Peninsula 
is often not distinguished from the town. One informant whose residence was in 
Colville referred to Coromandel as part of her community, while Coromandel, as 
a port on the peninsula, is often linked for fisheries purposes with Thames.  
Whitianga on the opposite coast of the Peninsula is very much part of Coromandel 
commercial fishing since that is where the ‗local‘ company OPColumbia (OPC)59 
is situated. OPC is not the only company involved, but does provide some of the 
ACE for the Coromandel fishermen, and most of the locally caught fresh fish sold 
in the town. Leigh is also a port and a town, but the Leigh Fisheries Ltd factory 
services boats from the Hauraki Gulf (including Coromandel) and the NE coast of 
the North Island. So the three do constitute communities of place with 
recognizable boundaries for some purposes, but there are also other links and 
relationships, very significant for this research, which, as will be shown, blur the 
distinctiveness. 
Choice of Communities 
Initially a number of communities throughout New Zealand were considered for 
study, but the only likely funding source, the Ministry of Fisheries, was not 
pursued because of likely compromise with informants, especially fishermen. I 
have, however, lived on Waiheke since 1978 and completed a six month research 
project based on Auckland City‘s Viaduct Basin fishing community over the 
summer of 1981-82 (See: Duncan L. 1982) and therefore considered Waiheke and 
the Viaduct as case studies due to the advantages of that longterm knowledge.  
                                                 
59
  Johnson and Haworth (2004 376) note that in ‗Think Big‘ days there were three 
fish processing companies in Whitianga, Fletcher, Ocean Products and Columbia 
Seafoods but they became two and after the introduction of the QMS just one, 
OPColumbia (OPC). 
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During the Viaduct study I had hung out on the wharf and gone on trips on boats 
using each of the different methods and, since roughly one third of the Auckland 
longline fleet was based on Waiheke, I met many of the Waiheke fishermen and 
subsequently followed the establishment of The Waiheke Fishing Co-operative. 
Later, although not as actively involved, living on Waiheke I followed the 
changes in the fishing industry on the Island and also watched those in the 
Viaduct with interest. With this background and contacts these places seemed 
obvious choices.  
As research progressed, however, it was apparent that the Viaduct and Waiheke 
were closely linked. Before the Co-op and its ice plant, many Waiheke fishermen 
unloaded, sold their catch, bought ice, gear and fuel and reprovisioned at the 
Viaduct. Although Waiheke and the Viaduct allowed comparison between urban 
and semi-rural and big industry versus small-scale industry this interrelationship 
meant they were not really separate cases. Additionally, the influence of the 
America‘s Cup which resulted in considerable restructuring of the Viaduct area 
and associated relocation of the fishing fleet was considered likely to have overly-
distorted the picture (See: Figures 7 and 8).   
 
Figure 7: The Viaduct Basin then (Summer 1982). 
( Note the steelwork for the lifting bridge [The Viaduct] in the top right-hand 
corner.) 
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Figure 8: The Viaduct Harbour Now (July 2009) 
Note: Taken from same viewpoint as Figure 7. 
An early informant had pointed out that following the introduction of the QMS, 
virtually all fishermen on Waiheke had sold their quota, those on Coromandel had 
leased it out and were set up for life, while I was aware that at Leigh some had 
kept theirs and were still operating at least until recently. In addition, the fishing 
co-op at Leigh had become a company in 1982 and now (2009) Leigh Fisheries, is 
part of The Lee Fish Group and had bought up quota so there were both quota 
owning and ACE-dependent fishermen based at Leigh. It seemed then that each of 
these communities had responded differently to the QMS and that comparison of 
these responses would show a range of social implications of the QMS.  
These three communities are all within the Hauraki Gulf. Leigh, in the west, is a 
narrow inlet sheltered from all but strong southeasterly winds and, by comparison 
with Coromandel, a deep harbour except in its upper reaches. Coromandel 
Harbour in the shelter of the Coromandel Peninsula is in a broad shallow bay 
enclosed by islands, exposed to some extent to the southwest and, even at the 
wharf, many of the boats bottom on the low tides. This factor restricts the time 
they can enter or leave their berths. Some smaller or more shoal-draught vessels 
can use the even more tidal reaches of the river. Waiheke on the other hand is an 
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island with its major port, Matiatia an inlet like Leigh but sheltered to the east and 
open to the west, sufficiently deep for all the fishing vessels in its fleet
60
.   
The population of the communities has varied over the years. Prior to the QMS it 
was about 303 in Leigh, 948 in Coromandel and 3181 in Waiheke
61
 (See Table 1).   
COMMUNITY CENSUS 
 1981 1996 2001 2006 
Waiheke 3,181 6,288 7,137 7,689 
Coromandel 948 1,498 1,437 1,473 
Leigh 303 423 423 390 
Table 1. Community Population 
Source: Census 1981: Population by Territorial Local Authorities, 1981 Census, 
Department of Statistics, Wellington 1981. Remainder: Statistics New Zealand 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/ (Accessed 26 August 2010) 
The populations of the communities have grown between 1981, prior to the QMS, 
and the most recent census in 2006 as indicated in Table 1.  However, as the table 
shows there is considerable variation with Waiheke growing at a much faster rate.  
Indeed, Leigh and Coromandel both peaked in 1996 with populations of 423 and 
1,498 respectively in 1996.  
All communities share a similar history of Māori occupation and initial 
dependence in European times on the extraction of timber. Gold was found in 
Coromandel in 1852 (Coromandel Town History Research Group Incorporated 
2002 10) and by that stage Waiheke was being mined for manganese, sand and 
gravel (Monin 1992 160-167) and as the bush was cleared the land in both 
communities was being broken for farming. In the mid 1850s at both Waiheke 
                                                 
60
  For informal navigational local knowledge of these ports see Royal Akarana 
Yacht Club Cruising Handbook (1972)  
61
  Population by Territorial Local Authorities, 1981 Census, Department of 
Statistics, Wellington 1981. 
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(Monin 1992 131) and Leigh (Frost 1991 4) the ―40 acre system‖62 was used by 
the Auckland Provincial Government to encourage settlers. Farming, especially 
sheep farming, was important for all three until more recently the farms were 
subdivided for life-style blocks and more intensive developments. On Waiheke 
this began in the late 1980s. Tourism has become a feature of all three 
communities, with Leigh benefiting from its proximity to a marine reserve, 
Waiheke from its closeness to Auckland, and Coromandel being on the tourist 
route of the popular Coromandel Peninsula. 
Administratively all were originally under the Auckland Provincial Government 
until the formation of the Waiheke County Council in 1970 and amalgamation 
with Auckland City in 1989
63
 . Subsequently, Coromandel was amalgamated with 
the Thames District Council in 1979 fell under Waikato Regional Council in 1989 
so Leigh and Coromandel have been communities within Rodney and Thames-
Coromandel Districts respectively. 
All three communities have strong fishing histories evident in local and national 
histories (Gulf News; Coromandel Town History Research Group Incorporated 
2002; Frost 1991), but the numbers of fishermen, boats involved or relative social 
importance are not as readily identifiable. Currently there is a fish processing 
plant at Leigh, and shellfish processing at Coromandel. Both these communities 
and Waiheke have shops selling limited amounts of fresh filletted fish. Each 
community has been the base for fishing operations in the past and only Waiheke 
does not currently have a fishing fleet.  In all three there were families where two 
or more generations were prominent in commercial fishing and well recognized 
by the community. In Coromandel it was the Strongmans, in Leigh the 
Torkingtons and Davies, and on Waiheke the Gordons and the Scotts were 
prominent and undoubtedly there were other fishing families who got on with the 
occupation but were not so publicly active or easily identified.  
                                                 
62
  Whereby free land (40 acres per adult, 20 per child – roughly the costs of 
steerage passage from Britain to New Zealand) rather than free passage was offered to 
attract immigrants to Auckland (Monin 1992 129 130).   
63
  See: Auckland City Libraries: Auckland Region Archives: 
http://www.aucklandcitylibraries.com/populartopics/resourcepages/localhistory/Auckland
-region-archives.aspx. (Accessed 15 August 2009). 
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Sources of Community Information  
For Waiheke the main sources of information were my own observations, Paul 
Monin‘s history (1992), my Viaduct research, the Gulf News, local histories or 
overviews for visitors such as (Picard and Picard 1993) and interviews with 
informants. For Coromandel historical data was from Coromandel Town History 
Research Group Incorporated (2002), Mitcalfe (1980) and informants. For Leigh 
history, I depended primarily on Frost (1991), previous visits while with 
Greenpeace and a Northland trip (Duncan L. 1995) and informants. In addition 
Internet pages including census data and the company register were searched for 
each of the three communities. 
Timelines of changes in fisheries management in New Zealand were extracted 
from Hersoug (2002) and from the Gulf News for Waiheke (Appendicies 3 & 4 
respectively).  
Late in my research MFish supplied McCormack and Crothers‘ (2008) report on 
―Leigh: A Community of fishers?‖ Despite its main focus on the relationships 
between the Marine Reserve and the fisheries it records fishermen‘s attitude 
toward the QMS. Indeed this is the only fisheries research on the present 
communities and, shows the strength of SIA methodology by dealing 
comprehensively with issues of fishermen‘s identity apparent in my present 
research: ―fishers believe themselves to be natural environmentalists and 
promoters of sustainable management techniques. This perception may be 
somewhat idealised, however, it is a firmly held belief‖ (McCormick and Crothers 
2008 35).  It also reveals attitudes about quota ownership (p33), landlubbers and 
quota ownership – a major source of unease (p36), paperwork (p40), income, 
costs and crew relations, relationship with Leigh Fisheries (p43), social cohesion 
and factions among commercial fishermen (p45) and other issues. In addition, 
while not denying that some have done well financially from the QMS, it 
confirmed that the vehemence of feeling some express toward the system is not 
just a product of my own partiality.  
Leigh Fisheries, on an Internet web page to promote the company and their 
product to European consumers, provides a good description of the town.  Leigh 
is ―a small village at Cape Rodney on the North Island of New Zealand. It has a 
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population of about 450 people - a typical fishing village‖, with ―[a]pproximately 
20 per cent of the working population … employed by "Lee Fish". The company 
is the largest employer in the village. About 30 people work operationally at "Lee 
Fish". They fillet, sort and pack. 60 employees fish on the 30 boats, two people on 
each boat‖.  
Constraints 
Such indicators for community change can, however, founder on the rocky shores 
of the concept of community (discussed in Chapters 1 and 2).  Moreover, a clear 
baseline or set of reference indicators, such as census numbers of community 
fishermen and occupational data, and ongoing effective, robust monitoring of 
these indicators did not exist. Without such baselines there has not been an 
ongoing coordinated data collection programme measuring changes in those key 
indicators over time. Consequently, distinguishing social implications, due to 
rights-based fisheries management, as opposed to, general social change resulting 
from decades of neo-liberal policy, particularly for communities, is much more 
problematic when conducted as a hindsight investigation.  For example, it is 
impossible to determine the extent to which the availability of fish in the 
supermarket has been influenced by trends in the agri-food industry as opposed to 
consequences of rights-based fisheries management using ITQs.  There are also 
problems in obtaining occupational and other statistical data for communities that 
are not recognised as such for statistical data collection purposes, and this is 
exacerbated when the data collection methods used by Statistics New Zealand do 
not differentiate fishing and fish processing as an occupation from other sectors of 
food processing and production. It is unlikely that there is any community in New 
Zealand for which reliable ongoing data on relevant social indicators for the 
purposes of this dissertation exists, with the possible exception of the Chatham 
Islands. The Chatham Islands, however, are in fact anomalously managed under a 
community quota system (Marshall 2000) and therefore not an appropriate case 
study.  
Consequently this research used a mixed-method methodology that evolved as the 
research developed to take advantage of data sources and opportunities that arose.  
The primary data sources comprise interviews and documents, and methods were 
chosen that reflected these data source limitations.  Logistical constraints meant 
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also a focus on the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery and predominantly Waiheke 
Island, only supplemented by Coromandel and Leigh communities.  In retrospect I 
would liked to have spent much greater time in both Coromandel and Leigh 
interviewing and getting to know more fishermen and community members. 
Unfortunately circumstances didn‘t allow so data collected is heavily weighted to 
my home base, Waiheke. These three communities were, however, clearly distinct 
communities that historically had significant involvement in fisheries and were 
believed to be likely to show the effects of the implementation of the QMS in 
contrasting ways. 
It became apparent during the research, however, that these seemingly 
geographically separate and distinguishable communities had more links and 
interactions with respect to fisheries and among the communities than originally 
perceived. Likewise fishermen from these communities of place had preferred or 
habitual fishing grounds and landing places (e.g. the Viaduct) but overlapping 
communities of occupation. Therefore, rather than being three separate case 
studies, they were theoretically and practically just one case reinforced by the 
research focus on snapper.  
The exclusion of the part-time fishermen, an event ostensibly independent of 
rights-based fishing but one that highlighted the very question of rights, emerged 
as significant when some informants asserted that social impacts of the exclusion 
were probably more pronounced than those of the QMS. This further blurred what 
might have been a fairly clear before/after QMS distinction. Difficulties in 
locating informants and accessing official records also imposed some constraints 
on distinguishing between the effects of the QMS and the exclusion of part-
timers. The potential impact was however sufficiently significant that it has been 
incorporated into the dissertation. 
Known Links Among the Communities 
Fishing in the Gulf was not static and while fishermen from one community may 
have had their favourite patches they were not confined to just those fishing 
grounds. Depending on season and other climatic conditions, fishermen 
periodically moved away from their local areas and indeed at different times, 
many fished throughout the Gulf. At various times, often for commercial 
convenience or access to a wider choice of buyers, gear or maintenance facilities, 
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the fishermen from all three communities have landed their catch or worked out of 
the Viaduct. Similar links, interactions and relationships probably apply to other 
ports around and in the vicinity of the Gulf. In part a result of the seasonal and life 
cycle movements of snapper, the dominant commercial species, the Hauraki Gulf, 
can therefore be considered as one fishery that has been exploited by fishermen 
based in its various communities.  
Points of Compatibility 
While there are considerable similarities and differences in these communities 
they are not necessarily typical of all coastal fisheries or fishing communities in 
New Zealand. All three are smallish, semi-rural, coastal communities in the 
Hauraki Gulf, within reasonable proximity of a major urban conglomerate 
(Auckland) and, more particularly, an international airport with links to major 
overseas markets. In the past snapper has been the main target species and 
historically contributed to subsistence in all these communities and a significant 
component of the local economy. 
Perhaps the biggest similarity among all three communities is the presence of the 
agriculture industry giving way to lifestyle blocks, increasing pressure for coastal 
development and developing tourist industries. Leigh, adjacent to the marine 
reserve, Waiheke, as an island setting and Coromandel with gold mining history 
and aquaculture industry have developed tourism and associated businesses. 
Other similarities are more closely apparent between two rather than three places. 
Waiheke and Coromandel share a history of the depletion of the kauri forests 
(Agathis Australis, an iconic New Zealand tree), longterm visitor industries, 
increasing coastal subdivision, and generally development pressure. In Leigh and 
Coromandel there are significant marine industries. At Leigh, Leigh Fisheries 
claims to be New Zealand's biggest exporter of chilled fish while at Coromandel, 
Sanford, New Zealand's second largest fishing company, maintains a processing 
plant for oysters and mussels from the marine farms in the vicinity.  
Points of Uniqueness  
Each of the communities has its particular distinctive attributes. Waiheke is an 
island and, with the exception of charter fishing and a very recent Wharf Seller‘s 
Licence has virtually no fishing industry. It has, however, become a major 
commuter community contributor of labour to Auckland, and has developed an 
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international recognition for its wine and figs. Coromandel was the centre of a 
gold rush and has deliberately retained at least the shop facades and claims 
identity from that time. At Leigh the fishing fleet and factory operations provide a 
more obvious dynamic.  
Waiheke Island is semi-rural (See Figure 9) with a deeply indented coastline, 
located in the Inner Hauraki Gulf in the middle of snapper spawn grounds. 
Matiatia, its main "port" is 19kms or 35 minutes fast ferry ride from Downtown 
Auckland near the Viaduct Basin.  The island's northern side is more exposed 
while the southern, more sheltered and the mainland is just a few kilometres 
across Tamaki Straits. The island is 19.5km long and extremely variable in width, 
being 0.75 km across the villages of Oneroa and Blackpool but 12km at the 
eastern end colloquially known as the 'Bottom End'. 
Waiheke can be seen as one community of place with various communities of 
occupation such as the fishermen or the commuters or as numerous overlapping 
communities based in the villages. In the early days these were separated by 
greenbelts and were more visually distinct. The advent of the supermarket, 
centrally positioned at Ostend, undercut the economics of the food and general 
stores, increased traffic island-wide and eroded a greater sense of village 
identities. 
The residential population was about 2000 in the 1970s but with the island being a 
visitor and holiday destination it catered to between 20,000 and 30,000 tourists 
over the summer. Economically this created a summer boom and a winter bust for 
local businesses.  About that time many who were seeking to escape the modern 
urban 'rat race' and live an alternative lifestyle, settled on the island.  Accordingly, 
the permanent residents could be loosely divided into two broad categories, 'the 
capitalists' and 'the alternatives' with concomitant ideologies and identities. There 
were fishermen in both categories. 
The alternatives strove for a community ethos by establishing networks for an 
informal economy of cooperation and exchange and such institutions as the Food 
Co-op, Playcentre, and alternative health services, while avoiding consumerism. 
Many supported their ideals by gardening, pottery and crafts, repairing boats, 
creating artwork, or as social welfare beneficiaries, stretching meager incomes 
supplemented by part-time work, a conscious reciprocity for labour, services and 
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the exchange of surplus produce with those in the network of an informal 
economy. 
 
Figure 9: Waiheke Island showing the main places named in the text (Source: 
Max Oulton) 
 
Critics had a different evaluation and referred to:  
Self-consciously trendy areas like ... Waiheke Island where the inhabitants 
are preoccupied with the pseudo-problems of personal and spiritual 
growth. The particular manifestations sometimes have their logic - 
alternative medicine for instance - but the total effect is quite bizarre:  
tarot cards, astrology, naturopathy, self-actualisation, men's groups, group 
living and loving, Reichian massage, neuro-linguistic programming, 
'organic' foods. Running through these otherwise unrelated fads is a 
common purpose: establishing the identity of the individual both through 
an external system of superstition or spirituality, and through collective 
activity with other individuals. (Jesson in Sharp 2005 150) 
The external pressures of governance, population increase and a globalised 
economy have shaped community dynamics on Waiheke. Prior to changes 
introduced by the 1984 Labour government, Waiheke was locally autonomous 
under the Waiheke County Council. Following an amendment to the Local 
  
93 
Government Act (1974) the Island was amalgamated with Auckland City in 1989 
and administered as part of the Hauraki Gulf. 
Globalisation had increasing effects on the community and, indeed, the fishermen. 
For much of the 20th century Waiheke had been a locality for baches and a 
holiday destination catering for travellers, tourists and casual visitors. With the 
growth of the tourist industry nationally and on the island, vineyards producing 
internationally acclaimed wines, more gourmet restaurants, and expanding 
accommodation including resort and conference centres, the island's tourist and 
visitor industry became more formalized to attract increasing overseas custom. 
OTHER COMMUNITIES 
The literature, my past experience and more recent opportunities to visit them, 
provide some information about commercial fishing in other New Zealand 
communities.  Those in the literature have been covered in my literature survey 
and are drawn on as relevant in subsequent chapters. During the course of this 
research visits were made to Ngawi (exposed coast), Thames (inshore), and 
Helensville (harbour, estuarine), Lyttelton, Akaroa and Whangarei (all harbours).  
Information obtained while visiting these communities will be drawn on where 
appropriate in the following chapters as points of comparison, but were not part of 
the detailed study.  
CRITERIA: SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ITQS  
An objective of this research is to determine to what extent, if at all, the 
introduction of ITQs has changed the ideology and ethos of owner-operators, 
quota owning, and ACE-dependent fishermen and their crews. It is to see whether 
or not the ethos and identity of fishermen, the work and social relations between 
skippers and crew and their relationships with non-fishing members of the 
community within which they live, have been altered as a result of ITQs and 
commoditised fishing rights. 
ACE-dependent fishermen have to lease quota from quota owners who may be 
corporates, quota brokers or owner-operators. The cost of leasing adds to their 
operational costs and therefore may marginalise them still further than previously. 
It may also mean that control of their operation shifts from the wheelhouse to the 
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corporate boardroom (Apostle, McCay et al. 2002). Indeed fishermen have 
complained of being micro-managed by cell-phone from ashore (Apostle, McCay 
et al. 2002 121). Thus ACE-dependent fishermen may no longer enjoy the cache 
of independent owner-operators and are simply contractors to the corporates.  
Loss of quota can result in change of community focus from active participation 
in the seafood industry to servicing the tourist industry with charter operations for 
example, which may also involve resource extraction but are, in addition, 
dependent on the whims of outsiders. Jentoft notes that, ―Many feel that it would 
ruin the special cultural characteristics; that the authenticity would be lost. It is 
even claimed that the tourism industry would reduce the coastal culture to a 
caricature of itself. There is a danger of devaluation through commercialization‖ 
(Jentoft 1993 93). 
While as Davis and Bailey (1996 253) say, ―[t]he logic and dynamics of such 
management policies give little recognition to the fact that for many in small-boat 
community settings fishing and ocean resources are as much expressions of social 
relations between kin and familiars as they are about economics and property‖. 
But in terms of comparative perspectives, if a social approach shows that at the 
community level (bottom) there is social injustice and inequity, this is, at least 
potentially on a face to face basis within a community structure where formal and 
informal mechanisms may be available to help resolution. The economic 
perspective of right-based fishing, however, allows, maybe even promotes, social 
injustice and inequity to a higher level (top) resolvable only through more formal 
means. Thus, just what ownership of quota means for such fishermen and their 
communities has to be identified. 
Fishermen 
There is a question as to whether social change follows or precedes fishery 
changes.  Hamilton et al (2004 196) suggest that ―[a]s a fishery transforms its 
resource base, the fishery itself must change too, and along with it the fishery 
society‖. However, Helgason and Palsson (1997 120) emphasise that as quota is 
―quantifiable, divisible and commensurable‖, fishing rights have been 
commoditized to a particular sector (in their case, boat owners) ―in a privileging 
of capital over labour, shifting power from sea to land and widening the economic 
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rift between boat owners and their employees‖. Thus the change in management 
instrument resulted in social change. 
For individual quota owners this may bring more certain income and returns and 
result in increased status whereas those who have to lease are deprived with 
concomitant changes in community relationships (Apostle, McCay et al. 2002) 
and social status. In some more extreme cases owners have been referred to as 
―quota kings‖, "Lords of the sea" (Helgason and Palsson 1997 57) or ―quota 
barons‖, 
This probably means a change in relationships from more co-operative and 
sharing on the basis of reciprocity and community solidarity to more formal with 
mutual assistance giving way to utilitarian commercial transactions. 
Concomitantly it may increase the social distance between fishermen and families 
of those who own quota and those who do not. Seeking information on such 
matters formed a key part of the research. 
Communities 
The loss of quota owning fishermen from communities may result in a change of 
ideology of communities from resourceful, self-sufficient collectivities to 
company towns or dependent dormitories for corporate employees. Ashore, 
therefore there may be changes in social justice, and equity, the social fabric, 
livelihoods and social relations, which have affected the identity, ethos and 
outlook at levels of the community from fisher families through to the community 
as a whole. 
Research at the community level (Holmes 1998 105) has shown a much more 
varied response among communities and indicates that to understand the 
implications of a change in ideology, such as that experienced in New Zealand, its 
impact on fishermen needs to be explored at a scale that enables the diversity and 
the variety of responses to the new regime to be expressed. Again, information 
was sought on such matters. 
PRACTICALITIES: FIELDWORK 
Having lived on Waiheke since October 1978 and participated in various aspects 
of the community through out that time but, I unfortunately did not regard this as 
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fieldwork and haven't ―anthropologised‖ the community in the sense of keeping 
detailed notes and records. I have also maintained interest in the Viaduct, visited it 
periodically and, particularly since owning a digital camera over the last few 
years, photographed the fishing vessels and general activities whenever 
opportunity offered. 
Fieldwork in the Coromandel and Leigh has required more intentional 
arrangements. Early in my research the (Waiheke) Ferry Users Group (FUG) 
annual social trip by ferry to Coromandel allowed a preliminary visit (5 March 
2005). On that Saturday afternoon a couple of hours were spent on the wharf 
looking at the boats and talking with the two owner-operators who were doing 
maintenance at the time. 
The recommissioning of a friend‘s trimaran (Kliss) enabled visits by sea to both 
Coromandel (30 Sept - 2 October 2006) and Leigh (13-15 December 2006). It was 
hoped that arriving by small boat would facilitate contact with fishermen in a way 
that arriving by vehicle and standing on the wharf would not. They were short 
visits but provided an introduction to these communities and an entree to deeper 
discussions with some of the fishermen. 
These trips also showed that to interview informants in Coromandel and Leigh 
required either a much longer time or better shorebased mobility. Subsequently I 
purchased the Daihatsu HiJet mini-van to provide transport, accommodation and 
sufficient certainty to make appointments for interviews with informants. I used it 
for trips to Thames and Coromandel (8-11 Jan 2007) as well as Whangarei and 
Leigh (5-10 Feb 2007).  It also enabled visits to places I couldn't have seen 
otherwise (Ngawi 18,19 Dec 2006 and Helensville, 5 February 2007) and the 
flexibility to travel on for two interviews in Parua Bay (Whangarei, 6 February 
2007) when a strong easterly wind and a public holiday (Waitangi Day) meant 
fishermen were absent from Leigh. 
DATA SOURCES 
Interviews with fishermen, their wives or families, participants and leaders in the 
fisheries, in the communities and the industry, provide the primary data used to 
determine the social implications of changes in the flow of rights. Supplementary 
information was gathered from archival sources such as census data, local 
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periodicals (e.g. The Gulf News) and local histories from the Auckland Public 
Library Archives, items in the news media, observation and also more casual 
conversations. Informants were found from past contacts in the fishing industry 
from the Viaduct research and Greenpeace contracts, by telephoning quota or 
ACE owners in Leigh or Coromandel who were identified from the quota register, 
by the snowball technique and through opportunistic encounters. 
PRACTICALITIES / METHODS: INTERVIEW 
PROCESS 
My interests are in the expressive, the more emotional feelings and subjective 
responses to fish, fishing, the community and the politics of the fishery, rather 
than the instrumental and more objective aspects of the subject. I sought to make 
the interrelations between people variables and factors transparent in an attempt to 
highlight the role neo-liberal rights-based policies play in shaping communities. 
For this reason interviews have been quoted at length to ensure the informants' 
perspectives are apparent and have not been distorted by my possible bias.  
Census and statistical data, and other material normally grist to a formalist mill, 
hasn't been given a great deal of prominence. Nor has the role economics plays in 
altering fishermen's behaviour as they describe or rationalise it because these have 
been addressed for the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery by Dewees (1987; 1989; 
1997; 2007).  
My interviews were generally arranged by phone and conducted at a time and 
place as convenient for informants as possible, most typically at their dining room 
table. Often we had had a brief chat about the topic, which I deliberately didn't 
prolong because often what had been said once would not be repeated in 
interviews and although I made notes after such conversations, they were never as 
rich as the recorded information. At the interviews the topic and the Consent Form 
were explained and permission to record on a digital voice recorder (DVR) was 
almost always given. Later these recordings were downloaded to my laptop and 
transcribed. 
The working title for my dissertation was "The social implications of rights-based 
fisheries management in New Zealand". For a few informants no further 
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explanation was required. They had observed or participated in the development 
and introduction of the QMS. For others, though, such insider terminology was 
meaningless so I either explained the terms or, more usually, glossed the title as, 
"Social change as a result of our fisheries management system" explaining that 
this involved the privatisation of catching rights. 
The interests, concerns and perspectives of each informant were different so each 
interview was different and often covered different aspects. Aside from fishermen 
or former fishermen who could be regarded as similar, at least in terms of 
occupation, most informants were in different situations and could provide insight 
into different aspects of the research. I did not, therefore, start with a list of 
standard questions but rather on the basis of previous contact or knowledge of the 
person's situation often conveyed when I outlined why I was doing the research. 
Typically this was my assertion that ideally when a fisheries management system 
was being changed they looked at biology to look after the fish, economics to look 
after industry matters and social science to look after fishermen and their 
communities. That from the literature in NZ there had been little concern with the 
social and the classic phrase was "[l]et the chips lie where they fall" (Clark & 
Duncan 1986 129). Frequently, without further prompting, my informants told me 
of their experiences or how they were involved in their specific area of relevance. 
Alternatively, or possibly later, I asked what attracted them to fishing and how 
they got in. I was interested in what motivated them, what they did and what it 
meant for them. This was a familiar and entirely non-threatening approach and 
informants seemed very willing to share. 
My objective was to facilitate a guided conversation, to follow their enthusiasm 
and the results, generally, provided good coverage of the information I was 
seeking. Where necessary I asked questions raising relevant areas not already 
covered (how, for example, the family was affected by the absences or 
uncertainties of fishing trips?). At times I would use stories of my own experience 
to empathise and elicit clarification or get more detail on relevant issues. My 
objective was to get an account of recruitment, objectives, satisfaction, fishing 
ethos, relationships with family, with the industry, with community, future 
prospects, and attitude to ITQs. 
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The QMS was introduced in 1986, so investigation of the ensuing social change 
has meant comparison of fishing before and after, involving experience over some 
30 or more years.  The research was therefore vulnerable to the normal difficulties 
associated with oral history, including the potential to valorise or rationalise past 
roles and actions as well as oversights, recollection distortions, selective 
memory
64
, reliability of memory (Perkes and Thompson 2006 3), the issues of 
subjectivity/objectivity and ―the effects of the interviewing process on the 
interviewer‖ (Yow 2006 58 63). 
Some informants had, in fact, been actively involved over all that period, whereas 
others had not. There is potential that those who remained throughout or were still 
actively fishing were not fully representative of the overall participants‘ 
experiences.   Moreover, I suspect, their recollections were probably more 
influenced by direct experience and emotional commitments, their lived 
experience and their memorable moments, than by matters that might more 
objectively be the facts and figures of official history. It is through this experience 
and meaning that I sought to understand the implications of rights-based fishing 
(See K‘Meyer 1997; Perkes and Thompson 2006 3).  
Fishermen are not restricted to participation in only one community. One 
fisherman, for example, who I first met unloading in Leigh, keeps his boat at 
Whangarei Basin and lives elsewhere. Another vessel, one of the only purpose 
built longliners first launched during my Viaduct study in the early 1980s, was 
seen unloading in Leigh then later moored at Sand Spit, just south of Leigh. 
Coromandel fishermen, while generally unloading at Coromandel, sometimes did 
so at the Viaduct or even occasionally at Leigh. A Coromandel informant told me 
about boats, normally based there targeting snapper, which as a result of the QMS, 
periodically moved to deeper water, even to the Far North to target gurnard.  
I knew from copies of the Gulf News and cuttings in my records that this 
community weekly newspaper contained a rich dataset, essentially a local history 
of Waiheke commercial fishing from before the QMS at least until the demise of 
the Co-op. Written as news or accounts from those involved or occasionally by 
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  For the politics of memory and the interplay of collective, personal memory and 
counter-memory see K‘Meyer (1997).  
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outside observers this material made up for the lack of current fishermen on 
Waiheke and also helped assuage concerns that my own recollections might be 
overly biased and provided a needed counter to my lived experience of Waiheke 
with a more neutral contemporary source. The current local news media I saw 
during my times in Coromandel and Leigh did not suggest a comparable source in 
either community and local Council staff confirmed this. Due to time constraints 
these sources were not investigated further and instead I have relied on the local 
histories referred to by council officers, found in the Auckland City Library 
Reference Collection or the local libraries at Coromandel and Warkworth (See: 
Coromandel Town History Research Group 2002; Mitcalfe 1980; Frost 1991).   
I also analysed Commercial Fishing, Professional Fisherman and the earlier 
copies of Seafood New Zealand but didn‘t find significant articles about these 
places. Logistic constraints worked against having sufficient time in these 
communities, or at SeaFIC archives in Wellington, to work through local 
association records. The perspectives and memories of fishermen and community 
members who had been or were involved in commercial fishing were of more 
direct relevance and interest than archival records.  
I accessed information on fishermen, quota, and ACE for SNA1 (snapper in Quota 
Management Area 1 which is between North Cape and Cape Runaway, bounded 
by the EEZ) and fishing vessels. As far as I could tell Census records did not 
contain breakdowns or categories that would be particularly useful for this 
research. So I relied on those records that had been informative which I had 
collected in the past. 
Before this research, based on casual observation, the news media and the trade 
journal, I had assumptions about the social implications of the QMS, such as: a 
reduction in the coastal fleet, a declining number of independent owner-operators 
(e.g. Stevens 1999b 43), more work for less return, and less fresh and local fish 
for higher prices. In the past when I thought I knew what was going on suddenly 
new information came to hand refuting, or seriously complicating my perceptions. 
For this project, therefore, the approach and questions were directed at allowing 
informants to express their views and their perceptions of social implications to 
emerge in the analysis. I hoped that interviews would be guided conversations that 
would:  
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Take us into the mental world of the individual, to glimpse the categories 
and logic by which he or she sees the world. It can also take us into the 
lifeworld of the individual, to see the content and pattern of daily 
experience. The long interview gives us the opportunity to step into the 
mind of another person, to see and experience the world as they do 
themselves (McCracken 1988 9). 
On a surprising number of occasions when I mentioned the subject of this research 
in casual conversation, there were vehement responses about the lack of fresh 
locally caught commercial fish, particularly from those not connected with 
fishing. Some then agreed to an interview, but for others I noted their statements 
and checked them against interviews with community people who had been 
involved with fish.  
The guidelines for qualitative research or collecting oral histories advise asking 
open questions, either attributing or not attributing meaning (e.g. Emmerson et al. 
1995; Becker 1998 14) or the implications of ideology on the 
interviewer/interviewee relationship (cf Yow 2006).   
Informants 
Table 2 outlines some of the characteristics of the informants who participated in 
the study.  The fishermen I interviewed were firstly those on Waiheke I had 
known from the Viaduct Research who lived and moored their boats on the Island. 
Soon after the introduction of the QMS virtually all quota was sold so these 
people were no longer fishing commercially
65
 and in several cases had moved off 
the island to Auckland or Northland. The Coromandel and Leigh fishermen 
interviewed were those I met on those wharves and others I‘d been able to contact 
through one of the FishServe databases
66
 or those suggested by other informants. 
In all these cases the fishermen lived in the community and, when operating, had 
generally based their boats nearby. In addition there were two fishermen, key 
informants, one in Auckland who had put his fish through the Waiheke Fish Co-
op and one in Leigh, both of whom had been enthusiastic fishermen and active 
with the Federation who I had first met while with Greenpeace. I had met Peter 
Stevens and Bob Martin earlier following my time as deckhand, when they had 
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 One is now a charter fisherman. 
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  See Appendix 1: Abbreviations and Glossary. 
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been on the Federation Executive and seen subsequently when they were part of 
the NAFMAC Roadshow and again later when I was with Greenpeace. While for 
some fishermen it was clear from the FishServe databases that they did or didn‘t 
own quota and were ACE-dependent, others clarified their position in the 
interviews. 
Informants  Fishermen Community Other Totals 
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Waiheke 10  6 9 2  27 
Coromandel 2 6 2 4 1  15 
Leigh 1 4 3 2   10 
Other 4  2  3 2 11 
Totals 17 10 13 15 6 2 63 
Table 2. Informants 
 
Notes: Of the 63 interviews with these informants 9 were informal i.e. on the 
phone and not recorded, or they either didn‘t sign the consent form or didn‘t 
explicitly give consent on the recording. Informants here are in one category only 
but could arguably be in several (‗Former fishermen‘, for example could also be 
in ‗Community‘). 
Some of the fisheries officers who had operated in the Hauraki Gulf before and in 
the early stages of the QMS were resident on Waiheke or at Coromandel. One of 
these had been a share fisherman before running boats for MAF, is almost a 
neighbour, and now runs a dive charter boat often moored in ―my‖ bay.  
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The key community people interviewed in the communities of place at 
Coromandel and Leigh were either contacted through longterm colleagues and 
residents Wendy Pond or Bill Ballantine (respectively) or were obviously 
connected with the fishing industry such as the local fish shops. The major 
exception was the licensed fish receiver at Thames who managed his shop on the 
wharf.  
Some informants from the Ministry had been with MAF Head Office or the 
Auckland Regional Office and involved with the design, introduction and 
development of the QMS and were still with MFish or were consulting. Others 
were fisheries officers who initially crewed then skippered the MAF patrol boats. 
All three had worked extensively in the Hauraki Gulf but also in the Bay of Plenty 
and up the Northland coast. Consequently, they, particularly by comparison with 
Head Office staff, were in close contact with fishermen to enforce the regulations. 
All operated boats of similar size and in the same conditions and marine 
environment so had greater understanding, indeed empathy, with the fishermen 
than officers from Head Office. 
MAORI 
I have deliberately avoided the complexities and sensitivities of Māori fisheries 
issues. They are very significant for New Zealand fisheries and Māori now have 
some 50 per cent of the quota which is being devolved to Iwi with significant 
social implications for Māori communities, whanau and individuals and also for 
those companies and fishermen who currently lease this quota. This is a 
fascinating but complex matter on which I have little background, knowledge or 
entrée. Consequently the dissertation makes only passing reference to what would 
otherwise be very important Māori issues.  Where I make comments in relation to 
the impacts on Māori of the rights-based fishing they are based on information 
that arose naturally as part of the interview or document analysis process, rather 
than something that was specifically sought or explored. A specific detailed 
exploration and analysis of the implications of rights-based fishing for Māori and 
Māori communities was beyond the scope of this research.  
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ANALYSIS 
Since the interviews were transcribed and often keyworded I tried the 
demonstration packages for many Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) programs 
before deciding on MaxQDA because it contained a graphics program and 
operated as I anticipated. Unfortunately it will not analyse audio, video or pdf 
files. I recognized the utility of working directly with audio toward the end of my 
interviewing. Pdf files are now becoming ―industry standard‖ making ability to 
work with this format essential. Other programs were used to assist the research 
project principally Word, Text Analyst and the database program Zoot as a 
repository for significant quotes and information. I also experimented with many 
other programs
67
 to facilitate data handling, understanding and writing.  
While using the computer for archiving and analysis, works on Computer Aided 
Qualitative Analysis (CAQDAS) (e.g. Barry 1988; Bong 2002; Coffey, et al. 
1996; Lee and Fielding 1996; Peace 1998) and software for Qualitative Data 
Analysis (QDA) (Kelle 1995ab, 2007; Koenig n.d., 2004; Bourdon 2006), were 
among references that guided analysis by, for example, assisting coding interview 
transcriptions and considering, open or axial coding (Urquhart 2000) and their 
subsequent interpretation. 
MaxQDA was the particular software program used for analysing the transcripts 
of my interviews. These were firstly imported into the program and a coding 
scheme set up to identify the required information. Each transcript was then read 
and relevant information, in a sentence or paragraph, marked with a code or 
codes. Alternative Boolean searches would locate a key word or combination of 
keywords and those relevant could be coded. Once the corpus was coded, 
information could be retrieved from all or selected transcripts using Boolean 
searches on the codes. 
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  X1, DTSearch for searching, MindManager to enable visualising chapters and the 
whole document and Tinderbox since I would have prefered to work with software that 
made networks, interconnected levels, multi-dimensional webs of information visual. 
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SUMMARY 
In summary, the dissertation methodology has involved a mix of methods and 
data sources attempting to cover a period of about thirty years including 
participant observation on the wharves and the boats, reviewing the different 
incarnations of the trade journals Commercial Fishing, Professional Fisherman 
and Seafood New Zealand, collecting newspaper cuttings, noting TV coverage, 
Internet searches and general interest observation. It has involved some fifty 
formal interviews, supplemented by documentary analysis. The data derived has 
been analysed using qualitative data techniques with MaxQDA.  
The lack of a clear baseline and an ongoing monitoring programme before and 
after meant the QMS cannot be robustly evaluated in the sense of objectively 
measuring its achievements and failures against its original objectives. It also 
became apparent that rather than separate case studies the communities were in 
fact one regional fishery that impacted differently on different terrestrial bounded 
communities of place. Additional matters arose in relation to the impacts of the 
exclusion of part-timers and the impact of QMS associated regulatory matters 
such as Licensed Fish Receiver (LFRs) processes. The methodology employed 
therefore sought to shed light on the lived experience of the QMS and associated 
or contemporary fishery management decisions and their implications for the 
‗communities‘ and fishermen rather than an evaluation of the QMS as originally 
intended.  
This chapter has presented the methodologies used in this research; my 
background in relation to commercial fishing, my preferred methodology, SIA 
and why it was not appropriate, the necessity of using ―grey literature‖, past 
research and interviewing - essentially ―retrospective ethnography‖, the choice of 
communities, their similarities and differences with the reason for focus on 
primarily one, and the practicalities / methods of interviewing and analysis. The 
research assumes that the ideology of each of the components (corporates, 
management, fishermen and communities) will be experienced as ethos and 
expressed as identity. Dynamic interrelations between the components, result 
concomitantly in interactions between the ideologies and hence their ethos and 
identities. The 1984 Labour government and Rogernomics meant, however, that 
neo-liberalism became the dominant ideology. Hence the dissertation will assess 
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the social implications of the QMS by examining the changes that resulted in 
ethos and identity, for local fishermen and their communities.  
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Chapter 4: A Critique of the Received View of the 
Introduction of ITQs 
The focus of this dissertation is on the changes that arose from the introduction of 
rights-based fisheries management. This chapter will, therefore, provide a critical 
evaluation of the usual explanation for the fisheries crisis and the introduction of 
the QMS to resolve it. It will examine MAF‘s ideology and its relations with a), 
the corporates that created open access and the crisis of overfishing and over 
capitalisation in the coastal fishery as exemplified by the introduction of ‗big 
boats‘, with b), coastal fishermen and their Federation with grants and loan 
schemes and with c), inshore part-timers (pluriactive fishermen) and their rural 
coastal communities. 
As my research developed it became increasingly clear that despite the critical 
comments of various commentators (e.g. Cullen and Memon 1990; Wallace 1995 
1997; Hersoug 2004) the dominant view of the QMS did not stand closer scrutiny. 
Following a critical review, this dissertation argues, therefore, that it was the 
advent of the ‗big boats‘ for the deep water fishery and Rural Bank loans for the 
development of the coastal fisheries which led to the open access which was 
blamed for stock depletion which, in turn led to rights-based management with 
ITQs. The exclusion of the part-timers shows the government‘s lack of concern 
for social implications. Indeed some informants suggested that the social 
implications for fishermen and their communities of this exclusion were more 
profound than those of the QMS (early informal interviews, Informant 14).  The 
significance of these features of the history of New Zealand fisheries has had little 
more than passing reference in the academic literature
68
.  
It was commonly believed New Zealand‘s coastal fishery was overfished but the 
National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee (NAFMAC) discussion 
document indicated ―the problem is spread disproportionately among the various 
regions, among the various fishing methods, among the various sizes of vessels 
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 Haworth‘s ―Tides of Change‖ recently published (2008) does track the 
Federation‘s concern for both the increasing fleet of ‗big boats‘ on the coast and the part-
timers.  
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operating in the trawl fishery, and among the various species which are considered 
important‖ (Struik in Boyce et al 1986 117).  
ITQs were purportedly introduced to resolve the problems of over-fishing and 
overcapitalization in New Zealand's coastal fishery. Commentators (Newell et al. 
2005 1; Boyd and Dewees 1992 184; Sissenwine and Mace 1992 148) generally 
believe that these problems were the result of open access. This dissertation 
instead argues that it was a consequence of Government policy following the 
declaration of the EEZ in response to the fishing industry and public's perception 
of foreign fishing around New Zealand. The Government‘s 'think big' 
development orientation facilitated the fishing industry's expansion of the fishing 
fleet with imported duty-free 30 metre boats for the deepwater on the one hand 
and loans for coastal boats on the other. It was government policy, therefore that 
created open access although as Cullen and Memon (1990 52) argue ―[c]ontinued 
inshore fishing effort is likely to have achieved this result unaided but the process 
was accelerated by the use of larger, more effective boats originally purchased by 
New Zealand companies for deepwater fishing. While there were a relatively large 
number of part-time fishermen, the New Zealand industry had come to be 
dominated by a number of large operators. Thus, 90 percent of the vessels caught 
less than 20 percent of the fish‖. The depletion of coastal stocks was a 
consequence of Government facilitated over-development creating the open 
access that led to the crisis. 
The big boat issue dealing with the development and corporatising of the fisheries 
involved the bigger NZ companies such as Sealord, Fletchers, Sanford, Skeggs 
and others, the government and the international market; and a high level or 
institutional perspective. The exclusion of the part-timers shows the lack concern 
for a grassroots perspective. 
FOREIGN FISHING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
NEW ZEALAND FISHING INDUSTRY 
Cozens (2001 1) argues that despite the presence of Japanese vessels fishing 
around New Zealand from the late 1950s, the advice of experts, the slowly 
developing domestic fishing industry and official reports, New Zealand was slow 
to develop an industry to take advantage of these resources. Foreign fishing 
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started with Japanese targetting tuna, then snapper longliners that provisioned and 
bunkered in New Zealand ports. While most of the fishing was not in competition 
with New Zealand vessels, longlining for snapper was. In addition, the foreign 
fishing indicated the extent of the resources was larger than realized. The New 
Zealand fleet had been catching only about one quarter of the total catch available 
in local waters (Eggleston 1977 15).  
Rees (2005 83), citing Le Heron (1996), and Sharp (1997) noted that ―[t]hrough 
'think-big' policies, the Government made large scale access to fisheries possible, 
at the expense of overseas fishing companies, in return for large scale investment 
in processing and labour. Between 1978 and 1982 the industry invested $47 
million in vessels and $25-30 million in onshore processing facilities‖. 
Brian Kenton
69
, well placed to convey the industry's perspective, indicated the 
fishing industry was aware of the foreign fishing, but became alarmed at the 
extent revealed by New Zealand Defence Department information showing that 
393 foreign fishing vessels had been identified working in waters surrounding 
New Zealand. He questioned ―why this large build up was never brought to the 
notice of the Government earlier‖ (Kenton 1977 11)? 
By 1976 the government responded to the fishing industry and public concern at 
the foreign fishing by following Iceland's lead and entered negotiations under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for enlarging NZ waters from 
the 12-mile limit to the 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (See 
Figure 10). Fishing industry leaders were skeptical of the form of access 
agreements. Peter Stevens, for example, then President of the Wellington 
Trawlermen's Association, was concerned, that ―many politicians will see 
unilateral agreement as a legal basis to trade access rights in return for sales of our 
agricultural products‖ to the detriment of the local fishing industry. He believed 
that attention to ―foreign expertise‖ was misplaced since their catching methods 
were not ―as new, better or even as efficient as ours‖. The essential difference 
was, he felt, ―(t)he large foreign fishing nations have massive markets of 
traditional fish consumers to provide a continuing incentive while our efforts have 
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  Trawlerman, Managing Director of Kenton Trawling Company Ltd of Timaru 
and President of the Federation of Commercial fishermen. 
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been inspired by individual pride, a worthy motive perhaps, but hardly the 
formula for  economic growth and survival in today's world‖ (Commercial 
Fishing, August 1976 5) 
 
Figure 10: New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Source: Max Oulton). 
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BACKGROUND: “THINK BIG” 
Although it gained wider currency in public debate Wilson claims the term ―think 
big‖ essentially arose from ―a range of large-scale, capital intensive energy related 
projects undertaken in the late 1970s by the (then) National
70
 New Zealand 
government … to reduce the escalating foreign exchange burden being imposed 
on New Zealand by the rising oil prices as a consequence of the Iranian revolution 
of 1979‖ (Wilson 2006 162).  
Wallace points out that ―[f]ishing was one of the first of the infamous Muldoonist 
"think big" policies of paying a resource rental and argued the proceeds should be 
put into a revolving fund to pay for fisheries research and management‖ (Wallace 
1997 10). Although the formal ―think big‖ policy may not have included such 
fisheries development, the ―think big‖ ideology, certainly did. Arguably, from a 
more general perspective, ―[a]s time passed the term came to embrace almost any 
new factory or industrial development which Government MPs wanted to use to 
illustrate the success of their 'National Development Strategy'‖ (Douglas and 
Callan 1987 151). 
Certainly within some sectors of the fishing industry, particularly among the 
representatives of smaller fishermen and companies, and the Labour opposition of 
the time, the loans and importing of the ‗big boats‘ epitomised the ―think big‖ 
policy. Sir Basil Arthur, then Labour Party shadow minister for primary 
industries, believed that the first victims of the ―think big‖ policy were the inshore 
fishermen and, in no uncertain terms, at the Federation's annual conference 
asserted ―the Government policies which allowed the importation of big fishing 
boats and let them fish inshore waters had caused problems. The livelihoods of 
many small fishermen had been threatened and others had been put out of work‖ 
(NZ Herald, 1981).  
Bruce Jesson, a critic of the ―think big‖ policy, contended that a result was ―a shift 
in the balance of social forces: towards groups such as the finance sector; and 
against groups such as the trade union movement … [and had] been evident since 
the late seventies‖ (Sharp 2005 139). 
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  A ―Right wing‖ party as opposed to the ―Left wing‖ Labour party. 
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As Taylor et al (1999 4), argue ―the economic benefits from developments are 
centralised, while the negative impacts of changes and the social costs arising 
from the developments are substantially borne by the regions and communities in 
which the resource development activities are located‖. Of relevance for the 
fishing industry were the: 
key influences of, and close alliance between, the interests of multinational 
capital and the State in resource development, the role of technological 
change (and imported technology) and its influence on work and its 
organisation, and the power of the corporates to restructure local society. 
These interacting, extra-local influences, when focussed on resource 
exploitation, bring changes to regional and local communities and their 
physical environments which are not anticipated or always welcomed. 
Conflicts result (Taylor et al 1999 4). 
The formal ―think big‖ policy discredited Muldoon's National Government and 
resulted in significant detriments to the communities directly affected by the 
projects and added further indebtedness to New Zealand. In addition, by less 
formal extension, the ―think big‖ philosophy that led to the importation of the ‗big 
boats,‘ increased corporatisation of the industry and also impacted severely on the 
inshore fishermen and their coastal communities. 
A result of the ―think big‖ policy was, Wilson argues, that ―[t]he debt incurred by 
the 'think big' projects also bolstered the neoliberal rationale for the selling of 
other state assets – such as banks, railways and airlines. Where privatization was 
not feasible, other sectors of the economy were restructured through 
corporatisation and deregulation‖ (Wilson 2006 162) and in turn led to the 
introduction of the QMS. 
BIG BOATS 
A key plank in the argument for introducing neoliberal ITQ systems is that they 
will enable industry rationalization and this is often interpreted as meaning 
investment in bigger boats of greater capacity and the removal of smaller vessels 
(Aslin et al, 2001 23). It is important to note that that this was not a consequence 
of anticipating the introduction of the ITQ system. 
Connor observed significantly that, ―[b]oth the number of 24-33m vessels and 
their total capacity increased by nearly 500 per cent in the decade leading up to 
implementation of the quota system in 1986, while the number of vessels over 
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33m in length increased by an order of magnitude. Some of these large vessels, 
imported under duty concessions to increase domestic participation in the deep-
water species, had also been fishing inshore, increasing pressure on stocks‖ 
(Connor 2000). 
Even before the declaration of the EEZ, New Zealand companies, ostensibly 
gearing up to supplant the foreign fishing fleet were evaluating and importing ‗big 
boats‘ in the 100 foot/30 metre size range under the duty-free scheme. Fletcher 
Fishing had imported two British Distant Water trawlers (86.06 m length overall 
(l.o.a.)) (Lovie 1988 168, 169). These were of compatible size to the foreign 
factory trawlers already fishing in New Zealand waters. Other companies, 
however, focused on a smaller class.  "Skeggs … commissioned two 100ft stern-
trawlers … at a total cost of $2 million‖ (Avery 1007 13) while Wrightsons NMA 
sent a team overseas to examine ―fishing vessels of the [same] 30 metre class in 
Denmark, Spain and Korea and called for quotations from shipyards in those 
countries‖ (Avery 1977 13). Sealord‘s two new196-ton (199.15 tonne) trawlers 
began pair trawling in mid September and, ―put the New Zealand industry on a 
technical footing with the world's big league fishing countries‖ (Commercial 
Fishing, November 1977, 31).  
By late 1977 some coastal fishermen were concerned at the prospect of the ‗big 
boats‘ competing with the more traditional vessels on the coast. The Moeraki 
Fishermen's Association, for example, had made submissions to the Federation: 
―The inshore fishery has already been ruined by foreign boats and there is not 
enough for the small inshore fleet. What will happen if big New Zealand owned 
trawlers choose to fish inshore?‖ Then, tellingly in terms of the part-timers and 
the issues concerned to be addressed in this dissertation, ―As I see it, the smaller 
boats are going to be hammered by part-timers from the shore side and the big 
trawlers from the sea side‖ (Commercial Fishing November 1977 15). Kenton 
confirmed the perspective: ―I think the big New Zealand trawlers are going to be 
more of a problem to the established New Zealand fishermen than the foreign 
boats. There is no way the ‗big boats‘ are going to be able to fish out of the 
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developed area
71
 all of the time. They are not big enough to be in the hunt, like the 
Japanese and the Russian boats‖ (Commercial Fishing November 1977 15).  
Cliff Skeggs, managing director of Skeggs Fisheries Ltd
72
, took the opposite view, 
essentially implying that the companies should be able to expand regardless of the 
consequences for the coastal fishery ―We've got to grow up to the fact that we are 
all New Zealanders and that they are all New Zealand fishing grounds. There must 
be no discrimination between small trawlers and large trawlers. The grounds must 
be fished to their capacity. Large trawlers have to be serviced just like the smaller 
ones.‖ He did concede that the inshore grounds had been overfished and the main 
potential for the ‗big boats‘ was ―out on the continental shelf‖ (Commercial 
Fishing November 1977 15). 
PAIR TRAWLERS 
In the light of Skeggs‘ comments, it is significant that many of these ‗big boats‘ 
were built or bought in pairs and set up for pair trawling
73
. Mills (1978 64,65) in 
discussing 30 metre vessels, refers to rejecting designs not suitable for pair 
trawling and states explicitly, ―The vessels were laid out so they can pair trawl as 
well as single trawl if required‖. Titchener's account of Sanford‘s search for 
vessels in the 95-foot class (30 metre) and then the trialling of the first pair, the 
Albert Sanford and San Rakino, confirms that not only were they set up for pair 
trawling but that they immediately entered the coastal North Island West Coast 
fishery (for snapper) using that method. They were so successful that Sanford‘s 
ordered a second pair, San Hauraki (See Figure11 and Figure12 for size 
comparison) and San Manukau. The naming ceremony and their trials pair 
trawling in the Hauraki Gulf were attended by both, Hon. Duncan McIntyre, 
Minister of Fisheries and Hon. Jim Bolger, former Minister of Fisheries but then 
                                                 
71
 By the ―developed area‖ he was referring to the traditional coastal fishery.  
72
  One of the large fishing companies. 
73
  Pair trawling involves two matched boats towing a net between them. Fishermen 
who used this method argued it is more power and fuel efficient and catches more than 
the combined catches from single trawling. Before the QMS Fishermen using other, 
particularly passive methods, argue pair trawling takes too great a share of the catch 
(Viaduct Research). 
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Minister of Labour, immediately before they left for fishing on the West Coast 
(Titchener 1982 112 113). So the Government was fully cognizant they were 
operating in the inshore fishery
74
. 
 
Figure 11: San Hauraki, one of the ‘Big Boats’ that pair trawled for snapper in 
the coastal fishery 
 
Figure 12: Cotapaxi, primarily a snapper Danish seiner but multi-purpose fishing 
vessel here handlining for bluefin tuna. She is a sister of Diana the vessel I 
crewed on. 
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  This would not have been unreasonable had the ‗big boats‘ remained in the more 
exposed fisheries of the West Coast but many also encroached on already crowded 
inshore fisheries.  
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Likewise Skeggs ‗big boats‘, Hawea and Waipouri, Sealord Products Fifeshire 
and Whitby and Jaybelle-Nichemo's Recovery II and Resolution all pair trawled 
and this method was a prime consideration in their design. Pair trawling is most 
closely associated with the snapper fishery and I have not found evidence of its 
use in other New Zealand fisheries. Johnson's only references to the method are 
all in relation to vessels targeting snapper (Johnson and Haworth 2004 302-306) 
so that it seems that far from being bought primarily for the deepwater the ―pairs‖ 
were bought for and first used on the coast for snapper. While their use in the 
exposed conditions in the West Coast snapper fishery may have been justified 
since they were not generally in conflict with smaller boats, the ‗Big Boat‘ ‗pairs‘ 
were also used in the already congested east coast snapper fishery (Haworth 2008 
240, 242). Certainly it appears that high value coastal species were essential for 
their economic viability. So instead of deepwater usage in practice, from 
Johnson's account there are hints that the investments in the ‗big boats‘ were 
directed at demonstrating fishing commitment in a bid for deepwater quota 
(Johnson and Haworth 2004 297). This raises the very significant issue of whether 
these vessels were bought in anticipation of the QMS, or as I have assumed, by 
―quota‖75 Johnson meant share (Enterprise Allowances (EAs)) of the deepwater 
resources.  
When, in 1978, at the Demersal Fisheries Conference, conservationists questioned 
bringing more fishing vessels into the coastal zone (Elder and Taylor 1978 70). 
Mr MacKay
76, answered they ―were exploiting coastal species in order to obtain 
overseas earnings‖ (Elder and Taylor 1978 71). Others were also skeptical. Dr 
Elder
77, felt that the imported 30 metre vessels ―were not really being aimed at 
deepwater species, but at the already exploited coastal stocks‖ (Elder and Taylor 
1978 71) while Mr Waugh
78, expressed his belief that these vessels ―would not be 
able to fish the deepwater resources‖ but felt they should replace smaller less 
                                                 
75
  Prior to the QMS fisheries were managed with a competitive quota for the 
species in the FMA so the term was in general use but its meaning here is unresolved. 
76
  President N.Z. Seafood Processors Association and Managing Director Nelson 
Fisheries Ltd. 
77
  A scientist with the Fisheries Research Division (FRD) of MAF  
78
  Also from FRD. 
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efficient vessels on the coast (Elder and Taylor 1978 71). Elder and Taylor 
concluded that those present felt those vessels were adding to the fleet rather than 
replacing other vessels (Elder and Taylor 1978 71).  
From the perspective of Hauraki Gulf owner-operators, Catton (1978 111) 
suggested that whereas the small vessels using passive fishing methods ensured 
the quality of each fish, the bigger company boats using power methods landed 
lower quality fish and had lower rates of financial efficiency since they require a 
higher proportion of their profits to pay for the bigger boats. Indeed he felt the 
situation was ―scandalous‖. The ‗big boats‘ showed the incongruity of the 
situation since it appeared that one part of the Government was saying the stocks 
were fully fished or, like his own species, snapper, possibly overexploited, while 
another part ―appears to be providing duty concessions, and presumably loan 
monies, to enable an increase in catching effort in that fishery‖ (Catton 1978 111, 
113).  
By 1980 the consequences of the ―think big‖ policy were becoming very apparent. 
Mel Courtney, MP for Nelson and convenor of the Opposition fisheries' sub-
committee on production and marketing, in asserting ―the policy is falling apart‖, 
expressed the view of many. ―The industry … expanded so rapidly it was 
overcapitalized with too many boats … [t)he inshore fleet expanded and joint 
venture and duty-free boats exerted further pressure‖ (Commercial Fishing June 
1980 5). 
Some fishermen were in deep financial trouble and in 1980 felt ―the last few 
months … (had) been one of the worst 'lows' for years. The industry wanted 
subsidies but there were equitability problems since what would benefit larger 
operations would do little to help the smaller fishermen‖ (Commercial Fishing 
June 1980 5). The big companies were also facing serious problems. Skeggs, for 
example, just three years after the euphoria of buying their ‗big boats‘, reportedly 
lost $418,000 in eight months from their Nelson operation with the ‗big boats‘, 
Hawea and Waipouri losing $11,201 on just one trip, and, consequently they were 
tied up (Commercial Fishing June 1980 7). Doubts were being raised about the 
longterm viability of prime species such as snapper from the traditional fishing 
grounds of the coastal fleet as a result of ―increased fishing pressure applied by 
larger more sophisticated vessels‖ (Riley 1982 380).  
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By 1983 coastal fishermen were very concerned about the status of their stocks. In 
the run up to the industry restructuring that resulted in the introduction of ITQs, 
NAFMAC (consisting of top level representatives of the big fishing companies, 
MAF divisions, the Fishing Industry Board, The Federation of Commercial 
Fishermen and the Fishing Industry Association) published a discussion document 
providing an overview of New Zealand Fisheries and then conducted ―The 
Roadshow‖, a series of meetings in all the main fishing ports to consult with 
fishermen. The belief at the time was that to ensure sustainability of the coastal 
stocks, fishing effort had to be reduced by 40 per cent. While the document had 
been circulated to some prior to the meetings, in general it was handed to 
fishermen as they entered. It noted ―trawlers over 18 metres operating in the 
inshore fishery comprise 40 per cent of the trawl fleet, land 42 per cent of the total 
catch and 72 per cent of the trawl catch and may incur significant losses‖ 
(NAFMAC 1983 4).   
Box 2: ‘Big Boats’ and Part-timers' catch compared 
Arguments that part-timers contributed to overfishing are difficult to sustain. 
From the NAFMAC Report (1983), boats are listed in descending / ascending 
order of landings (NAFMAC 100) the top 50 boats which would have included 
the newly imported ‗big boats‘ caught 43,139 tonnes making the average catch per 
vessel 862.78 tonnes. Just 2.2 average ‗big boat‘ catches were therefore equivalent 
to the tonnage landed by the bottom 2,000 boats. It took only 88 per cent of the 
average ―Big Boat‖ catch to equate to the catch of the bottom 1,500 vessels and 
merely 22 per cent to be equivalent to the catch from the bottom 1000 vessels. So 
the catch of the excluded 2260 fishermen had been approximately that of 2.4 ‗big 
boats‘ while that of the estimated 1500-1800 part-timers excluded had 
approximated the catch of between only one or two such average ‗big boats‘. 
 
 
The most significant finding of the document was that ―in 1981 the top 50 boats 
accounted for 45 per cent of the total landings while the bottom 3,500 boats 
accounted for only 20 per cent of the total,‖ (NAFMAC 1983 100) and further, the 
bottom 2000 of the latter, landed only 4.1 per cent of the total landings (See Box 
2). The top boats were clearly the big company boats and included those ‗big 
boats‘ imported duty free or built with suspensory loans. It seemed that if MAF's 
prime motive had been to save the coastal fishery these vessels could have been 
traded-up into vessels suitable for the deepwater. The Government and the 
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companies did have the financial expertise and contacts to achieve this. Mistakes 
had been made with the size of these boats and there were calls for the ―New 
Zealandisation‖ of the industry that should have encouraged such a move. Indeed 
it was not long before companies working in the deepwater began buying much 
larger factory trawlers. Instead, in order to save four per cent of landings the 
Government excluded the part-timers. The only explanation appears to be the 
Government‘s concern at the potential loss the trawlers would make on the 
inshore fishery. Robin Allen
79
 presenting MAF's perspective on this conflict 
within the fishing industry noted that the ―[m]edium sized trawlers, who must 
make their living from the prime inshore species such as snapper and tarakihi, are 
concerned that larger trawlers which have been purchased to fish in deeper waters 
offshore are also attracted to the prime inshore species‖ (Allen 1983 23) but 
justifies leaving such ‗big boats‘ in the inshore fisheries since ―there may be low 
valued resources in the inshore areas which are not attractive for small and 
medium sized fishing boats, but which could be effectively used by larger fishing 
boats were they not excluded from the area‖ (Allen 1983 24). Which begs the 
question as to why the ‗big boats‘ were still allowed to fish prime inshore species.  
It may well be that the companies‘ choice of vessel size was unduly swayed by the 
advice of their local skippers and familiarity with the domestic market. But since 
Government Ministers were hosted aboard during pair trawling trials just the day 
before departure for snapper fishing grounds it is hard to believe that the 
Government did not know the ‗big boats‘ would in fact be adding pressure in 
already fully fished coastal fisheries. It is hardly plausible that this extra pressure 
could be applied without not just Government awareness, but also Government 
approval. Rather it seems part of a defacto policy, to corporatise the coastal 
fisheries. 
                                                 
79
  MAF / Assistant Director Fisheries Research Division 
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RURAL BANKING AND FINANCE CORPORATION 
LOANS 
As noted above, even while companies were importing ‗big boats‘ and forming 
joint ventures to supplant foreign fishing the Government was offering suspensory 
loans to build bigger coastal vessels and MAF was already warning that coastal 
fisheries were fully fished. 
Ironically the same issue of Commercial Fishing (September 1977) reported both 
Duncan Waugh‘s80, warning to the annual conference of the Federation of 
Commercial Fishermen that the ―Inshore demersally [bottom fish] caught stocks 
were fully fished.‖ (Commercial Fishing September 1977 17) and the Minister of 
Fishing, Mr. Bolger's, Budget announcement of suspensory loans for building 
larger, at least 21 metre, fishing vessels in New Zealand and "the special fishing 
boat scheme ... designed to assist suitably qualified fishermen who had 
demonstrated thrift and initiative but who had relatively little capital to purchase 
and operate their own fishing vessels, both from the Rural Banking and Finance 
Corporation (Commercial Fishing, September 1977 41; see also Information 
services 1977).  
In outlining the proposals for the EEZ the Minister of Fisheries assured the 
conference, that the government was ―committed to the expansion of your 
industry as rapidly as our investment resources will allow‖. Addressing concern at 
direct foreign competition with New Zealand coastal fishermen he noted that 
―These 'prime fish' will … be wholly reserved for the New Zealand industry so 
that our local fleet will be entitled to catch the lot.‖ (Commercial Fishing July 
1977 8, 9). The 1976 budget had made provision for ―fishermen or companies to 
import larger fishing vessels duty free. To date, eight vessels worth $9 million 
have been approved and further applications are under consideration‖ 
(Commercial Fishing July 1977 8, 9). By contrast, the minister pointed out that in 
―1975 there were only nine fishing vessels on the New Zealand coast longer than 
24 metres‖ (Commercial Fishing July 1977 8, 9). So the government was prepared 
to double ‗big boat‘ capacity despite concerns that the stocks were fully fished. 
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  Research Director of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.   
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The EEZ was declared on 1 April 1978 and later that year the Government 
confirmed its development policy by extending the ―deadline for the duty-free 
importation of larger fishing vessels‖ because ―[s]imply, it is that we still need 
larger, more versatile vessels in our fleet‖ (Bolger 1978 3). He also noted a second 
suspensory loan scheme contributing to the construction of 15-21 metre coastal 
vessels while the previous scheme for smaller vessels now had a rider attached  
―for larger vessels than last year‖ though these vessels were to ―concentrate on the 
less preferred species‖ (Bolger 1978 3).  
With sectors of the public and industry already facing conflict with the 30 metre 
‗big boats‘, Neil Mills, Sanford‘s General Manager felt it necessary to assure the 
demersal fisheries conference that ―the planning of these (30 metre) vessels 
involved a large number of people from each section of our business, especially 
fishermen, engineers, factory executives, marketers and accountants were 
especially involved‖ and the company had considered all the relevant facts. He 
felt Sanford‘s decision to buy such vessels had been confirmed when both Sealord 
Products and Skeggs Fisheries reached the same decision quite independently 
(Mills 1978 64). Indeed, I recall that some years later when attending a MAF 
Stock Assessment meeting, a CEO with one of the companies operating ‗big 
boats‘ told me that they had done their homework, sought the best information 
and followed the best advice available, but despite this the 30 metre boats were 
clearly too small to work the Chatham Rise and other deep water grounds so had 
to fish the traditional coastal fisheries.  
Ostensibly at least, the goal, from the Government's ―think big‖ perspective, was 
to develop an internationally competitive New Zealand fishing industry. The big 
companies wanted to demonstrate commitment to the deepwater with bigger boats 
but of a size still within their experience and the expertise of New Zealand crews. 
In order to maintain economic viability they stuck with the methods and species 
they were familiar with. From the perspective of the Federation of Commercial 
Fishermen, the smaller companies and more traditional owner-operators, the 
coastal fisheries were under severe pressure and to save their livelihood 
desperately needed restructuring. 
The prime inshore species were being depleted initially as a result of foreign 
fishing. The rapid, Government facilitated, expansion of the fleet especially with 
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the imported duty-free 30 metre ‗big boats‘ and other loans for boats bigger than 
those in the traditional coastal fleet, then created the problems of 
overcapitalization and overfishing. Since the ‗big boats‘ being bought for the deep 
water were neither restricted to the deep water nor being replaced by more 
appropriate deepwater boats, deliberately or otherwise, the coastal fishery was 
being corporatised for the benefit of the larger companies to the eventual 
detriment of the smaller and individual fishermen and their communities. 
Rightly or wrongly there was a steady progression developing the corporate fleet, 
creating open access and taking over the coastal fishery from the traditional 
fishermen and the communities that they supported and which supported them. 
Part-Timers 
If the issue of the ‗big boats‘ provides perspectives on the discourse frameworks 
of the ―top‖ then an analysis of the discourse surrounding the exclusion of the 
part-timers shows the perspectives from the ―bottom‖ of the fishing industry. 
It has been argued that the exclusion of the part-timers happened in the context of 
MAF's growing recognition, in the late 1970s early 1980s, that existing 
management methods including a moratorium on issuing new licences, and the 
declaration of controlled fisheries were not working (Sinner and Fenemor 2005 3). 
McManus, reported the sequence of regulation ―... the government ordered a 
moratorium on commercial fishing permits in the Hauraki Gulf in 1980 and on 
fishing permits generally in 1982, these were revoked by the Fisheries Act of 
1983‖, but was critical of official ―wrong doing‖ in the implementation of these 
policies showing why many fishermen felt disaffected (McManus 1994 1, 2; see 
Other Perspectives, p139).  
PLURIACTIVE FISHERY NEW ZEALAND  
Prior to the early 1980s there appears to have been a significant level of 
pluriactivity in New Zealand although little research was done on its importance, 
especially in the fisheries. Russell and Campbell (1999 122) claimed that ―[a]t the 
start of the 1970s, the fishing industry was characterized by a large number of 
small-scale and often pluriactive fishers engaged in commercial fishing, with 
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another large group also engaged in fishing on a recreational basis. There were 
few large companies involved and little exporting‖. 
Compulsory licensing of fishermen first came into effect in January 1940 and 
Johnson and Haworth found that ―there were 362 full-time and 1341 part-time 
fishermen in the industry. Another 319 full-time and 119 part-timers were classed 
as 'other than fishermen' but licensed all the same. Others worked in the fishing 
industry but not on boats. A year later there were 972 full-time fishermen and 761 
part-time‖ (Johnson and Haworth 2004 134,135). In the late seventies the Gulf 
News reported that in the Hauraki Gulf, ―An increasing number of part-time 
fishermen are also engaged in the fishery. In 1978, out of 680 registered 
commercial vessels in Auckland, 545 earned under $4000 gross from fish 
landings‖ (Gulf News 7 November 1980 16). 
Part-time fishing was part of a thriving informal economy in the 1970s-1980s 
involving sharing and exchange of food and produce in small communities 
(Johnson and Haworth 2004 358). Many of the part-time fishermen were at or 
near the level of subsistence fishing and some may in fact have been subsistence 
fishermen. In their survey of subsistence fishers Ackroyd Walshe et al. (2002) 
distinguished between economic and social/cultural fishers where the former 
―harvests for him/herself and or immediate dependants and uses the surplus for 
small-scale commerce‖ (Akroyd Walshe et al 2002 1), and the ―social/cultural 
subsistence fisher gifts fish for reciprocity and mutual purposes. The definition 
does not include reciprocity for immediate or near term material benefit, such as 
swapping fish or other commodities or benefits at the time of the transaction‖ and 
would be illegal under the QMS (Akroyd Walshe Ltd. et al. 2002 2). Māori 
customary fishing exemplifies the latter category. Now though, Pita Rikys, one of 
my few Māori informants stated strongly, from first hand experience, that both the 
recreational and customary fishing limits are quite inadequate for Māori 
subsistence purposes.  
Akroyd Walshe Ltd. et al (2002 24) also note that the informal economy has 
different referents for different researchers: 
Work activities other than regular formal employment that are 
remunerated either in cash or in kind' … the term has also been applied 
very broadly to include non-economic aspects such as an individual's sense 
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of place in a larger community as well as overall community integration. 
Under the informal economy non-wage activities 'are ultimately geared 
toward economic ends even if they are maintained or practiced through 
overt social relationships which may exhibit positive social and cultural 
benefits for their participants'.  
Unexpectedly my research found that this informal economy, though not as 
extensive as it was then, nor as apparent, still continues. Scott sketches the 
contemporary context. ―In addition to paid work … there are informal means 
largely outside the realms of the state and the market by which households can 
supplement their incomes, based on self-provisioning, unpaid domestic and 
community work and reciprocal exchange within localities‖ (Scott 2000 39). 
Before the exclusion, fish in the informal economy networks would often have 
been from the part-timer catch. Now the fish is from the recreational catch but 
judging from a New Zealand television series on coastal surveillance and court 
prosecutions, it may also be from illegal catch. Fish were certainly among the 
resources that contribute to such family and household self-provisioning, 
subsistence and the reciprocity that strengthens community networks. 
WHO WERE THE PART-TIMERS? 
Not all the part-timers were, like Walter Murray (See Box 3), based in relatively 
isolated rural communities and dependent on seasonal work. Part-timers were a 
diverse group. For some, fishing provided an essential part of their livelihood and 
for others it was a supplement for other incomes, for tax rorts or other perks. 
Many of the former were seasonal workers in other primary sectors such as 
farming, forestry, or the meat processing (the freezing) works (Rennie 1998), 
while many of the latter were professionals taking time out from other 
occupations or using part-time fishing to get sales tax off their recreational boats, 
berthing space in the Viaduct or to cover their holiday expenses (Viaduct 
Research notes). 
 
Seasonal fishermen  
Numerically part-timers dominated the New Zealand domestic fishery and in 
some regions their livelihood activities included in addition to seasonal fishing, 
farming, forestry or work in the meat processing industry (the freezing works).  
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Taylor et al. (1999 6), in surveying New Zealand resource communities, found 
that [in contrast to commercial fishing] in the period 1986-96, ―across most 
primary sectors, full-time employment gave way to part-time employment‖. While 
the Taylor Baines consultants show the significance of part-time fishermen they 
do not refer specifically to the exclusion of part-timers in 1983 and just indicate 
―small operators withdrew from the fishery‖ (McClintock 2000 7). Their study of 
Riverton exemplified the dependence of communities before the exclusion of part-
timers, especially in the period 1950-1970, ―on the fishing, agriculture and meat 
processing industries‖ and indicated that ―many part-time fishers were also 
employed as seasonal workers on farms or at nearby freezing works‖ (McClintock 
2000 4) while many others were transient fishers ―attracted by the rock lobster and 
paua [abalone] booms‖ (McClintock 2000 6). In addition there were ―a lot of 
seasonal fishers catching rock lobster during the boom years‖ and many of these 
―according to one of our informants … were 'instinctive fishermen' and 'the best 
conservators', with a comprehensive knowledge of their fishing territory‖ 
(McClintock 2000 10). 
Box 3: Part-timers dependent on commercial fish excluded 
The following exemplifies the situation of rural (seasonal, isolated) part-time 
fishermen dependent on fishing who were excluded by the definition of full-time 
fishermen 1 October 1983. 
Walter Murray 
Walter Murray moved back to Te Hapua initially to become a fisherman 
setnetting for mullet, a non-endangered species (Murray 18 September 1984). He 
was granted a permit under the Fisheries Act 1908 in 1978 (Watson 29 August 
1985) and was dependent on fishing to supplement the $6500 he earned as a 
casual driver of the school bus especially since he did ―not get any income during 
the three months School Vacations‖ (Murray, 31 October 1983). It took him six 
years to accumulate his fishing gear, a boat and finally a freezer after Hikurangi 
Fisheries ―reclaimed this equipment in March 1982‖ (Murray, 31 October 1983). 
His ―motor was damaged in February '83 & parts were not available immediately. 
I only received the motor back in January 1984‖ (Murray 25 May 1984).  
Consequently he did not meet the criteria defining a fisherman under Section 2 
Fisheries Act 1983 (in force 1 October 1983) and, like 2260 others around New 
Zealand (McClurg 1997 102; Sharp 1997 510), his fisheries permit was not 
renewed.  
MAF stated, and then in the process of appeal reiterated, the ―criteria defining 
commercial fishermen include persons who: have earnt at least $10,000 from 
fishing; or at least 80% of their total gross income is derived from fishing; or 
126 
 
annually catch a minimum of 5,000kg of fish; or are on less than a subsistence 
income (which is $4,400pa)‖. And explained: ―The inshore fishery is facing major 
problems and a substantial reduction in fishing effort will need to be made in 
order to ensure a continuing industry. The definition of a ‗commercial fisherman‘ 
is designed to exclude those persons who have another occupation or source of 
income‖. They conclude: ―After careful consideration of the information you have 
supplied, as well as of records of fishing returns held by the Ministry, it has been 
decided that you do not qualify as a commercial fisherman in terms of the Act and 
therefore no fishing permit can be issued to you‖ (Dobson 2 March 1984). 
Walter Murray appealed and in the process some 22 letters were exchanged 
variously between Murray, MAF, Hon. Bruce Gregory, his local MP and Colin 
Moyle, Minister of Fisheries and J.W. Watson of the law firm John Hooper.  
 
He ―commenced fishing again in February (1984) on the assumption that I would 
obtain the permit and to date I find that I meet your minimum catch requirement 
of 5000kg & only in 4 months‖. ―Receival Dockets for the period February, May 
'84 show(ed) a total in excess of 6000kg‖ (Murray 25 May 1984) but he was still 
excluded. 
So despite the isolation of Te Hapua, Murray's financial commitment to 
commercial fishing, lack of employment opportunities in the area, the exigencies 
of his situation and the leniency in allowing the ‗big boats‘ to remain fishing on 
the coast, MAF was intransigent and Walter Murray was excluded from the 
fishery (Murray 1987). 
 
 
Small-scale Fishermen 
The exclusion didn't only affect part-time commercial fishermen. Soon after the 
Fisheries Act 1983 came into force, but before fishing permits had been declined, 
the New Zealand Herald ran a story about three fishermen, which I take as being 
typical of the many who expected to be excluded by the policy. Mr Roy Morey, 
based in Taipa, had started fishing with a dinghy and oars before graduating to a 
five metre boat and had been a commercial fisherman for 28 years. Mr Colin Pugh 
operated from Houhora in the Far North and Mr Ough had been fishing in 
Northland for seven years after part-time fishing the Hauraki Gulf. Like many 
other small commercial fishermen around the coast they expected to be excluded. 
They, like Walter Murray, had the right to appeal. They did agree on the necessity 
for conservation but wondered why the Ministry did not exclude the big trawlers. 
Landing and reporting $10,000 of fish, the previous year were the criteria to be 
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considered. Mr Pugh, had ‗―caught only $8,000 worth of fish and that was enough 
for him to live on‖ he said. His commitment to fishing had involved an estimated 
$100,000 moving to the North and the anticipation of fishing until he was 80. He 
was, he felt ‗a classic example of how to turn a small amount of fish into a 
reasonable income. We get by all right‘‖. They blamed the depletion on the big 
trawlers and believed that if only two pair trawlers were removed forty local 
longliners, compared with the five crew on the trawlers, would have jobs for life. 
They could not understand why, "[i]f the ministry wants to reduce the strain on 
fish stocks … it is making life difficult for the small owner-operators who make 
the least impact on the resource‖ (NZ Herald 7 November 1983). 
So unlike the corporates wanting allocation of the deepwater resource, neither 
financial commitment to fishing nor dependence on this occupation was 
considered sufficient for part-timers wanting to remain in the industry. 
Urban part-timers  
During my 1982-83 research, Viaduct informants, said of part-timers: ―[t]hey're 
doctors and dentists and just in it to take the cream … Part-timers are public 
servants, school teachers who have annual leave; all of them are in it for a fast 
buck. Summer, what's better to do?‖ (Viaduct Research). ―As a result of the ready 
granting of licences ‗fly-by-night‘ fishermen have taken advantage of the good 
money to be made in the schooling season – often dumping cheap fish on the 
market at a time of the year when year-round fishermen are starting to recoup 
winter losses. Several local fishermen mentioned the North Shore company 
directors who take two months off to reap the benefits of the lucrative summer 
season‖ (Gulf News 30 July 1982 30). 
Heuristically there were two broad categories of part-timers; rural fishermen 
dependent on the fishery for a yearly income with little if any alternative 
employment and urban-based part-timers with more options. Rural part-timers and 
other excluded fishermen were diverse, often from very different backgrounds and 
with very different emotional or financial dependence on commercial fishing for 
their annual livelihoods or lifestyles. They and their fishing were, however, a 
significant part of both formal and informal economies of rural communities right 
around the coast.  
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THE EXCLUSION OF THE PART-TIMERS 
The mechanism to exclude the part-timers was the Fisheries Act 1983. Very 
significantly Martin asserted ―when the exclusion of part-timers was undertaken 
in October 1983 ITQs in the form we now have them had not yet been seriously 
considered. In hindsight we clearly must acknowledge that if we had been able to 
introduce the ITQ policy in 1983 the removal of part-timers would not have been 
necessary‖ (Martin 1987 Appendix p1). 
Stan Crothers
81
, to clarify the Ministry perspective, said:  
Because of poor policy settings there was a burgeoning of actual and latent 
fishing effort in the inshore fishery. This excess effort was leading to the 
overfishing of many of our high value inshore fish stocks. Part timers were 
seen as part of this increasing problem. Many fishers had permits for many 
fishing methods across many different fisheries that could be used at any 
time. i.e. there was no real control on fishing effort. 
Like the Federation: 
MAF analysis showed there were two distinct groups of part time fishers. 
The first group consisted of lifestylers, working part of the year fishing and 
the rest on such activities as possum trapping, shearing, fencing, forestry 
etc. This group largely lived in regional/rural areas. Many were Māori. The 
second group of part timers were largely urban dwellers in full time 
employment who held fishing permits to get around sales tax, offset 
income tax, enable them to sell their excess recreational catch etc. The 
policy to remove part timers did not distinguish between these two groups. 
The policy was a complete failure. It did not reduce or control fishing 
effort and probably had a much greater adverse social impact than any 
fishery policy before or after it, including the implementation of ITQs. It 
certainly provoked Māori into thinking about the nature and extent of their 
customary fishing rights protected by both the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
Fisheries Act (Stan Crothers 4 June 2009). 
The MAF perspective was not uniform across the department. While Head Office 
personnel were instrumental in developing the policy, operational staff such as 
MAF fisheries officers, working face to face with fishermen on a day to day basis 
and others based in the rural centres, were very aware of the personal and 
community hardship it would involve, especially in rural areas.  
Regional fisheries officers wrestled with the problems of playing God to 
many families who relied on fishing for part of their income. At the same 
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  When interviewed he was Assistant Director of MAF but retired soon after.  
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time they also relished the opportunity to clean out some of the more 
destructive and difficult people in the industry: those who poached, sold 
for cash, filed misleading or false returns could be excluded by the 'under 
$10,000 provision (Johnson and Haworth 2004 359).  
WAS EXCLUSION THE FIRST-CUT FOR ITQS? 
MAF sources reviewed are adamant that when the part-timers were excluded ITQs 
were not envisaged and the exclusion policy was not related to the introduction of 
the QMS. McClurg (1997 102), for example, states explicitly that ―[it] is a 
mistake to view … [exclusion of the part-timers] as a planned or necessary 
precursor to the introduction of ITQs three years later. ITQs were not under 
consideration at that time and analysis focused on the possible application of boat 
buy-back schemes, though some feared that buying vessels from part-timer fishers 
would prove expensive and remove little effort‖ (McClurg 1997 102). 
Kim Walshe, who was MAF Regional Manager (Auckland) when ITQs were 
introduced also refuted my suggestion that the exclusion of the part-timers was 
part of the lead up to the introduction of ITQs.  
ITQs were not decided on – the Minister at the time, who was McIntyre, 
was not prepared to go with ITQs so it was not until Moyle came in with 
them. [Within] a week of Moyle coming in with the new Labour 
government, he called the Ministry together and said: ―Right we‘re going 
to move on ITQs – I‘ve decided that‘s the way to go.‖ But prior to that it 
was technically correct to say that it was not the precursor to ITQs because 
even though I was heavily involved with people like Ray Dobson in the 
process, the Director of Fisheries Management at the time which is Brian 
Cunningham, all the time he was there, he was adamantly opposed to 
ITQs. So there was a lot of scepticism from the Ministry about ITQs (Kim 
Walshe, pers com 4 April 2007). 
Neil Martin (1987 1), a MAF officer, in an appendix to his presentation to the 
Waitangi Tribunal Hearing of ―The Muriwhenua Claim‖ at Te Hapua, states that: 
"the first point which must be stressed is the policy which excluded part-timers 
was quite separate from the ITQ policy. The exclusion of part-timers was a 
management measure introduced to cope with the growing policy of overfishing‖. 
Likewise Ministry informants (Stan Crothers
82
 and Jonathan Peacey
83
, pers com 
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  Deputy Chief Executive, Mfish. 
83
  National Manager Fisheries Operations, Mfish. 
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21 November 2006) and MFish personnel at Chris Deewes' seminar (5 May 
2006), all made the same assertion. In strict policy terms that may be correct, but 
there are wider issues in terms of social process. 
Indeed Crothers emphasised: 
There is an urban myth that the policy to remove part timers was part of 
the government‘s strategy to implement ITQs. At the time in question, as 
the Chief Fishery Officer, I was involved in the fisheries policy and 
operational areas of MAF at a senior level. I am unaware of any factual 
foundation for this notion. Indeed many officials have sworn on oath that 
there was no connection between the two policies. In my view this is just 
another conspiracy that seems to thrive in this sector (Stan Crothers 4 June 
2009). 
Kim Walshe
84
, pointed out that the exclusion of the part-timers was his first job 
when he had been promoted to Head Office (pers com 4 April 2007). Johnson and 
Haworth confirm, stating  
Newly appointed assistant director Kim Walshe made the first public 
announcement on reducing effort. Part-timers were seen as a threat, able to 
increase effort if they became full time. 'They must be removed from the 
inshore fishery now,' said Walshe. While the timing of his comment could 
have been seen as a reaction to Stevens' [effort reduction] paper, it was 
merely stating the official attitude which had now gained added strength 
from the new Act's definition of a commercial fisherman (Johnson and 
Haworth 2004 357). 
Walshe, contradicting Crother‘s emphasis, asserts that  
The exclusion of part-timers was driven almost exclusively not by the 
Ministry but by the Federation of Commercial Fishermen, in particular 
Peter Stevens. Their concern was that … part-timer fishers were the nub or 
one of the major ways in which they could reduce effort because by that 
stage everybody had got concerned there was too much effort in the 
fishery. And it was seen that by getting rid of the part-timers they would 
be able to get rid of a substantial amount of effort. A second reason 
was that even at that stage they were talking about the potential of an ITQ 
system and flowing from that the need for a buy back scheme and they 
knew that if they had to pay out a lot of part-timers then a lot of money 
would, they believed, be dissipated in the wrong courses and that given the 
amount involved the Government would balk, part-timers would make it 
more expensive (Walshe 4 April 1007).  
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  Former Director of MAF Auckland and now consultant to the recreational 
fisheries sector. 
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Speaking of the criteria used for the exclusion, Walshe said they had to be 
objective and simple since there were about 4000 applications to deal with (pers 
com 4 April 2007). 
Connor, who worked for MAF in the 1990s and subsequently wrote his PhD using 
MAF records (pers com), takes a more neutral line. ―The uncompensated 
exclusion of part-time fishers in 1983, although not strictly part of the QMS 
strategy, is difficult to view as equitable in light of the subsequent adoption of 
ITQs. Although it would have incurred greater transaction costs, these fishers 
could have been included in the quota allocation process, without substantively 
affecting the achievement of its objectives, producing a more equitable outcome‖ 
(Connor 2001). 
From my observations and interviews, for many fishermen, commercial fishing 
was a passion while clearly for others it was the employment of last resort but for 
both, severity of the full-time/part-time conflict was certainly aggravated by the 
depletion of the coastal fisheries and the shortage of full-time work ashore. It 
might be claimed, at least in theory, that following the introduction of the QMS 
part-timers could buy quota and re-enter the fishery. In practice, for those 
dependent on the fishery, exclusion meant their very livelihoods were at stake to 
the extent of some believing Social Welfare assistance, ―the dole‖, was virtually 
their only option (e.g. Peter Waapu in Waitangi Tribunal 1988 40; Walter Murray 
1987 Letter 31 October 1983). Their very ability to support themselves and their 
families was jeopardised to the extent that buying quota would have been 
impossible.  
It is not clear just when the notion of ITQs received widespread consideration. It 
is, however, relevant to note that the concept was in circulation prior to the 
exclusion of the part-timers. Yandle, for example, found ―ownership‖, the core 
element of ITQs, being discussed in Fishing Industry Board Annual Reports at 
least as early as 1974 (Yandle 2001 113).  Sinner and Fenemor state that in his 
1980 report, Peter Riley in the MAF's Economics Department evaluated limited 
entry policies and recommended the setting of total allowable catches and 
transferable quota (Sinner and Fenemor 2005 3) and reported that a ―small group 
of officials within MAF and the Fishing Industry Board began to promote the 
concept of transferable catch entitlements in 1980 and sponsored a visit to New 
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Zealand by Professor Lee Anderson
85
, of the University of Delaware, in early 
1982. During this and subsequent visits in 1983 and 1984, Anderson gave 
presentations to fishing industry leaders and government officials about the 
advantages of ITQ as interest in the concept grew (Sinner and Fenemor 2005 4). 
In the NAFMAC (1983) discussion paper used for the ―Roadshow‖ ITQs was the 
sixth of seven solutions suggested for discussion (NAFMAC 1983 13). At one of 
the NAFMAC meetings I attended one fisherman asserted that in fact ITQs were 
the only new management tool being offered and that all the other suggestions had 
been tried and proved inadequate (Personal research notes, 1983). Sharp noted 
(1997 512), ―[m]ost fishers … attending the public meetings supported the 
exclusion of part-timers (full-time attendees 59-91 per cent – part-time two per 
cent)‖. So "there was a clear consensus that part-timers should go, with special 
arrangements for some areas. Part-timers had no say in this. Very few of them 
belonged to their local fishermens' associations‖ (Johnson and Haworth 2004 
363). The final report to government stated ―it is NAFMAC's view that some 
policy such as ITQ's in the long term, but within the FMP [Fisheries Management 
Plan] framework, should be further examined with the view to devising a 
workable policy based on this principle‖ (Belgrave 1983 14).  
In his analysis of the conflict within the fishing industry, Robin Allen
86
, 
foreshadows a shift from fisheries as a common property resource to some form of 
privatization and ownership like land: ―Future management to obtain the optimum 
use of fisheries is likely to entail a move from using them as a common property 
resource, to some form of ownership and control, analogous to the change from 
common property use to individual ownership which occurred long ago in most 
land use‖ (Allen 1983 23). His terminology became familiar as that of the 
advocates for property rights and ITQs and his discussion provides a preliminary 
outline of the QMS. It clearly indicates that there was serious consideration of 
ITQs by sections of three of the four fisheries components, the Federation for 
coastal fishermen, NAFMAC representing all but part-timers and the 
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communities, and within MAF, at the very time the part-timers were being 
excluded. 
Moreover, presumably about 1982,  
The New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen (NZFCF) had 
sought a share of deepwater quota to distribute to inshore fishers, 
demonstrating that its leaders, at least, were already beginning to see the 
flexibility that quota offered. The Government rejected this proposal; its 
main concern was to stop the race to fish without disrupting existing 
deepwater operations (Sinner and Fenemor 2005 5; see also Haworth 2008 
204). 
Technically the two policies, ITQs and the exclusion of part-timers, were different 
and involved different factors such as administrative convenience, a narrow 
economic efficiency and detailed development. They may well have been separate 
but clearly ITQs were actively being considered before the part-timers were 
excluded. With the privatisation of fishing rights being discussed in the Federation 
it also advocated exclusion of part-timers to ensure compensation if it should 
come to the exclusion of ‗bona fide‘ fishermen. It seems hardly credible, then, that 
in MAF the importance of one policy to the other was not considered.   
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONSIDERING THIS 
EXCLUSION HERE 
While MAF officers state that the exclusion was not part of the introduction of 
ITQs, a number of informants assert that the exclusion of part-timers probably had 
greater social implications, for fishermen and the coastal communities they 
operated from, than the QMS, and so is therefore socially more significant than 
the introduction of ITQs. This exclusion is also delineated in the academic 
reviews of policy that preceded the QMS. Sharp (1997 510), for example, 
observes that ―part-timers fishers were not seen as a major cause of the decline in 
stocks, nor were part-time fishers catching a significant share of the total fish 
landed. Part-timers were, however, seen as the necessary first cut in the effort-
reduction process to enable a clear focus on the later stages of effort reduction. In 
part, the removal of part-timers was also justified by the high transaction cost of 
accommodating the interests of a large heterogeneous group of fishers‖.  
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Although outside the focus of this dissertation, the impact of the exclusion of part-
timers on Māori and their communities, led to the fisheries claims before the 
Waitangi Tribunal and the 1992 Sealord Settlement -- arguably the greatest social 
implication to result from the fisheries restructuring and so adding weight to the 
importance of the exclusion. 
Despite the serious impact of the exclusion of part-timers and the obvious issues 
for them, their families and communities, there is a lack of research on, or 
comprehensive reviews of, part-time fishing in New Zealand. The next section 
will examine the role of pluriactivity or part-time fishing in New Zealand to the 
extent that it sheds light on the implications of implementing rights-based 
management with the QMS.  
PERSPECTIVES 
Some informants suggested that the social implications for fishermen and their 
communities of the exclusion of part-timers were greater than those of the QMS. 
Separating the social implications of the exclusion of the part-timers from those of 
the QMS or indeed from subsequent social change as a result of neoliberalism 
generally is beyond this research. Nevertheless understanding of the process is 
assisted by awareness of the different perspectives involved in the exclusion. 
Different views were expressed as to whether or not part-timers were beneficial or 
detrimental to the coastal fisheries and, even within particular groups; the 
perspectives were not always identical. The views of commercial fishermen 
especially as expressed by the Federation and those of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries appear to have been the most influential in the decision to exclude 
part-time fishermen from the fisheries so they are the perspectives presented here. 
Full-time Fishermen 
Many full-time fishers regarded part-timers as a significant threat to their own 
livelihood. The Gulf News quoted a fisherman‘s assertion that ―[m]any of these 
[part-time] fishermen fish only during the peak of the season and their catch 
reduces the potential catch of full-time fishermen. While the fishing may be 
economic for individuals with other sources of income it is having a damaging 
effect on the already uneconomic position of many full time fishermen‖ (Gulf 
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News 7 November 1980 16). It was a competitive situation. Resources were 
already fully exploited. 
Informants, during my research at the Viaduct, (summer of 1982-83) and again in 
2007, with a few exceptions were strongly against the part-timers. Several of the 
longliners, for example, stated ―the part-timers follow and just see where you're 
fishing and set on top‖, they are ―licenced so [they] could use the Viaduct for 
mooring‖. They also complained that since they were relatively inexperienced, 
part-timers ignored the usual protocols on the fishing grounds, ―parasiting‖ on 
[full-time fishermen‘s] knowledge, encroaching on their gear and depressing their 
market. One of the exceptions was the skipper of the Danish seiner I worked on 
later who, from strong involvement with the Federation and experience working 
round the coast, was well aware that the part-timers were not catching a huge 
quantity of fish. Also, as a seiner he was working outside the Danish Seine Line 
(See Figure 6) so was less in general conflict with them (Viaduct Research). 
The trade journal, Commercial Fishing, about that time reported the anger some 
full-time fishermen felt toward the part-timers. A meeting of the Taranaki and 
Wanganui Commercial Fishermen's Association, for example, suggested that 
―unless the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries took some positive action to 
police their activities, direct action might be taken‖. They were concerned that 
part-timers often left gillnets set for so long ―they became polluted with dead fish 
which … spoilt the fishing grounds. They set too close to other fishermen. They 
sometimes sold their fish ‗under the counter‘ and endangered the stability of the 
local fish market and the livelihood of fulltime fishermen – at the same time failed 
to file fishing returns and evading taxation responsibility.‖ Since many of the part-
timers were also waterside workers and policemen, the Association hoped that 
mutual job exclusion could be arranged with the Watersiders Union and the local 
MAF fisheries officer could assist police the part-timers. That only 30 of the 200 
fishing boats registered in New Plymouth worked full-time indicates the extent of 
their difficulties and they felt the part-timers were forcing the full-time fishermen 
to travel further afield to avoid the problems (Commercial Fishing, December 
1977 17). 
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The Federation of Commercial Fishermen 
An influential lobbyist for many years, Peter Stevens, Secretary of the Federation 
of Commercial Fishermen had been campaigning for an Effort Reduction System 
(ESR). Johnson reports ―Stevens‘ campaign for ERS was being met in part by the 
reduction in part-timers‖ (Johnson and Haworth 2004 359). The thrust of his 
argument was that,  
… removing the catching power of part-timers would only go a small way 
to solving the problem of overfishing. Departure by attrition – failing to 
catch fish, losing money, not being able to afford repairs or to feed a 
family, then leaving the industry – had become increasingly common since 
the mid-1970s. Full-time fishermen had been given a means of leaving 
while keeping at least part of their financial skin intact‖ (Johnson and 
Haworth 2004 359). 
Bob Martin, then President of the New Zealand Federation of Commercial 
Fishermen (the Federation) told me that when travelling with NAFMAC he was 
very conscious that fishermen throughout New Zealand were, like himself, 
agitating for more effective management. They ―asked for something to be drawn 
up to show what the situation was,‖ insistent that ―[y]ou can't carry on like this‖. 
The part-time issue was, he felt, complex. ―Commercial fishermen all over the 
country said basically 'Hey no way – you've got guys in the freezing works 
[getting] big money and they duck off in the closed season and that's fine but if 
you expect us to take cuts then ‗No way José'‖ (Bob Martin pers com 6 February 
2007). He did imply that they did not realise at the time how many would be 
excluded. 
When asked if the difference between urban and rural or part-timers dependent on 
fishing was considered Bob Martin stated their job was not ―to regulate people's 
lifestyle. I might want $100,000 and another guy might want $20,000, he might 
want to live in a caravan‖. The issue was that ―there were people holding part-
time licenses… just for sales tax off motors and things like that. There were all 
sorts of part-time licenses out there. How you would ever pick a distinction 
between them legally would be a hell of a job. Every one of those licenses had the 
potential to become full time licenses, if somebody else got their hands on them‖.  
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Charged with managing the fisheries, part of MAF's stock monitoring was 
provided by collating mandatory catch returns from commercial fishermen. 
Johnson and Haworth indicate, however, that fishermen's compliance was often 
inadequate and the difficulties were aggravated by part-timers but this didn't only 
apply to them:  
… the vast majority of fishermen just wrote down their total landed weight 
of each species on the MAF form (although some under-reported that as 
well). Little of the fish dumped at sea was recorded. Most of them left the 
catch-effort information panel blank. Many were months behind with their 
paperwork, and some didn't send returns in at all, and got away with it. 
The system was also bogged down by increasing numbers of part-timers 
who might fish only one or two months of the year and failed to submit 'nil 
returns' for the other months (Johnson and Haworth 2004 309). 
Also, ―[m]ost commercial fishermen to some degree or other – over the years they 
fished – sold for cash money – it was one of the sidelines like you have tradesmen 
working over weekends now, you know, for cash‖ (Bob Martin pers com 6 
February 2007). From observation, fishermen‘s cash sales, ―home freight,‖ were 
part of the culture, but I am not aware that MAF collected any data to verify the 
extent of the practice. 
Peter Stevens, encapsulated the Federation perspective:  
You see as the law was then, anybody who was a New Zealander or a 
naturalized New Zealander had to be given a fishing permit. It cost next to 
nothing. Because of the sales tax exemption people were registering as 
fishermen who weren't fishermen merely they might have wanted to build 
a yacht or run a launch or all of that and they got all the sales tax 
exemptions for the sake of about a $5 fishing permit. Right.  There were 
people that went to do that who wanted to make some money out of their 
fishing to cover their pleasure fishing costs were told by the Ministry, 
‗Well you'd be legal if they take out a permit‘. There was this massive 
growth of numbers and numbers and numbers and it was quite obvious 
that there was no way for both those reasons and for the fact that that we 
didn't have a lot of fish in New Zealand – we have a very small fisheries – 
inshore fisheries – long lived fish – not a great deal of fecundity … and it 
was all going to collapse. Then I kept hammering away at this idea that we 
needed to take a proper look at what we've got. We were then being 
invaded by foreigners who were eroding things. We had companies getting 
bigger boats that were putting more and more pressure on. We ourselves 
were becoming super efficient at fishing – we were the best in the world. 
We started with next to nothing in 1965, 66 and by 1975 we had just about 
stuffed it (Stevens, pers com 19 November 2006). 
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To ―balance the book socially‖ NAFMAC, in apparent contradiction to Martin's 
claim of not regulating lifestyle, decided on the criterion that 80 per cent of 
income was to be earned from fishing, but it opposed the cancelling of unutilised 
licenses
87
. The government, however, accepted both criteria.  
It was to balance the books socially, as it were, but they [part-timers] were 
fishing about 12 different permits, 12 different methods and only used one. 
So that was all potential later on – to create big problems. The government 
was right to do that. I agreed with them from day one because you've got 
to clear the books. You can't have all this latent slip hanging round 
because otherwise it all comes back to bite you and your whole system 
falls apart (Stevens pers com 19 November 2006). 
So the Federation was concerned about numbers and the position of their 
members. They saw a huge potential from unutilised licenses, many held by part-
timers, who could be utilised or become full-time with an explosion of fishing 
effort. Few part-timers either belonged to the Federation, or had attended the 
meetings so if, in the course of the effort reduction, the Federation‘s own 
members would have to exit the fishery, it wanted them to get compensation so 
they could leave with dignity. The same consideration was not extended to the 
part-timers. 
Consequently: 
The Federation of Commercial Fishermen convinced MAF and the 
Minister of Fisheries that part-timers were at the heart of the excess effort 
problem and that they needed to be removed to ensure sustainable fishing 
and to ―professionalise the commercial sector‖ (Stan Crothers 4 June 
2009).  
National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee 
Perspective 
NAFMAC was a ―high level committee of MAF and industry representatives, 
chaired by M.J. Belgrave, Deputy Director-General of MAF [which] conducted 
the ―Roadshow‖ around New Zealand to consult with the industry on effort 
reduction. 
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An indication of MAF and the industry‘s perspective on the exclusion of part-
timers is given by the NAFMAC discussion paper: ―Future policy for the Inshore 
Fishery‖ (cited here as NAFMAC 1983) was circulated before and during the 
round of consultation meetings and the committee‘s subsequent report to 
Government (Belgrave 1983b)
88
. The actual exclusion was the result of the 
Fisheries Act 1983 but, while the legislation was under consideration, NAFMAC, 
The Report, a discussion paper was issued to facilitate the consultation.  Given 
the report was put out under the signatures of Duncan McIntyre the Minister of 
Fisheries (Forward) and M.J. Belgrave (Preface) it provides a plausible indication 
of MAF's thinking at the time, as well as also indicating the influence of those 
fisheries sectors represented. 
The main aim of the discussion paper was to find policy options to solve the 
immediate overfishing problem, allow stock recovery and then ―ensure the longer 
term biological and economic well being of the inshore fishery‖ (NAFMAC 1983 
5). The ultimate objective was to ensure that effort did not increase above 
sustainable yields. The discussion document set the first phase of effort reduction 
as ―Administrative removal of Fishing Units not Wholly or Substantially Involved 
in the Fishery‖ (NAFMAC 1983 5), but the document stated that to meet the 
Fisheries Bill's requirements a person ―must show they are wholly or substantially 
reliant [not just involved] on fishing for their income‖.  
Interestingly, MAF‘s Robin Allen commented, ―conflict exists at all levels in 
local fisheries where fishermen who use small open boats … are threatened by 
trawlers which might be based a considerable distance away‖. In relation to part-
timers he reports ―there is widespread agreement that part-time commercial 
fishermen should not be encouraged, and this could be extended to mean that 
there is no need to protect the local industries which use small boats confined to a 
restricted local area‖ (Allen 1983 24). MAF therefore accepted the removal of 
part-timers as essentially the first phase of the necessary effort reduction, fully 
aware of the likely spatial and industry effects. 
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   ―National Fisheries Management Committee Report to the Minister of Fisheries 
on Future Policy for the Inshore Fishery‖ (cited as Belgrave 1983b). 
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There is a significant difference between substantial involvement and substantial 
reliance. The NAFMAC paper indicates that the latter meant financial dependence 
on fishing. ―The new Fisheries Bill provides that to obtain a permit to fish a 
person must show that they are wholly or substantially reliant on fishing for their 
income‖ (NAFMAC 1983 5). Belgrave then suggested some 14 criteria that could 
be used to determine who is a ―commercial fisherman‖, also known as a ―bona 
fide‖ fisherman or a ―full-timer‖ or ―full-time‖ fisherman who could be licensed.  
The objective of NAFMAC's policy was ―to reduce effort and progressively 
ensure the economic position of those remaining in the fishery‖ (Belgrave 1983 6) 
although it was admitted that while there ―are a large number of 'part-time' 
fishermen they do not catch a large volume of fish. Indeed, it can be generalized 
that 90 per cent of vessels catch less than 20 per cent of the fish‖ (Belgrave 1983 
7). The policy allegedly stressed effort reduction and conservation but the removal 
of the part-timers made little difference to either. Supposedly it also allowed for 
financial dependence but, if the Walter Murray case is an indication (See Box 3), 
ignored financial dependence and commitment; significant criteria in other MAF 
policies. The policy allowed the returns from only 1983 not as was the case later 
when ITQs were introduced and catch history was derived from the best three 
years. There is no indication in the NAFMAC paper that social aspects would be 
considered.  
MAF Perspective 
Many part-timers had licences for gear they weren‘t using or for other species to 
allow for seasonal and natural variation so one of the reasons given for exclusion 
the part-timers was MAF‘s concern that dormant licenses could be activated. 
MAF officers at the time explained, said: "[t]here was burgeoning effort and part 
timers were seen as part of it. Many fishermen had permits for many methods and 
could use them at any time. … [and]  the Federation persuaded MAF that part-
timers were the problem. The government did their homework and with the 1983 
Fisheries Act they were removed" (Stan Crothers pers Com 2006). According to 
McClurg 1997, "  ―the 1983 Fisheries Act allowed for the cancellation of unused 
licences or licences held by ‗part time‘ fishers‖.   
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Neil Martin (1987) justifying the exclusion of the part-timers from the Northland 
fishery argued that most part-timers who were registered in Whangarei seemed to 
be Pakeha, registered for other reasons than fishing, or were also gainfully 
employed but holding permits so they could retire from white collar jobs. The 
threat to the fishery was, that those who held the permits could gear up and fish 
harder, or fathers could transfer their permits to their sons, or at retirement could 
sell the vessel and transfer the permit to a younger entrant with the result that the 
catch might increase. The concern was, therefore, for ―potential effort‖ (confirmed 
by Herzog 2004 25) not actual effort like that of the ‗big boats‘. Perhaps most 
tellingly, Martin stated that he had checked the catch of 12 new hard working 
(presumably full-time) owner-operator longliners and found that in some years 
they had caught over 150 tonnes of fish which, from the NAFMAC paper 
represented 1/6th of the sustainable yield on the northeast coast (Martin 1987). 
What he didn't say was that that catch could have been caught by just one or two 
trips of the average ‗big boat‘ but he did claim that those excluded could appeal 
(Martin 1987 Appendix p1). He is, however contradicted by Russell and 
Campbell (1999 123) who noted that 85 percent of those excluded were Maori and 
(subsequently) few Maori were allocated ITQs.  
Those Pakeha part-timers who were dependent on the fisheries may have had very 
similar moral and community rights, but they were unorganised individuals with 
no legally recognised collective rights and have therefore disappeared into the 
population. In many cases the impact on Pakeha individuals, families and 
communities may have been similar to those on Māori. Research and information 
on the latter is therefore used here as being possibly illustrative of the social 
consequences for part-time fishermen. 
Johnson asserts that MAF did allow for some flexibility stating: "In many parts of 
the country fishing was mixed with farming or subsistence activities. In these 
circumstances MAF conceded 'room for some manoeuvring'. It would listen, it 
would consider, but it held the power to make the final decision‖ (Johnson and 
Haworth 2004 357). But in the end, as well demonstrated by the response to 
Walter Murray's application, MAF let the economic advocates override other 
social issues.  
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Box 4: My perspective 
My perspective may not be strictly objective. In the course of this research I 
realised that had I chosen differently I could well have been one of the excluded 
part-timers. In 1978 in Matawhi Bay, in the Bay of Islands a small-scale 
landowner who longlined snapper from a converted mullety knew of my interest 
and took me on a several day trip setting the lines off the Cavalli Island and 
mooring in Whangaroa Harbour and offered to sell me the mullety. After 
discovering New Zealand inshore fisheries were seriously over-capitalized and 
that scientists and managers already believed they were depleted. I could not as a 
conservationist, become a fisherman. The real clincher though, was lack of capital 
but had I decided otherwise and persisted, my aspirations toward a subsistence 
lifestyle would have meant that I would have been among those excluded. 
 
Other Perspectives 
An investigative reporter, McManus
89
 (1994), has a different perspective (See 
Boxes 5 & 6), reporting that in their concern for effort reduction and 
professionalisation of the industry MAF's tardy treatment of license applications 
was of uncertain legality and, from their enthusiasm for some fishermen's 
interests, information from certain Federation officers was of questionable 
accuracy.  
Box 5: McManus: Fishermen stripped of livelihood 
After it became clear fisheries officials had been abusing their powers to victimise 
small-time fishermen Fisheries Minister Doug Kidd rushed through retrospective 
legislation ensuring justice would never be done for those deprived of their 
livelihoods. ... the government ordered a moratorium on commercial fishing 
permits in the Hauraki Gulf in 1980 and on fishing permits generally in 1982, 
these were revoked by the Fisheries Act of 1983. Inspite of this change in the law, 
MAF officials, then Fisheries Minister Colin Moyle, and then president of the 
Federation of Commercial Fishermen Bob (Taffy) Martin, continued to tell 
fishermen the moratorium was still in place. In this way newcomers, unless they 
had money and/or political clout, were deliberately excluded from the industry. ... 
[H]undreds of fishermen were fobbed off with  the moratorium ruse and refused 
permits on this basis, Thus when  the ...(QMS) was introduced in October 1986, 
hundreds of small-time fishermen could not demonstrate a catch history - on the 
basis of which quota were allocated. Thus the bureaucrats stripped them of their 
livelihood (McManus 1994 1, 2).  
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  An Investigative journalist with the The Independent (monthly newspaper). 
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The retrospective nature of the legislation and the speed at which it was 
introduced were condemned by the Law Commissioner, Sir Kenneth Keith, who 
said it also negated section 27 of the Bill of Rights Act, the section giving people 
disagreeing with bureaucratic and government decision the right of appeal to the 
courts (McManus 1994 1 2). 
It must be stressed that the issue of questionable legality was by no means one 
sided; miss- and under-reporting, and undeclared wharf sales, for example, were 
not uncommon. Several informants referred to scams, especially in relation to the 
claiming of quota at the Quota Appeal Authority hearings and McManus cites a 
fisherman buying a boat and, she believed, the quota, only to find the seller had 
kept the boat registration and quota and sold the latter back to MAF for $40,000 
(McManus 1994 1 2). 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACT 
The Fisheries Act 1983 excluded part-time fishermen by defining commercial 
fishing to mean: ―In the case of an individual, a person who is engaged or 
intending to engage in fishing for sale throughout the year, or a specified part of 
the season of each year, and who can satisfy the Director-General that during such 
time as he engages in fishing for sale he relies wholly or substantially on his 
fishing activities for his income‖ (Fisheries Act 1983, Section 2 Interpretation (1) 
81) [my emphasis]. 
Because of the Fisheries Act 1983 definition of ―a commercial fisherman‖ many 
fishermen, but especially those who fished part-time did not meet MAF's criteria, 
were refused fishing permits and excluded from the fisheries. This is widely 
referred to as the exclusion of the part-timers. 
The Fisheries Act 1983 had certain consequences. It excluded licensed fishermen, 
without any compensation, from the New Zealand coastal fishery who did not 
meet MAF's criteria of ―commercial fishermen‖. Not all were fully dependent on 
the fishery for their livelihoods but there were many who lost a vital part of their 
annual means of income and subsistence support and there were major 
consequences for their families and communities. It is not clear just how many 
were excluded and there is less knowledge about how many of those were 
dependent on the fishery. 
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Since the definition of ―commercial fishermen‖ in the Fisheries Act 1983, and 
MAF's criteria also applied to full time fishermen, it is unclear just how many 
part-timers were excluded and how many were Māori. Cullen and Memon do note 
that many were Māori, and stress the critical issue and the results for the industry: 
―These operators were numerous but their catches very small‖ and ―[w]hile there 
was a relatively large number of part-time fishermen, the New Zealand industry 
had come to be dominated by a number of large operators‖ (Cullen and Memon 
1990 52 59).  
CONSEQUENCES FOR PART-TIME FISHERMEN 
The Law Commission states that the ―result was to approximately halve the 
numbers of commercial operators, something like 1500 to 1800 going out of 
business‖ (Law Commission 1989 17) and this estimate is taken as the number of 
exclusions by subsequent authors (e.g. Wallace 1998, Rennie 1998 Connor 2001). 
However, McClurg, with access to MAF statistics, states that ―a blanket 
moratorium was placed on the issue of new licenses in 1982 and as a further step 
in halting and reversing the expansion of effort, the 1983 Fisheries Act allowed 
for the cancellation of unused licences or licences held by "part time" fishers. As a 
consequence, 2260 licences were cancelled‖ (McClurg 1997). This appears to be 
the more reliable figure although it does not account for the number of successful 
appeals that may have been allowed from the Law Commission report. Johnson 
and Haworth, also with access to Ministry records, notes ―In 1984 NAFMAC 
estimated that 2260 fishermen, 46 percent of the total would be removed from the 
fishery‖ (Johnson and Haworth 2004 359) and Sharp also uses this figure 
observing that ―those not meeting the criteria were excluded. It was estimated that 
46 per cent (about 2260) of the existing license holders would be excluded‖ 
(Sharp 1997 512). Straker and Kerr continue the confusion stating ―as at October 
1 1983, 46 per cent (2260) of licence holders did not meet the stated criteria and 
were labelled ―part-time‖ fishers. Part-timers did not have their permits renewed, 
therefore were excluded from the commercial fisheries, partly for administrative 
convenience but mainly because they had the greatest potential to increase their 
fishing effort‖ (Straker and Kerr 2002 42). 
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It would seem, then, that a total of 2260 licences were cancelled (although 
whether this was an estimate or the actual number is unclear). Some were full-
time but an estimated 1500-1800 were part-time, and of these maybe 85 percent 
were Māori. All would have had boats, gear and other equipment representing a 
significant financial, to say nothing of their social and emotional commitment to 
the fishery, lost without compensation. 
As Rennie points out the biggest and most critical impact was in Northland, 
especially among Māori (See also Fairgray 1986 45; Habib 1985 15; Johnson and 
Haworth 2004 388). Basically the new regulation made it simpler to introduce the 
ITQ system. No compensation was considered for the former part-time fishers. 
With consequent high unemployment rate and a preference for growing 
marijuana, ―[i]t is not surprising that the successful Maaori challenges to the 
legality of the Crown's claims to be able to allocate rights of access were initiated 
in the North‖ (Rennie 1998 7). 
CONSEQUENCES FOR OTHER FISHERMEN 
Whereas the Federation and Fishermen's associations had been strongly against 
part-time fishermen before the exclusion, after its affects started to bite, the trade 
journal Commercial Fishing expressed significant concerns. In Wellington, for 
example, an estimated 120 out of 170 commercial fishermen would be excluded, 
80 of who reportedly appealed. The Wellington Regional Fisheries Association 
labelled the exclusion ―an afront to any kind of human rights fishermen have as 
Kiwis. ‗Everyone has a right to go broke if he wants to‘ … No allowance has been 
made for the financial commitment – between $10,000 and $60,000 – these men 
have made to the industry. They will be left with a totally unsaleable vessel‖ (Don 
Ritchie in Commercial Fishing 1984 January 15). Experienced skippers in 
Canterbury found the new requirement to have a skippers ticket was used to 
prevent them qualifying as ―committed‖ and one of these was selling his trawler 
as a pleasure boat after 45 years fishing.  
Commercial Fishing (March 1984 23) noted that further south: 
 "Big financial losses are being suffered by Canterbury fishermen forced to 
sell trawlers as pleasure boats‖ while Dick Brown, President of the 
Lyttleton Commercial Fishermen's Association said  ―[i]t goes against the 
grain to see hard workers put out of business when big companies, like 
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Fletcher Challenge, are ‗chartering‘ foreign vessels and crews to catch 
their deep-sea allocations‖. One fisherman, ―Glenn Parrat, a watersider, 
had his application for a commercial fishing licence accepted last 
September …two weeks later he received his receipt and a letter saying his 
licence could not be granted until he obtained a skippers ticket.  ―I was‖, 
he said ―really angry at the way they treated the case and changed their 
minds. After I had been licenced for two years they suddenly decided that I 
have to have a ticket‖ and, since there was no compensation for loss of 
livelihood or money on gear, he ―decided to sell his $20,000 trawler as a 
pleasure boat for $12,000, leaving him with all the fishing nets and 
equipment‖. Another, ―Mr Ken Smith who has been fishing commercially 
in his spare time for 45 years was told that he had to get his skippers ticket 
to retain his commercial licence. As he is 57, Mr Smith did not want to go 
to ‗school‘ to obtain his ticket so he could fish for just another three 
years
90‖. He said  ―Commercial fishing has been my only source of income 
since I lost my other job. … The fishing plus my wife's salary gave us a 
comfortable living.‖ He was ―selling his $15,000 boat, Wainoni, for 
$8,000 as a pleasure boat‖ (Commercial Fishing March 1984 23).  
However, of my informants, only a few had been affected by the exclusion and 
only one directly. He had gone with his partner to the Coromandel Peninsula to 
―escape‖ unemployment in Auckland. Then because other work was not available 
in the district he had been crewing on a boat that was then excluded. As a result he 
was forced onto the dole and into a struggle for subsistence. More generally many 
of the part-timers were not just excluded from the fishery they were also excluded, 
around the same time, from other part-time employment in the district as work 
opportunities in the Coromandel forestry, or in the freezing works, elsewhere, 
were closing (See le Heron et al 1989 397). 
Box 6: McManus: Process used to strip fishermen of livelihood 
During last year's hearing before the Quota Appeal Authority (QAA), a former 
MAF officer, giving evidence for Main [a fisherman] described to the court the 
various ruses he and his colleagues employed to give permit applications the run 
around and illegally shut prospective fishermen out of the industry (McManus 
1994 1 2).  
Rick Boyd (A fisheries scientist with the Fisheries Management Division of 
MAF) said as a matter of course, prospective commercial fishermen were told a 
moratorium was in place even though MAF was aware this was not the case. "It 
was a matter of general knowledge and cynical humour that all such permit 
applications... were stored in a cardboard box in Ray Dobson's [another MAF 
official] ... office.  This box was a bottomless pit... By not making a decision, 
even when there was no legal basis for refusal, no permit was issued. Boyd and 
                                                 
90
  Retirement age and eligibility for the old age pension was then 60. 
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his colleagues justified this by saying they believed the fishery was at risk.  They 
eventually concluded the government had scrapped the moratorium by 'mistake' or 
'oversight'. "Although the 1993 Act revoked the two moratorium notices, the 
Director General felt that he needed more controls of the issue of fishing permits 
than were apparent on the face of the fisheries Act 1983," Boyd said. …During 
the so-called moratorium, some of the big guns, including Fletcher Fishing, 
managed to obtain large and valuable permits from MAF. Recounts Boyd: "... 
(Successful) applicants sought legal advice, and generally made a trip to 
Wellington with their solicitor to personally confront the Assistant director who 
was responsible for the decision to issue new permits.  When confronted on this 
basis, the Assistant Director issued the permits in question promptly." …  Aware 
that MAF's past blunders, accidental or otherwise, might be about to cost the 
government hundreds of millions of dollars, Fisheries Minister Doug Kidd 
sneaked retrospective legislation into the House just before Christmas 1992, 
preventing aggrieved fishermen from going to court to appeal quota and 
permitting decisions. At least 27 appeals involving $87 million worth of quota 
were already in the pipeline, and Kidd and his officials feared a flood of cases … 
triggered by two 1992 High Court decisions in favour of fishermen (McManus 
1994 1 2). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Just as the designation of the EEZ excluded foreign fishing vessels from 
surrounding New Zealand the exclusion of part- timers removed some two thirds 
of the New Zealand fleet, and almost 50 per cent of New Zealand fishermen from 
their livelihood and many coastal communities from a significant portion of 
economic support. 
To summarize, the reasons given for the exclusion of the part-timers were diverse. 
For MAF it was to reduce the pressure on the fishery by removing the threat of 
unutilized licences and part-timers becoming full-time, for administrative 
convenience, to reduce the ―illegality‖ of under-the-counter sales, less than 
reliable reporting and to ―professionalise‖ the fishery and possibly to ensure 
cooperation from the Federation. For NAFMAC the exclusion was part of effort 
reduction by ensuring only those wholly or substantially dependent on the fishery 
remained. For full-time fishermen, but especially for those most in contact with 
part-timers (longliners and setnetters), it was to remove the chaos and 
inconvenience of ―newbies‖ unfamiliar with the etiquette of fishing and the 
economic threat to their already marginalised livelihoods. For the Federation it 
was part of effort reduction to ensure sustainability of the stocks and, if ―bona 
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fide‖ fishermen (Federation members) were to be removed they would get fair 
compensation rather than it being dissipated to all the part-timers as well. 
Few of those excluded were particularly powerful or visible in the consultations 
and the impacts on them were not considered until after the event. Many part-
timers had caused congestion and difficulties for Federation members on the 
fishing grounds and threatened their income by adding fish to an already glutted 
market. MAF appears to have been partly appeasing the Federation that found the 
part-timers relatively vulnerable and easy to marginalise, demonise and ultimately 
exclude.  
McManus‘s (1994) report on both MAF and the Federation's treatment of licence 
applications and the severity in denying applications to remote rural fishermen 
dependent on the fishery, such as Walter Murray, suggests possible illegality.  The 
total catch of those excluded represented the annual catch of only a few average 
―big boat‖ catches. Those boats had been imported for the deepwater but were 
allowed to fish on the coast. Effort reduction may have been the primary rationale, 
but if so it was not well considered or the potential expansion of effort from 
unused licences could have been dealt with using other policy instruments. Rather, 
it seems that top-level concern, consciously or not, was to corporatise the fishery 
and in the process denied communities access to commercial fisheries. 
At the time the dominant justification for the exclusion was to address 
overfishing. The more professional fishermen had the ear of government that was 
particularly concerned about developing an industry. The part-timers offered an 
easily marginalised group that could be blamed for the woes, in a more objective, 
equitable discourse might well have attributed as the consequences of ―think big‖ 
and the ‗big boats‘. Subsequently economic impacts on communities might 
attribute the desire to introduce ITQs as the reason for the exclusion, however, 
MAF and later authors have defended that change suggesting it was 
administratively driven. While the introduction of ITQs may have been facilitated 
by the exclusion, that introduction does not appear to have been the key driver for 
it. The part-timers were undoubtedly the weakest players and most easily 
demonised.  
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The consequences for communities have never been fully assessed but did give 
momentum to Treaty claims. In the context of this dissertation it appears those 
impacts may have been greater and been conflated with the social implications of 
rights-based fisheries management. 
In retrospect this overall process exemplifies Naomi Klein‘s Shock Doctrine 
(2007), the creation of a crisis to allow the takeover of existing rights by 
governments and corporates. The government deliberately developed the coastal 
fishery, facilitating development of the larger companies (corporates) but whether 
it was intended to shift control of access to the fishery from local fishermen to the 
corporates is outside the scope of this research. 
This chapter has argued that the crisis in the coastal fishery was a consequence of 
the think big ideology with Rural Bank development loans under which MAF 
tolerated the corporates‘ ‗big boats‘ imported for the deepwater fishing to fish on 
prime coastal species in contrast to their lack of concern for the consequences of 
the exclusion of part-time fishermen and their coastal communities. 
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Chapter 5: BEFORE the QMS 
To establish the baseline for change this chapter delineates the commercial fishing 
vocation and ethos as it was before the introduction of the QMS for coastal 
fishermen and their communities. Drawing primarily on data from Waiheke Island 
and notes from Coromandel and Leigh it will indicate the variety of fishermen, 
their recruitment, their methods, the ethos "out there", and the political, economic 
and community context. The significance for the fishermen of their vocation will 
be shown by the features that distinguished their families from friends and 
neighbours, their work from the regular and periodic services provided by others 
and the contribution of commercial fishing to the community in terms of 
employment, nutrition and identity. 
The perspective of fishermen and the communities on the QMS is largely absent 
from the literature. It is their story and generally not mine and is quoted here in 
their words so that inferences I was not aware of still remain.  
COMMUNITY FISHERMEN 
Since communities are formed by regular and periodic interactions among people 
and may be on the basis of either a blend of emotional feelings and shared 
interests or of needs and services, Hauraki Gulf snapper fishermen were part of 
their communities of place but also their community(ies) of occupation. This 
section will describe the ethos and perspective of Hauraki Gulf fishermen and 
their communities as it was before the introduction of the QMS. 
In the late 1970s the 36 fishing boats based on Waiheke Island were roughly a 
third of the Auckland registered longline fleet. Before the advent of the Co-op and 
ice plant a typical trip might begin by leaving their Waiheke community of place, 
'steaming' the 19km to Auckland for ice, bait and possibly fuel. Then out to the 
Gulf fishing grounds for several days before returning to the Viaduct to off-load, 
sell the catch and replenish. During the intensive periods of the school season 
fishermen were lucky to snatch only an overnight on the island before heading for 
the grounds again.  
There was, therefore a symbiotic relationship between, the semi-rural or fringe 
community of Waiheke and the urban port, the Viaduct Basin: servicing their 
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enterprise brought fishermen, into regular contacts for fuel, ice and provisioning 
and to sell their catch to fish shops, buyers or fishing companies and, less 
regularly, with mechanics, engineers and boat repairers. Fishermen were, 
therefore, part of a community of occupation. From fairly early, as independent 
owner-operators, Waiheke fishermen were not limited to service providers on the 
island. They used the Viaduct particularly to sell their catch for the iki jimi market 
and for purchasing ice
91
 and thus were in contact with other fishermen based there 
and other industry personal seasonally, and irregularly, as careers and 
opportunities evolved.  
The position of crew is more ambivalent than the skippers or owner-operators. 
While working on the boats crew members were part of the community of 
fishermen but many worked in other occupations, especially over the winter. Thus 
commitment to this community came and went. Likewise the families of 
fishermen shared the involvements and exigencies so had shared interests and 
interacted with each other to a greater or lesser degree. 
Seasonally, and as their careers developed, Waiheke fishermen worked around the 
Gulf. In summer they tended to work the waters around the island but moved 
further afield to the outer Gulf or even beyond as local fish became scarce. The 
community of place centred on Waiheke but at different times other fishermen 
from elsewhere moved into Waiheke waters and the community of occupation 
expanded and contracted merging and blending with those other communities 
based on the Viaduct and around the Gulf.  
FISHERMEN'S ETHOS 
For this research ethos is regarded as the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishermen's 
experience of ideology. Consequently this section describes the experience of 
fishing and reveals the ethos and thence the prevailing ideology before the 
introduction of the QMS. The experience of fishing will be considered in terms of 
a variety of aspects, including their recruitment into fishing, their career 
trajectories, the experience of being "out there", the politics and economics of 
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   Especially before Waiheke Sea Products (the Co-op) was established on the 
island. 
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fishing, and fishermen's relationships with each other, their families and their 
community(ies).  
As contended above ideology is experienced as ethos and, following Bartleby 
(1995 2000) ethos is used here to convey what the fishing occupation meant, both 
in terms of the physical activity and emotionally; what the experience was like 
(good and bad), what made it different for one fisherman as opposed to another, 
what kept these people fishing commercially and what made the occupation 
special to them. 
The ideological perspectives of fishermen were as diverse as their personalities. 
Davis (1991 19) suggested that community fishermen were constrained by 
collective interest so implied they were conservative and looked after the stocks. 
My informants ranged from consciously conservationist (Informant 21 for 
example had always been interested in fishing and the marine environment, was 
passionate and caught only what he needed) through to one entrepreneurial 
fisherman who got into it because he needed the money – fishing as employment 
of last resort – so caught all he could and even expanded his operation (Informant 
13).  
Recruitment / Career Trajectory 
Before the QMS there was a variety of career trajectories in commercial fishing 
and often a fisherman began in one category and, as his interest and skills 
developed his career moved through other categories. One person began, for 
example, fishing recreationally as a child and youth. Then, after a stint off the 
island, came back to the rural part of Waiheke to live off the land and fish for 
subsistence before moving back into the community. This meant easier access to 
the local fish shops and opened commercial opportunities so he began fishing for 
the local retail market.  As the iki jimi trade developed he was both a local retail 
fisherman and an iki jimi fisherman first sending prime snapper to Auckland on 
the ferry and then through the Waiheke Co-op (Informant 6a).  
Those I've termed family fishermen grew up in fishing families and followed their 
fathers or uncles.  Fishing was 'in their blood,' they grew up with it, fished with 
their fathers first for recreation, then as crew before they started on their own 
account (Informants 7, 10, 31, 41). Others chose fishing as their career early so 
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after leaving school joined as deckhands on boats, (most typically using one of the 
active fishing methods, Danish seining or trawling) or, less directly, took jobs in 
the fishing industry before becoming crew (Viaduct Research, Informant 3). The 
other major career path was by men moving into fishing from another job. Among 
my informants many had been tradesmen and particularly the opening of the iki 
jimi market made the move possible (Belcher Gulf News 9 May 1980 26; 
Informants 26, 44).  
Although the process of becoming a fisherman was as idiosyncratic as my 
informants, there are a number of types with similarities and differences. The 
main categories considered here are subsistence, family, local retail and iki jimi 
fishermen. Just as the process is different so to are fishermen's ideologies with the 
polar extremes being conservation oriented and entrepreneurial. The former is an 
expression of alternative ideals with the latter more compatible with neo-
liberalism. 
Subsistence Fishing on Waiheke 
Before the QMS subsistence fishing, particularly for snapper and kahawai, was 
prevalent among some of my commercial fishermen informants and although 
subsistence fishing remains important for the island and indeed elsewhere, 
commercial fishermen are no longer involved.  
Despite the 1970s being the era of hippies and alternative lifestyles and Waiheke 
was notorious for its hippies and alternatives, only one of my informants and his 
partner had begun intentionally as a subsistence fisherman. He started coming for 
holidays and fishing the local bay with his grandfather. Then, in his early twenties 
came back with his partner and children to create an alternative lifestyle, an ethos 
of rural self-sufficiency, with bags of wheat, flour, chickens, shellfish, a drag net 
and a rifle, living in one of the original farmhouses on an isolated southern beach. 
After living off the land and the sea, subsistence fishing they moved back to the 
more developed part of the island and eased into a more commercial operation 
(Informant 6).  
For another (Informant 12), fishing was a more attractive adjunct to farming.  
I inherited the farm when I was a teenager. ... still over at school and had 
to come home and run the farm … I decided I'd rather fish than milk cows 
by hand. … So you run dry stock on the farm and like that and put time 
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into fishing so I never got into fishing in a big way … just fishing for a 
living. But it subsidized my life so I didn't have to draw out of the farm. 
So in fact, if anything, I probably made enough out of it to put a little bit 
into the farm.  (Colin Gordon). 
Family Fishermen 
On Waiheke, two informants (Informants 5, 12) had sons who followed them into 
commercial fishing. The first had one son (Informant 7) who remained on the 
island while three of the four sons of the second informant became commercial 
fishermen.  Only one (Informant 10) remained on the island while a grandson 
continues the family tradition and fishes out of Thames. 
Informant 7, the son of the first, when asked what attracted him to fishing and 
how he got in, told me:  
Yes – basically born into it with Dad being a commercial fisherman down 
on the farm and he was farming and fishing and I just got into it. Just 
ended up being involved helping Dad with the fishing when he was 
fishing and got through to the teenage stage and Dad suggested I get 
myself a fishing license and it was easy enough to do and away you go. I 
just flopped into it. I got myself a boat a few nets and longlines and bits 
and pieces and away I went (Informant 7).  
Informant 10 fished for 20 years and was known as ―the setnetter‖ although by no 
means was he the only one using set nets. Of the twenty local fishermen he was 
the only one to target dogfish ―There were a lot of grizzles about me being a netter 
in the days. Like people hated nets and they hate them even more today‖. Overall 
though, ―it was great then but 20-odd years at it for myself – commercial end of 
it‖. Commercial fishing had been ―really wonderful‖. When the quota system 
came in the fishery was declining.  ―It was a struggle … to make a living at it.  I'm 
glad I'm not doing it now. It was the lifestyle really a beautiful lifestyle that I've 
been lucky to participate in really … Now I'm at the other end -- the recreational 
sector and that's awesome just being a recreational fisherman out there – you 
know,‖ (Informant 10). 
So unlike other commercial fishermen who started recreationally this informant 
was involved in commercial fishing from the start, at first with his father, then on 
his own and now he fishes for enjoyment and ―the pan‖ (food). He'd started 
fishing for ―predominantly snapper with licenses for setnetting, drag netting, 
plonking, handlining, longlining‖ and these gave  ―the freedom to catch those fish 
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all year round. So I had everything and I didn't go very far to catch the fish either.  
So it was quite good‖.  
At the time, aside from he and his father, there were only a few fishermen 
working in or near the bay so it wasn't congested because new fishermen didn't 
know what they were doing so didn't last and it was the extra knowledge, skill and 
motivation he had from growing up in a fishing family that made the difference. 
He started fishing from a ―little tin boat‖ – no cabin and liked fishing in the rough. 
―Yeah. I mean when it's really rough I get quite excited. I can't sleep at night. … 
The fish will be banging. That's part of the local identity isn't it? When you get 
conditions like that you know the fish are going to be around (Informant 7). 
On Waiheke, during this period, the 1960s and '70s, commercial fishing tended to 
develop from subsistence fishing or fishing as a means of supplementing other 
activities  (part-time or pluriactive) with family relations becoming increasingly 
important in the recruitment of new fishermen. 
Commercial fishing in Coromandel and Leigh followed a similar pattern. In 
Coromandel the Strongmans are recognised as one of the prominent fishing 
families. Ian Strongman was a second-generation fisherman.  
When I was a little fellow I was mucking around in boats and what not. 
Then Dad went deckhand for … (his brother) and I was always down 
there when they came in, helping unload and it just interested me and I did 
a cabinet making course when I left school and at that time Dad bought his 
own boat. I came back to Coromandel from Auckland as quick as I could 
and I was deckhand for him for about ten years I guess.  When Dad 
retired, my brother, worked with me and he became a quota broker  (Ian 
Strongman).  
Ian bought his father's boat but when the quota management system came in his 
father sold his quota, so Ian had to lease quota (i.e. buy ACE).  
At Leigh Barry Torkington and his brother were third generation fishermen. Their 
grandfather started catching crayfish and put them on the steamer for Auckland 
but … he didn't get paid for many. Their father started commercial fishing just 
after World War Two with a dinghy rowing just outside the Leigh harbour to 
catch plentiful crayfish with a few pots. These were transported to Auckland by 
steamer and mail truck and sold on the Auckland waterfront through a contact 
there. Then he persuaded his brother, a local quarry worker, to join him in the 
  
157 
business that they continued for the rest of their lives.  During that time they 
expanded their operation by building some boats and adding snapper to their 
target catch. This was rugged work: 
When they were going out to Little Barrier you'd never see a boat and they 
were going out there for a couple of days, go and sleep a night and …  pull 
the pots twice and never see a boat. But no winches or anything, all pulled 
by hand. All pulled by hand. The pair of them had hands like … bears' 
claws … you know (Barry Torkington).  
Fishing had an ethos of freedom, of independence of working for oneself. Indeed 
Barry Torkington describes his motivation to become a fisherman as:  
Freedom from an 8-5 job…you could make your own living, at your own 
pace, being your own boss. This was a huge plus for me and I shot across to 
Aussie as a young guy with the idea of saving some money, enough to buy 
a boat, a bit of land and that was it, very low tech, very easy. Just a way of, 
just make enough money to avoid having to get a job (Barry Torkington)
92
.  
Although circumstances and aspirations were different, family fishermen eased 
into the occupation by participating in the household livelihood, using their 
father's gear, learning his skills and sharing his vision. They experienced an ethos 
of kinship and freedom where the main restrictions were imposed by the marine 
environment and the life cycle of their quarry. 
Local Retail Fishermen 
Perhaps starting as subsistence fishermen, many moved into fishing more 
deliberately for the fish shops and became retail fishermen.  After subsistence 
fishing for the family, informant 6 eased into commercial fishing using his 
grandfather's gear setting nets around the Bay he knew so well from early 
recreational fishing. As he expanded operations he got a loan from the family to 
buy his own 14-foot aluminium dinghy and outboard motor, then he went into 
partnership with a now invalided fishermen, ―good at doing deals and conning the 
young guy‖. He used his partner's nets and the partner smoked the catch and they 
were selling to the fish shops on the Island. After leaving the partnership he began 
getting his own nets but longlining was becoming popular. It was only about then 
that he realised that he had to be registered. 
                                                 
92
  See also: http://torkington.com/history/ 
158 
 
Fishing in the late 1970s and early 1980s was flexible. He was using three 
different methods, set nets, drag net and longlines and depending on seasonal 
availability, caught a variety of species: snapper, kahawai (sometimes there were 
huge schools in the Bay and periodically the dolphins chased them right up to the 
beach), trevally and the occasional kingfish, smoking some and selling some fresh 
(Informant 6). 
Largely self-taught this fisherman learnt the basics from his grandfather, became 
first a subsistence fisherman, then with family assistance and increasing 
commercial arrangements, he became more commercial and picked up other 
knowledge in both co-operation and competition from senior fishermen. Most of 
his knowledge and skill, however, came from the trial and error of setting his gear 
in the local bay and adjacent coast during a decade of commercial fishing 
(Informant 6).  
 
Figure 13: A small Waiheke (retail) fishing boat circa 1983. 
Two of the senior fishermen (Informants 5, 12) on the Island through the 1980s 
and 1990s had both grown up on farms at the bottom end of the island. One, had 
fished commercially well into his seventies but when interviewed he was retired 
and only occasionally putting out a small flounder net for recreational or 
subsistence purposes.  Most of his fishing was for flounder or mullet netting with 
a 14 foot [4m] dinghy (c.f. Figure 13) and old outboard motor, the largest boat 
he'd used, working only on the south and east coasts of Waiheke and usually close 
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to home. But he sometimes used a long line, with maybe no more than 25 hooks, 
for gurnard and a drag net for snapper.  Most drag net fishermen in the Hauraki 
Gulf had bigger boats and used a winch, which wasn‘t legal, but he always hand 
pulled his net, occasionally using the outboard.  
It was hard – bloody hard work, even with using the outboard because I 
hand did it all. So I'd always leave home before daylight. I'd pull it at 
daylight sort of thing and I'd be home – well it depends on the time of the 
year sort of, but a couple of hours after daylight I was home with the fish 
I'd caught. So that's how it sort of worked. Well my floundering that was 
done tidal really. Wintertime – setting over night (Informant 12).  
Fishing was not his main occupation.  
The less running the better because I've always had a lot of work to do on 
the farm … I supplied a shop for years and years and years … but there's 
not really any decent fresh fish outlets on the island. I mean there's fresh 
fish in the supermarket and different things but not fresh fresh fish.  Fish 
that I supplied to the shop was FRESH fish, top high quality! It was 
caught and probably sold the same day or within two or three days at the 
most … I did fish to the Co- op for a few years and I made quite a bit of 
money at that time, iki-ing them and they were sending them to Japan … 
It was very good at one stage but then it faded out (Informant 12).  
Before the QMS, fishermen could take advantage of new opportunities as they 
arose.  This informant, for example, would gill, gut and string the flounder on flax 
and land it to another fisherman on the other side of Tamaki Straits who would 
sell it in Otara (a suburb in South Auckland) from his van. ―He used to catch his 
own but then he actually preferred me to catch them and he'd just sell them, which 
worked all right‖. There were various patterns depending on species targeted and 
season. ―Yeah there are changing patterns. Everything is changing all the time. 
The quota system sort of changed that‖ (Informant 12).  So local fishermen could 
supply local shops, regional outlets and, by landing to buyers in Auckland, even 
the international market. 
The other senior fisherman on Waiheke (Informant 5) grew up on a Waiheke 
farm, attended a one teacher school at Man-O-War Bay, spent a couple of years 
away, and then returned and remained on the island. He had always loved fishing 
but never sold any while on the farm. Then he married the sister of another 
fisherman, moved up to a bach
93
 on the end of Onetangi almost next to the hotel 
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and fished more commercially selling to the locals in Onetangi. He too just used a 
small boat launched off the beach.  Other informants told me how he and his wife 
had a bench set up by the bank and cleaned or filleted the catch then took fish to 
regular customers (Informant 5). 
Some time after he started fish disappeared from the Gulf and he had to revert to 
shearing sheep for a while.  By the time of our interview he had been retired for 
some years and told me:  
When I was doing it commercially I used nets and longlines and 
handlining and all that type of fishing because I actually supplied only the 
[Onetangi] hotel along here. I had to. I used to go out every day, 
sometimes all night, sometimes to get the fish for the guests. … The 
guesthouse was running in those days. That's what I fished for. I had about 
22 years of it. I supplied them with fish. But I didn't rape the Gulf or 
anything in those days but I used to see a lot of wastage – you know with 
the seine boats and the trawlers.  Longliners don't do that much damage. 
Not really because they only catch live fish and what they don't need they 
put back‖ (Informant 5). 
Others, working in full time but low paid jobs caught fish to feed their families 
before becoming retail fishermen. One (Informant 21) who grew up on the Island, 
for example ―just grew up walking around the rocks and fed my family and when 
I got married I decided that I was still going to live on the Island so I was 
labouring and I was working in a timber yard and I was earning $90 a week (mid 
1970s) driving trucks‖ (Informant 21).   
Iki Jimi Fishermen 
The biggest group of informants was those who, for convenience, I've called ―iki 
jimi‖ fishermen although many had been part of the influx into the fisheries in the 
1970s before the introduction of that method (See Box 7, page 157). Typically 
they had been introduced by friends, come into commercial fishing from other 
careers, and targeted snapper for the lucrative Japanese iki jimi market using old 
launches converted for longlining (See Figure 14).  
The iki jimi method, also known as iki jime‖ and ―iki jume‖ was introduced to 
New Zealand fishermen by Barry Torkington after he and his brother retuned 
from a trip to Japan to investigate the snapper market. In 1980, after an attempt 
that failed in 1979, fishermen received a 10cent/kg premium but fishermen spiked 
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them on the way out of the icebox. In 1981 after showing Leigh fishermen the 
correct method, Barry Torkington introduced it to Auckland.  
He ―went down and got a few Auckland boats doing it and we used to get the fish 
packed in a shed in Auckland, a fish processing place, and market it ourselves 
under our own brand which was great and the returns were huge. We doubled the 
price for the fish in no time‖ (Barry Torkington).  
Another informant put it in context, showing how fishermen had scope for 
innovation before the QMS and the possibility of cooperative relationships with 
fishermen from other communities:  
Barry and his brother are amongst the early ones who were aware of what 
Japanese fishermen were doing and went over to Japan to have a look at the 
market for themselves, came back and taught themselves how to do it and hence 
Leigh Fisheries who were always the most innovative of all the little fishing 
companies and they were the first ones into that … Those are the guys who really 
started it. ... [W]hen the Waiheke Co-op … was set up … one of the  first things 
that we did at Waiheke Island  was to get some experts to  lecture us on iki jimi  
fishing and that's what the Waiheke Co-op was aiming to do … So I think 
probably Leigh (was) first and perhaps some people up in Northland … and then 
there was Waiheke Co-op and then really last of all the Auckland Viaduct and 
then later on down the track seine boats and trawler fishermen started sticking 
holes in their heads too. And I must say, probably improving their fish quality 
(Informant 14). 
 
Box 7: Iki Jimi Fishing 
The method involved killing each live snapper quickly as it came aboard the longliner by 
putting a spike into the brain. Then immersing it in slurry of seawater and ice to drop the 
temperature and chill, not freeze it. Since the fish did not flap around the muscles were 
relaxed and the flesh stayed together and also maintained quality, appearance and taste. 
Quick chilling in the slurry prevented the release of enzymes that would change or 
discolour the flesh or affect the taste and tests done at Massey for the NZFIB showed that 
even inexperienced tasters could identify ―iki‖ fish since the flesh quality and texture differ 
markedly between iki and non- iki (Baigent 1987 41). The snapper were then packed on a 
layer of ice on their bellies into iki bins with some ice over the top so they didn't get ice 
burn. They would be regraded by size, colour and condition after landing to the packing 
shed. Although it normally took only three days for the fish to travel by air to Japan the 
method allowed up to a week. The fish are also handled carefully throughout the process to 
ensure all scales were intact and appearance perfect. Japanese reputedly eat with their eyes 
and red coloured snapper were especially prized for ceremonial purposes such as weddings 
(Baigent 1987 41, 43; Viaduct informants; Martyn 1991 38). Fishermen now use cotton 
gloves to prevent sweat and oils getting on the snapper (Leigh Fisheries). 
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One informant who became an iki jimi fisherman entered fishing in what seems 
the 'classic' manner: ―I just loved … (fishing) as a kid … just going down the 
wharf there as young kids do… Like I wasn't doing that great at school. When it 
came to it I decided whether I wanted to go fishing or be a chef‖.  He was too 
young to take an apprenticeship with either the Navy to be a chef or on a trawler 
in Onehunga
94. ―So then I looked in the papers and there was a long line boat 
looking for a deckhand which you didn't need an apprenticeship for so I started 
out of Kawakawa Bay‖ (Informant 42). 
After a year there he followed his parents to the fishing village at Leigh, ―but no 
one was looking for deckhands so I just went around to a lot of the boats and said 
I'd work for free on various boats and it started from there. So three or four years 
on one boat and … I studied hard for my skipper's ticket. At the age of 21 got my 
skipper's ticket and started running boats from there‖. The QMS was introduced 
while he was crewing on others' boats so he missed out on quota (Informant 42). 
Other fishermen had come from diverse careers such as labouring (Informant 26), 
mechanic (Informant 44), panel beater (See: Gulf News 4 August 1978 5), real 
estate agent (Informant 13), teacher (Informant 14).  Often they had experience 
with boats and friends who were already fishing which also accounts for cliques; 
groups of three or four fishermen the boats rafted up at the pontoon between the 
ferry times. For the locals waiting for the ferry it was "the boys and their boats" as 
they baited up or did maintenance together then fished separately but met up to 
anchor over night in the same bay. 
Some were attracted by the lifestyle, others by the money. Some were 
entrepreneurial fishermen constantly seeking to improve the method and 
get a product for a better market  (e.g. Barry Torkington and iki jimi), 
another had the first colour sounder in the Viaduct (Informant 14), or 
setting more and more gear, another had to get a better boat, then bought a 
second, an old Danish seiner to also get into tuna fishing (Informant 13). 
Others who may have initially been attracted by the money persisted 
because they appreciated the lifestyle and were content to fish at a 
reasonable level (Informant 26; Chris Dunn, longliner).  
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The difference in attitude and ideology was not just to the occupation but also in 
the manner they fished. Showing the diversity within just one clique one 
informant described his colleagues. Referring to one he said:  
I can remember fishing alongside him a few times but he wasn't the gun 
fishermen that some of those other guys were. He was life styling he 
wasn't out there to catch as much fish as he could catch, that's for sure. He 
was really doing it for enjoyment rather than anything else. Another was 
smart, he could catch fish, that's for sure and he was out to catch fish. He 
wasn't out for fun. He was out for money. Yes, he was a good hard hungry 
fisherman and once or twice he had some outstanding strokes of luck too. 
He was consistently good and he targeted good fish and he used 
technology a lot.  
[A third] used to talk about finesse rather than mega hooks and I certainly 
subscribed to that way of thinking as well and the three of us used to talk 
to each other and respected each other quite a lot I think. [The fourth and 
fifth] were gun fishermen from the old school really in terms of they could 
catch a hell of a lot. [The fourth, especially] was always volume rather 
than quality, I think and his little boat wasn't … wasn't, the ideal boat for it 
although he got a, he built a, … [another] and put big fish bins in it and 
probably improved his quality a lot later on. I don't know but he's a guy 
that could catch fish.  
[The sixth] was probably the most born and bred, most natural fisherman, 
of anyone on the island. He was kind of the genuine Waiheke local who 
knew every little nook and cranny and he fished very consistently and 
very regularly.  He never caught too much and he never caught too little 
and he fished all through the year, in a way, in some ways the most 
professional fisherman of all. After the QMS came in he was one of the 
first to sell out. I know because I bought his boat and his quota. He was 
one of those fishermen who didn't go for colour sounders and all that sort 
of stuff but he observed the birds and the tides and weather and he was 
kind of a natural fisherman (Informant 14).  
Some built their own boat (Gulf News 9 May 1980 26). Others bought an old 
launch.  Some had persisted with the boat they started with (Chris Dunn, 
longliner, for example), while others changed boats and indeed three of the 
informants owned the same boat (Lotus) sequentially. 
The Coromandel was similar. People fished for subsistence then as other 
employment dried up began fishing commercially:   
In the mid 70s you'd just throw your line out and you got heaps of fish just 
like that. You didn't need to make any effort. You hardly needed to even 
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bait the line. There were just heaps of fish there in the mid 70s. But then 
after the economics started to get tight and the fishing (expanded), there 
were lots of young fishermen out with their boats. Man that made a real 
impact because they fished close in and they had the smaller boats and they 
fished all along the coast and it got much harder then.  It was the job of last 
resort for young men trying to support their families … Just got up or 
borrowed from their families $3 or 4,000 for an old fishing boat and set out 
to support themselves. So that was mainly what it was and there were heaps 
of them. There just got to be more and more and more of them until there 
were no fish basically. And you saw the big [Japanese] longliners. They 
would fish along the line and they would send the little boats in. We were 
right on the edge of the restrictions for coming into the Gulf at that stage 
when they were beginning to bring in restrictions. Boy they went over that 
line every night (Informant 2). 
These informants didn't fit the typologies of fishermen presented in the literature 
and, while it is useful to consider them in the categories used here, the situation is 
more dynamic since an operation that began one way, in one category, developed 
another and ends in a different category. One fisherman, for example, started 
recreationally, then for subsistence, retailed a bit, then deliberately moved into 
both iki jimi fishing and retail. 
The profitability of the iki jimi market had seemed responsible for the 
considerable influx of fishermen into the snapper fishery in the early 1980s but 
this perception was refuted by one informant from both his own and wider 
experience. 
People came in because they just wanted to fish. There was always a 
market for fish. The iki jimi market was already in the process of being 
established when I started fishing. I just went straight into that form of 
fishing. Most other fishermen around me were converting their attitudes, 
more than anything else, towards higher quality type of fish and they were 
learning what they should do and I was learning as well … Most of my 
fellow fishermen had been fishing before the iki jimi market opened up. 
… It was certainly the factor that made longlining profitable and exciting 
in the early 80s. It was a golden time and had it not been the controlled 
fishery I'm sure many more people would have come in because of the iki 
jimi market.  Because of the controlled fishery they couldn't and the 
controlled fishery was more or less in place before most people were 
aware of the iki jimi market, I think (Informant 14). 
The technology they used, the boats and type of gear, particularly whether active 
(trawling and Danish seining) or passive (longlining and set netting) contributed 
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to the occupational identity of my commercial fishing informants. The boats most 
iki jimi fishermen used had been designed and built locally, for recreational use, 
most of them, especially the older, specifically for the Hauraki Gulf (See Figure 
14).  
 
Figure 14: Waiheke longliners at the Matiatia pontoon gearing up for an iki jimi 
trip. 
Fishermen were innovative, always watching each other, checking out the boats 
and gear to see how they resolved the hassles. The problem of catching seabirds is 
an example and also represents the range of conservation ideologies among 
fishermen, from the more conservation minded who were there to experience the 
marine environment to the more entrepreneurial for whom monetary return was 
more paramount;  
Birds! I've seen fishermen that pissed me off a bit. I used to call them 
truck drivers because they weren't actually out there because of the 
environment or anything they were there to make a quid. I used to see 
them shooting birds and also laying the gear that quick they weren't using 
weights and they'd have three or four, five, six, ten birds pull their gear 
down and personally myself, if a bird did get hooked you'd chip back up 
and try and get it off because it didn't do your gear any good for a start.  
Birds that used to get us were sooty shearwaters, they were the worst 
(Informant 2). 
Longliner Chris Dunn explained how the work and gear changed during the years 
he was fishing:  
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Yeah well we progressively moved. When we first went there … we were 
hand hauling the bloody kuralon. We used to pull the bloody gear in, even 
in the summer time and you'd just drop the fish on the bloody floors inside 
a covered cockpit but just drop the fish on the bloody floor. Then you'd 
pick up all your gear before you'd turn round … dig the ice out then with 
… (an ice) pick you'd throw the things in … At the end of it (after the 
advent of iki jimi) we were holding the little darlings and you'd have your 
gloves on – we weren't allowed to touch them because the Japanese 
alleged you leached the colour out of them.  You had a spike so you'd take 
the hook out of the mouth and then you'd spike it in the brain then you'd 
drop it in a slurry bin. I built in [bins for] slurries of seawater and ice and 
then even after awhile you'd break off half way down a line. If the fish 
were in a slurry bin for longer than about an hour and a half the eyes used 
to freeze so for appearances sake, if you were getting good catch you'd 
just cut the line under a buoy and a little anchor and drift away from it and 
put the fish away. We used to stack them on their little tummies. Pick 
them up with little gloves, stack them all up and you'd have ice underneath 
them.  You'd have only one layer of fish, all on their tummies, then you 
used to put ice on top of that. We used to put boards in so it would take 
care, if you were falling off seas and things, there was no crushing and 
then you'd put down some more ice and then put the fish down, you 
know? The fish were beautiful (Chris Dunn, longliner).  
By comparison with trawling, or to a lesser extent with Danish seining, with time 
off during tows or sets, longlining was constant labour intensive work.  
I didn't like seining much. [My skipper] didn't have a drum. It was all 
coilers, stamping the bloody rope down. Hard work, utter boredom sitting 
round waiting waiting waiting to do the shot and then it‘s all action when 
it was on and then … No, with longlining it's constant working all the time 
there are very few spare minutes. When you do get them it's idling back to 
pick up the gear, putting fish away, baiting up for the next set cleaning up, 
hauling gear, it‘s all on (Informant 13). 
For those who wanted to work in the inshore environment, iki jimi fishing while 
labour intensive, with early starts and constant physical effort, had relatively low 
capital demands with comparatively cheap boats, gear and easily obtainable. 
Fishing as a Last Resort 
Much of the commercial enterprise and employment on the island is sensitive to 
wider economic trends such as the housing market and, being dependant on 
visitors and seasonal fluctuations. As with many other coastal communities access 
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to commercial fisheries could make the difference for some between tiding over 
or even succeeding well and bankruptcy. An informant explained:  
I'm a real estate agent but before that I was a photo engraver. No I came 
home to help my Dad in his real estate business. We had a boom in '72, 
'73 and at the end of '73 we had a crash. Had a young family, made lots of 
money in real estate. The taxman was all over me wanting provisional tax 
for the next year assessed on the income in previous years. I started with 
Dad in '69 incidentally. There was no money coming in, you'd sit around 
all day, no appointments. Nothing would happen, no money. So I had to 
do something so my mate and I went out and, as I say, we put out a 
hundred metres of net and caught a heap of fish. This was pretty good so 
we got started on fish. Got a license, bought more net supplied the local 
fish shops – catching too much (Informant 13). 
The fisheries also helped resolve the perennial problem of lack of employment 
because ―any young bloke around the island that wanted a job. You could go and 
see one of the skippers and he'd be tried out and he'd get a job fishing‖ (Informant 
1). Fishing then required practical seagoing and boating skills so provided an 
option for those youth who would hadn't done well at school. One now very 
successful fisherman explained the situation and his experience.  
Those people might not have been any good at school. They might have 
dropped school days and gone fishing instead of going to school but they 
were the 'bone fide' people in the fishing industry. They are the ones that 
should have been helped – [instead of] these university delinquents – take 
away the electronic equipment and they're stuffed. That's what they are. 
I'm no good at school. Good thing I went fishing in the early days I 
suppose. But everybody's got something good about them and the fishing 
in the old days was one of those things. You could pick it up and catch 
fish, you could do alright (Informant 7).  
He got into the fishing by choice but the fisheries also provided the community a 
means of dealing with some of those youth at a loose end and getting into trouble 
with alcohol. The novel, Royce, Royce the people's choice (Hawes 2002) provides 
realistic detail of this option. 
ETHOS "OUT THERE" 
On the assumption that the highlights, positive and negative, would indicate both 
the physical experience and major motivations, the questions: ―What was the best 
of it, out there?‖ and  ―What was the worst of it‖, were asked. 
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 During my Viaduct research, seiners and trawlermen tended to regard their boats, 
not like recreational boaties as expressive objects but, like a farmer's old utility 
vehicle, merely a tool and the Gulf just the 'factory floor' for the routine grind of 
an arduous activity. The marine environment of the Hauraki Gulf was the arena 
for fishing activity and their boats the means of access. Kenyon and most of my 
present longline informants also suggest otherwise. In his seminal paper, ―Making 
a Living from the Sea‖, Graeme Kenyon, epitomized what longlining meant to 
him before the introduction of the QMS:  
Ten years ago, small-time commercial fishing was a way of life which 
gave independence, opportunity and the excitement of a gambler's 
optimism, a source of pride to each individual that he could use wit, skill 
and energy to provide for his family in the most primitive way, hunting in 
the wild, becoming in tune with the environment, the weather patterns, the 
changing sea conditions, falling in love with the Hauraki Gulf and its 
coastline, its islands and its havens of safety and calm in times of 
exhaustion and despair, rejoicing  in the good times the sheer joy of 
surging back from the Cape in a rising north easterly, a following sea 
building behind and a reasonable freight carefully iced away as a reward 
for two twenty hour days single-handed, followed by a straight twenty 
four, three hours out from the Mercuries
95
 or behind the Barrier, and then 
setting the autopilot for home. The occasional brief comment over the 
VHF being the only contact with the others, but through that link a sense 
of community, a few laconic words, but so full of meaning if you are a 
part of that community, all of us just two good trips away from being rich 
but never quite making it. My fraternity: the longliners, we never took too 
much, rarely had the luck or the stamina to do it, limited by a labour-
intensive method which held unlimited hope but never quite delivered. 
But prices were good, and we could afford to be generous and bloody-
minded at times, and to do well you had to be always optimistic and 
opportunistic (Kenyon 1992 1). 
Fishermen learnt the seasonal variability of fish and the methods and gear setups 
required to catch them: 
[Y]ou could split where the fish were and the effort into quite clearly four 
seasons and we used to work the spring and autumn. In the early stages we 
used to work in the channels when the fish were coming in out of the 
deeper water with the tides coming up onto the shellfish beds in the 
shallower waters and then they‘d go back out … You know the channels 
used to drop off when the tides got too big and you‘d get only juvenile fish. 
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You know the bigger fish are smart enough and they‘d stay out because 
there was a lot of [fishing] effort and so it was hard fishing when the tides 
got over about 3.2, 3.3 metres
96
. ... Then in the winter we used to be hard in 
on the foul. What I mean hard in on the foul we had the early Furuno 
sounders ... and they were hard to [calibrate] – we didn‘t have colour 
sounders ... but you could pick up the bottom profile and you could see fish 
marks and I would just start. I would drop the gear when the bottom profile 
went like that [gesture], if there was a flat area and you didn‘t cut the gear 
and get the anchor on – generally there‘d be couple of hooks outside and 
just on flat profile ground and you‘d get – at the start of the line no fish and 
then where it was all jagged there‘d  be often bloody near a fish on every 
hook  and then the last couple  of hooks out on  the ground on the flat 
ground outside you‘d get  nothing. ... Then in the school season I had them 
[the snoods – traces] about 4 yards apart so the play in the school season 
was in the early period I used to pick up fish (Chris Dunn, longliner).  
The demands of the livelihood were ongoing: 
We used to fish for three nights, four days, and then we'd have to steam up 
to Auckland and unload the catch and get the ice and bait and any 
replacement gear and then we'd sail back down again and wait until the 
start of the next week generally. So it was one trip a week. We fished year 
round … We were originally hand hauling monofilament backbone line … 
just trying the backbone was difficult. But we … had your snoods tied 
onto the backbone and we used to cut up inner tubes from bicycles … to 
get some bloody grip but of course things got bloody exciting when you, if 
you, got one of those bloody big stingrays on, sharks, you didn't tend to 
land sharks much bigger than 6 feet.  But if you got one of those bloody 
big carpet things, the danger was, if you let go, the gear started going 
through and you'd get hooked up!‖  (Chris Dunn, longliner). 
Best Times 
In contrast to many of my Viaduct research informants for whom the Gulf was 
just work space, for a surprising number of the present informants, the best was 
being ―out there‖, at sea in the marine environment, in the Gulf and, perhaps 
secondarily, boating.  
Oh I enjoyed, I just really enjoyed the ocean. The fishing for me was 
never the important part.  Being on the ocean was the important part and 
still is. I still, I think that whole growing up on the coast and spending a 
youth mucking around in boats and a lot of time at sea, it‘s definitely the 
ocean that's the attraction (Greg Hayes). 
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Well I love catching fish. There's the joy of catching fish, just to be out 
there. It is something. I love the old boat I have you know. If you love the 
boat then you love being out there in it and you'll do well with it. … You 
love to see the birds. You love to see the fish life, the whales, the 
dolphins, the sharks. You like to see the bag, the fish coming up. The 
whole thing is, I suppose you can say it‘s like an addiction; everything's 
changing all the time. You're hunting.  Man is basically a hunter, you're 
always hunting for things waiting for that, it's a gambler's paradise. Where 
do you get a job like that? You never know what you're going to earn and 
a lot of it is up to your own ability. It's not just a straight-out gamble. It's 
an intelligent gamble (Greg Hayes). 
I say to people 'If you love the sea and you love fishing then all right go 
fishing.  Don't go fishing for the money, go for the passion. If you go 
because it‘s your passion then you might make money but if you go for 
the money you'll never do it'. And that is the secret.  If it is your passion 
and you just love the sea. I mean I've been on the boat and I belong out 
there. If you gave me some square arsed steel boat and it‘s like a truck, 
alright. That's what I call them, they're just truck boats … I go out there in 
my old dunga sort of thing which is a lovely ship, you know (Greg 
Hayes). 
When I asked Ian Strongman what he most liked about being out there he said:  
Freedom! I'd wake up in the morning look out the window and if it was 
blowing or rough, not go. Or if I did go I'd tell the wife I'd be back 
tomorrow but then get enough fish and be back that night. 
Despite the 4.00am starts and the fisherman's hands
97
 others agreed with him:  
The attraction for me was freedom; freedom from an 8-5 job. Which I've 
had a few …  This was a way you could make your own living, at your 
own pace; being your own boss. This was a huge plus for me. I remember 
my uncle saying to my old man [father] when he was fishing he'd say 
―Anybody who'd go fishing for a living would go to hell for a picnic.‖ He 
thought it was just the craziest, the hardest, the most uncomfortable and 
hard lifestyle to choose. But definitely to us, when we were just starting it 
did represent freedom. Even though, sure it took you to the edge a few 
times it was, that's what it was about (Barry Torkington). 
Appreciation of the environment, or working the boats, were not the only factors. 
Often lifestyle, the challenge of hunting, a good catch, and freedom merged. ―Just 
the sheer solidarity like just the beauty of the whole thing and not having to worry 
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and the saltwater aggravating sores, some fishermen's hands often become swollen and 
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about anything basically. You were just in the environment. You were with the 
birds; the wind and the water and you could make some money out of it‖ 
(Informant 26).  Their friendships and camaraderie might not always have seemed 
most important at the time but it is what fishermen remembered later. Kevin 
Martin, for example:  
The best of it, mate, exactly what's happening right now, talking to you. 
Meeting the people. I love the people … the main thing … is the 
comradeship with the people.  That's what I liked. I liked that and I still 
like it … I used to enjoy sitting down and having a beer and talking 
bullshit.  I like it. I just liked all the bullshit about it. All the rah rahing 
around and the story got big and the waves got bigger and the ship got 
smaller and that's what I liked (Kevin Martin).   
When asked about the best of it, the fisherman who was perhaps the most 
entrepreneurial (Informant 13) said:  
It was a lifestyle. It was hard physical work. Long hours we'd work 30 
hours straight.  We'd leave here (Matiatia). You'd go down pick up your 
ice after the 9.00 o'clock boat (ferry) so you were down there just after 
8.00. You'd get your ice and bait then start idling your way out wherever 
you were going and cutting up bait, making up gear from the last trip, 
replacing traces and stuff so.  You'd get out and you'd see something on 
the sounder so you'd put a little shot down just to see what it was and see 
whether the fish are biting or what the hell and we'd mainly target the 
evening set. That would be the big one and whack in a couple of thousand, 
1,500 to 2,000 hooks and pick it up then start doing short shots 300s all 
through the night because you could not leave, put a lot of gear in the 
water over, there's patches of lice out there that would just strip you as 
soon as it hits the bottom so any fish on there, if there are any fish on there 
too long, gone. If you can see them on the sounder and if they're on the 
bottom, you've got them on the hook, there's nothing surer so you put in a 
short shot so you've got the fish and that was beautiful fish. They're only 
in the water less than an hour, you'd whack in 300 hooks and turn around 
and pick them straight up. So we'd carry on doing this all night. Come in 
and unload, sometimes you'd need to take it to town (the Viaduct) and by 
the time you'd got your ice and loaded and everything and got back to the 
island it would be one or two o'clock and by the time you did all the things 
you had to do, well I had to do because I was running another business as 
well and I'd crawl into bed about four or five o'clock in the afternoon. 
They'd wake me up for tea but the sleeps were incredible (Informant 13).  
Sometimes it wasn't just the appreciation of the environment but also the contrast 
with shore based occupations and the uncertainty of the results:  
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Well sometimes it was quite miserable. At other times it was very 
enjoyable. I suppose on the enjoyable times, you'd be coming out of a 
little bay on Great Barrier Island thinking to yourself most people are 
working all year and looking forward to going out to the Barrier for one 
week and here I'm doing it all of the time so I virtually own the Hauraki 
Gulf. It's my place. I'm here all the time.  That kind of feeling but I think 
the compelling thing about fishing, apart from all of those things, I think 
there's a kind of addiction to it and it's a little bit similar to the addiction of 
gambling, I think, and people who are prone to those addictions take very 
readily to fishing.  
The reason why it's so addictive is that it is so unpredictable. The rewards 
can be very great but they occur randomly, you can convince yourself that 
you are a good fisherman, I'm not a good fisherman, but there's still a 
randomness to it. You never quite know, the best guy never quite knows, 
what's going to happen and there's always the thought that the next one's 
going to be even better and sometimes it's not so. You get this intermittent 
reinforcement.  
These failures and the occasional great successes and all of this drives a 
kind of addictive process and if fishermen become in any way sort of 
slaves it's a slave to that. It's the thought that the next trip's going to be a 
good one and that drives you to go out and do it again so there's the 
excitement that a gambler experiences when he thinks he's about to strike 
it lucky and I think that's probably the thing (Informant 14).  
Several fishermen referred to the gamble and the excitement engendered by the 
uncertainty of the catch:  
The best out there was the unknown. You could never put money on what 
would turn up.  What was today's problem? On any day there were so 
many variables you could never stop trying to learn. The unknown. One 
day you'd get eight baskets off one shot. The next day in the same place 
just one then a week later there's more again. You just don't know. But 
experience helps (Informant 18). 
Worst Times 
I had anticipated that bad weather would be the worst of it but this was not the 
case.  Fishermen certainly experienced bad weather, even those who used small 
open boats right inshore.  
Informant 12, for example said:  
It was lovely at times but bloody awful at other times because when you 
were supplying a shop you were trying to get the fish and sometimes you 
had to go out and stuff them. I'd never go off shore these days. Yeah, I've 
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been out there in all sorts  … I suppose being out there in a little boat. One 
time ... when I was longlining with an outboard running in reverse to hold 
me into the wind and pulling the bloody longline and working it in and it  
was so bloody rough I had planes circling over me to see if I was alright. I 
looked like I was in trouble. Yeah, I don't miss those crook times and cold 
winters, have a bloody string of nets out and by the time you'd been over 
the first net you were totally numb.  You couldn't feel a thing with your 
hands.  You had to do all the rest by eye and make your hands, tell your 
hands what to do and hope they did it. I don't miss any of that (Informant 
12). 
So many fishermen felt a sense of obligation, often a financial necessity, to 
retrieve the gear, but also to their customers. For some, the gamble contributed to 
the best, for others it was the worst, part of the experience out there: ―Just the 
uncertainty. It was like playing cards. It was the uncertainty or the stress of not 
earning any money and that happened quite a lot‖ (Informant 26). 
It's a whole lot of things. Getting boarded by the MAF. That's a hell of a 
thing; it always stuffs your day up. Getting the net round the propeller. 
Hooking the net up on a rock or a roll or something and ripping the arse 
out of it …Yeah expensive. Those are probably the worst things. The 
other, sometimes you get days out there when the fish, you don't catch 
anything; for various reasons, like there might be an earthquake in the Bay 
of Plenty and that spooks the fish so you don't catch anything. So you tow 
your gear round all day and you burn a lot of fuel up and stuff and you 
don't catch anything, maybe a bit of, half a box, that sort of thing.  There's 
that, that's not much fun (Informant 20). 
In addition there was the contradiction between camaraderie and dependence on 
the one hand and ruthless competition on the other: 
Yeah it was a very cutthroat business but I think the basis was fishermen, 
you know, when you were out there you used to rely on other people. 
Especially before we had radios because none of us had radios to start off 
with in our boats. So I guess that sort of come through in the industry. But 
boy they would cut each others‘ throats (Informant 44). 
The lack of fish was often a big factor. ―The worst was having a mortgage when 
the fish were not biting. When you'd get the southwesters that blow for a week. 
We don't get them now‖  (Informant 18).  
For another, the worst was what it meant in terms of his relationship with his the 
family:  
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No. I neglected my family. I missed out on the best times of my kids 
growing up and in the end sort of distanced myself from my family 
despite the fact that I didn't want to do that but it happened because each 
day seemed more important than one's sort of family goals which could be 
shoved off for another day or so, which always happens. The Quota 
Management System didn‘t cause that, fishing itself did (Informant 14).  
Perceptions change with age so that with nostalgia the best might outweigh the 
drudgery and the worst of it. So for these mainly small longline fishermen the 
occupational ethos was hard physical work for uncertain returns but at sea in the 
beauty of the Gulf. They worked down among the waves in small old boats with 
the reality of caulked timbers and steamed ribs, cranky diesels, oil in the bilge and 
fumes. There was a sense of freedom, the gamble of the hunt, the intellectual 
challenge of elusive quarry but not the regularity and authoritarian regime endured 
by shore-based work forces. 
Fishermen: Politics 
Heuristically, taking politics as meaning action to do with power and authority 
within social involving relationships from an expressive perspective, the politics 
of fishing involved interactions and interrelations among different components of 
the industry and community constituents: the process of becoming and remaining 
fishermen and engaging with other local fishermen, fishermen using different 
methods, fishermen from elsewhere, complying and contending with the rules and 
regulation of MAF's management and enforcement regime, negotiating with the 
market (See Economics,  below), and relating with their families and the 
community.  
More formally Gulf fishermen had their own Association, the Combined 
Fisherman‘s Association which was a combination of four small associations, 
Auckland, Waiheke, East Coast Bays and Rodney. They were all small fishermen 
and had representatives on the port Liaison Committees with MAF, Ministry of 
Transport (MOT) and provided a better inter-sector understanding from a 
fisherman's point of view and vice versa. The Association was trying to maintain 
the quality of catch and the industry. The members were one-man businesses, not 
industrial enterprises, and earned an average income, adequate for a fisherman‘s 
personal needs and to support his boat. The return to the country was staggering. 
It was all private capital investment and didn't require Rural Bank Loans and they 
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remained viable because of the ability of the men to make it so. Their income 
fluctuated. Some were young and single, young married with a family and house. 
An older man is an asset to the industry since he had knowledge but also had his 
boat and land freehold so he didn't need the income of a man starting out (pers 
com, Ken Browne, President Combined Fisherman's Association, Viaduct 
Research 8 October 1981).  
The process of becoming fishermen, for family fishermen for example, involved 
negotiating the family fishing traditions and attitudes, participating or not with 
father or other relative, learning the skills, deciding to become a fisherman then 
committing to the choice, with or against the support of the family, friends and 
community.  Learning to fish meant not just becoming competent with the boat, 
the gear and accumulating fishermen's seasonal and ecological knowledge. It also 
meant contending in the political arena. It was a time when there were increasing 
numbers of fishermen.  Consequently many fishermen began to experience 
reductions in their catches and there was a growing belief that fish in the Gulf 
were being depleted. They also had to contend with the politics of increasingly 
intense negotiation with other varieties of fishermen, groups and institutions such 
as MAF. Even the choice of where to fish involved a political dimension. This 
was especially true for the longliners and setnetters in relation to the part-timers 
before the Gulf became a Controlled Fishery (See Appendix 3) but also in relation 
to MAF.  
Chris Dunn (longliner) for example, felt that he was contending with part-timers 
"parasiting" and aggravating the alleged overfishing.  
Every school season you got all these bloody pricks [part-timers] turning 
up who you'd never seen before and they'd just gone and got out and got a 
bloody license, put a bloody boat in and they'd come out and follow you, 
… What happened was with all these new entrant guys, the cheeky pricks, 
they'd be hanging off the wharf in Matiatia. You'd often four or five new 
boats, you'd never seen them before, you'd row out to your boat and get 
your gear ready … Steam out of the harbour and a couple of these guys 
would drop off the thing and they'd follow you out and no 
acknowledgement. No hello or anything like that. … They'd see where 
you dropped you gear and they'd do a parallel set and they'd drift their 
gear over you. There were bloody fights and arguments. It was just 
ridiculous.  Anyway that was the legacy of the Ministry.  That's why I hate 
bloody government servants I must admit (Chris Dunn, Longliner). 
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He was also critical of MAF‘s response to the issue. ―When MAF decided that 
the Gulf was under pressure they didn‘t just say: 'There's a moratorium, 
everybody‘s whose earning …(so much)', if they‘d just done the simplest thing 
it would be to say: 'It's now a fishery for those who can prove they derive their 
income full-time out   of it.'‖  
I always thought that was just an absolute mismanagement and the 
Ministry just couldn't give a stuff about it. Then when they decided that 
there was a whole lot of discussion about how the Gulf was going to be 
managed and for three years prior to actually putting the controls into 
place they actively opened up the licenses and encouraged people, new 
entrants, to come in. So for about the last year and a half we used to have 
these bloody strangers. I used to think they just about tripled the small 
boat pressure on the fish (Chris Dunn, longliner). 
There was also conflict with other gear users. For the longliners it was set netters 
on the one hand, and Danish Seiners on the other:  
Of course if you were gill netting fish, of course the fish are all dead and, 
you know, they are sitting around in there and a lot of them are getting 
eaten out. It was just a waste of a resource … But … [two other Waiheke 
fishermen] got into netting big time they had power haulers and they had 
little fast boats and they'd put the bloody nets all over the 'foul' all round 
the Noisies [islands] and they'd ghost fish for bloody years. They'd lose 
gear and that was a c*** of a thing and the Ministry had no interest in 
bloody limiting that (Chris Dunn, longliner).  
When I worked on Diana
98
, for one part of the school season the longliners 
working inside the seine line had been getting fish. The seiners outside, however, 
had been ―starving‖. As the fish moved out, the liners, as they were legally 
entitled, moved with them and their longline sets often meant the Danish seiners 
could not do their seine sets, as and where they wanted, without towing-up the 
longlines. It was, therefore, frustrating for the seiners waiting until the longline 
had been retrieved or galling for the longliners when their gear was entangled in 
the seines. On the other hand some set net and long line fishermen suggested that 
the bulk catching methods, Danish seining and trawling, also had implications for 
the fish inshore.  
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While some individual fishermen did annotate their sounder tapes with position 
and conditions and did keep their shot books with similar information for fishing 
spots, tows or sets, for obvious reasons fishermen neither published nor broadcast 
their knowledge. It was their intellectual capital built up incrementally through the 
course of their fishing careers. As one fisherman said:  
Nobody will write it down and tell you very easily. I mean you can't pick 
up a book. I'm not going to write the book on how to do it. Nor am I going 
to tell the next guy who goes out there or he'll clear out the areas where I 
know where and when to fish; what size fish I'll get. You know I can 
target into the right place at the right time.  That is everything really in 
fishing plus the way in which I execute my method. So, yeah, it is very 
hard now to get well-qualified fishermen. There‘s new guys coming on, I 
mean there‘s been a lot of guys over the years, fly-by-nighter.  You see 
they come in, young guys, burn themselves out, there's one guy sick, and 
now either in prison, dead or in nut houses (Informant 37). 
Fishermen: Economics 
Economics concerned the relationship with the market, initially with clients in the 
community, local fish shops and/or buyers at the Viaduct. The best indicator of 
the economic situation of my informants was the market for which they fished. 
Initially one of the older family fishermen (Informant 13) had his own clients in 
the local village before he started supplying the hotel. As another fisherman told 
me:  
[He] wasn't commercial fishing in those days, virtual, [he'd] go out and 
catch a few fish and … (his wife) would fillet them and he had his set 
clients. I suppose you could say it was commercial fishing but he wasn't 
unloading in the city or anything like that. No bulk fishing (Informant 13)  
He knew his clients and what they wanted so could match his expenses and effort 
to their needs.  
The local retail fishermen kept the shops supplied so their relationship with 
consumers wasn't quite so direct and they were reliant on shop owners or 
managers knowledge of their clientele.  Meanwhile "bait" sales through several 
fish shops, takeaway outlets and corner stores selling ―bait‖, ensured a flexible 
market.  
The son of one of the older fishermen said:  
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All my fish was sold on the island. … I was supplying three at that stage, 
or more, because there were part-time ones that only took a little bit. 
Three or four fish shops; they were dealing in fish and chips. Yeah it was 
a lot of work but it was pretty rewarding and pretty good money for back 
then. You know, for a small venture with not much capital input and it 
was all effort, whatever effort you put in. In those days, like when I first 
got married, and that I was virtually working seven days a week  
(Informant 10). 
Twenty to thirty years ago, local fishermen were directly, or perhaps only one 
remove from supplying fresh locally caught fish to a relatively small community. 
Waiheke was much closer to self-sufficiency than is the case now. But it was not 
perfect.  Meager catches in winter as a result of natural variability and the 
seasonal cycles of fish numbers had a flow-on effect for fishermen and their 
families. This made it ―very hard when there was no fish caught because you still 
had all the expenses of running the boat, buying ice, buying bait and getting no 
return for it. So you could go backwards very quickly financially. The winter was 
hard to get through at times‖ (Informant 8). 
Before the Co-op was established, with the exception of the few that kept their 
operation strictly local, most of the fishermen took their catch to the mainland on 
occasion, if not regularly. As noted, one of he senior fisherman supplied a market 
stall at Otara
99
 (Informant 12), another fisherman supplied his brother-in-law's 
fish shop in Auckland and sometimes also his in-law's friend who also had a fish 
shop. ―I'd be out at five [am] and the day was over by eight in the morning‖ 
(Informant 6) and the fish would be on the ferry.  
Buyers 
With increasing numbers of fishermen more sold fish at the Viaduct. Many of the 
buyers at the Viaduct were Dalmatian and the Waiheke fishermen had mixed 
feelings about them. In winter when the fish and indeed the fishermen were 
scarce, the buyers cultivated the fishermen to get the fish but in the spawning 
season it was different.  
I suppose we got a reward in a way because if there was, and there were 
periods, when there was an absolute glut but because we looked after … 
[his buyers], you know, you could go out … but if you got onto a patch of 
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fish you could bloody come in and drop it  off and turn around and go 
straight back out, fill up and come back in and … [his buyer]  would be … 
saying, ―Jesus. Not more fish‖. But because we looked after him through 
the winter season he would somehow lay off that fish and I'm sure he even 
took a loss on some of the fish (Chris Dunn, longliner). 
Some of the fish sold on the wharf at the Viaduct went to fishshops but another 
fisherman said his Dalmation buyer ―had a truck up on the Viaduct and he used to 
buy my fish and take it all through the North Island and sell‖ (Informant 26). 
Other fishermen sold to one of the relatively smaller companies and, seemingly as 
a last resort, to the much larger vertically integrated ―corporates‖ such as Sanford 
or Jaybel Nichimo. Even then they had a personal relationship with a known 
buyer or buyers. My skipper, for example, had three buyers, all Dalmations.  It 
seemed most of the buyers, at this 'intermediate' level were Dalmations, who got 
first choice of the fish. In the event that they did not want it or there was more 
than they needed then it was offered to Jaybels or Sanford (cf. Johnson and 
Haworth 2004 110-117). 
It was similar for most of the Waiheke fleet before the Co-op was established.  
Chris Dunn said:  
Although you were fishing say for four days you'd come back in on the 
fourth night.  Go home and have a decent bloody sleep, have a shower and 
wash because I didn't have a shower on the boat and I was a vegetarian in 
those days so I used to go away with these vegetarian bloody pizzas. I 
didn't even have a stove for the first three or four years so I'd just eat cold 
food and you'd come home, have a good feed, have a sleep. You'd still be 
up again at five o'clock next morning because you had to be up in town
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-- it's an hour and a half run if the boat had a clean bottom. You'd steam 
back up to see …[his buyer who] used to come down and bloody plonk a 
40ounce bottle of rum on the back of the boat, particularly in the 
wintertime when we were keeping his business going.  
So you'd do all your business and then often … start drinking about half 
past nine or ten o'clock but by then you'd done five or six hours work. So 
you'd all have a few snorts with all the guys would sit around and tell a 
few jokes and things (Chris Dunn, Longliner). 
Chris Dunn also said that with the effects of the camaraderie and the rum the 
fishermen ―used to play chicken all the way back down [to Waiheke]‖. 
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Export 
Increasingly the globalizing export, and particularly the iki jimi, market had more 
influence, offered better returns than local retail and attracted Waiheke fishermen. 
As a consequence the community didn't get fish, at least:  
Not as much as it should have, it could have benefited more and probably 
as a result of that they [commercial fishermen] had more disposable 
income. But the community didn't have the range of fish it had before or 
direct access to the fish like we did before. That's true the local fish shops 
at that time started to not be able to get fish … That is when it started to be 
exported … Yeah they were the export prices but also it was all tied up. I 
mean, if you brought fish in it was exported. Nobody [none of the 
fishermen] was interested in giving a couple of fish to the local shop. It 
was mostly … [shop owner's] at that time, although there were other 
people, and he would just try and get a bit of second grade fish off 
whomever he could, like shark fillets or stingray. In the end he was 
reduced to selling his chips and snapper that had been in the net too long 
and that kind of thing.  And he'd also learnt to sell lower qualities of fish 
too. So it was really the end of the easy access to fish for the whole 
community (Informants 6a, 6b -- husband and wife). 
So it was not only the corporates who were influenced by the export market to the 
detriment of the local community. Initially fishermen on Waiheke had supplied 
the island, then, when they caught more fish than locals could take they started 
landing the excess at the Viaduct on a small scale for the fish shops and the 
Auckland domestic market, then to companies who were also exporting 
internationally for a higher price. As the Japanese iki jimi market developed, 
Waiheke fishermen increasingly focused on this higher priced, premium market 
and it also opened opportunities for new fishermen.  
Waiheke was not self-consciously a 'fishing community' and ironically it was not 
the local market, or even the wider Auckland domestic market but the export, 
particularly iki jimi, market that supported the establishment of a more 
identifiable fishing industry and the Co-op on the island.  
Fishermen: Social Relationships 
Fishermen were by no means socially homogenous. One informant was running 
two boats and a lot of gear, fishing mainly at night while also trying to keep 
another business running. In consequence he had little or no energy to socialise 
(Informant 13). Others worked more closely with a ―mate‖ running another boat 
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while still others formed cliques, groups of three or four who baited-up and got 
their boats ready together at the wharf on almost a daily basis. The shared 
experience, running a boat, fishing and confronting the challenge ―out there‖, or 
MAF, developed a sense of camaraderie and trust. While generally they did not 
fish in the same place, often they'd rendezvous and raft up in the same bay 
overnight. Ashore, they and their families often socialised together. 
Perhaps the most dramatic expression of the relationship, the camaraderie between 
fishermen, was the lengths to which they'd go to assist each other or other 
‗boaties‘ in difficulty. Using old boats, sometimes with makeshift arrangements, 
in an uncertain marine environment, not surprisingly there were exigencies. Even 
in the semi-enclosed Gulf, situations could be extreme and Chris Dunn told me:  
I remember once my drive ditched on me … [I was] in the "shit" down in 
the Firth and big seas. Some nuts came loose and it affected essentially the 
timing of the diesel. It was dark and it was blowing bloody hard and the 
guys had been fishing for three or four days they were  f****** and I 
bloody, I just, I was f****** (Chris Dunn longliner). 
He called up on the radio, got two of his mates and both got out of bed and they 
steamed out to assist. 
There were other cases where boats were caught in weather much rougher than 
anticipated with planks opening up, with pumps or motors failing, being sheltered 
in the lee of their mates or being towed. One story I heard in the Coromandel pub 
was of Search and Rescue (SAR) asking a fisherman to check a Mayday call from 
another fisherman 130km northeast of Barrier Island in 70 km/hr southwesters 
and tow him in. Unfortunately, before getting to the wharf, his boat started taking 
water from a broken engine cooling fitting and in turn needed assistance. He then 
faced a long wait for reimbursement.  
As a result of the camaraderie that developed through fishing and involvement in 
such emergencies, even now several decades later one can call up for assistance 
and the others drop everything even for several days to offer the needed expertise. 
The bonds forged fishing run deep. 
ESTABLISHING THE CO-OP 
Establishing the Co-op is indicative of community fisheries before the QMS. It 
involved the needs, motivations and relationships among the fishermen, with the 
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authorities  (e.g., the Health Department and the County Council) and with the 
community. 
For the fishermen part of the motivation for starting the Co-op was to get 
essentials like bait and ice and eliminate the travel time having to go over to the 
city. It also avoided the hassles of filling too much time in the pub.  One of the 
fishermen pivotal in starting the Co-op said,  
We used to take it (fish) over to Auckland. And it's the usual old thing. 
When the fish started running you'd go over and been out for a couple of 
days and finally had a boatful of fish and thought it was great and go over 
there and all of a sudden the price had halved. So that was,  *****? Of 
course when fishing was good it was hard to get ice over in Auckland … 
It was attractive to be able to do your fishing on the island and return 
home to the island. To cut out at least a day and extra miles and so on … 
It seemed silly to me that you'd come home 'knackered' and then you had 
to go over to Auckland.  It was as simple as that and sea conditions of 
course. It could be quite awkward getting over there at times in a small 
boat (Informant 44). 
―Of course you've got to have a certain critical mass to have a local industry. I 
was one of the ones involved in actually starting up the Waiheke Co-op and it was 
possible to start that Co-op up because  there was about 18 or 20 local fishermen 
and by banding  together they had enough critical mass to  actually set up their 
own little chiller plant and  ice making plant and run a truck back to the mainland‖  
(Informant 14) (See Figure 15). 
Establishing the Co-op was very much a team effort. Right from the time when 
one of the senior fishermen, who would not himself benefit from the Co-op, first 
put his hand in his pocket and put a substantial cheque, or bank roll (accounts 
differ) on the table, setting the example that others followed, a handful of 
fishermen contributed significant expertise and others their labour.  
[E]verything was done on the cheap. I went to Westfield [freezing works] 
when they were closing up and bought a couple of pallets of electrical 
goods and brought them all back and … [one fisherman, formally an 
electrician] knitted them all together and did all the electrics … One of my 
fortes is ferreting out things. I've never bought anything new in my life. 
I've always go to auctions to buy things. … But yeah it was the only way 
could set it up with the funds that we had. I think that if we had asked 
members for more it would have folded because it was just beyond 
[them]. I can't remember what it was but the – you know all that 
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machinery – the only thing new that we bought was the ice head, itself. 
The big compressors, 20 horse power compressor I bought that second 
hand from McNeal‘s out at Tuakau and bought the chiller and the freezer, 
all those motors etc. bought at auctions and what have you. I think it had a 
pretty hard life, that machine. It run day and night for years and yeah what 
was it 3 tonne a day, 5 tonne a day [ice plant] (Informant 44). 
While a few fishermen did the skilled work, others did the labouring. ―We all put 
our back, our sweat into it. We all had a share holding … we built the damn 
thing!‖ (Informant 13). ―[W]e did a huge amount of work in building the Co-op 
… [W]e didn't need to get ice from town which was a major. All the fish was 
traded through the Co-op and it was taken out to a crowd in Onehunga … was the 
exporter or it was the pack house and somebody else was the exporter‖ (Informant 
6). ―We got involved with Reijio Sea Products exporting the island fish‖ 
(Informant 13).  
Like much community enterprise, as the Co-op developed, personal factors and 
networking, not just commercial convenience, were involved. Getting on well 
with those one was dealing with was significant. The Co-op contracted with one 
of the Japanese fish exporting companies in Auckland to process and export their 
snapper to Japan. It so happened, about the same time, that an informant, a would-
be fisherman had joined one of their boats as deckhand for several months before 
moving into the office
101
. When one of the Japanese people that he got on well 
with, also a key liaison with the Co-op, decided to leave, he felt it was time he 
moved on also. Both the managers had also got on well with another Japanese 
man who had good relations with the buyers in Japan so asked him to continue 
exporting their snapper and invited my informant to participate. They formed 
Reijio Holdings in 1984 and through to 1990 exported chilled  (iki jimi) snapper 
to Japan and pioneered the Taiwanese market (Informant 3). 
Despite the ideology of harmonious community relations, the internal reality is 
often conflicting. Fishermen had joined for different reasons. Some, including two 
who were Auckland based always put their fish through the Co-op books to 
support cooperative community enterprise and generate work on the island, ―I 
wanted to see the fisheries stay on the island‖ (Informant 5) but for others 
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economic benefit was more important.  Lots of different things were going on 
within the Co-op: 
They built the depot and the ice tower and they had the truck and would 
come over on the barge to town. But even back then everything was open 
as to what was going through with the prices [transparency] and so on. 
Even back then some of the fishermen would be happy to steam to town to 
unload if the competitor was paying 10cents a kilo more. They were doing 
that and losing dates fishing (Informant 3). 
So despite the benefits many found, and their ideological support, the Co-op didn't 
work out for all the members. One found ―it was like layers of middlemen so 
magical figures, like $10 a kilo from Japan; well fishermen didn't see that or 
twenty dollars a kilo. We didn't see that. We struggled, we struggled to try and get 
$2 out of him. He [the manager] was supposed to be getting these big sums of 
money‖ (Informant 6). 
An additional motivation was to provide employment in the community, 
especially for people on the island. One of those responsible had been on Waiheke 
for a long time and his wife had grown up on the island. As he explained her 
perspective of the employment situation she: 
… had seen most of her friends, you know, teenagers didn't have any 
employment on the island at all. Going back, what 40 years, 30-40 years 
and it wasn't the thing done then for teenagers going out flatting by 
themselves so families used to leave the island, as teenagers were growing 
up, and go to the mainland and find employment for the kids etc. A lot of 
those kids come back to Waiheke when they got on their feet. The only 
industry really on the island over my period was the clothing factory and 
of course it had closed down so there wasn't anything at all in that way 
and one of my biggest buzz was getting [fishing] licenses for a couple of 
young people on the island. … You know I went down to Wellington and 
lobbied for them and went through all the clip clap that went on in those 
days. It was a buzz. It was very hard to get a license over the period that 
we were fishing before quota came in. So yeah it was good (Informant 
44). 
The Downside: Regulations 
Regulations created major difficulties and were indicative of relationships with 
the authorities. The fisherman mostly responsible for negotiating explained: 
That depot we built … [on Waiheke] turned out to be … the only export 
depot in New Zealand and we come under all those rules and regulations 
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and that thing was set up as a whole fish factory. It was ridiculous what 
we had to do and so on what we went through. Later on an export 
receiving depot was a bloody 20 feet container sitting in the middle of 
nowhere and trucks coming in and piling stuff in taking a bit of ice out 
and we … [had to have] bloody hard hats and all sorts of things. That was 
built by the members. It was mostly voluntarily built. We just missed out 
on all the handouts, like Leigh and Coromandel that …[were] all built 
with government loans which, if you made a viable go of it, those loans 
were wiped out.  But we never got any of that. It was a real struggle but 
yeah, it was good …When we started off I went up to Leigh. They were 
very good. They showed us right through the whole lot, gave us a lot of 
advice about ice plants and that. Went over to Coromandel, they were the 
same (Informant 44).  
 Community Support 
Some people in the community had mixed views on facilitating commercial 
fishing by supporting Co-op infrastructure. Indeed, the island's senior statesman, a 
former Chairman of the Waiheke County Council, Planning Committee and 
subsequently Hauraki Gulf Councilor on the Auckland City Council when asked 
about the economic importance of the Co-op said  
They had quite a significant role to the extent that the Community Board 
at the time was considering to meet their needs in relation to the expansion 
of the wharves, if there needed to be a cool store on the wharf and 
arrangements … They made an economic contribution [to Waiheke] and 
four or five were engaged in the storage (Informant 44). 
It went both ways. Indeed the Gulf News reporter (Simon Johnson pers com) 
responsible for most of the fishing news articles, recognising its importance stated 
that the Co-op then was probably the biggest business on the island putting more 
than a million dollars into the community annually for the years they operated. 
The question is, though, did fishermen feel, on balance, support or opposition? 
The Co-op manager felt: 
Looking back probably very supportive. Thinking about things, you know, 
different things come to memory. One, for instance, was the first meeting 
we had. They said 'well the Council won't let you put up a plant because 
of the waste from it', because we were talking about putting up a 
processing plant not only a receiving, an export receiving plant and ice 
plant. I went to the Council … and they were very supportive. Another 
thing that was at a later stage after we'd formed the Co-op I was told in no 
uncertain terms that there was no way we could get a diesel pump down at 
the wharf. [Named person] had tried for many years to get one and the 
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Council supported us on that and as you know we put up a diesel pump 
there. Yeah, yes, we did get support. I can't really remember anyone being 
against it as far as the public went.  
The general thing in those days, everyone was against outside boats 
coming into the community – trawlers – it was a big No no, wasn't it? In 
the Gulf I think longlining was seen to be a much better way of fishing 
and even set netting … [One fisherman] got it in the neck a bit when he 
got into monofilament nets. People didn't like that but on the whole I think 
it was good. Bit of feedback from putting bins of fish on top of the old Iris 
[Ferry] and water come in. Stuff on the way over on a bad trip and the 
Baroona [Ferry] and so on. Yeah it was crazy days (Informant 44). 
So before the QMS individual fishermen could determine arrangements and, 
through interaction, negotiation and teamwork between themselves, with 
cooperation from the community, establish an enterprise to meet their collective 
needs. Physically it may have utilised an eclective assemblage of redundant 
equipment and relationships may not always have been harmonious but for the 
years of its operation it was one of the biggest industries on the island 
contributing both social and monetary value to the fishermen and to the 
community. 
LEIGH 
Fisheries were very significant for Leigh: 
Oh definitely and this place was born by the ancestors who came here, the 
mill, owned by the Wyatts. They're shareholders in Leigh. Mathiessen's 
Bay, Mathiessens, they're here, they're shareholders so and then 
generations down from them. It's a very localized company. Part of Leigh 
is where we are and what we do. I suppose if you were brutal the best 
place for us would be at the airport‖ (Informant 3). 
Neil Macdonald, a former fisheries officer from Coromandel recalled that in the 
early days, perhaps in the 1950s, when Leigh Fisheries ―started up they had 
longline boats only, fishing out of there and they used to come over this side when 
the weather was right‖. He remembered that Leigh fishermen: 
… came down and they headed and gutted (snapper). That's how all the 
fish went back – iced down, headed and gutted. Just cut through the back 
and shoot through … I was up there once. I used to go up and see them 
about once a month and have a chatter. The thing that intrigued me, they 
were smoking fish and there's a roll of bacon and a leg of ham. My word, 
what a choice – profound (Neil Macdonald)! 
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Later when he visited periodically between 1970 and 1986 generally whole fish 
were landed and other methods, including Danish seining, were also in use. Even 
before the QMS Leigh fishermen had a reputation for good fish. A Waiheke 
fisherman, who at the time was doing three or four day trips, reported that his 
Auckland buyer used to say that:  
… the second best fish used to come off Waiheke. The best fish used to 
come out of Leigh and the only thing they had us better on is the fish had 
a bit more colour. The fish in the Gulf were often a little bit pale. But also, 
the guys from Leigh often used to do overnight trips then they'd come in 
after overnighters daily. Then of course when we set up Waiheke Sea 
Products [the Co-op] we organised that so we unloaded at Waiheke‖ 
(Informant 19).  
Leigh was smaller and a much greater proportion of the population was involved 
with the fisheries than on Waiheke. An informant who fished with fishermen from 
both communities suggested:  
But they were never the same.  The Leigh boys were always different and 
generally they didn't mix well with the Auckland fishermen and weren't 
liked but I had a lot to do with Leigh because I went up and worked for 
them afterwards and so I sort of knew both sides quite well.  Totally 
different bunch of guys altogether (Informant 14).  
From the perspective of the Waiheke fisheries officer who knew both 
communities, if anything, it was better at Leigh since, ―there was not much else, at 
the time, except fishing. Sure there's a bit of farming.  But the whole township is 
based on fishing out there. It‘s one of those few places in NZ that were fishing 
villages. I'm sure there were others down south and up north‖ (Informant 1). So at 
the local level there were differences among the fishermen based in the three 
communities but on a larger scale these were not great. 
COMMUNITIES 
This section will set out the community side of coastal commercial fishing as it 
was before the QMS; traditionally informal through to more regulated. It will 
outline aspects of fishermen's families and their communities. Fishermen were 
and are individualistic and, likewise, their families, children, aspirations and 
interactions within the community varied. Fishing was not a nine to five 
occupation and its demands varied. In some cases the differences from the more 
regular patterns of community life meant personal, relational and occupational 
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strains took their toll. The fishing supported the community by supplying fresh 
locally caught fish initially to locals and, in some cases the informal economy, 
then to the fish shops. Fishermen also needed community support from 
boatbuilders, repairers, engineers, mechanics or other relevant trades. Commercial 
fishermen were part of the community and in earlier parts of their lives many 
members through selling directly had been more involved in community life. The 
community was still fascinated by fishing so fishermen and their boats were topic 
of great interest, were reported in the local press and frequently featured 
conversation
102
. Fishing was, therefore, a significant part of the community and 
contributed to its identity.  
Community Subsistence 
Traditionally for rural coastal communities, including those in the Hauraki Gulf, 
fish from locals were an essential part of subsistence. Many coastal people in 
communities just about depended on fish as a source of protein. In sheltered areas 
households even had jetties, nets, lines, scoop nets and all the gear needed to fish. 
In one particular community a pluriactive farmer/fisherman had what was known 
as the ―fish boat‖ and would barter a good catch. Licenses weren't considered 
(Faye Giles). 
Everybody ate fish and they ate all the fish they caught. I can't think of 
any kind of fish that was caught there that was not eaten.  And the Māori 
rules held … where you have a sort of moratorium on shell fishing at one 
end [of the bed] for say three years or whatever, let them breed up, make 
sure there was always plenty there (Faye Giles).  
So not only did fish provide an important part of diet for the community, 
community rules ensured conservation. There was no external motivation that 
threatened fish supply while an informal economy ensured all shared.  
On the Coromandel there were many subsistence fishers. Sandra Watson, for 
example, was born and raised the tip of the Coromandel Peninsular.  
There were six in our family and we lived mainly off the sea and the bush. 
Our mother would go fishing catch us fish for dinner. In those days you 
could just walk down in front of the house and throw a hand line out and 
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catch a bait off the rocks which would be crabs or some of the little kelp 
fish and we were always guaranteed to have fish for our tea. [It was] 
mainly snapper, they were good sized snapper too, not just legal size, the 
ones that you catch a lot of these days. … Over the years I've found it's got 
harder and harder to catch fish off the rocks. Basically now you've got to 
get a boat and go out and go out (Sandra Watson). 
Fishing Families 
Family is used here in the loose sense of a husband, a wife and their children but 
there were variations including partners with their children from former 
relationships. Like other concepts in this research it is dynamic with considerable 
variation between the families and changes through time in the course of the 
fishing careers of my informants. 
Fishing families differed from others in the surrounding community in that one of 
the partners, usually the ‗husband‘, and this was certainly the case for all my 
informants, was a commercial fisherman. In some cases the 'wife' was also heavily 
involved in the enterprise by doing the bookwork, liaising with buyers, the 
mechanics and assisting with general shore-based support. In others, the demands 
of young children, schooling, normal household and community affairs meant she 
was not directly involved in activities that could be related specifically to 
commercial fishing. There were, of course, variations between these two fishing 
family situations with time, life cycle and circumstances. Families were not static 
entities.  The irregularities and uncertainties of the commercial fishing occupation 
were probably greater for fishing families than for families with other occupations 
in the community. To a greater or lesser extent fishermen‘s relationship with the 
community, as opposed to those businesses that contributed to their enterprise, 
was through their families. 
The regular and irregular absences due to seasonal, weather, market and the 
exigencies of fishing meant that many routines, satisfactions and stresses on the 
family tended to be different from those of other families. This may even have 
been taken for granted by a wife or partner who had grown up in a fishing family, 
as was the case for a small number of the wives of my informants. For others it 
was an accepted, tolerated or resisted part of the relationship and probably 
differed for every couple and varied throughout the family 'cycle'. 
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The time spans covered by this research and the fishing careers of informants 
meant that the families moved through different parts or stages of the cycle from 
the formation of the couple, with or without children who grew up went to school 
and maybe college or university or got jobs and moved on, through to retired 
fishermen with their lifelong partner or, for a number of informants, maybe a new 
one. 
For my informants then, fishermen supported and were supported by their 
families. Many were in relationships or at the young family stage of their life 
cycle. An informant explains:  
But after awhile I did the young Kiwi thing and did the big OE in seventy-
four – came back and didn't really know what the hell to do. I got involved 
with a girl whom I'm still married to and so I ended up saying, ―Shit I'd 
better settle down‖ I meandered around for a while – came back into 
Auckland  ….  (in due course got a boat and) just got started. We went 
across to Waiheke and got a mooring and just rented a house over there 
initially (Informant 19). 
Indeed, for one, it was the necessity to provide for the family that was the 
incentive to start commercial fishing.  
My first child was born in seventy-two so yeah I had a young family.  That's when 
I started fishing. That's why I had to start fishing because of young family.  Built a 
house. Lots of money for two or three years prior, then suddenly nothing and what 
can you do‖ (Informant 13)? 
Some of the wives were actively involved in the enterprise, making up lines, 
baiting hooks, keeping the books, liaising with shore facilities, looking after the 
children and running the household. Others were not so actively part of the fishing 
itself but never the less maintained the ―home base‖.  For younger members of the 
family, it would have been a diverse and uncertain occupation, with Dad's 
comings and goings at sometimes unpredictable times but also trips on the boat or 
family holidays on the boat, something different. 
A Waiheke fisheries officer when asked if the community was helpful to the 
fishing, responded:  
There's whole families that were relying on the fishing and there were 
people getting work on fishing boats as deck hands and later, if they saved 
enough money and they were good they finally become fishermen. They 
build their own boats and went fishing so it was just like a turnover. It (the 
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community) was very reliant on fishing and they went through the system 
and there are still a few people out there – the fishermen. It could have 
gone that way if people hadn't sold their quota (Informant 1). 
For some fishermen and families, at earlier stages of the family cycle, when the 
fisheries were not yet the constant grind of a challenging occupation, they 
provided a romantic element. Then, as the novelty wore off fishing families 
provided a support system or for those not too busy to socialise, interaction with 
those in a similar situation: 
Often it would be the blokes drinking themselves but yeah it felt like quite 
a nice network of the fisher families in the island. You know we felt like 
we had this thing in common and could just stop and chat about this and 
that (Informant 8). 
Children 
Children growing up in fishing families, both traditional and non-traditional, 
―learnt the business‖. They went out (usually) with Dad on the boat from an early 
age, learnt the language and terminology of the sea, boats and fishing gear. One 
former fisherman's wife told me:  
I've three sons and they are all excellent in boats and that's because they 
grew up with a fisherman and were in boats from when they were a baby 
and they've all got a really good sense of the sea and handling boats and 
catching fish and, yeah and, they're teaching their children that and that's 
come from their father being a fisherman really. So it's had an effect, quite 
a big effect in the family actually. I've got these little grandchildren who 
are learning to handle a boat and they're quite small and they're quite 
capable (Informant 8). 
Wives and children not only have opportunity to experience the fishing ethos at 
sea they may also learn the joys and disappointments of Dad's presence and 
absence, the excitements and dissatisfactions of good and bad catches. For those 
whose children were interested, fishing could provide jobs for the family and, vice 
versa, the family could provide crew that would otherwise be notoriously difficult 
to find:  
The two biggest boys, especially the eldest one was a real keen 
fisherperson and he used to go and help out, if he wanted to, especially if 
he was saving up to buy a [commodity] and get the deckhand money and 
learn about boats. He's a very good boat person now (Informant 8). 
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Strains / Divorce 
Unlike many other jobs, commercial fishing, especially from small coastal 
communities is not a nine to five job so the hours when the fisherman would be 
away from his family, were uncertain and irregular and some fishermen in 
particular were ―night owls‖ (Informant 14).  
It was long hours, incredible hours. You'd get two, three or four hours of 
sleep a night, if you were lucky and you were up crack of dawn, before 
dawn, for the next day … During the winter, well I'd be working all night. 
The local guys would be working in here [near Waiheke]. I'd be working 
down the Firth or way up off Tiri or up off Kawau or and then we'd do a 
lot of trips out to Curvier, Merc's [Mercury Islands], Mokohinaus, Arid 
Island, back of the Barrier and around there. Then I'd be away on the 
Podgora (another vessel) doing trips so it became full time (Informant 
13). 
In response to a question about her former husband's leaving for a trip in the early 
hours or returning late at night one informant indicated how irregular it could be: 
… just strange hours … if it felt right, if the wind was doing what it should 
be. Yeah, three or four in the morning, might be more like five and 
depending on how the fishing went, whether he came back or not. If it was 
no good he'd come back probably and start again fresh or if it was going 
quite well stay there and make the most of it (Informant 8). 
Sometimes, though, trips were regular. In a couple of cases the fishermen 
generally worked in sight of home but in other situations the fishermen could be 
very distant. For them the advent of bad weather could mean being caught out and 
seeking shelter in a remote bay or getting a good catch, or maybe bad catches and 
staying on. But, it meant considerable uncertainty for those at home. With the 
fisherman at sea families found some form of communication desirable. 
Some Waiheke fishing families communicated through Auckland Maritime Radio 
but then Citizen Band (CB) radios or VHF radios enabled them to maintain ship to 
shore contact. ―Yes he could hear from home, what was going on and … it was 
good‖  (Informant 9). 
Perhaps more than more regular occupations fishing put strains on the family. The 
father or husband would be away often but even when they were home: ―Guys 
were working so hard that when you came ashore you were so exhausted, all you 
wanted to do was flop. I was just so busy personally‖ (Informant 13).  
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Some had grown up in fishing families so could cope and others were able to 
adjust the times and demands of the fishing or the family or both so that 
relationships worked and families remained together. Others didn't manage. 
Fishing could be hard on the family. Indeed, only a few of my informants had not 
been divorced and while it was not uncommon among my non-commercial fishing 
peers to split or divorce, the strains on fishing families mean it seemed even 
higher among fishermen. As an indication, one informant commenting about those 
who generally made the eight-or-ten-day trips that were typical for the trawlers 
and Danish seiners based in the Viaduct, when asked about the stability of 
relationships said:  ―Well no, those guys, most of them are divorced‖ (Informant 
6).  
Another remarked: 
But we [the fishermen] spent a lot [of time together] – we used to drink a 
lot which wouldn't have been good for the relationships. I think, I've read 
that even now fishing's still one of the, it's got one of the highest rates of 
divorce, the fishing industry (Informant 26). 
Another, speaking of his personal experience noted:  
… it was very bad for the family … It‘s not a good job for a family man 
unless you're located in a place like Waiheke Island where you can go day 
fishing and be back home each night and restrict your fishing to sensible 
hours. There's no reason why fishing has to be damaging to families but 
there's a great tendency for it to be so because of the unpredictableness 
that comes with it. As I explained, and because of the geography of trying 
to fish out of a place like Auckland city because it doesn't lend itself and 
therefore necessitates several days each week away from home, and quite 
a long way from home, so therefore I found it very damaging on my 
family. But I believe it is possible to do it without being damaging on the 
family but it wasn't possible for me to do it.  
I think there will be plenty of other Auckland fishermen who can say that 
it was not good for their family. I don't think there would be very many 
who couldn't. A place like Waiheke or Leigh is really the place to be if 
you want to be a fisherman and especially if you want to be a small time 
fisherman and fish locally and stay at home. That's the way to go. But 
that's not the way to make a lot of money. The problem with fishing is, 
because you can lose a lot of money and you can be poor, when the 
opportunity presents itself to make a lot of money, you've got to take it. 
Otherwise you won't be a fisherman for very long, unless you happen to 
be quite good at it. If you're not too confident and there's a chance there 
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you've got to take it and that can mean fishing comes first and family 
comes second, which is not good in the long term. 
FISHERIES SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY 
Bob McDonald, wrote on Fishfolk outlining the extent fisheries contributed to 
communities ―There is a mighty list of those who live off the sea, invisible to 
most on the (Fishfolk) list:  
Those that rent rooms and caravans to recreational anglers, the charter 
boat operators but also the tackle shop proprietors, the bait sellers, the 
tackle making factories of which even little Australia manages to import 
nearly a billion dollars worth. Then there are the boat builders, the 
outboard makers, the local government boat ramp fee collectors and the 
boat ramp builders.  All of this eclectic collection of business, small and 
multinational, rely on fish.  The processors of fish, the supermarkets and 
fish shops, the restaurants, dapper and cheap, and of course the 
commercial fishing industry with nets, bigger boats, gear, wharves, slips 
etc. as all on the list know.  Then there is the scores of scientists and 'user 
pays' academics and government workers that live of the proceeds of dead 
commercial fish, increasing the costs of fishing and amount the fish 
caught to pay them, all the while making a  living out of shifting the 
fishing rights  around to reduce the catch. And finally … there is us, the 
eaters of fish and the watchers of fish (McDonald, Fishfolk, 25, July, 
2002). 
C Phipps likewise outlined on Fishfolk, how commercial fishing contributed 
significantly to local communities.  
Fishing – recreational as well as commercial – is "the backbone of coastal 
economies" – at least those not overwhelmed by the form of prostitution 
called "tourism" [or more euphemistically  ―Visitor Industry‖ on Waiheke] 
– because the money flow in the communities revolves around fishing. 
Fishing causes money to flow to bait shops, boatyards, chandlers, fishing 
charters & guides, fish markets, fuel docks, harbors (sic), marinas, 
mechanics, restaurants, tackle shops, and other categories that just didn't 
come to mind quickly enough. That that's not the same as saying that the 
people involved have a whole lot of money to spare.  One season's more-
or-less cyclic trough in fishing catch can flatten the previous season's peak 
in catch and whatever profits were derived from them. This holds true not 
just for commercial fishers, but also for charters & guides for recreational 
fishers, and all the people who depend on their catch and business. Salt 
water being so wonderful for mechanical devices, equipment maintenance 
is a continual issue and money sink. As with nonfishers, there are long-
term uses for extra cash that may make it unavailable for other nonfishing 
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use, such as sending the kids to college, so that the kids have career 
options beyond being dependent on fisheries for their future (C. Phipps, 
Fishfolk, 19 April 2003). 
The same is true, to a greater or lesser extent, of these Hauraki Gulf communities, 
and certainly applies even more strongly if the Viaduct and other communities 
surrounding the Hauraki Gulf are included.  
Community Economy: Retail 
As communities formalised from clusters of cooperating households to villages or 
towns with shops and businesses, traders and shops increasingly retailed fish. 
Indeed, growing up in Auckland in the 1950s, fish stalls were one of the features 
of a family Sunday drive along the Tamaki Drive. 
On Waiheke, one of the first articles on the fisheries in the Gulf News (6 February 
1976 11) was of the application to Council by the Lindegren's father and son team 
to sell fish caught from their boat from a mobile stall several days a week. The 
results of the application were not recorded but the senior Lindegren had done 
similar from Auckland. Fish was a basic staple for the population and supplying it 
provided livelihood for fishermen. ―In those days you made a very good living 
buying fish, sell it on the side of the road [Street stalls] and providing it for fish 
shops‖ (Informant 44). 
There have been various fish shops on Waiheke. One informant who grew up on 
Waiheke said that in the 1960s there used to be a fish shop in Ostend, that used to 
sell a few fish although her family caught fish recreationally so wouldn't have 
bought fish very often. ―Then there was just the fish Co-op shop that I remember 
and they were in two places in Tahi Rd and in where the Post Office used to be‖ 
(Informant 4).  
When I came to Waiheke the public could buy fresh locally caught commercial 
fish from the fish shop in Oneroa run by Norma and Malcolm Shepherd who had 
bought it from Murray Bromily in March 1978 and from the butcher in Onetangi 
(Gulf News 1978). At different times there have been mobile fish stalls such as the 
Lindegrens‘ (Gulf News 1976). Indeed the summer before this research began 
(2003, 2004) there was a regular fish stall, at the Ostend Saturday Market, selling 
fresh fish that had to be imported from as far away as the Chatham Islands. 
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Similarly, in Coromandel the fishermen and the fisheries generally supported and 
were supported by the community of place. Commercial fishing provided fresh 
locally caught fish. In the butcher's shop, for example:  
… back then we also had a license for fish – to be able to sell fish over the 
counter. I used to get it off … [a local fisherman].  It was always hit and 
miss, depended on the weather but … about half the year … 20 weeks or 
25 weeks – we would have fresh fish to sell in the butchers shop.  I'd get it 
off him on the Thursday and people would always come in and see if you 
had any. It wasn‘t the most clever thing to do in the butchers shop because 
if they could buy fish they didn‘t buy meat. (Keith Stephenson). 
Also, before the Coromandel Fisheries factory was sold to Sanford, locals were 
sometimes able to buy fresh locally caught fish that was not required for other 
orders. After Sanford bought the Company supply for locals was not as regular.  
[When parents] were no longer catching their own fish so we expected 
that at Sanford we would be able to buy fresh fish from the local fish 
factory. But it wasn't like that. There were certain times when I suppose 
word got around that if you went to Sanford you could buy a whole fish 
and I think you had to clean it yourself and … scale it yourself. I can 
remember once going there and Sanford saying, ―No we've got no fresh 
fish for the public. Go to the fish and chip shop‖ and that was 
unbelievable to us. Anyway the situation has now reached a level plateau 
where the fish and chip shop regularly, reliably sells fresh fish to the 
public. So isn't this an interesting change,  …  first we caught our own fish 
then we tried and scrounged it from the local fish factory, sometimes 
unsuccessfully, and now we go to the fish chip shop where we buy fresh 
fish at $19.00  /kg for gurnard and terakihi. $19 /kg for fresh fish 
(Informant 22a)! 
But more than that, they had tangible economic and social benefit by supporting, 
the community. As he experienced  
… most of the boats ran accounts at the butcher's shop in those days under 
the name of the boat. I wouldn't have all that (detail) now but that was 
interesting … [even] the seasonal guys that would come round this way 
into the Coromandel into the Hauraki Gulf in the scallop season and 
would be fishing out of Coromandel or they'd use Coromandel as their 
base for part of the  season and those guys would have  stocked up when 
they come ashore to take them out for  however many days‖. In those days 
the boats ―probably a crew of 2 or 3 and they all had families here. They 
would all have been part of a community where they belong to a 
committee.  Their children would have gone to school (Keith Stephenson).  
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Community Employment  
Fishermen regularly called on island and community services as an essential part 
of the occupation. Transport, for example, where the passenger and vehicular 
ferries and SeaBee Air, linked Waiheke Island and the ―mainland‖. Before the Co-
op was established, fishermen could order supplies that would be sent over on the 
ferry or the amphibian run by SeaBee Air, depending on the urgency of the 
requirement. ―Things like crates and lines and hooks and ice and anything like 
that was all from Auckland until [THE Co-op] came and ice came and we got bait 
here too. When we were able to buy our own bait here. That was good. It was 
certainly better bait that we got through the Co-op‖ (Informant 6). 
Although it was a regular practice for fish to be sent over to Auckland iced in bins 
on the cabin top of the ferry, the ―Iris Moana‖ or on the ―Baroona‖, there were 
times when other passengers found it inconvenient and offered a ―[b]it of feed 
back from putting bins of fish on top of the old Iris [ferry] and water come in. 
Stuff on the way over on a bad trip and the Baroona and so on, – yeah it was crazy 
days‖ (Informant 44).  
Indeed some of the stories convey the informality of island life. One fisherman 
said:  
I had these half size crates with lids and little plastic strapping system and 
I had to have them down at Surfdale for SeaBee Air by 7.30 in the 
morning so I would go out at 4.30 or 5.00, pull the nets, get them back, 
put them in these crates. There was no ice then and send them over by air 
to … [his partner's brother] and in fact, one morning, they were that fresh 
they were still kicking on the [filleting] bench in Auckland and people 
were stunned. Like guys that were buying off trawlers had no idea what a 
fresh fish actually looked like and there were fish actually flapping on the 
bench. There was one time I went down to the aeroplane and the pilot 
said, 'you gave me a hell of a fright yesterday!' I said, 'what was that?' and 
he said, 'I got half way to Auckland and there was this big [thump thump 
thump] and I didn't know what it was. I was totally panicked. I thought the 
rivets were coming out of the wings, you know!' And he really, they were 
those little amphibian aircraft, thought it was coming apart and he dropped 
down low and he was sending out mayday calls and the whole bit, you 
know! And it was this bloody big trevally in the box and it was thumping. 
He wasn't at all amused (Informant 6). 
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Once the Co-op was established the boats were unloaded into the Co-op truck, 
taken to the premises in Tahi Road, sorted, repackaged for export and freighted to 
Auckland by truck on the vehicular ferry from Kennedy Point. 
So as their markets expanded from supplying just island residents and fish shops 
the fishermen contributed the costs of freight increasingly to the transport 
operators. 
Fishermen also utilised other essential services in the community periodically. 
They were running old boats, for example, so would call on the services of my 
neighbour, a highly experienced, sailor, designer and boat builder, one of the few 
on the island with the necessary traditional woodworking skills. It was an ethos of 
assisting community members with the skills and materials they required often 
with the "Kiwi cando" or "No.8 wire" attitude so they could surmount a marginal 
situation and "stay afloat". It was not commercially transaction but part of 
community cooperation and "helping out". He explained:  
They were nearly all old pleasure launches converted, boats built in the 
thirties and forties with much bigger engines in than they were designed 
for and the aft ends closed in for shelter. When the snapper were running 
of course they worked like stink. These boats were generally carvel built 
with caulked seams. There were some more modern ones as well. They 
basically drove the hell out of them. When they got a full load they were 
flat stick for Auckland whatever the weather and they would plough into 
sou'westerly 20kt, 30kt winds full steam and it gave these boats a lot of 
hard work. I would frequently, or from time to time, be called out for an 
urgent repair job and find a boat lying on its side on the shingle at Matiatia 
dried out at low tide with the caulking hanging out around the stem and 
the garboard. 'Can we get going for the next tide, please?' And, so getting 
it dry enough to take the putty was the big challenge. I used to use a 
blowlamp to try and dry the seams out as best I could. Ram the caulking 
cotton into it and putty it up then [nail] copper tingles over the top, sort of 
thing, and get them going again (Informant 28).  
 
When metal work was required, Peter Franken
103
, an engineer, for example, made 
up a stainless steel gunnel and ―the ratchet gadget which I used for winding the 
tyres‖ (Informant 6). 
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At times such expertise led to innovations that not only helped local fishermen but 
also had wider commercial spin offs. The haulers and clips developed by a 
mechanic and an engineer respectively are a case in point. As I knew from 
experience pulling longlines by hand was a hard and painful business at least for 
the newcomers. But, although there is a knack and practice eases the chore, 
probably also for more experienced fishermen. Because fishermen's hands never 
really dried out during a trip, they remained soft and puffy and cuts and abrasions, 
from hauling lines or ropes, never really healed while at sea. It was one of those 
occupational hazards so they sought solutions. Some of the fishermen were more 
experimental than others and some had a mechanical ―bent‖ and came up with 
ideas and perhaps individual solutions but it took the expertise of others in the 
community to realize more universal, more commercial innovations. Line haulers 
and snood clips are a case in point. 
While the ratchet ―thingie‖ worked for one fisherman (Informant 6) others tried 
line pullers. One fisherman had been a mechanic and his mentor ―had a line puller 
on his boat which was probably some ten years before anybody had them on 
Waiheke, I made one straight away‖ (Informant 44). But the line hauler made 
from recycled starter motors from demolished trucks became the more general 
equipment.  
Initially lines would be made up, typically with 100 snoods and hooks and be 
wound into half a car tyre or a tray with a rubber (perhaps inner tube) edging 
slotted for each hook.  Then ―hockey clips‖ and haulers were introduced. It meant 
the backbone could be hauled mechanically while snoods were kept separate. 
Knots or metal slugs crimped on the backbone in pairs spaced often an arm's span 
(1 fathom) apart meant that as the line ran out the snood and hook could be 
clipped to it. Likewise as it came in each fish, hook and snood could be unclipped 
more easily. 
The innovations also eased the tedious job, when making up new or replacement 
gear, of tying knots to fasten nylon snoods to the backbone was eased somewhat 
by using the commercially available ―hockey clips‖. As the Gulf News reported:  
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Waiheke fisherman Jerry van Iersel
104
 was having trouble with the 
"hockey clips" on his long lines – the clips were prone to slip from the 
line, were hard on cold, wet hands, and had the potential of tangling the 
traces when the line was wound in. ... a brainstorm and three months work 
from an island engineer Peter Franken, and some finance from a Waiheke 
businessman, the new clip is being manufactured (with an 'ingenious 
machine') in a totally island enterprise (Gulf News 31 December 1980 5-
7).  
This was a community enterprise. The fishermen had a problem and an idea to 
resolve it, took it to the relevant expert in the community, who, with additional 
financial assistance to cover some of the costs, solved it. Having helped local 
fishermen they then patented and marketed the clip in Auckland and more widely. 
As well as its contribution the challenge, the cash flow and livelihoods of other 
trades and occupations on the island, commercial fishing supported the 
community lifestyle in other ways. The experience of the Women's Group is a 
case in point (See Box 8).  
 
Box 8: Community Fishing Lifestyle 
Women's Group 
The experience of the women's group exemplifies the benefits access to commercial fishing 
made to the community before the QMS. In the early 1980s my partner was in a women's 
group which drag netted on Onetangi beach because the partner of one member was a 
commercial fisherman and they could use his gear and license. It was probably borderline 
between subsistence fishing, informal economy and commercial fishing.  
Mainly we needed some extra money. The women… all had small children. We were all 
looking for some way of getting a little extra bit of money but that could involve the 
children. … (Her partner) would get these big drags on Onetangi Beach. That was 
legitimate at that time. He was registered for dragging but it also meant that he had this 
huge volume of fish for a couple of days which he had to process so it was something 
that we could do with the children on the beach and round about the bach (Informant 6b). 
As they learnt the methods the women helped with the drag, then rowing the net out, 
clearing it, processing and marketing the catch. As the result of an accident preventing the 
fisherman retrieving the nets his partner had picked them up in rough conditions so knew 
                                                 
104
  Informants named at least one other fisherman as being involved (e.g. 
Informant 6).] 
 
  
201 
the operation and took the lead. 
So that's how we started.   We (the women) did quite a lot at the times of the year when 
there would be large schools of kahawai and that was something that we could do 
because we had freezers and we could process all the fillets into bags and it was frozen 
and then there was quite a market on the island at that time. … We'd sell some smoked 
and some bagged as cat food (Informant 6b). 
My own memory was of times when my partner came back and we had a copper full of 
kahawai – beautiful looking fish. If there was a lot I'd give a hand otherwise she filleted or 
sometimes steaked, them. Then she'd bag them up and take them round the food shops 
while our potato patch benefited from a prime fertiliser of frames and scraps.  
It was ―a good job too then when all the women were involved … because it meant that a 
lot of families got some good food at quite a reasonable price, quite cheaply,‖ (Informant 
6b). So it certainly had benefits for the community since unemployed or under-employed 
mothers with young children had a social and economic activity their kids could share in, 
that contributed to both the larder and the wallet.  
 
Community: Informal Economy 
In addition to their contribution to the regular and periodic formal economy 
fishermen were part of the informal economy as well. In the early days they gave 
fish away, exchanged, raffled or sold it around the local community.  
What my father and mother used to do was catch it – smoke it and sell it to 
the Four Square [grocery store] in exchange for groceries and stuff like 
that. Take it along to the pub and have a few raffles and make a living. 
That's how they made a living (Informant 7). 
During my Viaduct research, at the end of most trips the skippers and crew took 
what was referred to as ―home freight‖, a couple of fish each, ―a feed‖. My 
impression was that most of this fish either went home or to neighbours or friends. 
Some was, however, sold especially by casual crew to restaurants.  My skipper 
expressed concern that one crewman was taking more than a reasonable amount 
and selling it ―on the side‖ to make extra. 
Among community fishermen home freight was customary.  
For a lot of the guys who were fishing then if there were old folks, you 
know, they'd take fish around to them. Some of the Māori guys on the 
island could do fish heads. There was all this sort of spin-off then. 
Fishermen were always good at giving things, always. If someone was a 
little bit old or a little bit fragile. They'd just take a little bit of fish around 
every week or two, you know, and give them. A great deal of that went on 
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throughout the community. You know, for fishermen to give some fish to 
someone and think nothing of it and next day there'd be eggs there or 
something like that (Informant 1).  
In many ways this was merely a continuation of customary practice in the 
community. One informant spoke of fishing recreationally, in his younger days, 
with his grandfather when they habitually giving their large catches away making 
a considerable contribution to local nutrition:  
In those days there were no amateur limits or anything … He used to gut 
and scale the fish  ... [but] didn't ever sell them. He was really strict about 
that. He refused to take even petrol money. People'd say, ―You've got to 
have something for your petrol‖. No, no, no – I'll get my boat seized. And 
he would cut pieces of flax and we would string them together and my job 
was to run over the hillsides and take them to widows and people with big 
families and he would be there cutting and scaling. I don't remember him 
ever doing fish fillets. I mean he did at home for himself but the fillets 
were always ... scaled and skin on. ... And you'd think – how the hell did 
people eat all the fish he distributed? I don't know. Maybe they had friends 
they gave some to. … We'd make a string out of flax and feed it up 
through the gills and the mouth, poke it up the gill and out the mouth.  
He'd say take these to Mrs. Fisher and take these to Mrs so-and-so-else.  
He kept most of that end of Onetangi in fish (Informant 6a). 
On Waiheke even fish that was not in prime condition or was otherwise unsalable 
was used by the informal economy. Speaking of his partner a fisherman said:  
She used to trim up … anything that was substandard, we never wasted any 
food and she would trim up these licey fish and take them along to the 
Playcentre mums and things like that for a couple of dollars for a little bag 
of fillets. All the chewed out bits would be cut away. We had a tractor then 
and she went off on the tractor with a trailer and this big pile of smoked fish 
and she came back at the end of the day with a couple of hundred bucks and 
said there you are. I was stunned. I was stunned. I didn't think she would 
sell more than one or two fish but she did (Informants 6a, 6b). 
 
Whether the fish was bought retail or came through the informal economy, local 
people were able to get good health promoting fresh food at prices affordable even 
to those on fixed and limited incomes and especially to those who most needed it.   
A fisherman's spouse said:  
I think they [their clients] had ready access to good food and it was good 
food and it was at a price that wasn't expensive and it was very easily 
available. The benefits for us who were involved in it, [her husband] and 
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them, me and other people who helped, it was a good life you know. It 
was a lovely lifestyle by the beach. It wasn't too demanding all the time. 
Yeah, it was really I think a healthy and relaxed lifestyle. The benefits to 
the community were the access to the fish and not just for them but also 
for the cats and bait‖.  While the fisherman noted, ―It was inexpensive. I'm 
not sure what the price was then but a few years earlier than that when I 
wasn't fishing I used to buy flounder because it was cheaper than 
sausages. I think flounder was two and six [two shillings and six pence, 
equivalent to 25 cents] a pound and sausages were three shillings [30 
cents] a pound (Informant 6b). 
The community then had easy access to fresh locally caught fish, good nutrition at 
prices affordable even for those such as unemployed, drop-outs, beneficiaries or 
new families who had minimal means of support. Fish was one of the currencies 
of community cooperation. 
IDENTITY: WHAT DID THE FLEET MEAN FOR THE 
COMMUNITY? 
Islands, Waiheke in particular but also New Zealand in general are embedded in 
the marine environment.  Before the QMS the local seas were a direct source of 
food, livelihood and recreation that made island, and fishing community lifestyles 
distinctive from urban or inland farming or forestry communities. This section 
explicates the contribution of the fishermen and the fisheries to community 
identity. The boats and the fishermen who worked them were part of the 
community's identity. At Coromandel:  
I come up the Peninsular in about 1961. Back a little bit later, it appears, I 
can remember even going down to Thames and there was something like 
about 14 boats tied up at the wharf down there. There was more than that 
tied up here, I can't honestly remember but they were a bigger commercial 
identity up here than what they were down in Thames. We had boats tied 
up both sides of the wharf (Keith Stephenson).  
In general the fishermen and the fleet were just taken for granted, an intrinsic part 
of the community. For some people they were a source of work, often difficult 
and often rushed, trying to get boats repaired on the beach between the tides 
(Informant 28), for example, or of fish to sell or buy. But they were seen to be 
contributing members of the community workforce. 
More than that, the fishermen and their boats provided maritime interest at the 
wharf. For me personally, and it is true of others, I recall, many times when 
waiting to catch the ferry watching 'the boys' and their boats. Often, between the 
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ferries, there would be three of four rafted up or anchored just off the wharf 
pontoon, often stern-to so that cockpits were together or close so fishermen could 
chat as they scrubbed down, baited up or stacked trays. While it might not have 
been a tourist attraction to the extent of Fishermen's Wharf in San Francisco, these 
were recognized members of our community, adding diversity, making a living 
from the sea thereby giving substance to the maritime nature of our island culture. 
It meant that boating and fishing on the island was not just a recreational activity. 
It was also a way of life and (then) an essential support for the island and the rest 
of us. It meant that island life had a basis in real maritime tradition. It wasn't just 
an optional life style totally dependent on Auckland or the transient contributions 
of tourists and the visitor industry. 
Members of the community saw the lights of the fishermen working off the 
northern side of the island.  There was a sense of familiarity and reassurance. The 
'boys' were working. For their part, if anything went wrong there were people who 
would be aware of it ashore so hope of assistance. Now there is a sense of loss, a 
significant part if the character of the island has gone.  ―Remember when the 
longliners used to work here – you'd see the lights out at night and you knew who 
it was and where they were and you know? You don't see them. You don't see the 
buoyed lights on the longlines. So who's fucking fishing it‖ (Informant 46)?  ―… 
at night you could look out and see something like 20 something lights from the 
fishing boats off the northern coast‖ (Informant 13). 
SUMMARY 
The fisheries were not in a ―traditional state‖, nor indeed was the community, 
before the QMS but both had been driven by and managed for ―development‖ and 
the ‗big boats‘ so the administrative ethos had not been community sustainability 
but economic expansion –  ―Think Big‖! Even so fishermen supported, and were 
supported by, their communities of place; embedded in the webs of community 
reciprocity with locals, trades people, boat repairers, engineers, mechanics, 
grocers, and they provided fresh  locally caught fish directly to family and  
friends, to  the local wider and even international  markets. Their ethos had the 
informality of ―Kiwi culture‖ with relatively cheap boats converted from other 
uses and locally made and maintained gear.  ―Out there‖ there was a sense of 
freedom, of self- or mutual- reliance; of self- dependence and of working for 
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themselves and family, a sense of identity and rugged independence but also 
strong camaraderie with other fishermen. For their communities they contributed 
to island and community identity and provided additional livelihood in the 
snapper school season and opportunities for diversion for potentially delinquent 
youth. On Waiheke, for example, the Co-op was one of the biggest industries on 
the island. Fishermen were of both formal and informal economies both the 
fishermen and the communities benefitted.  
In occupational terms ethos "out there" for the fishermen before the QMS 
involved their experience gearing up perhaps with the help of their families. Then 
in small old wooden  "much loved" launches, leaving in the early hours, out into 
the impressive beauty of the Hauraki Gulf or threatening marine conditions, 
recalling all they'd learnt or recorded from past seasons and the previous trips, 
depending on the season, weather and tides, heading for the chosen fishing 
grounds. The boats always in motion, the fishermen reveled or contended with the 
conditions located fish, set gear later retrieved, spiked, and slurried and iced the 
fish. They exchanged cryptic information of chat with their friends and colleagues 
on the radio or within hailing distance, contended with other fishermen, some 
friends and part of the clique, some known and or more distant, some using the 
same, others using different methods, or with MAF regulations and inspections 
always a hassle but hopefully by known fisheries officers in similar small boats. 
Depending on the fishing they'd anchor overnight, maybe rafted up with a friend 
in a calm enclosed bay or just in joggly
105
 shelter, before motoring out again in the 
early hours but finally steaming to Auckland with the catch to berth or raft up in 
the Viaduct and off load, trusting or suspicious or with curdling apprehension, to a 
buyer or buyers, auctioning or directly to a ute or truck. Squaring the sale with the 
buyer then cleaning the boat, maybe getting the ice truck and filling the bins with 
flake ice from the nylon chute or refueling from the petrol company tanker or, 
alternatively heading back to the wharf at Matiatia, tying alongside and offloading 
to the Co-op truck, getting cleaned up, putting the boat on the mooring before 
rowing in, catching sleep at home. Then back to moor alongside the pontoon 
between ferry times, rafting with the boats of friends and cleaning or baiting ready 
for the next trip. 
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For the fishermen commercial fishing then meant an ethos of freedom, the 
independence of self employment, a livelihood out there in the marine 
environment, "messing about in boats", free of the urban "rat race" and the 
tyranny of nine to five work for the boss, instead integrated, comfortably or 
uncomfortably to the dictates of snapper life cycle, seasonal and climatic 
variation. It meant the solitude of working solo from very early morning until very 
late or the boredom, the challenge of hunting an elusive quarry offset by the 
uncertainty of no catch, the adrenalin from contending with rough weather or the 
excitement of bonanza and frustration when it never came interspersed with close 
companionship with colleagues or the brief respite of family. 
For the community, the fishermen and commercial fishing expressed the island 
identity of Waiheke was a community of place, with often conflicting 
communities of interest (e.g. capitalists and alternatives), an island embedded in 
the Hauraki Gulf with fishermen and the Co-op an ethos of the marine 
environment. More than many New Zealand coastal communities, Waiheke was 
self-consciously an alternative to Auckland's urban conglomerate; a community 
where cooperation and interaction aspired toward low energy lifestyle, living with 
nature and community reliance. Before the QMS commercial fishermen and the 
Co-op expressed an identity, if not of dependence on the sea and fish, then need 
for, and commitment to, the sea, with marine livelihoods supplying basic 
affordable nutrition, fresh fish caught by known or almost known fishermen. 
This chapter delineated commercial fishing for Hauraki Gulf community 
fisherermen before the introduction of the QMS. It drew primarily on information 
from Waiheke Island and briefly from Coromandel and Leigh. It presented 
fishermen‘s account of their recruitment, their methods, experience and ethos "out 
there", in the political, economic and community context. Their significance and 
the contribution of the community was shown by the features that distinguished 
their families from friends and neighbours, the services provided by others and the 
contribution of commercial fishing to the community with employment, nutrition 
and identity. 
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Chapter 6: Transition to the QMS 
The introduction of the QMS resulted in a transition from a management regime 
termed by neo-liberal proponents as 'command and control' that focused on input 
controls, to one based on property rights focusing on outputs. Social impact 
literature emphasises the need to consider the planning for change, the 
implementation and the subsequent operational phase.  The preceding chapter 
addressed the previous situation. The next chapter will address the changes for 
Hauraki Gulf community fishermen and their communities following the new 
regime. This chapter focuses on the immediate impact of the transition to the 
QMS. There is some integration of pre- and post-implementation phases since it is 
not possible to put this period in tidy timeframes.   
This chapter is, therefore, concerned with the perspectives of the significant 
components but primarily fishermen's responses in the final run-up to the QMS 
and its introduction. It initially deals with general issues of getting quota, then the 
more specific perspectives of local fishermen and their response. Inevitably in any 
change of regime there is an element of transition impinging on different attitudes 
and attributes that results in advantages and disadvantages for different 
components and people. The decisions made and rhetoric used, reveal the 
underlying rationales and structures.  
This chapter sets out: 
 The MFish perspective on social considerations at the introduction of 
the QMS. 
 The Federation's perspective as presented by Bob Martin, (president) 
and Peter Stevens (secretary).  
 The perspective of informants on the transition of the QMS for Hauraki 
Gulf fishermen and communities. 
 The implications for companies and their response. 
MAF(/MFISH) PERSPECTIVE 
Since much of the literature on the QMS was written by those who introduced it, 
the broad MAF/MFish perspective has been well canvassed so this section will 
present the MFish view in hindsight (2006) in addition to the views of those who 
oversaw the implementation in the Hauraki Gulf.  
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In the response to the suggestion that the introduction of the QMS, neglected 
social aspects, Jonathan Peacey argued that the two buybacks of quota were an 
indication of social concern but he ―liked to say, there were three: 1. Variable 
price and 2. Fixed price by MAF and 3. by industry with those who decided they 
were in the business of fishing buying up quota. Some observers felt from the 
prices they were offering that they'd had a power surge through their calculating 
machines ". 
Emphasis on the buybacks indicates there was now acknowledgement of the rights 
of full-time fishermen, which they decided to ignore for part-timers, especially 
before the right was changed again from absolute to proportional quota. Kim 
Walshe then the MAF Regional Manager, Auckland, noted that there was 
opposition to the QMS within the Ministry but this was: 
[A]lmost exclusively due to those who had to implement the ITQ system 
and so they looked at  the practicalities of administering it and they said 
that it was too difficult… It would not be able to be done, for example, if 
Fred Beard hadn't turned up with his optimization programme of how to 
develop an economically efficient buy back programme and also just as 
important was that computer technology was finally coming on stream
106
. 
Prior to that it would have been impractical to do it (Kim Walshe). 
Fisheries Officer Perspective 
Fisheries officers, like traditional village policemen or school prefects were loved 
and hated
107
, respected or despised depending on context. Those on the boats 
generally lived in the communities and interacted at sea with fishermen on a face-
to-face basis inspecting and enforcing the input controls such as the method lines, 
mesh sizes, seasonal and area closures.  
Like fishermen they operated small boats and worked at sea, they regarded or 
disregarded the beauty of the Gulf, they were concerned for the marine ecosystem 
and certain fish species, especially snapper, they were part of the 
interrelationships and interactions within the community of occupation but unlike 
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  Jimmy Ngapo, for example, had legendary status within the Waiheke community 
when I arrived. 
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fishermen their objective was not catching fish and, if they could have their way, 
fishermen would comply with requirements so would not require catching either. 
They were intermediaries, MAF personnel and answerable to Head Office but 
living in and accountable to the communities, with a history of face to face 
interaction with the fishermen and most responsible for monitoring the QMS in 
the Hauraki Gulf. Some supported the introduction of the QMS but others, 
including front line staff were opposed to it.  
Bill Dumpleton started on the patrol boats, spent time in the Tauranga office 
before becoming a Regional Fisheries Officer.   He felt that because Bay of Plenty 
fishermen already had a management committee, facilitated by fisheries officers, 
with all sectors including part-timers, amateurs and Maori, they were more 
receptive to the QMS and communities like Coromandel had already come to 
terms with the controlled fishery in the Hauraki Gulf so more readily accepted the 
QMS: ―it was just another step for them. They adapted very well".  
Refuting my impression from attendance at the Auckland consultation and 
concluding meeting in Wellington was that fishermen in general opposed the ITQ 
system he stated: 
In a group they would say they don't want it because they're adverse to 
change. But you go and talk to them as fishermen and say ―Well this could 
do this and that‖. And they'd say  ―Yeah but we didn't want to say that in 
front of everybody.‖ I found that in heaps of cases  (Bill Dumpleton).  
There were issues such as reporting catches. In the old regime there were 
considerable irregularities with under reporting and misreporting.  
There was a lot of jiggery pokery on the older days.  … A lot of … black 
market fish and that sort of thing. You know they'd sell it off here and 
there'd be – there has always been fish returns as long as I can remember 
and a lot of  ... those fish returns were never sent in and that's where the 
… quota system came in. 'Where's your bloody fish returns?' and of 
course they'd buy at the local market and then of course you've got the 
pseudo amateur who's always been there that used to catch more than the 
commercial fisherman and supplied the neighbourhood with fish (Bill 
Dumpleton).  
He felt, however, the system wasn't strict enough and fishermen should only get 
quota for landed and reported catch.  In addition the new paperwork systems 
demanded so much additional information on everything from net length to 
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weather that a former fisheries officer estimated filing it out required at least 10 
years learning. The recruitment of police as fisheries officers meant a significant 
improvement in enforcement and overall formality. He concluded that if MAF had  
"known how complicated it was they wouldn't have backed the ITQ system as 
much as they did. But now, by far the majority of fishermen can see the benefits 
of the QMS now" (Bill Dumpleton).   
Dave Collins, skipper of the patrol boat ―Tokatea‖, then based on Waiheke was, 
however, vehemently against the QMS and indicated there were others within 
MAF who felt similarly. He and his crewman had been share fishermen and, since 
they weren't going to get anything out of it were also opposed to the proposed 
change. It had all happened overseas and they could see jobs "going down the 
drain".   
They (MAF) wouldn't let us go to the (Consultation) meetings. … the 
skippers were  made redundant; got rid of all of us ... and got rid of all the 
fisheries officers up there as  well. … They drove a wedge between us and 
the Fisheries Officers ashore (Dave Collins).  
Eventually they lost their jobs. MAF got new boats and canvassed office staff to 
crew them, rather than the seagoing staff. This drove a wedge between fisheries 
officers and the fishermen, significantly changing the relationship. Previously 
field staff lived in these fishing communities and so were accountable to them, 
had previous boating and sometimes fishing experience in the Gulf and therefore 
empathy with fishermen and the communities. In the new QMS regime the new 
fisheries officers with more formal police and compliance background were 
implementing more rigid compliance and enforcement. To both fishermen and 
their communities they were outsiders. 
Neil Macdonald, who was based in Coromandel for 17 years and then in 
Auckland for 16, also reported opposition in MAF toward the QMS. As training 
and induction in preparation for the new regime there were conferences for all the 
fisheries officers of the region, conducted by the Chief Fisheries Officer, Assistant 
Chief Fisheries Officer and Training Officer. In a simulation exercise, however, 
that went through the whole supply line process participants found faults and most 
doubted the QMS would work (Neil Macdonald). 
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Unlike the stated objectives of the National Fisheries Management Advisory 
Committee NAFMAC, from further consultation meetings with fishermen 
throughout his North Auckland Region Neil Macdonald believed the purpose was 
"to explain how the new regime would work under the Fisheries Act. The main 
idea that was to bring all the commercial fishermen up to play with what was 
intended. To get all their gripes and bitches and things before they [MAF] really 
implemented things. Give them an idea that way the government was moving. … 
[To] explain to the guys as best we could from our side – what was coming in, 
how it was going be policed and all that sort of thing. That was the main gist of 
our Fisheries Division (Neil Macdonald). 
The fisheries officers, to a greater extent than the QMS advocates of Head Office, 
especially those with a fishing history and empathy with fishermen and the 
communities, saw the complexity of the regime, the difficulties of reporting and 
the imposition of a more rigid compliance regime enforced by outsiders. Their 
perspective was, therefore, from the ethos of small boat operation and face-to-face 
relationships, concern for the illegalities and enforcement of the regulations but 
within knowledge of individual fishermen's economic, family and social 
circumstances.  
FEDERATION PERSPECTIVE 
Bob Martin was a fisherman and President of the New Zealand Federation of 
Commercial Fishermen through the critical years, 1983-87 and again 1988-99 
(Haworth 2008 212) and so had experience of the original regime and provides 
critical insight from a fisherman's perspective on the design, introduction and 
transition to the QMS. Peter Stevens had been trawlerman fishing out of Napier 
and Wellington and quickly became Secretary of the Federation. The men were a 
team. If Martin was the public figure Stevens was the strategist. The following 
sections present the social implications involved in the introduction rights-based 
fishing as seen by each man. 
Bob Martin 
When Bob Martin started fishing, the opportunity was there for everybody, "[y]ou 
could walk in and get a permit and go fishing". But in the context of the coastal 
fishery: 
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Trouble is – it doesn't matter when it happens or how it happens, once the 
catch has to be controlled those days are gone. It doesn't matter how you 
control it. … There is no easy way – once you control the catch to stop 
people making money out of it people are going to get hurt. … What's the 
alternative – to keep it open? Now I used to go to meetings and commercial 
fishermen used to say at meetings they would like to see only commercial 
fishing – only fishermen and their families – their sons and all that would 
be able to buy in. That's from a socio-economic view – that's fine but the 
trouble is why should somebody who's possibly unborn have more right to 
go fishing than somebody who's here now (Bob Martin). 
Quota entitlement for owner-operators was ostensibly straightforward. Most of 
my informants did own their own boats so were owner-operators but balancing the 
amount of paper work from MAF, understanding their options and the small print, 
the reporting issues and ensuring enough quota to maintain a viable operation was 
confusing. From his personal perspective and as President of the Federation, Bob 
Martin saw other social and legal complexities; 
The quotas were meant to come in, in 85 but MAF just couldn't do it in 
time – they just fell apart. They just couldn't do it. And I fully expected 
not to have any quota at all (Bob Martin).  
Fishermen needed quota but, for example, the issue of whether the catch history 
was attached to the boat owner or the boat, or the skipper or, possibly, the crew, 
was not clear. Subsequently, a common criticism of the ITQ system has been that 
established crew were not compensated in any way for loss of their livelihood. 
Bob Martin elucidated: ―What happened was – if you had a fishing permit on the 
day the quota system came in you were entitled to your catch history. It was never 
specified that it was the catch history of the vessel that you owned.‖  
There were both politics and individual rights involved. Bob Martin believed 
more fishermen should have followed the precedent of an Auckland share 
fisherman who saw a lawyer who wrote to MAF and asked for a permit. MAF had 
all the quota in Wellington locked up because: 
They couldn't risk the Districts giving out things that would cost more 
quota – you see. They sent him back a letter saying, ―No he wasn't entitled 
to a permit because he didn't own the boat,‖ but after it came in, the Act 
said ―Anybody on a fishing vessel should have a fishing permit – anybody 
on a fishing vessel‖ (Bob Martin).  
Most fishermen hadn't realised that so hadn't applied. One share fisherman did and 
was refused but:  
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It turned out they had to give him quota. He was the only one in New 
Zealand that I know of who actually did that – went to a lawyer… Now I 
don't know if that guy leased boats at that time so it's questionable if he 
had a fishing history if he wasn't, you know what I mean. If you leased the 
vessel you were in the business of fishing and all – you paid the bills – 
you did all that sort of thing so there was no doubt that it was your catch 
history and that sort of thing (Bob Martin).  
MAF was trying to reduce the quota, fishermen were trying to ensure their rights 
and complexities made it difficult:  
Under the terms of the Act … at the time – you could buy a licensed 
fishing vessel. They [MAF] couldn't stop you but of course in some ways 
they did. They locked it up. People would apply for the transfer [of catch 
history) and it would never happen. You can actually understand the 
reasoning behind it. You didn't have to like it, but they [MAF] were 
actually in some ways acting illegally. They weren't refusing anybody 
anything. …  One guy decided to lengthen his boat – he made a 
commitment that he wouldn't increase his request for quota but of course 
when the quotas came in he did. …'Look, I've lengthened my boat so I 
need more'. …  Commitment and dependence were the big thing. Like 
guys who bought (trawl) wire to ostensibly to go out orange roughy 
fishing.  Maybe they never would have gone but still but they showed 
commitment and dependence. So they had all these things in the mix 
going on but I suppose to some degree it's inevitable. You have to open an 
Appeals Authority or to some degree it is unjust (Bob Martin). 
On the other hand some fishermen also exploited the situation. Bob Martin said he 
was in the pub and  (a fisherman) said to him  ―You know I went to that Appeal 
Authority and I lied and I cheated and all I got was a lousy extra three tonne‖. 
―He's the most honest rogue I've ever met said Bob Martin.  
Such a complex and comprehensive quota management system had not been 
introduced elsewhere.  While theoretically simple, in practice:  
It was such a huge thing happening [that] there were gaps all over the 
place, if people knew how to exploit them … although we were at the top 
of the tree in the Federation we didn't actually realise these things 
ourselves. We were taking MAF at their word or (what) we were told. The 
fishermen knew MAF wanted to cut snapper 40 per cent so believed that if 
they tendered 40 per cent of their quota that was their cut.  
When John Belgrave (Director General of Fisheries) addressed the Federation 
Conference (about 1985) they learnt the worst: 
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You could offer your 40 per cent and then whatever they were short, 
averaged over all users, you could lose again. … I know a lot of fishermen 
here (Whangarei) it seemed. So instead of 40 per cent they lost 60 per cent 
or whatever the extra cut was (Bob Martin).  
There was compensation for the forty per cent but not the twenty that they'd never 
see again.  
But we didn't ourselves understand that until at that conference and John 
Belgrave was talking … I'm not saying anybody was deliberately deceitful 
it‘s how misunderstandings occur – you assume – you hand in your 40 per 
cent and that's it – you know‖ (Bob Martin). 
Peter Stevens 
Peter Stevens, trawlerman and then Secretary of the Federation grasped the scope 
of the changes from the big perspective of large-scale business and the national 
fishery. He knew the history and issues of the coastal fishery and was one of the 
architects of the QMS. From his experience and position, as a fisherman and 
accountable to fishermen, therefore, Peter Stevens represents the coastal 
fishermen's perspective. While fishermen might understand their own fishery few 
understood the coastal resource, biomass and national fishery but he was one of 
the few who did.  It was an issue of numbers; too many fishermen.  He explained, 
outlining the lead up, context and background of the QMS: 
The history of numbers in fishing, like owner-operators and fishing in 
New Zealand is very very short. Most of the people … came in after '65 in 
a great rush in a rash – weren't traditional fishing people. They were 
people like me who had a whole lot of varied skills – there were people 
who worked in trades and all sorts of things, came into fishing attracted by 
it for a whole lot of reasons … Some people liked the lifestyle, other liked 
being able to work for themselves, others just saw it – ―well I've got to do 
something, I'll go fishing.‖  All of this sort of thing and there's a little bit 
of attraction – the hunting, shooting, fishing sort of thing and there's a lot 
of people might have wanted to go farming but couldn't afford a farm but 
could get into fishing for five dollars [for a fishing permit]. With all that 
mix of people there's a great deal of innovation – development … so we 
were capable of wiping … [the coastal fishery] out. Most fishermen, most 
people for instance, don't realise how close we came to that. There were 
many species that were almost going to have to be zero TACs put on them 
and we were very close to having to close down a lot of fisheries. So what 
do you do? (Peter Stevens). 
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By the late 1970s he could see the number of fishermen expanding with incentives 
to get in, sales tax exemptions and the belief of administrators, politicians and 
fishermen that there were so much fish in the sea there was no need to worry 
about management.  From his experience as a big roofing contractor Peter said: 
―(I) knew business and systems and all …how to organise things … but, I've got 
to give Bob Martin a certain amount of credit. I was a voice in the wilderness for 
ages and it was getting harder and harder. The Federation was bloody pathetic‖. 
He didn't join until the Wellington Trawlerman's Association organised a big 
protest in 1979. ―There were going to be 400 boats illegally fishing in Wellington 
Harbour – that's when I joined the Federation‖.  
About that time Peter Stevens was talking to Brian Cunningham (then Director 
General of Fisheries) on the Napier Wharves. Stevens had just seen the number of 
fishing permits issued: ―and, in Auckland alone that year, 1978, they'd written out 
2,200 fishing permits – new ones…. Every time a freezing works closed 800 
workers went and got a fishing permit‖.  He told Cunningham, that it couldn't 
continue. But Cunningham, putting the MAF perspective, replied they couldn't do 
anything about that since the Act said, if you're a Kiwi you've got to have a 
fishing permit. Stevens told him to change it and his condition for the fishermen's 
co-operation was a new Fisheries Act.  
He insisted that Duncan McIntyre, the Minister of Fisheries at the time, chair a 
national meeting in the Leglislative Chamber with people from all round New 
Zealand. The fishermen had had a ―guts full‖ and insisted that the Fisheries Act 
was rewritten. ―That meeting was the beginning of the 1983 Fisheries Act,‖ said 
Peter Stevens. He was feeling the Federation was ―bloody hopeless‖, then at the 
annual conference Stevens saw Bob Martin advocating for Northland fishermen 
so persuaded him to stand for the Executive Committee. So there was a bit more 
weight and we got other people thinking and all through this process, what was 
happening. Well I kicked it all off I've kept it going because I was the strategist 
and Bob delivered the work (Peter Stevens). 
From the NAFMAC consultations I had felt that MAF did not consider 
alternatives that had not already been tried. Peter Stevens stated, however, that 
"[t]he government sent officials to see other fisheries management systems. 
Dobson went to West Australia, for example. Stevens argued:  
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The government was right. You couldn't muck around. Look honestly, all 
these other alternatives were looked at and all found wanting because they'd 
take us right back to where we were because other countries because in 
other countries that had tried to change anything slipped straight back and it 
never did any good. Things were getting more and more desperate with our 
fisheries. Remember all the numbers were still in the air. The technology is 
growing and growing, the size of boats and all that sort of thing and more 
and more people were getting into fishing, exercising their permits (Peter 
Stevens). 
Very significantly, Peter Stevens asserted:  
You've got to put fishermen out of your mind and look at the resource. The 
biology and that. If you don't state that – no hope – you've lost the fishery 
AND the fishermen. Also the number that were licensed to fish had grown 
to such an extent that, … If it was all divided up equally no one would have 
got enough to survive on. Not enough to even put food on the table let 
alone put profits and pay for everything. Initially there was a point; when I 
first started we could have, I believe, shifted effort. Stopped it – stopped 
everything – and shifted effort and take [effort] where there was too much 
… [to an] area where it could take a bit more. Moved Aucklanders to the 
West Coast and things like that. But we rapidly got beyond that being 
effective. And so I was pushing for a buyback and a new management 
regime but not necessarily ITQs because that came later and the idea was to 
save fisheries and then take it from there (Peter Stevens).  
Stevens claims to have convinced the conservation lobby to support ITQs: ―It 
represents government control over the amount of fishing and takes away this fish 
till you drop sort of thing,‖ and they thought that this was good … So they agreed. 
They came in behind … because they were concerned about the corporates 
keeping expanding in terms of how much fish they took‖ (Peter Stevens). 
At the same time:  
Increasingly there's a critical mass required for economic viability. Once a 
30 footer [10m] catching X fish could provide a living but now with the 
costs of OSH [Occupational Health and Safety Service] requirements and 
Maritime Transport and so forth and all ―the administration of quota 
system – it all adds up. All of a sudden that 30 footer that could do quite 
well – it [now] needs to be a 60 footer catching 5 or 6 times more fish‖ 
(Peter Stevens).  
In other words, he sees the ‗big boats‘ as the future for fisheries. 
Nevertheless the Buybacks and then the Quota Appeal Authority (QAA) were set 
up to protect the rights of individual fishermen.   
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The idea of the buyback was:  to do anything effective it was obvious that 
we had to reduce the number of people fishing – that fence-line effort 
reduction scheme. But you can't just kick people out so I didn't want that 
to happen. So we had to get a buyback so there was compensation … so 
that people could get out with something rather than knocked out and so 
forth (Peter Stevens). 
MAF's acceptance of the Federation's lobbying for quota buy-backs indicates that 
there was at least an implicit recognition of equity issues and a de-facto fishing 
right for coastal fishermen that hadn't been there for the (small-scale) part-timers. 
Even so the QAA wasn't all the Federation hoped for:  
There were some shocking things done in regard to the appeals and that. 
The big problem with the appeals is that there was no refereeing. It was 
covert not overt. Now I insisted and … well most of us insisted, that they 
be overt and that peers were brought in to peer judge and they [MAF] 
wouldn't do it. So people (the appellants) could tell lies and get away with 
it and there was a lot of that (Peter Stevens).  
[Consequently] with some fishermen applying for more quota than perhaps 
they deserved and others unable to meet MAF requirements Peter Steven's 
believes he did what he could to make fair adjustments. As Federation 
secretary he said: ―I had a lot of control and I had a lot of quota taken away 
from people or … [denied] people who had no right to it whatsoever and I 
had quota given to people who had every right and were shoddily treated 
and I'm quite proud of that really.‖  
Society moves on. "My point being that all of these communities were never 
going to survive on fishing because there wasn't enough fish in the sea – period! 
Everyone of those people – a large percentage of those fishermen on Waiheke 
were all going to go bankrupt if nothing was done" (Peter Stevens).  However, it 
may also be claimed that if the fishery had been less corporatised there would still 
have been community fishermen and the Waiheke fishery would probably have 
persisted at least until the collapse of the Japanese Iki Jimi market. 
According to Stevens (interview) the government was not going to put red cod, 
flat fish and one or two other fish that breed quickly on quota. He considered this 
―a matter of social justice‖.  
The Morris's
108
 of the world were unaffected. There was no capital 
involved and so forth and they had their fish. They got their flats [flounder]. 
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  A well known small inshore setnetter formerly a president of an inshore 
fishermen‘s association. 
218 
 
For example, in Napier there were about 30 trawlers, 15 or 18 in the 
deepwater and catch tarakihi, trevalli, snapper, groper, gurnard and some 
flats. The remainder fished for flats predominantly because they were too 
small to do anything else. I said, ―Those boats aren't going to get anything 
[quota] – all the other boats are. You can't do that to people. Red cod – 
most of the people down in Canterbury have been on red cod.  They're 
going to get nothing and [only] one or two amongst them are going to get 
quota‖. So I said, ―How can you do that? You've got to put the long quota 
system – You've got to treat everybody in terms of their share in 
perpetuity‖. So they agreed (Peter Stevens). 
Initially leaving the few species targeted primarily by small-scale inshore 
fishermen outside the QMS may be viewed as mitigation of the equity issues. It 
also indicates the agency of key people in the development of the system. 
While he has qualms about the number of people who mourn the loss of the 
owner-operators Peter Stevens notes that now New Zealand has depleted its native 
timber numerous jobs were lost similarly. 
Now in fishing, if we've run out of fish – the same thing has happened. We 
would have run out of fish. We simply can't accommodate everybody. The 
fact that it's corporatized doesn't take away from the fact that fisheries are 
protected by TACCs that the government can affect and change. That was 
the name of the game. So I'm quite confident that our fisheries, from a 
human point of view and exploitation point of view are very very safe – for 
all time. All time say 1000 years. How long is forever…they're safe (Peter 
Stevens). 
Clearly, rather than correct MAF's mistake of allowing the ‗big boats‘ to fish the 
coastal fishery from his background he accepted their legitimacy. The focus was 
on symptoms not on causes. 
HG FISHERMEN PERSPECTIVE: INTRODUCTION 
OF THE QMS 
Although the QMS was introduced 1 October 1986, transition to the new 
management regime did not happen overnight. Initially fishermen had to get 
tickets (skipper's licence) and secure licences to remain commercial fishermen 
during the Controlled Fishery.  Then to remain fishing commercially under the 
QMS fishermen had to establish their 'catch history', the annual average reported 
catch between 1981 and 1983 (Johnson and Haworth 2004 364) in order to be 
offered nominal quota. Waiheke fishermen were generally on low incomes so for 
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some, especially in the context of the island's informal economy, minimizing their 
tax could mean the difference between a reasonable year financially and little 
more than breaking even. Consequently some had patchy catch histories. 
Fishermen: Exit before the QMS 
There were tensions in the run-up to the QMS. Industry people in the early 1990s 
complained of commercial uncertainty due to constant restructuring. More recent 
interviews with fishermen, indicated that it had been ongoing and personal. They 
had faced the uncertainty of keeping their licences when the controlled fishery 
came in and further upheaval was in the offing. Some were ready to get out. Some 
were increasingly disillusioned with the fisheries regime, others felt 'ripped off', 
exploited by buyers and being too restricted by bureaucratic requirements, by 'the 
System'. Others were exhausted by the work, the tensions and were ready to leave 
and some exited before the system came in.  
Two informants, for example, had been passionate for the work but left during the 
run-up to the QMS. One was offered a more financially attractive opportunity 
(Informant 19), while the other would have received what he felt was a good 
amount of quota but gave up fishing before the system was introduced. He said 
he'd done everything right – reporting "by the book" and was offered the correct 
amount of quota but didn't uplift it. The new regime was looking more restrictive 
than he wanted to work in so, with his wife, decided to exit commercial fishing. 
He also felt that small operations like theirs were being exploited by the Waiheke 
Co-op, which he felt wasn't democratic and his fish was considered of less 
importance than that from bigger enterprises.  
Getting Quota 
Before they could fish under the QMS commercially fishermen had to get quota 
by firstly establishing a catch history, the average of the best two years reported 
catch for the period 1981-83. On the basis of the catch history owner-operators 
then received offers from MAF of nominal quota. This was not the final amount 
since MAF wanted to reduce the Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) in 
each area. Two buyback rounds enabled fishermen to sell back quota at a 
sufficient price to compensate them for leaving that fishery. The remaining quota 
was still more than the desired TACC so individual entitlements were reduced by 
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'pro rata' cuts. Many fishermen felt that they had insufficient quota to be 
economically viable and so appealed to the QAA. 
It was complicated. Fishermen often didn't understand the logic of MAF's process 
and felt they were cheated. One, for example, had been offered 24 tonnes of 
snapper quota but recalled that he had to sell back sell back a percentage at MAF's 
price, initially $5 /kg then later $7 /kg. If the percentage MAF wanted was not 
offered:  
[T]hey took it off you anyhow. I lost four tonne because I was incorrect. I 
think I had to get rid of 15 tonne out of that and I only offered 11 or 
something through no fault of mine because none of us were lawyers … 
They railroaded us so I offered 11 and I was four tonnes short – I didn't 
get paid for that. They just took that off and said in 1986 … it would be 
reallocated when the fishing stocks built up. That's bullshit. Nobody's ever 
mentioned anything about that anymore. And evidently you've still got to 
be registered as a fisherman to even contemplate how to get it so they 
robbed us like that somehow. Then of course you could keep the rest that 
became yours in perpetuity which you could lease, sell. I hung on for 
about a year. ... The initial thing was the government took it off us for $5 a 
kilo and $7 – there were two trades there … when it become mine … [the 
price] just continued to climb. But a lot of people, when they saw $10 a 
kilo they grabbed it [sold]. It actually went over $50 a kilo but even now, I 
think today you'd still have to pay $40 a kilo to buy quota (Informant 26).  
He then sold his quota to another fisherman for $12.00 /kg who later sold it for 
$52.00 /kg. He sold his boat to the same fisherman. Like their Waiheke 
counterparts some of the Leigh fishermen, even those who got quota successfully, 
still feel resentful at the way the QMS was introduced (Informant 26). The twenty 
years since this happened puts such vehemence in perspective.  
Quota Appeal Authority (QAA) 
Fishermen's and industry circumstances differed widely so the Quota Appeal 
Authority (QAA) was established. In his review in 1992 Peter Stevens explained 
that while drafting the preparatory legislation industry leaders and government 
officials considered an appeal process. They knew many catch histories were 
incomplete. The MAF database contained challengeable errors, widespread 
developments meant the industry had numerous commitments so a formal appeal 
process was necessary to ensure natural justice (Stevens 1992 7).  
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As a result of inaccuracies in the MAF catch database, miss- or under- reporting, 
fishermen's career exigencies such as illness or changing boats, the appeal process 
was legally and morally necessary, indeed essential for the individual fishermen 
who got quota as a result of their appeals. The process itself was excessively 
delayed for some and caused considerable hardship and those responsible – MAF, 
industry leaders, and (truth be told) conservationists – had considerable 
misgivings about the process in general and its implementation.  
Industry leaders had developed tight rules but were then virtually excluded from 
the process as government legal advisors ―established the criteria according to the 
dictates of our legal system‖ (Stevens 1992 5). Industry was concerned that too 
much quota could be given out. Stevens is adamant that:  
Collectively the industry didn't want appeals at all because it didn't want 
to see TACs increased by what some saw as a handout factor …(but) 
agreed out of recognition of the judicial and moral rights of those 
individuals who might have been denied equality and/or natural justice‖  
(Stevens 1992 5, emphasis added).  
Since no experienced fishermen were involved on the QAA panel there was no 
peer pressure, on the one hand, and appellants' lawyers found loopholes that gave 
some more than a fair share although others ―received a lot less than their 
entitlement
109
. There were many who stood to gain but didn't appeal at all, or if 
they did, were poorly prepared and so lost out‖ (Stevens 1992 5). On the other, the 
process was complicated and drawn out over more than two years in some cases. 
In 1990, the editor of The New Zealand Professional Fisherman (1990 11) 
published a letter to the QAA from one such fisherman, John Blake, who stated 
that the delay he faced meant:  ―The strain financially and emotionally on my 
family at the moment is tremendous and you (Secretary of the QAA) are our last 
hope to stay in the industry‖. 
There were often legitimate reasons for appeals to the QAA but some claims 
whose legitimacy has always been questioned (See Box 9) and nationwide ―by the 
end of the process 900 fishermen out of 1300 potential objectors carried their 
objections to a hearing‖ (Johnson and Haworth 2004 377). Even so 
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It was a nightmare because the quota actually blew out by a massive 
amount and I thought: ―What's the point of having a quota system?‖ … It 
just got so complicated. If they hadn't recorded – that's it – you don't get a 
quota. It's as simple as that but of course I sort of call it the hardship clause 
– there was, you know, the poor little fisherman [in isolated places] … 
Because I was fighting their cause I couldn't very well ignore what they 
were saying. At that stage the minimum quota was I think 5 tonne before 
they qualify. A lot of them were only 2 ½, 3 tonne – which was 'big bickies' 
to them (Bill Dumpleton). 
 
Box 9: QAA claims 
 Fishermen had been absent from the fishery due to illness or their boat had 
been wrecked or was out of service or they were building a new vessel  
 Fishermen had been fishing for someone else between owning boats and 
had forgotten to transfer licences.  
 Mistakes had been made reporting catches.  
 Some fishermen lied and cheated to get more quota.  
 
 
Fisheries Officer, Neil Macdonald outlined some of the rorts some fishermen had 
resorted to in claiming catch history to get quota.  
There … (were) all sorts of ways they get in there and mess around 
originally to generate quotas. I heard of a guy, after I left the fisheries, up 
North Auckland who used to kill a couple of cattle beasts and … half of 
each one for himself and flick [sell] the rest off and the money he got for it 
went down on his fish quota that he caught … as an invisible species of 
fish. He paid all his dues and that and recorded everything like that and he 
thought that quite a good quota of flounder and mullet and that in the set 
net and it was never ever picked up and he got quota. He got quota on that 
(Neil Macdonald).  
Another fisherman longlining in the Hauraki Gulf started recording baracouta in 
his returns. When MAF queried the catch he explained it was bycatch which he'd 
used as bait on his thousand hooks, which was partially true but: "he built up a 
considerable amount of quota for something he never ever caught. … So there's a 
couple of avenues where a couple of guys have got in and fiddled the system" 
(Neil Macdonald). 
Consequently the TACC for snapper in QMA1 was set at 4,710 tonnes in 1986-87 
a reduction from reported landings of between 6,000 and 7,000 tonnes in the years 
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just prior to the ITQ system but by 1990-91 QAA decisions had increased the 
TAC by 1,222.446 tonnes (around 26%) about 110 tonnes more than the previous 
reduction‖ (Duncan L. 1993 27,28). This was of concern for MAF field staff 
caught between enforcement against tax avoiders and concern over the situation of 
individual small fisheries in isolated situations (e.g. see Box 10).  
Stevens concluded it ―as a traumatic and necessary exercise that had to be carried 
out in order to make the transition (Stevens 1992 7). That the QAA was 
established indicates that MAF did recognise the existing rights of pre-QMS 
fishermen and natural justice to an extent limited by the complexity, duration and 
uncertainty of the system. In the communities a few fishermen and their families 
took what quota they got and carried on as before. For most though there was the 
stress of the complicated, long running appeal process with considerable 
uncertainty whether they could remain solvent and maintain their livelihood. 
Waiheke 
On Waiheke, fishermen felt that the way MAF brought the QMS in was ―sneaky‖ 
as they did not know in advance which years were to be used for catch history
110
. 
Reporting on which catch histories were based was mandatory but there were 
discrepancies on both sides with databases incomplete and in some cases, miss- or 
under-reporting. This is a moral issue with responsibilities on both sides. In order 
for MAF to manage the fishery, they needed the information but to maintain a 
reasonable operation, fishermen needed a reasonable income and some had to 
resort to contributing to the community practice of supporting the informal 
economy.  
There were many reasons for lax or under-reporting catch returns: the complexity 
of the forms, the difficulty and inconvenience of filling them out at sea, in small 
boats that were too wet, with too much motion, under uncertain lighting by 
fishermen who were often practical manual workers and not generally clerks or 
bureaucrats, when they were exhausted from long hours of uncertain work (See 
Box 10). The fact the returns asked for a position and fishermen didn't want to 
give away their 'hot spots', the ethos of  'under the counter' wharf sales where 
buyers would offer cash which was far more convenient rather than cheques 
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which meant an extra trip to the bank cutting into time at home'. Their 
involvement in the informal economy and concern to minimise tax, led to fear that 
their fisheries returns could be matched with income tax returns so compromise 
tax avoidance. Many fishermen resented the bureaucracy and accountability: they 
resented MAF and just wanted to 'get on with it'. On Waiheke, they also wanted to 
continue keeping a feed for the family and giving a few to friends or neighbours 
and those who needed them. That's what fishermen did traditionally. 
Consequently some Waiheke fishermen struggled to get a quota package 
sufficiently adequate for them to continue fishing at a reasonable level and, with 
the assistance of the Co-op, some went to the QAA. 
 
 Box 10: Problems with compliance 
A fisherman explained: 
We were supposed to report our catches every day. Nobody ever did. What you'd do is, 
you'd get your report book out and you'd sit down in the evening and you'd say  ―Right, 
how many hooks have we done? We've done 500 or we've done 800. Right we'll call 150 
kilos – there like that‖. You might forget about that for three or four days.  But I think it 
averaged out the same and then – well I used to just ditto it – you see – and if I had the 
time and I was dry and I wasn't hungry I'd fill it out again, you know?  But a lot of them 
didn't fill them out at all and they'd just put in nil catch returns and consequently when it 
come up, when you got your quota, they didn't have a fishing history … I was basically 
bang on with what I used to catch …  24 tonnes of snapper quota, and I had 1½ tonnes of 
bycatch that was gurnard and that. ... If you average it out over a year that's basically 
what it was and we used to take cash – sometimes you'd go into the Viaduct and your 
Dalmation buyer would say: ―You want the cash or you want the cheques?‖ Well if you 
had any brains you used to take a bit of cash and a cheque next time or half and half but 
none of us got rich out of fishing (Informant 26).  
They went off the catch landing logs and knew no one was putting the right amount in.  
Also there were guys who had been fishing for years but who couldn't read and write so 
didn't sit tickets. They lost – didn't get quota (Informant 18). 
 
Licensed Fish Receivers 
In the transition to the QMS, the new requirement (For social complications see 
Leigh, page 280) that commercial fishermen land all fish to Licensed Fish 
Receivers (LFRs) was to have very profound social implications for Waiheke not 
  
225 
just for the Onetangi Hotel (See Box 11) but also in removing fresh locally caught 
fish from the community
111
.  
 
Box 11: Onetangi Hotel 
Back in the good old days, Farley Scott, lived on the beach front, virtually next door to the 
Onetangi Hotel, launched his boat across the beach and supplied the hotel for 22 years. ―Oh 
I used to go every day. I was out there every day. Usually I'd go out about 9.00 or half past 
8, 8 o'clock and come in at five and deliver the fish around the island. If I didn't get enough 
I'd go out after tea and come back at 3 or 4 o'clock in the middle of the night just to supply 
the hotel. Because they had all the guests there then. A lot of people'd ... take 20 pounds or 
20 kilos of fish every day. ... so I'd fillet it and take it along there for breakfast. It was quite 
exciting‖ (Farley Scott). 
Shortly before the QMS was introduced, Peter Rowland, the chef entered one of Farley's 
snapper in the NZ Fishing Industry-Auckland Star Restaurant Competition 1983 and won 
―first prize for his seafood speciality dish. Peter's winning entry ―Gannet Rock Snapper‖, 
was sampled by a panel of judges who visited the hotel last month. Apparently the quality 
of the fresh fish was everything the judges expected it to be – they were delighted when the 
waitress told them it had been caught that afternoon, Peter reported. 'I don't think there's 
any other restaurant around that can collect their fish supply directly from a fisherman just 
a 50 metre walk away down the beach,' he comments. Their 'private' fisherman, local 
resident Farley Scott, has been fishing Gulf waters for many years and, says Peter, brings 
back just what the hotel orders. 'If we want so many kingfish or terakihihi, he just goes out 
and gets it'  (Gulf News 22 July 1983 14, 15.). 
After the introduction of the QMS, the hotel applied to be a Licenced Fish Receiver but 
while the application was still in the pipeline were raided and threatened with prosecution 
for receiving fish. Neville Buckley, Regional Fisheries Officer, wrote ―that their 
application had been declined. 'He said the Ministry did not agree that the applicants' 
business was "sufficiently unique" to justify granting a licence, and was not satisfied the 
applicant would "conduct fish receiving operations in a proper manner‖' (Gulf News 20 
March 1987 25, 27). 
      
Co-op Involvement 
In getting quota Waiheke fishermen were disadvantaged. The Co-op had been 
formed particularly to service the iki jimi fishery. During my Viaduct research, 
informants stressed that the Co-op was concerned to get the best return for local 
fishermen by niche marketing iki jimi snapper. In the process of becoming 
established, the product was being labelled as from Waiheke Sea Products (the 
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Co-op) but in the longer term they were hoping to "personalise" it by labelling it 
from individual fishermen. For the strategy to be effective quality had to be 
consistently perfect and that meant each fish had to be handled, processed and 
packed with extreme care. Consequently, during the critical years for getting catch 
history fishermen were catching and landing far fewer fish than they had been, 
perhaps up to half of their previous catch tonnage. Their entitlements to nominal 
quota were far less because they were already adding value (Informants 3, 44). 
Danish seiners and trawlers, were beginning to do shorter tows and ice their 
catches more carefully, but were not going to the lengths of the iki jimi fishermen, 
so the companies running such boats would get 'full' quota, then have the 
additional option to add value. The longline fishermen, most of the Co-op 
fishermen were therefore at a disadvantage in gaining nominal quota, effectively 
penalised for being innovators. 
As a result the Co-op Manager directly lobbied Wellington and consequently the 
Co-op obtained quota of one species (recalled as probably hoki) that they sold 
immediately for 25 tonne of snapper quota and eventually ―after a big bun fight – 
handed out to members‖ (Informant 44). In the critical years for catch history, 
instead of fishing, the Co-op manager had been establishing, building and 
administering the Co-op so hadn't received quota in his own right.  
In addition to trying to offset the iki jimi discrepancy the Co-op tried to help 
individual fishermen with their reporting issues. As the manager said:  
We tried to go back through records and put a case that they should get 
some higher amount of quota than what was on paper on the day, and 
were successful with quite a few of them (Informant 44). 
There were different perceptions of the amount of quota Waiheke fishermen 
received. One, then fisherman, told me he didn't feel that individually he had been 
adversely affected by the QMS and that collectively the Waiheke fishermen all 
did ―OK‖.  
The 30 boat owners all ended up with enough quota. [Subsequently] it 
spoilt the industry when the companies aggregated the quota. That spoilt 
it. It was not as good environment as it was (Informant 18).  
But others felt they hadn't received enough and some remained embittered. The 
concessions made to the Co-op in granting some quota seem to indicate that MAF 
did have some awareness of social justice and equity issues. 
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Fishermen: Sale of quota 
Some Waiheke fishermen were offered quota they didn't take up. Others received 
fair entitlements but some, with assistance from the Co-op appealed, went through 
the process before eventually getting quota. Ultimately most Waiheke fishermen 
sold their quota. The one who didn't see sufficient benefit stated:  
I could have sold it because I didn't have that big a return but some of the 
guys got $200,000 or something for their quotas. …They're big quotas but 
I didn't have a big quota because I just fished locally – used to smoke 
them and cart them around twice a week to everybody (Informant 5).  
An Informant close to the fisheries said: 
To start with the quotas here, a lot of people sold because – there was a 
novelty factor as well.  It's like you're being paid and it was money for jam 
and possibly a lot of fishermen here fell into that category. It was easy 
money. They could sell a tonne or two. I think with snapper it was $6 or 
$7,000 dollars a tonne was the original starting point with the government 
– when the government bought quota back (Informant 3). 
Another had a friend who sold his quota so he could set up a motel business on 
Great Barrier. ―Cashing in the quota was quite handy for some people at that 
particular stage because they were quite tired of fishing‖ (Informant 4). Another 
suggested ―Probably the reason that they sold on Waiheke is that they were all 
downhearted by what happened with the fishing Co-op. They weren't actually 
getting the money out of it anyway. ... I heard that … (another fisherman) got 
$250,000 for his quota. Some of them set themselves up quite nicely‖ (Informants 
6 6b). 
The wife of another fisherman said:  
Yes, well I think some people heard about somebody else selling and all 
the money they got and thought oh well – I could do this and I could do 
that and it probably had a bit of a spin off and then some people bought 
some land with it – set themselves up doing something different.  Yeah 
really, I think the companies ended up with far too much quota. I think 
what a shame more people didn't keep it. Never have to work again – just 
lease your quota out and do what you like instead. … We bought a 
section, which was good. … but I think the very sad thing is  that you've 
got an island surrounded by ocean and people cannot buy fish caught 
around here  (Informant 8).  
Commercial fishing always had high rates of tension and divorce but the options 
opened by quota created additional tensions between some couples. A fisherman, 
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for example, was tired had had 'a guts full' and wanted to get out but his wife 
wanted to be prudent and retain the possibility of his getting back in by keeping 
the five tonnes of quota needed and leasing it out in the interim. Some invested 
and were hurt badly by the 1986 stock market crash. Consequently some couples 
split and others weathered the storm. 
Many of the fishermen sold to pay off their mortgages or build their houses.  
Eventually as the quota system came in I ended up with these quotas as we 
were coming to the farm here and we built this earth home – dug a hole in 
the top of the hill and built the earth home and moved here and did the 
alternate power thing and all that and I sold most of the quotas – got out of 
it. Sold it all and that provided money to build my house here so then I 
was forced to look at the private end of it more – the private end – you 
know the recreational end of it  (Informant 10).  
Another sold his snapper quota;  
to a guy from Coromandel – he flew over and signed it up and I paid off a 
$36,000 mortgage on  the farm. … So – you know – fishing was good to 
me in some ways‖. But ―its not economic in these outer-lying areas – the 
quantities and stuff that you sell – for someone to hold quota and do all 
the work of fishing it – it becomes such a big job for a little return that 
nobody wants to do it anymore. …  It was hard work and ended up being 
work without any real reward in the end – when you are down to a small 
amount (of quota). … I was going to hang onto mine but at the time I 
couldn't lease it and I thought 'bugger this'. The government keeps sending 
you these bills for – I don't want it any more. I felt like I was on string 
there – on a hook. I was a fish now. So I sold it for what I could get for it 
and got out of it. … When I got out actually there must have been miles of 
fishermen like me in a small way that all got out the same year – all 
decided that this was too much. Because up until then I'd had no trouble 
leasing out quota that I wasn't going to use towards the end of the year and 
that sort of thing. … So I ended up – I sold it eventually.  It was back in 
the nineties – late nineties (Informant 12).  
Another sold small amounts in an effort to continue fishing:  
There was just attrition, 'Oh, I'll sell a tonne we've got to put this bloody 
engine in and I've had a mean winter and the fish prices are way down so 
to sustain themselves they (fishermen) had to keep nibbling away at their 
quota and sell half a tonne and sell (more). … I held onto some quota for a 
while but the paper nightmare of leasing it – I just sold it out. The boat's 
still there, I thought I might go back one day – I kept it but I don't think. I 
don't think there's  … (an opportunity). Well you look out to sea there now 
and you never see a seine boat working whereas the horizon used to be lit 
  
229 
up at night – seine boats doing their shots – tow outs on the incoming tide 
(Informant 13). 
Informant 18 and his family were mortgage free when the QMS came in. He'd fish 
40 weeks per year, and spend three nights per week on the boat so 120 nights a 
year for 15 years. Then he left in 1991. He had hung on for five years but the 
remuneration got worse and worse. He'd thought it would be good and the money 
would be as good as they'd had, but it got worse. He sold his quota and basically 
cashed up and got out. There was money they wouldn't have had if not for the 
QMS. It was about the same time other workers were getting redundancy that ―put 
them on their feet‖. They bought a business and did well then sold that and have 
all they want so he doesn't have a yearning to get out there.  Friends invite him out 
to fish but he doesn't. He's done that. So overall they achieved their desired 
economic level (Informant 18). 
Another didn't do quite so well and felt they didn't get the best advice: 
I'm sure that if we'd been given the real assistance. … Somebody should 
have understood that these guys [fishermen] are not the sharpest knives in 
the drawer at the figures. I think I might have been persuaded to actually 
keep my quota. It was just like – 'There's some money there – do you want 
it?' Yeah, I want it – I'll take it. Because it set me up. I paid for my home. I 
bought a property and all that and all of a sudden I've got no business and 
I thought, ―What am I doing here? I want to go fishing but I can't now.‖ 
So it's a bit dumb. My children. My children want to go fishing. They 
could have taken my business over. So it's a lesson now. A lesson – people 
who had foresight have actually stayed in it. I actually ended up getting 
out because the money was so huge – I know two or three people who I 
still see fishing – they're in their 60s and that and they're doing it for – 
money doesn't mean anything – they're just doing it. I made that fatal 
mistake where I took the money. I didn't want a cent. I was quite happy 
before that, you know (Informant 26)?  
Most of the Waiheke fishermen sold for reasons more immediately related to their 
domestic and community situation. One fisherman, however, was involved with 
Federation politics and while working for them leased out his quota. Initially 
leasing out was reasonable:  
The idea of leasing was just really so someone else could have the use of 
it and there could be something back … like renting out your house or 
something. But it began to be leased at figures that were in excess of what 
even the fisherman could make catching the bloody stuff simply because 
of its scarcity and the kind of mania that surrounded it. Just like the share 
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market crash. Everybody suddenly wanted it and the price just went 
ridiculous and I feel that probably some of the bigger companies sat back 
and fed that fire because it really had very little impact on them 
(Informant 14). 
From his interest and this experience he had a wider view of the industry and New 
Zealand fisheries than most fishermen. Aware of trends and ethical concerns:  
I sold my quota because I began to think of it as a bubble in terms of its 
value.  I guess I was influenced by the stock market crash and I felt that – 
for the first time in my life I realised that commodities could rise above 
their true value because of all kinds of artificial forces and that you could 
be left holding nothing. In my last year of owning quota I made … 
perhaps … as much by leasing out my quota as I had made in previous 
years by going out and catching it myself and that seemed to me to be a 
strange slightly unwholesome and not quite right sort of spin off that the 
QMS should never have given rise to. Certainly the economic theorists 
never predicted that (Informant 14). 
He was in a quandary. On the one hand leasing his quota out meant he had the 
time and resources to do things he couldn't otherwise but on the other hand, since 
many were selling their quota soon the market would be saturated and his asset 
would be valueless. ―There's one school of thought that says, ―Never sell it. Never 
ever sell it.‖ There's another school of thought that says, ―Hey this is hugely 
overvalued.‖  I knew that at the time it was being sold for far in excess of what its 
economic worth would be in the hands of somebody buying it‖. He was persuaded 
by what seemed an excessive increase of user-pays costs such as those for 
research and ― I didn't think I was going to go fishing again. The excitement had 
kind of gone, the lifestyle had gone and [significantly] it had become just a 
business and I thought, I should try and think like a businessman and sell out 
while the going was good. I felt a bit sick doing it because it had never been my 
intention when I went fishing and I loved fishing and it seemed like the end of 
something and I was sad but it felt that I had no choice‖ (Informant 14).  
A lot of other people had sold out and I'd held onto my quota for a long 
time – … because I became involved in the politics of fishing. … I 
thought I was quite an important person representing the small owner-
operator and I felt that as long as I was going to be voicing opinions and 
saying this and saying that then I should be a quota owner. I didn't feel 
that it was very ethical to be telling other people what they should do 
when I wasn't going to be taking the consequences of it myself so I held 
onto my quota because if I wanted to be a spokesman I had to be willing 
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to take the consequences of whatever might happen but it all turned a bit 
sour in the end and I got a bit sick of it all and at that point I realised I 
should sell my quota and get right out of it and get out of the politics as 
well because it was a soul destroying activity. …  We all got the jitters 
after the stock market crash – you know. I thought quota would go the 
same way so I got rid of it. I wish I still had it. In fact if I still had my 
quota I'd be back out there fishing again there now. …. I'd be out there 
like a shot but I wouldn't even think about going fishing now – leasing in 
someone else's quota – it wouldn't be worth it (Informant 14).  
Some fishermen were convinced the major companies were manipulating prices to 
extremely low levels through high grading. Local fishermen expected the Co-op 
would prevent similar happening to them but that was not always their experience.  
I think it was when we were getting prices from Japan, with what we were 
getting paid and the grading – the way they were grading our fish was 
diabolical. We would be out there catching fish that would look like they 
had just come out of a machine they were all the same size – perfect iki 
fish and we'd get a reject rate of 70%. It was ridiculous, absolutely 
ridiculous because they'd been caught within – sometimes within 2 or 3 
hours of being unloaded. They were still in the slurry and they'd say, ―Oh 
no – they're too old.‖  
They had every excuse in the world so we were being hi-graded by the 
companies –ripped off.  There's no doubt at all. The companies were 
manipulating the prices to their advantage. That way they funded the 
purchase of the quota because the companies were buying the quota off 
the fishermen was with the fishermen's money that they were ripping them 
off. … When you compare us [Waiheke] to Leigh and comparing Leigh's 
prices to ours they were getting a far better price than we were. The 
impact was just devastating.  It was the end of it all. We got out of it in the 
end because it was just too much of a hassle (Informant 13).  
For many the decision to retain it or sell it involved husbands and wives and, to a 
greater or lesser extent their family. For some it was not an easy matter. Their 
relationship had not previously had to contend with the amounts of money 
involved. It varied with personality and depended on the extent to which long 
term aspirations were shared and in some cases became contentious to the extent 
that some couples split. Those fishermen who sold tended to be younger, in their 
20s or 30s. Many thought they could have the cash and stay fishing. It was a 
LOTTO
112
 mentality. Those who retained their quota tended to be older more 
                                                 
112
  The national weekly lottery. 
232 
 
established fishermen later in their career cycle with boats and houses paid off; 
perhaps more committed to fishing, possibly because they were later generations 
of fishing families so had greater experience to call on. It seems significant that 
those on Waiheke who retained their quota went chartering. 
For some fishermen and their partners selling was a short-term decision to meet 
immediate needs but others were hoping for an alternative. Some were glad to 
leave the fishing, because what had been a lifestyle ethos had become a business, 
but others had regrets, feeling the information they'd acted on had been 
inadequate. Commercial fishing always had high rates of tension and divorce but 
the options opened by quota created additional tensions between some couples. A 
fisherman, for example, was tired had had 'a guts full' and wanted to get out but 
his wife wanted to be prudent and retain the possibility of his getting back in by 
keeping the 5 tonnes of quota needed and leasing it out in the interim. Some 
invested and were hurt badly by the stock market crash. Consequently some 
couples split and others weathered the storm with eventually, all but one 
fisherman on Waiheke, selling their quota. 
Demise of the Co-op 
The QMS led to the demise of the Co-op. The Co-op was, of necessity, a Licensed 
Fish Receiver (LFR) with concomitantly increased administrative requirements. 
For fishermen quota ownership added monetary enticement. In the ethos of 
Waiheke both factors compounded. Those who ran the Co-op were there to 
support and cooperate with fishermen not to run a business. The additional 
demands of the QMS were, therefore, debilitating rather than challenging. The 
struggle with paperwork was an example: 
It was just a god damn paper nightmare – you know – every kilo of fish 
has to be accounted for and buying in fish and trying to sell your rejects 
through the Co-op shop and that – too much of a hassle – who needs it? ... 
Everybody just got pissed off with us [the Co-op] and found easier jobs 
because it‘s hard physical work. You don't mind doing it if you're making 
a buck but when you're working like a bloody maniac and not even 
covering the costs some weeks (Informant 13). 
The QMS changed people's perspectives, attitudes and aspirations. On the one 
hand fishermen needed quota and had to account for it but on the other quota was 
an asset representing options they hadn't considered previously.  
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There were 21 shareholders in the Co-op … The Co-op just got started 
really and then the quota system came into effect. It effectively killed the 
Co-op! Basically, there was a dollar on the snapper head … Slowly and 
surely fishermen would sell their quota and get out of the industry. It was a 
way of getting out and getting paid for it. They decided to sell out. I think 
some of them had had enough of fishing but that certainly was 'the icing on 
the cake' (Informant 13).  
One of the fishermen who had first facilitated the Co-op said:  
I think everything went quite smoothly for a while but when quota came in, 
of course, I think people got greedy then ... All of a sudden people could 
sell off a bit of quota and get rid of their mortgage. That was the demise of 
it. It ended up a bit of a bun fight in the end because the sections ... bought 
[for the Co-op] … in Ostend, for £500 pound, all of a sudden were worth 
quite a lot of money so a little group tried to take things over in the end … 
[One fisherman] and I went into battle for everyone else. Yeah it was a lot 
of 'fun'. That was basically what it was. Yeah. I'd got out of it for personal 
reasons, I suppose but most of the fishermen got out because … all of a 
sudden you could get money for what you'd been doing (Informant 44). 
A lot of fishermen dropped out so that eventually the Co-op had  
to start a fish and chip shop to keep it going … [but it] didn't have the quota 
to service it properly … You've got to have the quota. You must have it in 
your own right, to serve the community and if you haven't got it you can't 
do it. You'll always hear stories of people coming to the island and saying, 
―Jeeze, you should be able to buy fresh fish on Waiheke Island.‖ Well 
they'll be saying that for a frigging long time because I don't think it‘s 
going to happen (Informant 13).  
 Eventually dwindling numbers meant it was uneconomic to keep the Co-op going 
(Informant 13) and the Co-op was sold to a partnership of two couples who had 
been members (Gulf News 9 October 1992 37) (Box 14). They kept it running: 
There was a lot of [community] support but … [with the] black market ... 
[you] could keep yourself in fish from right next door to [the fish shop]. Ten 
dollars a packet of snapper – can't compare with that. So [it] only got the 
people who don't know about the black market fish, who were prepared to 
come to the fish shop and pay legit … It all boils down to the quota. The 
black market fish at the time was – probably still as high now. I don't think 
you'll ever get away from that (Informant 7). 
Reduced catches from improving quality and the pro-rate cuts in quota meant that 
even with the additional 25 tonnes of snapper quota many of the fishermen felt 
they were not economically viable. Some then sold their quota, whereas others 
tried to keep going but attrition, lack of cash flow, meant an exigency such as an 
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engine failure would lead to selling of small amounts of quota until they had to 
leave the fishery. Eventually the Co-op disbanded and in the mid nineties the fish 
shop closed so now locals virtually can't get fresh locally caught fish.  
 
Figure 15: The buildings that were the Waiheke Co-op (September 2009). 
Coromandel 
Getting quota was also difficult for some Coromandel fishermen.  One of my 
Coromandel informants found that the fishing experience was attached to the boat 
rather than the fisherman, or the owner. In the run-up to the QMS he bought one 
of the oldest Danish seiners in the Viaduct. Its owner, who had been one of the top 
fishermen, also owned a fish and chip shop in Mangere, had ill health and couldn't 
fish any more so had been trying to sell the boat for three or four years.  
 
In general, catch history went with the fisherman but in this case he said:  
Several years that history went with the boat … but he was told that he 
couldn't transfer it – which was not true … [because] it turned out that 
similar transactions had taken place all over the country and when I came 
to look at the situation it seemed to me that, what I was being  told was 
preposterous and that the boat was worth what he wanted for it anyway … 
The boat was the oldest fishing boat in the Auckland fishing industry, just 
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a year or so older than the Dorothy so if there was any boat … [that] had a 
right to a catch history it was that one… (Informant 35) 
What was being said to people was unreasonable and unjust and I decided … that 
if I can't get any quota I'll set it up and buy longlines for big tuna and set up a big 
surface longline and I was able to fish it under his permit for a few months after I 
bought the boat … I went off and did my surface longlining which was totally 
experimental for a New Zealand boat. 
They (MAF) changed it. So then I was advised that I could appeal because 
I should have had some quota and there should have been some applied to 
the boat … I did follow it up and was lucky to finish up … with some 
quota. That was difficult such a tenuous operation getting [quota] 
(Informant 35).  
Another Coromandel informant felt that the fishermen with families were fine and 
younger single fishermen who could live on a small income while they bought 
extra quota were also able to stay in. In comparison, older fishermen already in 
their fifties didn't get enough quota and had to drop out. ―So there was that whole 
generational difference; a bit sad for the old ones‖ (Informant 2). 
The consequences at Coromandel were more mixed than for Waiheke perhaps 
because more fishermen had been operating bigger boats (e.g. Danish seiners) and 
larger businesses for longer. Some individuals who, from a common sense 
perspective, appeared to have a good case for getting quota, had to really struggle 
whereas others, who contrived a case, got it easily. 
Bill Dumpleton's perspective of the introduction of ITQs to Coromandel was: 
We never got as many squeals from Coromandel as a community. Most of 
them were satisfied.  Most of them knew what they were going to do and 
they've always been quite an intelligent lot in Coro. They are savvy to do 
things, a bit like those in Whitianga too, with the three factories.  … 
[Also] they actually had a controlled fishery a long time before they had 
an ITQ system.  They had – you know it was just another step for them. 
They adapted very well – Coro (Bill Dumpleton). 
The social impact on Coromandel from the introduction of the QMS was 
dramatic: ―many fishermen made a substantial amount of money and gained an 
impressive asset by selling or leasing out their quota‖ (Bill Dumpleton).  Indeed, 
one informant suggested the QMS had created 46 millionaires overnight, but 
twenty years later wasn't sure of the exact figures: ―It might have been 16 in town 
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or 46 on Coromandel Peninsular‖. That does not alter the fact that some gained an 
impressive asset by selling or leasing out their quota. 
Contrary to early information however, not everybody was leasing their quota out. 
Some fishermen retained part of their quota for their own use (e.g. Informant 33). 
Others didn't get enough quota of their own so had to lease more but there were 
also others who wanted to fish who had to lease the entire quota needed to cover 
their catch. Bill Dumpleton felt that many people were making a lot out of leasing 
out quota and that created a problem for those who had to lease it in order to fish.  
A Danish Seiner said:  
It's a lot of water under the bridge since the Quota system came in. In a 
nutshell when I traded I traded down and sold the big boat because I didn't 
think the quota system would be enough to support it (Informant 21). 
 The problem was compounded:  
[T]hey were going to cut us back but they had us on a bit, because they 
kept saying 'if there's not enough cuts' [they would cut more – pro rata 
across all the snapper fishermen].  It's a 64 dollar question if there wasn't 
enough people cut out of the industry then they'd cut us back even more. 
That's where the catch – where the quota's all out a bit. So I decided 
bugger this, I'll sell the boat and just sell off. The mistake I made is I 
should have kept a little bit but even if I kept a little bit back that could 
have been cut back. It was never going to end … they cut the snapper 
down a lot. That was the biggest issue (Informant 21). 
Informant 21 sold.  
I got $6.40 or $6.70, I think it was across the species. … I got a payout 
and sold the boat separately and then I bought back in to the industry – 
enough for my entitlement back into the fishery – five tonne. Well I 
actually bought seven tonne. Then I found out I didn't need to do that in 
the first place because I was already a registered fisherman and when they 
bought me out they left me with 100 kg plus of baracouta. So they left me 
with … still good fish [quota] even though it was useless – baracouta 
(Informant 21).  
He started longlining but even so his operation was marginal. He had to spin out 
the small amount of quota he had but when the price for snapper landed dropped 
he didn't have sufficient. He needed a deckhand but:  
[N]obody would stay with you for say less than twenty grand ($20,000) in 
a year deckhand. Prior to that I had this good hand and everything was 
normal. We got quite used to one another but he had to move on to the 
forestry because we cut the bloody quota out by January and February – 
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my quota and a third schedule quota. So I caught more fish than what I'm 
catching now and ended up with less in my hand because I had to give it 
to him … I had to make dollars (Informant 21).  
So he decided to go solo but Danish seining again:  
I'll give it a go and I'll spin [the quota] out. If I don't catch it I'll lease out 
what's left.  In the first year – I got used to it quick but there were just 
certain things. Sometimes you can't get more snapper or … (its) not worth 
[sufficient], or you don't get as much leasing it as you would catching it, 
that sort of thing. Well that would change your mind … So I'll lease the lot 
(out) instead. Sometimes the factory will have a bit of extra snapper so I'll 
not catch a lot of snapper into here – just [higher priced] dory while there's 
[some around] – they cover me for other species anyway. So I'm still 
reliant on them. That's the only sad part about it. This game here – you sell 
– you're self employed but you're still working for the MAN – you know 
what I mean (Informant 21)?  
He had lost the sense of freedom.  
On Coromandel some did sell their quota. I was told:  
[B]asically the greed got the better of them. They saw the instant gain and 
forgot about the future.  One chap … well he sold that quota [10 tonne 
snapper] back to the company because they gave him a guarantee that he 
wouldn't need quota. He could just lease it back off them rather than have 
all his money tied up. (Then) he spent the whole bloody lot in a pub in six 
bloody months. Then he came back to work and there was no job for him 
and he realised then he'd made a huge mistake but it was too late. He also 
sold it really cheaply. I don't know the exact figure but it would have been 
less that $10,000 a tonne … He's not fishing now but he comes down (to 
the wharf) quite a bit (Informant 20).  
Ian Strongman explained the situation for family fishermen:  
[W]hen quotas were introduced I was deckhand for my father as was my 
brother. Initially the first thing we noticed was that with the quota 
reduction was that if we were all getting paid from the government – but 
with the quota you had left – you were only landing half as much as you 
were before. So you had a fishing boat set up to catch 60, 70 tonne of fish 
in a year… [but] your quota was only 35 tonne. To make your boat viable 
you had to go and lease somebody else's quota that had decided not to fish 
it. So that worked OK for a while – while I was on a boat that had a 
reasonable amount of quota provided – as my father's boat. Dad provided 
the quota.  
Ian Strongman leased his father‘s quota but when he retired a further quota 
reduction made him wonder, ―Where is this going to end? How many cuts are 
they going to take?‖ and decide to sell the quota leaving Ian to lease quota 
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privately. Others were also competing for this quota and against the factories, 
which could pay more. So ―by the time you landed your fish with your crew and 
your ice and diesel and expenses and the quota cost – the cost of leasing it – it just 
wasn't worth it‖ (Ian Strongman). As a result he now has a $120,000 boat that he 
hasn't used for six years, although a buyer is offering about $10,000 for the boat 
and some of the gear was sold to other fishermen its still a huge loss. Some of his 
peers have got bigger boats, diversified or they've got out. 
The QMS left no love for the government. One fisherman, a descendant of a 
European fishing family so perhaps more traditional than many others in 
Coromandel, was working his quota but had also started a mussel farm, yet felt 
betrayed. Colin Moyle, then Minister of Fisheries had said 
'This [quota] is bankable your kids can inherit it' but then they cut it. The 
second time they cut about nine per cent and no compensation there were 
a lot of promises that weren't kept. There have been reductions since 
(Informant 33).  
 [He] doesn't trust any government but ―Labour wants total control‖ and the 
paperwork is ―over the top‖. Because he didn't trust the government he sold three 
quarters of his quota and leases the remainder out. His brother, however, has kept 
all his but was not available to interview.  
Just as Waiheke lost the Co-op, Coromandel also lost its wet-fish factory that was 
adjacent to the wharf. Neil Macdonald explained that before the factory was sold 
to Sanford, the CEO of the company, [called] Coromandel Fisheries or 
Coromandel Exporters, was the biggest single owner of quota. During my first 
visit, fishermen on the wharf told me informally that when Sanford bought the 
fish factory they were assured arrangements to buy snapper and other wet fish 
would continue as before but just a month or so later, the factory converted to a 
mussel packing shed no longer buying fish. The QMS was rationalising the 
industry. 
COMPANY PERSPECTIVE 
While the QMS was supposed to smooth out fishing by eliminating the race for 
fish and since they had quota and prices were market driven, moderate the 
competition between fishermen. As a result with seasonal variation, snapper 
lifecycles, and other exigencies, fishermen's catches and their supply to their 
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market, the viability of the companies fluctuated. The companies' domestic or 
international markets did also though not necessarily in relation to seasonal 
availability. Their financial returns were still variable. Thus the return to the 
fisherman was less than predictable and with ethnic factors affecting cultural 
styles, not surprisingly, fishermen's feeling toward the companies were mixed. 
After the introduction of the QMS, leasing quota was an option:  
But then after the first year the leases steadily went up and up and the 
prices [for fish] came down and the costs went up so it all turned around – 
quite rapidly. That's why I think the companies are responsible because 
they saw that they had the power and there was nothing we could do about 
it so they seized on that. And they basically tell us: ―If you don't like it 
you can f---- off!‖  That's their attitude (Informant 20). 
With the factory in Leigh, and a community that was significantly more dependent 
on commercial fishing than either Waiheke or Coromandel, fishermen had more 
support and remained more viable. They got quota, held it and leased more as 
needed so that a bubble in prices in Japan meant they sold at top price.  ―500-1000 
Yen more than any other company in New Zealand because of the quality aspect" 
(Greg Bishop). 
Johnson and Haworth (2004) considered that companies aggregated (bought up) 
the quota so quickly to secure access to fish. As a result of the loan schemes, 
fishermen had become financially independent of the companies so when the 
chance to buy up the quota came companies were far more aware of the financial 
implications than fishermen and bought it as fast as possible. 
Fletcher Fishing was first off the mark. It was not the only quota buyer, 
but it was quick, aggressive, and paid cash on the spot. When one snapper 
fisherman called at Fletcher's Auckland plant to pick up a cheque for his 
catch the buyer laid out a cheque book in front of him and offered to buy 
his entire quota on the spot. That fisherman did not sell – or not until later 
– but many did. … The tenders submitted to the government in the first 
round effectively set a price per species. If fishermen were offering fish 
back to the government at, say $5000 a tonne, Fletcher would happily pay 
$7000 or $8000 … Some fishermen acted as though they had won the 
Golden Kiwi lottery. None of this was reflected in the government's 
statistics (Johnson and Haworth 2004 375, 376). 
Such aggressive corporate aggregation of quota also had implications for the 
smaller local companies that resulted in amalgamations and closures in the small 
ports thus changing the options fishermen had in selling their catch. Coromandel 
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fishermen, for example, were affected by what happened at Whitianga. Johnson 
and Haworth (2004) report:  
Quota buying at small ports caused substantial shifts in the way local 
processors worked. At Whitianga … Fletcher bought most of the local 
quota – mostly snapper – within 24 hours of its allocation, at a price the 
local processor thought was close to what it was worth. The fishermen 
then had boats but no quota. Those who wanted to fish had to lease from 
someone who owned it. Fletcher moved the processing factory to 
Auckland. Whitianga had already gone through considerable upheaval. … 
In the Think Big days it had about 15 trawlers, 44 scallop boats and three 
processing plants. Then as things became tougher in the early 1980s with 
falling catches and closed areas, three plants became two, Ocean Products 
and Columbia Seafoods. By quota time there was one. Jim Williscroft was 
running OPColumbia [OPC]. He had moved to 'iki fishing', small 
premium snapper for the Japanese market. Now he watched most of his 
fish supply go to Auckland in Fletcher Fishing's trucks (Johnson and 
Haworth 2004 376, 377). 
Generally smaller processors owned no boats so depended on independent 
fishermen. In the past they had kept them by guaranteeing bank overdrafts or 
making loans but later Rural Bank loans and development incentives enabled 
owner-operators to buy their own boats. Consequently they too had to buy 
sufficient quota to ―generate enough fish to keep his [the CEO] plant busy. It was 
no use controlling boats it had to be quota. Somehow he had to get quota. It need 
not be enough for his total requirements but there needed to be some sort of base‖ 
(Johnson and Haworth 2004 378). 
During my Northland Tour in 1995, a Leigh Fisheries spokesperson stated that 
most Leigh fishermen had their own quota. It had been the basis of Leigh for 40 
years. ―Aggregation? It's a product of market mechanisms.  If the market controls 
fisheries access it will go to those who control capital. That process hasn't finished 
yet". So aggregation of quota by big companies had little effect on smaller 
companies such as Leigh Fisheries. He said: 
If you've got quota and are fishing you've got quota and are fishing! If you 
sell out it doesn't matter who you sell to. The existing operators are not 
affected [by aggregation]. That's the way it‘s always been here; ding dong 
carry on (Leigh Fisheries spokesman). 
To maintain this position Leigh Fisheries:  
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[B]elieved that the company should purchase quota to help subsidise the 
fishermen with their  quota so there was a regime of borrowing money and 
going out there and purchasing quota. In the early middle 90s one of our 
share holders – he owned Coromandel Fisheries – which he sold to 
Sanford and that quota came to Leigh Fisheries so what Leigh Fisheries 
has [now in 2007] is 450 tonne in its own name in snapper and a 105 
tonne from Coromandel which is a 50/50 partnership (Barry Torkington). 
On Waiheke, one of those who saw the demise of the Co-op commented to the 
effect that the younger fishermen started selling quota to Fletchers to get cash and 
within 18 months the Co-op died. The young people and deckies needed money to 
do up the boats – they were just old wooden planked boats. The companies, 
Fletchers and Moana, offered big money and promised locals they would lease 
back at a reasonable price. He felt they even lied. But then, when the fishermen 
leased, locals got so little that quite a few left. During the good times they got 
double $13 or $14 /kg for snapper but most of the time only $5 /kg and paid $2 
/kg to lease. The Co-op was fine but because it had to be self sustaining it had to 
charge for bait and ice leaving just $1 /kg so it ―was down‖ from there. ―A big 
shame‖ (Informant 11). The Co-op did what it could but: ―the big worry at that 
time was of the big companies being able to get all of the quota and the little 
fellow being pushed out‖ (Informant 44).  
Another Waiheke fisherman drew attention to the different attitudes between 
companies:  
Fletchers bought all those companies. Then the QMS came in suddenly. 
They seemed to have inside information. Took over JBL and the company 
in Gisborne and others around the coast and all got quota. Then they 
weren't in for long. Can't get over it. They had the inside word this was 
going to happen. No one else knew about it they bought the companies. …  
[They didn't] see the guys who'd work hard – they should have. [They] 
were burglars [poachers but] Sanford, deserved everything they got – they 
had a history of fishing [120 years] and deserved [the quota]… There 
should have been an enquiry (Informant 18). 
I had believed that since the QMS arose out of the same neo-liberal perspective 
that underpinned the corporates and corporatisation and consequently matched 
corporate styles of operation it facilitated their gaining control of access to the 
fisheries. They had scientists, accountants, and lawyers familiar with and oriented 
to the complexities of finance, commerce and regulation. The fishermen, on the 
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other hand, did not generally have that interest or expertise. I felt the QMS had 
been designed for the corporates not the fishermen. 
Peter Stevens, previously a fisherman, President of the Federation and significant 
architect of the QMS, refuted this vehemently: ―No there were never these 
intentions but what I'm trying to say here – there's these human nature factors that 
create the inevitability. It was never done by intention. … [Aggregation] was 
always going to happen.‖ It was accelerated by an oversight. Fishermen were told 
quota was equity for borrowing but the banks disagreed.  One of the penalties [for 
fishing offenses] was confiscating quota that then reverted to the Crown so banks 
would not lend on something they had no legal hold over. [He] wanted penalties 
to be fines commensurate with the offence or gear or boat confiscations but wasn't 
listened to and the industry wasn't supportive (Peter Stevens). 
The communities were preoccupied with other restructuring including the Local 
Government Act and so in all probability most didn't even consider purchasing 
quota. Consequently they failed to ensure the availability of livelihoods for their 
fishermen and fresh locally caught commercial fish for their members. 
CONCLUSION 
During the transition and the early years there were mixed perceptions of the 
QMS both within and between the different components. While the ideologues in 
MAF were fully supportive, many of the operational, particularly front-line staff 
closer to fishermen and their communities had serious reservations. The 
companies saw the opportunity to secure their access to the fish by buying quota 
and thereby having more control in supplying the market.  
For local fishermen the transition meant the complexity of another bureaucratic 
change from the controlled fishery to the QMS and uncertainty from new rules, 
regulations and processes. It meant that the ethos changed from fishing as a 
lifestyle, or vocation; a change from the flexibility and relationship, supporting 
their community and Co-op to business transactions where they fed product into a 
supply chain over which they had no control. Their response varied. Reporting 
requirements and other restrictions compounded paperwork and for some 
increased the incentive to lease or sell their quota and ―get out‖ with a ―nest egg‖ 
and do other things. Others remained fishing and either sold their quota but leased 
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it back on the promise fishing would continue as before or, particularly the more 
business minded, came to grips with the system, retained ownership of their quota 
or bought more and continued fishing. Those leasing quota, especially from the 
companies, were obligated to sell them their catch so lost the previous flexibility 
to sell in the community. With the reduction in the number of quota owners, 
fishing, communities that weren't the base for fishing companies lost livelihoods 
for their members and the basic food and nutrition that had been provided by fresh 
locally caught fish.  
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Chapter 7: QMS Now 
The preceding Chapter demonstrated, the 'immediate' or transitional impact of the 
QMS implementation resulted in the aggregation of quota to larger companies, 
primarily through their realising quota ownership gave control over access to fish 
and fishermen taking the wind-fall gains by selling the newly acquired paper right. 
This was augmented by attrition of those who did not sell immediately. 
Significantly, both the Waiheke co-op and the Waiheke fishing fleet disappeared 
leaving lingering social implications and residual feelings of anger and distrust. At 
Leigh the fleet and Leigh Fisheries, now a company expanded into an 
international conglomerate and survived.  Coromandel was somewhere in 
between, having lost its fish processing plant and many of its fishermen. The 
focus in this chapter is on the present and more recent past - approximately twenty 
years after the introduction of the QMS and twenty- six after the exclusion 
regulations. This chapter shows the ethos of Coromandel fishermen facing the 
new regime and difficulties servicing distant factories, of Leigh and implications 
of the QMS for a community company and the community, particularly the fish 
shops. This Chapter, therefore, indicates the change in ethos and social 
implications from before the QMS where fishermen dealt primarily with the 
fishing occupation, their buyers on a relatively personal level and the community 
to the more stringent and bureaucratic under the QMS.  
FISHERMEN 
Waiheke 
 
Figure 16: Remnants of the Waiheke longline fleet (2009) 
Commercial fishing continued on Waiheke for a while after the introduction of the 
QMS but reporting and paperwork involved had profound implications. The need 
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for certificates and bureaucratic requirements selected for people with a different 
ideology. The livelihood was no longer available to those just interested and 
capable in boat handling and fishing but meant additional ability to cope with 
clerical and bureaucratic standards was also needed.  
One of those affected said: 
I disagree with the paper work, myself. To a certain extent the paper 
work's good but I disagree with the certificates that you need to be on the 
water to catch fish because in my opinion ... Some of the best fishermen; 
that's all they want to do. They don't need a piece of paper to say: ―I got a 
ticket to catch fish.‖ They are some of the best fishermen around and that's 
gone! It‘s taken away from them - completely. Those people might not 
have been any good at school. They might have dropped school days and 
gone fishing instead of going to school but they were the 'bone fide' 
people in the fishing industry. They are the ones that should have been 
helped - [instead of] these university delinquents - take away the 
electronic equipment and they're stuffed. That's what they are. I'm no good 
at school. Good thing I went fishing in the early days I suppose. But 
everybody's got something good about them and the fishing in the old 
days was one of those things. You could pick it up and catch fish - you 
could do all right (Informant 7). 
Fortunately for some their wife's role could expand to cope with the new 
requirements. 
Me - I hate the bookwork. I don't like pens and I don't like paper. I'm 
lucky because I come home every night and catch landing log's an easy 
thing to fill out. My wife does all that - does the whole lot. … We've never 
been in trouble with that because my wife's kept up with the new regime 
and all that. … It is a very small operation. So there wasn't a lot of paper 
work but you still needed someone. My wife's worked as a secretary when 
she first left school so she cottoned on to this sort of stuff pretty quickly so 
it was pretty easy. ... People who had bigger boats and can catch by-catch 
- you get stung if you bring back your by-catch. It could become very very 
complicated. Yep - you need to be a full time secretary and probably it has 
taken its toll on marriages as well (Informant 7).   
The need for quota and bureaucracy meant loss of the old ethos whereby a 
fishermen could meet local needs such as the classic case with the Onetangi Hotel 
on Waiheke where:   
[T]he 'old man' used to supply all the fish down  there. He supplied ... [the 
hotel] from day dot until it ended.  You could sell fish to anyone - you 
liked! And in effect there wasn't as much black marketing going on either 
- in those days you could go around and make a living off fishing by 
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selling to the community. But all that's been denied now. The fisheries 
quota system has stopped that and very successfully too. They've done 
110%.  They've killed it (Informant 7).  
On Waiheke the QMS also altered family dynamics. Where previously fishing had 
been  
from father to son. And that's probably the most important thing in the 
fisheries. And probably the last most important thing - there are no more 
father and sons which has destroyed the fishing rights of individuals. …. 
(T)he fishing is good, the resource is good  but the social part  of it - with  
families like myself there's no one else to follow up  because  there's been 
too many restrictions put on the fishing. So there are no more fathers and 
sons to come any more. Basically that's what the system has done - it‘s 
destroyed community  (Informant 7). 
This certainly applies to ACE dependent fishermen although children or relations 
of the few who keep their quota may still have the option of following the family 
tradition and becoming fishermen  (e.g. Wharf fisherman, Surf and Turf, Country 
Calendar, TV1, 27 August 2006). 
Coromandel 
Unlike Waiheke, some fishermen and boats are still working from Coromandel 
(e.g. The Gay Dolphin, the Vampire and the Nadgee  (See Figure 17) all Danish 
seiners. A few others go out occasionally but it was a striking comparison with 
before the QMS:  
It's not far off a dead port really as compared with what it used to be say 
in the 70s and 80s.  There's really only two longliners working. One of 
them's got this boat …  and it's just a bloody rust bucket. Like it's because 
he can't afford to maintain it and is probably slowly going bust. There's 
that other chap - he's a single guy and he's got no fixed abode so he lives 
on his boat so he gets by like that because his outgoings aren't all that big. 
He's got no family to keep or anything. Those are the only two longliners.  
There's three seiners here at the wharf that haven't moved for years, one 
of them Boy Roel for about 15 years. ... The Kia Toa here it's been here 
for about 5 years for sale.  He (the owner-operator) even tried to give it 
away at one part of it and nobody wanted it. It's down to about 
$10,000.There's the Sea Reaper down there. I don't know whether that 
will ever go again. … Sometimes the Eight Dollars works out of here and 
sometimes he works out of Mangonui (Informant 20).  
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Figure 17: Nadgee, Danish seiner, one of a handful of Coromandel boats still 
operating. 
One of the fishermen told me that the companies paid the fishermen a pittance so 
he was not earning enough and is finding it difficult to keep up the maintenance 
on the boat. The fleet is aging. It is heart breaking because he feels it is deliberate. 
He doesn't get enough return to maintain his boat and since the introduction of the 
QMS a lot of good fishermen have gone.  More positively, the ―cowboys,‖ those 
just in it for the money or with a liberal disregard for regulations, were weeded 
out or have changed but it will probably also put him out in a few years. He will 
have to tie up but he likes the lifestyle. He commented that there were no new 
boats coming in and no significant ―young guns‖ (ambitious new entrants). He is 
one of the younger skippers and it had always been his dream to have a boat - but 
now his family doesn't make a living out it. In fact the only reason he can keep it 
running is because his wife works and so subsidises the operation (Informant 21b) 
so essentially they kept fishing for the lifestyle. 
These boats used jetties attached to the Coromandel wharf but there was at least 
one fishing boat, a longliner, Tamure that uses a mud berth in the river that 
reportedly (Informant 20) hardly ever goes out.  
While commercial fishing from Coromandel might be only marginal now, the 
industry is still hanging on but the boats were increasing in size (See Box 12).  
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Box 12: Increasing size of fishing vessels 
There's always a big turnover of fishermen but there always seem to be people who want 
to have a go. That's what I've noticed. I've also noticed that in the last couple of years 
boats are getting bigger. … This is a small boat now [about 40 feet, 12.2 metres]  - at one 
time this was an average sized boat. They're getting like 60 footers [18.3 metres] now to 
do the same method of fishing (Danish seining) we do. That's a bit of a worry for people 
like me. Because it's all pressure (Informant 20). 
Because the quota was such an asset they've done quite nicely out of it so it's only really 
been the few deckhands that have tried to carry on in the system afterwards - like a young 
farmer.  Now try and get onto a farm with the huge cost of the farm - it's just about 
impossible. And that's really what it did (Informant 31). 
 
Implications of Quota 
Many fishermen in Coromandel kept their quota but some leased some or all of it 
out and developed other occupations such as mussel or oyster farms, building or 
timber operations.  Even here ACE dependent fishermen often found getting it 
difficult to get the ACE they needed.  One stated that getting the first tonne was 
difficult when he wanted to land fish to some factories, like the Auckland Fish 
Market, which leased snapper quota on a tonne for tonne basis.  
When there's hardly any in private hands. You know you ring around 
people to try and get some but it's already gone. Not many people … 
because most of them have sold it. So to get any reciprocal you go to a 
factory - well it's difficult‖ (Informant 20).  
[Snapper] quota is very nearly all held by fishing companies and they 
lease nearly all the quota that is leased around the place and they 
…control … the fishermen. They allocate what they feel like. Tell the 
fishermen what they are going to catch … then they get it or they may not 
- tie the boat up - for a couple of months (Informant 35). 
Sometimes the factory will have a bit of extra snapper … they cover me 
for other  [bycatch] species anyway. So I'm still reliant on them. That's 
the only sad part about it.  This game here - you sell - you're self 
employed but you're still working for the MAN - you know what I mean? 
They're still there and you're at the mercy of all of them. It's certainly not 
what it used to be. They don't sort of hassle me that much because the 
boat's mine. ... I've seen … [new fishermen] come and go into the street 
now and they got packages [of ACE for target and bycatch species] - all 
the packages off these big companies. Probably for the first year and it 
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sounds good - looks good and everything.  Then the reality sets in - 
everything changes - legislation and everything else (Informant 21). 
Yet from the perspective of those fishermen who still have quota to lease out it 
provided as good a return as fishing without the costs.  This also meant they were 
reluctant to return to fishing even if they wanted to for emotional reasons. 
Yes I lease it. I've still got the boat as well. The quotas worth just about as 
much to lease as the fish is to catch that means ... [it's] a 50 per cent cost. 
Catching fish is just occupational therapy - it‘s just meager living. You find 
that if you are leasing in quota for fishing all you can pay for is monthly 
[expenses]. … I'm not getting any money for what I am doing - it's just 
occupational therapy too. I'd go back to [fishing] it, but the balance 
changed (Informant 35).  
Since another fisherman's boat was mortgaged he couldn't give his quota to his 
son, or indeed to any other new entrant. The cost of leasing was high and since the 
companies own virtually all the quota he believed that soon there would only be 
about five [working fishermen] there was no future for the small fisherman 
(Informal Discussion Coromandel Pub 30 September 2006).   
Fishermen had become contractors and, like many others are working on a 
subsistence level;  ―on the very bare minimum where it is possible to operate … 
and most of them will go bankrupt in the process. Most … will finish up putting 
about 20 or 30 years of life in and being bankrupt at the end of it as the millions 
of dollars worth of [boat and] gear that they have had to buy [become obsolete]‖ 
(Informant 35). So on retirement fishermen are unable to retrieve much, if any, of 
the capital they have sunk into their operation and only what little savings they've 
managed from a financially marginal occupation. 
The need for quota [ACE], more rigid accountability and being unable to supply 
food means the occupational ethos is considerably more restrictive, 
individualising and straining social ties with the family and community. 
Crew 
When quota was sold crew missed out. For casual crew, particularly those still 
young and single or those who moved from boat and job to job, losing a particular 
berth was possibly no big deal. Generally, fewer boats meant berths became fewer 
so jobs afloat and entree to commercial fishing harder to find. Fisheries were not 
the only industry being restructured, so it also meant outdoor employment was 
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harder and harder to find and demanded a change in work lifestyle. It certainly 
made getting into commercial fishing considerably more expensive and more 
difficult. For those who were loyal to a boat or skipper and those who aspired to 
become skippers, the loss was severe. 
Crew lost out.  ―Well they did eh. It wasn't their quota.  I guess the lucky ones had 
a captain who said:  'Well we'll keep our quota and we'll catch it'. But there 
weren't too many of those‖  (Informant 34). 
The loss of boats and quota put additional pressure on those married or with 
young families and the impact on the community was significant:  
… these boats had a crew. They had … had probably a crew of 2 or 3 and 
they all had families here. They would all have been part of a community 
where they belong to a committee.  Their children would have gone to 
school and to say that it wouldn't have affected Coromandel wouldn't have 
been very accurate. I would say that it would   have … [though] I don't 
think you would say it would be a profound effect.  Economically and 
socially we did see that … a lot of good people left and with that in your 
small communities is never a good thing because … at that point in time 
there was nothing to replace what was happening [especially for crew]. 
We had the forestry but that was in its infancy and of course once that's 
planted and the trees are growing and the prunings done you just got to 
wait for another 30 years for something to happen.  … In all honesty it 
would have socially and economically… it would have been a dent in 
Coromandel's economy - for sure (Informant 34). 
It was not easy even with good loyal crew. One fisherman had his wife crew for 
him and kept additional expenses to a minimum but it was difficult and less 
profitable than 8-5 jobs on shore but  ―it's a lifestyle thing. I guess it‘s something 
you adapt to. It's probably not good. You've got to have an understanding wife. … 
You're not away from home so much. I had little kids with me. Their grandmother 
looked after them a lot as well‖ (Informant 20). 
Despite lower financial returns working the boat together at that stage of the 
relationship was fulfilling but he considered that now it is even tougher on 
families and relationships with more stress on maintaining economic viability.  At 
least one informant could provide work for his son on his boat, but urged him to 
look for another, better income position. 
Well I pay my guys 15 per cent. … [of] what I get paid for the fish value - 
without the  lease. I don't take out any fuel or ice or stores or anything - I 
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pay him straight off the top 15 per cent.  He probably makes about twelve 
grand a year gross. No, it's terrible.   … it‘s still bloody poor  money eh 
(Informant 20)! 
Crew was hard to find so I assumed those available would be those really keen on 
making a career of fishing but: ―No basically you get all the 'down and outers', the 
drunks and druggies - those who don't want a proper job; some of them on the 
dole kind of thing‖. It meant there would be lot of turnover which didn't help 
running an efficient happy vessel.  
He was pessimistic about the future and arguably the rigidity of the QMS added to 
the difficulty.  Often crew needed to be fishing part-time and also working part-
time at something else. 
Sandra Watson having crewed on a Danish seiner, a scallop boat and mussel 
barges attested to the crew perspective:  
They work hard. People need to get away from this attitude ―Wow it's the 
lifestyle - let them enjoy doing it‖. But that's not how it should be - people 
should get paid for a decent day's work and those guys work really hard. 
… We worked hard all right and you've got to put up with the weather - 
the rough seas and the pounding coming in. It is quite a good life for 
people that like the sea and I'm one that does like it. But why should you 
be penalised for doing a job you enjoy and get very little for it? (Sandra 
Watson). 
Relationships Government Departments (MFish / MOT) 
As shown by reporting requirements, under the QMS fishermen have a much 
more stringent relationship with MFish and other government agencies such as the 
Ministry of Transport  (MOT) than they had previously. Reporting requirements 
are strict and MFish compliance is severe. One fisherman, for example, said he 
was hammered for $400‖. [He'd] always been legal and had only ever had a 
parking ticket but just after [he'd] bought the boat he was fined for taking 
three fish home for his family to eat. There was no warning. They ruled by 
fear. They had too much power - and  ―behaved like storm troopers. … So 
everyone is playing by the rules. If there is a black market around … [he] 
doesn't know about it. No one is saying anything so if there is then they are 
keeping it very close (Informant 21b).  
The QMS had brought a change in fishing culture that affected not only the 
fishermen but also their families and food availability. Loss of 'home freight', a 
regular supply of fresh fish for a healthy diet, meant money was the only tangible 
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compensation for the job's demands on the family and this was generally marginal 
for ACE-dependent fishermen. The QMS had eliminated such non-economic  
'perks' and this was reinforced by stories of what happened in other communities. 
A Coromandel Community Board member told, for example, how at Kawhia (an 
isolated west coast North Island fishing community) a fisherman was heavily 
penalised for eating three dog fish (by catch) when the compliance officer saw the 
frames. Such complexity and accountability fueled animosity toward MFish 
(Boxes: 13,16). 
It was a common refrain in the industry: fishermen, particularly coastal and small-
scale just want to fish. They're not businessmen, they don't want to be filling out 
returns and doing paperwork.  Fishermen agreed that there should be rules: ―There 
have to be rules but they don't have to be over the top‖  (Informant 33).  
Ministry officials do not consider the reporting "a big deal, but recognise that 
fishermen do not share their view and may make the mistake of relying on their 
recollection the following day if they come in tired from fishing‖ (Neil 
McDonald)  
Box 13: MFish Compliance Requirements 
 [The QMS was] probably good for fishermen who understand finance and business and 
can do that … (but) there's other fishermen too. All he wanted to do was fish and the 
paper work trail for some of them was a real stumbling block.  They've come in and 
they've had MAF sitting on the wharf when they come in: ―Oh you haven't filled in your 
book tonight.‖  
―Well it was blowing 30kts and my hands were wet and the paperwork got wet, you 
know.‖  
―Oh not good enough!‖ 
The MAF crowd created a lot of animosity with those sort of tactics (Ian Strongman).  
   For some fishermen reporting and paperwork were more routine:  
I can handle it easy enough. … Yeah, I do the monthly returns on the internet. Only 
because I know they get there and there's a $400 or $500 fine if you don't get it in by the 
15th of the month. Then after, if you don't get it in … it's an $800 fine. … I know heaps 
of guys that have been fined. They don't show any mercy. I think it's just a revenue 
gathering exercise.  If they basically don't keep on top of you … I get it  [inspected] once 
a year - basically once a year  (Informant 20).  
 
In addition to MFish the MOT was also much more involved since the 
introduction of the QMS. Fishing vessels had to pass annual surveys. While these 
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were to ensure safety, fishermen found them onerous both in terms of costs which 
could amount to $30-$40,000 to get a small local boat up to standard and in terms 
of the 'agro' and compulsion involved. Fishermen's perspective was "nobody pays 
you for painting your own boat. If you're not pulling fish out - no pay.  Then there 
is ACE, levies for [he listed several] and payments. … People are too greedy and 
want too much for ACE. They have forgotten what it‘s like to be a fisherman 
(Informal).  Consequently there was considerable animosity toward the Ministry 
of Transport surveyor  
[The surveyor] knows that if we see him first …[all the fishermen] just 
drive off so he's left here on his own. So he generally hides over there by 
the fish factory and waits until the fisherman stops then he drives down. 
He's usually got a raincoat on. Or he walks down and suddenly he'll peel 
his raincoat off and there he is large as life in his white overalls. He's got 
you then (Informant 20).  
The fishermen's resistance, whether from either or both marginal economic 
circumstance or from resentment at being controlled adds to the compliance cost, 
further aggravates the situation. 
Relationships with the Companies 
As the companies had the quota and exported most of their fish there was little 
available for the community and no Coromandel fresh fish shop to sell them 
(although a smoke shop had recently opened, due perhaps to the tourism industry 
and brought most of its fish is fish in from outside the town. The ―Vampire and 
the Gay Dolphin fish for OPC in Whitianga so some of your fish go to Whitianga 
and then get distributed up from OPC‖ (Informant 20).  
The fishermen were prepared to do what was necessary but say: ―the companies 
have got too much monopoly and too much control. It's not a partnership‖. The 
QMS was empowering the companies, not the fishermen and has flow on effects 
for the environment since decisions were driven by short-term economics not 
long-term awareness of marine ecology. With OPC and Moana, for example, 
fishermen felt they had to be careful not to ―rock the boat‖ and keep them happy 
or they'll say: ―OK you can fish elsewhere‖. The fishermen don't have a contract 
so if there's a problem or the fisherman 'sounds off' it's  ―good bye‖ and there's no 
quota. He can't fish so had to get quota from another company but the implication 
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was that there was virtually none available elsewhere. (Coromandel FieldTrip 
2006) 
Since virtually all the quota for lease is in the hands of the corporates, they dictate 
where to fish and what type of fish the fishermen are allowed to catch driving 
some to consider getting out of the fishery altogether (Informant 35 and Informal). 
One fisherman with 30 years as a skipper and an engineer, estimated when 
downtime was considered he gets $5 an hour longlining despite working 
sometimes from 5am to 11pm (Informal).  
Others commented that they were now just getting $1.50 / kg whereas they know 
the companies sell fish for up to $30/kg retail locally and won't say how much 
they get overseas but presumably it was a lot more (Informal). Unlike the more 
openly managed Co-ops of the past, the companies ―keep us pretty much in the 
dark over what they get for fish overseas‖  (Informant 20). Landed price for 
snapper varied. Some fishermen said they got maybe $4.00  (/kg), others $3.50 or 
only $3.00 but they didn't know what the company gets because there was no 
disclosure. They saw the retail price  (maybe as much as $30 / kg for snapper) and 
felt the discrepancy was too high. Company profits and the extra costs of the 
commodity chain meant the cost to the consumer could be ten or more times what 
the fisherman received  (Coromandel Field Trip 2006). 
[We] really feel hurt when they see the price of fish in the 
supermarkets. When we see the gurnard for $8 or 9 or 10 a kilo and 
we're getting like 0.20 or 0.30 or 0.40 cents for it. Really it hurts - eh. 
Because we know we're getting blatantly robbed and nothing we can 
do about it. What they're basically doing is they are  [basically] 
saying that if you don't give us the gurnard - for nothing - then we're 
not going to give you snapper quota. … It's blackmail really. So 
there's not much money in the snapper and there's nothing in the 
gurnard and flounder. It's only the John dory that really pays anything 
and I suspect that they - even - they're most probably robbing us big 
time on that as well. … all the other blokes that I talk to  about it they 
all feel the same way I do. Powerless‖ (Informant 20)!  
Local environmental issues also influenced the options. The tidal nature of the 
Coromandel wharf meant that fishermen had to time berthing and departing right.  
The QMS had perpetuated if not exacerbated the dependence of fishermen on the 
companies  (See:  Stuster 1980).  
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Box 14: Under the Thumb 
When I steam back from Auckland - you know an hour or two hours after the tide and I 
can't get back to the wharf so I've got to sit out there all day until the next tide. That kind 
of thing.  … It's an extra day basically on top of your trip. … That's the reason why I 
changed - why I wanted to fish for OPC - because I could park right here and unload my 
bins straight onto the jetty and slide them across and straight into the truck and it was all 
good but at the end of the day - they were a bit cunning. They took me on when the … 
other boat had broken down but when those other people came back suddenly they said, 
―Oh we don't need any fish off you this week.‖ Then the next week would come, ―Oh 
we've got two seiners already unloading this week. We don't really need any fish off 
you.‖ Then after the third week I told them to get f_____d because I couldn't operate that 
way. So I got on the phone. Actually I got on the phone first to make sure that I could 
still have a placement at Leigh. Here's the other thing that makes it more difficult is that 
the factories don't like you fishing for other people, whether they can accommodate you 
or not. Basically they think they own you. If you start giving fish elsewhere they'll 
threaten to sack you and there's nothing you can really do. You've got to toe the line 
otherwise you've got no quota. … They've got us under the thumb basically (Informant 
20).  
 
In response to my suggestion that fishermen were tied to companies because they 
had their capital in their boats and had to keep earning, one fisherman responded 
[Quota owning companies] control how much we pay for the lease. How 
much lease they'll give us. How much they'll pay us for the fish once it‘s 
caught. When to go out. …  [At the height of summer] … Sometimes they 
even try to tell us what size fish to catch and what colour. …  Sometimes 
they'll even tell you not to go because the market's flooded. Through the 
rest of the year it's not so bad but it‘s probably about three months where 
they dictate the terms 'big time'  (Informant 20).  
LEIGH 
Leigh Fisheries with the fish factory and being by far the biggest employer in the 
town, ensures that Leigh was both a community of place and still very much 
location for a vibrant fisheries community of occupation (See Figures 18, 19, 20). 
Originally, the factory was established and owned by share holder longliners 
(Informant 20). Before the QMS, Leigh Fisheries had been a co-operative. Some 
of the directors were fishermen then and although retired now, still lived locally 
so there were still vestiges of fish tradition and community commitment in an 
otherwise capitalistic enterprise. An informant who had lived on Waiheke and 
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been involved with the Co-op, but now was involved in fishing in Leigh so knew 
both communities suggested:  ―The people up at Leigh Fish might be worth while 
talking to because they look at things as a real community up at Leigh it's very 
tight in that area‖ (Informant 3). 
 
Figure 18: Leigh now (December 2006). Commercial FV converted for charter 
alongside Happy 1, a trawler converted to a longliner. 
Leigh Fishing Fleet: Fishermen‟s perspective 
In the mid 90s ―25 boats work out of Leigh,‖(Leigh Fisheries spokesperson.) In 
the mid-90s I saw 21 in port including Reward and Southwind
113
, mostly 
longliners but one trawler, one Danish seiner and Beverly S gearing up with a big 
monofil reel for surface longlining (Northland Fish Tour). Fishermen then were 
moving into better longliners - purpose built launches Tungsten, for example (See 
Figure 19) and the Torkington brothers each built new fishing boats. The more 
economically successful fishermen were modernising. Probably none of the old 
wooden launches such as used from Waiheke survive commercially. Most fishing 
vessels are purpose built and except for a few vintage enthusiasts (e.g. FV 
Margaret etc) most are steel or fiberglass. 
                                                 
113
  Boats that were in the Viaduct during my Viaduct research. 
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Figure 19: Tungsten, one of the first purpose built, then new, longliners in the 
Viaduct  (1982)  now fishing into Leigh. 
 
Figure 20:Purpose built longliner (middle vessel) in Leigh (1992) 
Unlike Waiheke some fishermen still owned quota and their boats and were 
expanding their operations.  One such fisherman, one of the directors of the 
company, fished both his and also company quota as well (Informant 3). Other, 
particularly younger, fishermen were not so fortunate and one had sold his quota 
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to build a new larger vessel so now leases ACE. With quota he had access. 
Without his own quota, access is controlled by the company.  
But this is not the full story and there are also tensions and conflicts in Leigh. 
Now some of the fishermen were more marginal so the fleet operating out of 
Leigh has declined and Leigh Fisheries has to source fish from much further afield 
(e.g. Coromandel). One boat had been ―up north‖ for 5 weeks and was just back in 
Leigh. The skipper felt there was good fishing up north and a sense of community 
- cooperation and assistance not obvious in Leigh.  ―There is a tall poppy 
syndrome in Leigh so no one likes to get too big. The fishing is not so good here 
at present‖ (Leigh Kliss trip 13-15 December 2006).  
Yet from elsewhere, fishermen from Coromandel, for example, felt that some 
companies, Leigh Fisheries particularly, gave them a better deal, while other 
companies didn't have the capacity to handle all the fish they could land.  Despite 
the extra distance involved, at least one Coromandel fisherman was happy to 
supply Leigh Fisheries. The company had been good - paid a good price and 
talked to the fishermen. All the fishermen had wanted to work for them. Leigh 
Fisheries did well, but he thought they expanded too fast and were now the same 
as the other companies. They didn't pay as well and didn't talk to the fishermen, 
unless they wanted fish on Christmas day; ―They'd ring you up then alright‖ 
(Coromandel Field Trip). 
In Leigh, Greg Hayes said:  
[T]he fishing for Leigh Fisheries has made a difference. Despite the 
unreliability like - I've fished for Sanford's - cut me quota just like that - 
no morality within the industry there - Moana [Moana Pacific] who I've 
fished for - they weren't too bad but I was still very limited [in terms of 
getting quota] on the snapper and the other species. I wasn't getting a good 
price… but I was fortunate to get into Leigh Fisheries… I enjoy it more. 
Leigh keep the other guys fairly honest. They're a good company. I really 
appreciate them.  Best company I've ever fished for by a long shot and 
they say, ―Man that was good fish. Man that was really good. Bring me in 
more like that‖ - you know? They'd tell me it was gorgeous.  
All I've been used to over the years has been abuse [by] fishing 
companies. Now you're telling me the fish is good. Man that delights me 
to hear that. That's wonderful.  I'll go out and get you even better fish, you 
know. To be told and encouraged like that and told you've done a good 
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job. That's Leigh - you know - quite personal. You know they ring us up 
every day (Greg Hayes). 
The relationship with the company may be friendlier and the financial return 
better than from other companies but it is still marginal. In casual conversation a 
fisherman told me:  
Last winter there were only 3 or 4 longliners operating from Leigh - few 
owned quota.  The trawlers and seiners get the same as the longliners - 
they iki jimi if they are still alive and slurry their fish. So longliners no 
longer get a premium. There are theories about longlining. Sanford, for 
example, set 9000 hooks per day from their ‗big boats‘ - but they are only 
doing a few days per week now since the fish aren't there. He on the other 
hand sets only 2,000 /day‖ (Leigh Kliss trip 13-15 December 2006).  
Even so as a result of the QMS the costs of fishing had increased considerably and 
the financial returns decreased 
Trawlers and seiners are improving quality, but still not to that of good longline 
caught snapper.  However, the iki jimi market has suffered from competition by 
Japanese cultured snapper and the market no longer has the same high value 
return. One longliner at least ―couldn't even get crews to run his boats. In the 
wintertime anyway they were tied up because nobody would run them for him. 
There was so little in it‖ (Informant 20).  Leigh's markets include chilled fish 
flown to Australia, Europe and the USA.  
Even before the QMS there were gear conflicts (See Duncan, L 1982). Under the 
QMS, they were to be resolved by market forces rather than it being the 
responsibility of MAF. When the QMS was introduced the official attitude 
seemed to be to leave the mix as previously, leaving it to market forces to resolve. 
In the Gulf, the issue was between the more capital and fuel intensive trawlers 
providing fewer jobs and catching considerably more, but lower quality fish, 
versus the labour intensive longliners catching higher quality fish, with the Danish 
seiners occupying an intermediate position. Now, even with the QMS there are, 
however, still gear conflicts, especially between trawlers and longliners (See Box 
15).  
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Box 15: Conflicts Between Trawlers and Longliners 
The wife of a fisherman and café owner, Sarah Davies said:  
It's hard, I think, particularly with the quota holders and the way fisheries are being run 
now. I think they're just trying to push out the smaller boats and get the ‗big boats‘ back  
in there  basically … the trawlers and things which are wiping out everything. We sit and 
watch them and they'd be right in Mathieson's Bay [just south of Leigh]. They're right in 
close - they shouldn't be allowed in there. And then you can go out on your longliner and 
set a line one day get 15 or 20 bins - go there the next day and get 2 bins because you see 
that the seine boats go there.  
They shouldn't be allowed in that close but I think that's what the Fisheries want now 
because they hold more of the quota than anybody else. For us to buy quota it‘s just 
ridiculous - unless you've got a spare $100,000 or whatever it is - who has these days? 
(Sarah Davis). 
 
Crew 
In contrast to the generally depressing situation at Coromandel, fishermen in 
Leigh were more optimistic about the future. One young deckie, not long out of 
school, told me that he had been working on a dairy farm and earned in 14 days 
what he gets for four days fishing and the fishing was much more interesting. 
Even so finding good crew was an ongoing problem. ―Of course and keeping 
them. It's an art in what they're doing,‖ (Greg Bishop). Girlfriends or wives 
certainly helped as relationships developed or larger economic opportunities 
beckoned.  
It meant that there were opportunities for youth who were keen but even then 
often it didn't work out since sea conditions, the routines and the reality of 
commercial fishing were not always what aspirants from non-fishing families 
imagined. While the economics worked for some, the uncertainties and reduced 
share meant fewer were attracted. 
Peter Stevens, former secretary of the Federation, from a national perspective in 
referring to the issue of companies wanting to use foreign crew provided the 
context: 
They [companies] just can't get Kiwis. They are scared to advertise in the 
papers because someone comes along and they won't take him because 
they're lazy, drunk, doped out or just bloody mindless - they end up in 
trouble because they won't employ them. So they won't take that risk. 
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Anyone that WINZ
114
 sends is useless. They only go for the job because if 
they don't go they don't get the dole. They don't want you to employ them. 
They want you to sign: ―Sorry I can't employ you‖ They want that to 
happen so they can go back to WINZ and say, ―Sorry I can't get a job‖ so 
they could stay on the dole. No one's interested - that's a fact (Peter 
Stevens). 
Leigh: Reporting 
Like elsewhere the paperwork generated by the QMS is an issue. Every step in the 
production chain, every transaction has it‘s paper work and opportunities for 
control. At Leigh, for example, when boats unload they exchange dockets with the 
truck driver. The usual procedure seemed to be that the truck driver would lower a 
stack of empty bins and lids onto the deck, then hoist the full bins and the 
exchange dockets. A former fisherman now driving for Leigh Fisheries said,  ―we 
give them 30 [bins for fish] - that's what the bin limit [the amount the company 
will let them land] is at the moment. We give them 30 empty and whatever bait 
and pass the docket‖ (Informant 42). It was the same for the fishermen.  
MFish hold everyone in fear … I cover everything all the time - crossing 
the 'T's' and dot my 'I's' sort of thing so I don't have a hassle but ... there's so 
many things to remember and when you're tired! You know - it's hard to 
remember everything … It‘s not just MAF, it's the Maritime Safety and all 
the safe things you've got to do and compliance everywhere - it's ridiculous. 
So you know you have to be fairly astute to cover all those things and still 
be a fisherman. … So … you've got to be fairly professional sort of person 
these days to remain in the industry (Greg Hayes).  
 Other fishermen I have spoken with from around the country have expressed the 
same view with the same vehemence (See also: Box 16).  
 
Box 16: Reporting 
As reported by Anne Beston, Chris Matich, a 48 year old Kaipara fisherman from Ruawai 
was so frustrated by new MFish reporting requirements that he was intending to get out of 
fishing.  ―Generations of his family have fished from Ruawai at the river mouth. … By 
the time he was eight he was running nets out from his father's boat, and by 14 he was 
fishing down as far as Port Albert. Today he was up at 4am. His brother's going out again 
                                                 
114
  Work and Income New Zealand (WINZ), the government social welfare 
department. 
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tonight but he stayed home to mow the lawns and think about moving to Australia. He 
wants to pack it in. Bureaucratic red tape is killing the business for independent operators 
like him.  
―You can't just be a fisherman any more, you have to be an accountant, a lawyer, 
everything.  My wife would leave tomorrow but it's hard to get out, I'll get almost nothing 
for the money I've   invested.‖ Once he would have missed the family too much, his 
parents, brothers and cousins scattered throughout the town. ―But in the last year or two 
I've started to get bitter. Three weeks ago we got new books to fill in, you have to say 
what time you put the first anchor out, what time you put the last one in and what the 
weather was like at the time. Every single thing.‖  The average age of a fisherman now is 
50, he says. ―I haven't heard of anyone taking it on‖  (Beston 2007). 
 
FLEET 
Although not pursued in detail, many informants spoke of their own boat, or 
particular vessels in the fleet, with considerable affection. It was like my own 
experience with recreational boaties where there was almost a familial 
relationship. These particular boats were not just tools of the trade or means of 
production. They had, valued design features and histories; seemed to have their 
own personalities and idiosyncrasies so were a source of aesthetic appreciation 
and even emotional satisfaction. This was by no means universal as, particularly 
during the Viaduct Research, many informants regarded their boats, like a 
farmer‘s ute115, just means to facilitate their occupation. Indeed, I even heard 
fishermen use terms of approbium for their boat. For many, such as the ―new part-
timers‖, the QMS will not have altered the relationship. For other, more marginal 
fishermen, like the additional strain on a marriage, the additional expenses make 
the relationship with the boat tougher. 
The cost of ACE has squeezed fishermen's finances and this impacts, often 
severely on their ability to lavish attention, or even keep up the maintenance on 
their boats. As Ingram
116
 states, ―unless you own quota it's hard to make a buck‖. 
He noted that in January (2008) ―the wharf price for bulk green snapper in 
Auckland was around [NZ]$4 to $4.20 per kilo. The ACE price was $2 to $2.20 
                                                 
115
  Utility vehicle 
116
  Editor of Professional Skipper, industry observer and recreational fishing 
advocate. 
264 
 
per kilo, effectively giving the fisherman $2, out of which he had to go and catch 
the fish, pay fuel at $1.26 per kilo, and repair and maintain his boat. … And yet 
the housewife was paying nearly $30 a kilo for skinned and boned snapper in the 
shops‖. By mid-April the wharf price had increased to  $7.50 per kilo but the ACE 
price also increased to $5.50 per kilo (Ingram 2008 19). Consequently ACE-
dependent fishermen are struggling to maintain their boats. They are having to 
seek alternative livelihoods.  
Since the QMS there has been a considerable reduction in the coastal fleet and 
concomitantly the number of fishermen. Consultants Coriolis note that in the 
period 1985-2004 ―the number of fishing boats declined by 1,191‖  (Coriolis 2005 
12). This has happened partly by attrition. At least one of my informants saw his 
boat's failing Maritime Safety Survey as inevitable since his operation wasn't 
paying sufficient to maintain it at the mandatory standard. As fishermen sold their 
quota the effect has been fewer boats in the coastal fleet and few new additions. 
As Peter Stevens said ―No boats have been built in the last 10-15 years. The only 
ones that have been built are being built by boat yards because they've got nothing 
for the staff to do so they are building boats hoping to sell it‖ (Peter Stevens). 
Ingram (2004 4-9) however, reviewed one new build and the trade journals note a 
few others but the fleet is generally aging.  
Ingram expanded:  
When we look around the current fleet we see tired and inefficient ships 
by modern standards.  … With this fleet approaching some 30 years 
comes the cost of increased maintenance, higher fuel consumption and 
compliance costs. Most of these vessels suffer from decreased engine 
horse-power, cramped and often damp uncomfortable crew working 
conditions, tired deck machinery and dated fish handling and storage 
facilities. While we recognise the dilemma associated with these aged 
vessels, we have seen very few modern trawlers specifically built for 
inshore fishing within the last 10 to 15 years‖ (Ingram 2004 4). 
Certainly the old converted launches that were the bulk of the longline fleet in the 
Hauraki Gulf have gone. Even the boats based at (or near) Leigh are newer 
purpose-built launches and at least one was launched quite recently. One of the 
few new purpose-designed and built longliners I saw during my Viaduct research 
Tungsten is now operating into Leigh. The state of some of the boats at 
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Coromandel, however, support Ingram's views (See Table 3. for trends in vessel 
numbers in the ports studied). 
 
 1980 Pre-  
QMS* 
Early 1990s* Now (2006-7) 
Waiheke 36  17 0 
Coromandel  49 18 8 
Leigh  18 20 18 
Table 3. Estimates of Vessel Numbers in Case Study Ports 
Notes: Source: 1980 and Now from research notes and informants. ―Pre-QMS‖ 
and ―Early 1990s‖ from undated databases. 
As the boats become unseaworthy and the fishermen go bankrupt, the question is:  
how will the companies catch their fish? One suggestion is that the big companies 
are increasingly focusing on the deepwater on the one hand and aquaculture on the 
other. This might create ―space‖ biophysically and socio-politically for 
recreational fishers. Alternatively, as may be happening, New Zealand Companies 
may also use bigger vessels built, bought or chartered for the deepwater fisheries 
on the coast (See Dixon 2009 9 and Letters to the Editor same issue, 30). 
Inevitably, there will be increased gear conflicts as trawlers come inshore at the 
expense of recreational fishers and longliners, or they will have to fish further 
afield around the coast.  
CHARTER FISHING 
After World War when the fairmilies
117
 and large charter boats operated, ―You 
used to get the bigger boats taking people out and there might be 50 people on it. 
... They were charter boats and big ones from Auckland and they used to go out 
and they used to get off and sell them from the wharf when they got in and so on 
and all that sort of thing. But it‘s all changed now. … the fishing is getting better. 
It can‘t help but get better. I‘m glad they pushed the ‗big boats‘ out because that 
was ruining fish. …‖ (Informant 5). 
                                                 
117
  A class of ex-naval patrol vessels many of which were converted after World 
War 2 for civilian use. 
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Even before the introduction of the QMS there were clashes between charter
118
 
and commercial fishermen. The Gulf News (24 October 1980 31, 32) reported that 
Mr John Appleton, an Auckland charter boat operator asserted: ―Commercial 
fishermen are 'raping' the Hauraki Gulf and slowly destroying an area that has the 
potential of becoming New Zealand's top tourist attraction.‖  He claimed: ―a fish 
caught by a tourist from a boat is worth hundreds of dollars more to New Zealand 
than a fish commercially caught and sold through the export markets in Japan".  
Commercial fishermen, however, believed charter fishermen should have to 
comply with the regulations and reporting regime they did rather than the 
recreational requirements since they were a commercial operation and also adding 
pressure on the fish stocks in the Hauraki Gulf.  
By the mid 1990s virtually all the quota on Waiheke had been sold. The last few 
quota owners became charter fishermen (Cox 2001) mainly taking clients around 
the coast inshore. Charter fishing was one of the few livelihoods available that 
enabled them to utilise their ecological knowledge, understanding of the species, 
skills and experience of boat handling, the marine environment in general and the 
Hauraki Gulf in particular. It was the only livelihood available that offered the 
satisfactions of 'freedom' and working in the marine environment that had 
attracted many into commercial fishing in the first place. The only other 
occupation that didn't involve significant absences from family and community 
was aquaculture. 
Some, including many commercial fishermen, argue that charter fishing 
operations should have quota since they are utilising the same fish species and 
commercial fishermen. Their opposition contend that the clients are recreational 
fishers exercising their entitlements and the charter operation is not fishing but 
providing a service, the boat, gear and expertise (Rennie et al 2007 467) 
A random sample of charter boat companies gives an indication of the number in 
the Hauraki Gulf.  The September 2007 edition of the popular fishing magazine 
New Zealand Fishing News has 57 classified advertisements for Charter fishing 
                                                 
118
  Charter fishermen are those who use their boats and possibly gear to take 
individuals or parties recreational fishing. 
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companies operating from ports within the Hauraki Gulf, most with only one boat 
but a few had two. None of the boats shown were the old style of longliners used 
by the Waiheke fishermen. Only one still carried a commercial fishing registration 
number, a couple appeared to be conversions from the older Danish seine or 
trawlers although a few were the same style as the newer aluminium, planing 
deepwater longliners.  
The two of the three charter operators from Waiheke were not listed and there 
were none from Thames so this number is at best only an indication of the 
popularity of charter fishing and the number of boats involved
119
. 
In contrast to the earlier experience of Waiheke fishermen, the QMS is credited as 
resulting in more fish for charter fishers (Cox 2001 5). Like many of the previous 
commercial fishing operations charter fishing provides work for the skippers' 
wives. With the possible exception of Doolittle Charters, the fishermen's wives 
run the ―on shore part of the operation‖ (Cox 2001 6), taking bookings and 
organising web pages. 
One of those commercial fishermen who took up chartering provided perspective:  
The fishing in between before the quota system was introduced and the 
fishing today is that it only benefits one person - one ... [industry] - really 
and that's the growth of tourism.  It's a hot tourism thing for catching fish. 
The commercial fishing sector's gone by the board. Probably more 
money's being made out of doing tourism than doing fishing - than is in 
the catching power of fish commercially, maybe.  
I only need to catch nine fish per person per day (Recreational fish limits) 
instead of 100 a night sort of thing, you know. So that's better. As far as 
my business goes those nine fish can be selected per person. So we have a 
standard length of fish to take on board the boat if the fishing's hard. Apart 
from that they're all pretty good-sized fish. So we can select and put them 
back in the water quickly so there's less fish coming out of the water.  ... 
I'm actually catching more fish on my charters than I am commercial 
fishing because I'm allowed to. I'm allowed to - that's the silly thing 
(Informant 7). 
He advertised locally and most of his clientele were New Zealanders, some of 
them regulars whose emphasis is on getting together with the 'boys' (Informant 7). 
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  See also Rennie et al 2007 on problems of gathering data for the charter fleet 
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Another charter fisherman spoke of the satisfactions of still working on the water 
and facilitating necessary nutrition:  
It's endlessly fascinating, you know, to me anyway, yeah. And I get a 
satisfaction out of ...  getting a few fish for people, taking people out. 
When I was fishing I used to think it was providing fish, providing food 
for people. It's a good thing to do. Yes. I still think (that) when I take 
people out because they are mostly [Pacific] Islanders. Their main diet is 
fish so I still think it‘s good when they eat fish because they've got food to 
take home and put on the table for their families, you know … they're … 
mostly from South Auckland, they're on fairly low wages and, ah, the 
Islanders' diet's totally different from ours. We eat a lot of meat. You've 
just got to scrub the meat from their diet and substitute fish because that's 
what they like. They'll eat fish all the time (Informant 1). 
By comparison with the very early days when the fairmilies and large charter 
boats operated, he felt ―the fishing is getting better. It can't help but get better. I'm 
glad they pushed the big boats out because that was ruining fish. … You used to 
get the bigger boats taking people out and there might be 50 people on it. ... They 
were charter boats and big ones from Auckland and they used to go out and they 
used to get off and sell them from the wharf when they got in and so on and all 
that sort of thing. But it's all changed now‖ (Informant 5). Chartering now? 
Everybody goes out and when they are chartering like my son. There's two 
of them on the island doing chartering work. And they are limited. They are 
only allowed so many fish per person … they can't go out and flog the 
(resource) - which is good.  I reckon that recreation fishing is … good for 
that, so it must be getting better! There's more people coming. More boats 
certainly (Informant 5).  
A retired Fisheries Officer summed up the big picture for Waiheke:   
Like it‘s created a little mini industry -chartering - taking people out 
fishing, to get their own fresh fish, to do the whole experience so to speak. 
… Of course that's one of the attractions of coming to Waiheke - surely - 
is just to see if you can go out fishing. You just need to look at the boat 
ramps now and there's certainly quite a few (recreational boats) going out 
and these hire boats out of Matiatia and other places. They're always 
chocka and they always seem to be bringing fish in. The amateur situation 
right throughout fisheries has been quite dramatic. I think when we 
actually got down to the nitty gritty in the Bay of Plenty it was found that 
with the quota system in place that in the Bay of Plenty alone there was 
800 tonne of snapper caught by amateurs. Now that's a lot of fish (Bill 
Dumpleton).   
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RECREATIONAL FISHING 
A former Federation fisherman viewing recreational fishing on a national basis, 
felt that many people became avid supporters of recreational fishermen because 
they felt they were denied some sort of right by the QMS. As a result they've 
become a force to be reckoned with and the drivers
120
 of that movement are as 
commercial as any commercial fisherman‖ (Informant 14). While some consider 
the QMS has improved the availability of fish for recreational fishing  (Todd 
Silvester, MFish, pers com May 2006, Informant 8), the commercial fishermen 
argue that recreational should also be paying for their utilization of marine 
resources. 
Likewise commercial fishermen also argue that recreational fishers should be 
paying for their utilization of marine resources. Recreational fishing allows those 
passionate fishermen who sold their quota to still have access to fishing 
(Informants 10, 26) and they consider this could be a considerable amount of fish. 
Very roughly to estimate his household's fishing one recreational fisher argued: 
4X9s are 36 (fish caught) plus in between. If we know that this house has 
fished 36-40 fish in the last 2 months that's say in 80 days it's fished it's 
taken a fish every second day. This household - one household in one 
street - what the hell's the island fishing?  So that's let‘s say - at that rate 
this household is pulling 180 fish say 180Kg per household (Informant 
46). 
The feeling is that with the commercial boats no longer round the island there is 
more and easier fish for recreational fishers (Informant 15). It is not 
too much trouble catching fish - like if I want to catch fish for myself I can 
usually go  out and  catch a couple of fish and not come home empty 
handed although there are  times when  obviously … you come home with 
nothing (Informant 15). 
The harbour and marine farms in Corormandel provide alternative opportunities 
for charter fishermen. The increase in aquaculture since the QMS was introduced, 
offers 'mussel farm fishing' a form not as readily available from Waiheke. In 
addition to the typical charter boats barges similar to those that service the mussel 
farms take larger parties fishing around these marine farms. 
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  He was referring to manufacturers and suppliers of a considerable variety of gear 
and support. 
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Long time residents claim that holiday fishers have given the northern parts of the 
Peninsula a particularly high level of fishing pressure, resulting in waste as they 
cannot even give fish away.  
At Wyuna Bay, Coromandel Harbour, there have been significant changes in 
recreational fishing moving from rowing boats in each household to the current 
(2006) situation of ―at least two huge enormous launch fizzboats … rigged with 
great trolling rods‖ with a significant increase in fishing power in the holiday 
community (Informant 22a). Another informant familiar with the Colville area 
commented ―The fishing competitions are just devastating. I think they are a 
lovely concept but we might have to breed fish for those‖ (Informant 2). 
One former Coromandel commercial fisherman sold most of his quota because of 
his constant uncertainty of further quota cuts and established a mussel farm where 
fish were easy to catch from the charter boats. When they are working the 
(mussel) ropes the sea is red with snapper after the little black mussels. That is a 
problem for him but good for the recreational fishers on the (charter) fishing 
barges. He likes to see that because they keep the snapper population down - if 
each take their allowance of nine snapper with 10 - 15 fishers per barge - that 
helps him (Informant 33). But others are concerned about the effects of local 
fishing (See Box 17). 
 
Box 17: Recreational Fishing 
I am now 50+ and most of my life I've spent sitting on the rocks fishing - well (in) spare 
time and fishing for food - for fish to eat. Over the years I've found it's got harder and 
harder to catch fish off the rocks. Basically now you've got to get a boat and go out. 
Coromandel has the mussel farms that have brought a fair few snapper around but then 
you get the barges that take out lots of fishing groups – back-to-back groups - who also 
get a lot of fish. There's about - I don't know how many people go on the barge - maybe 
15 - 20 and when they are all bringing in 9 fish each it‘s quite a large amount of fish. It's 
quite patchy in Coromandel where I now live. We go out sometimes [by boat] and you've 
really got to search around the farms to find fish. You know - you can't just guarantee 
you can go out there and fish - catch a fish now. The chances on a boat are greater than 
off the rocks but you've got to move round a lot to go from farm to farm  (Sandra 
Watson).  
Well the very [Fisheries] Act itself … [where] the Minister decides basically how much 
to allocate and then divides it up so straight away there's competition between traditional 
fishing, recreational fishing and commercial fishing. Commercial fishing you've got 
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property rights.  Māori fishing seem to have traditional rights and recreational fishing just 
have a bloody strong argument and probably it will be translated into some form of  
[legislated] rights. … To protect themselves they simply talk down the TAC. Talk it 
down, just talk it down while the fishing industry tries to talk it up. … Nothing to do with 
looking after fish, I might say (Informant 14).  
So under the QMS there is less recreational fish for local people and catching what there 
is requires a more expensive, more mechanised operation. Fish for subsistence is not so 
readily available.  
 
A mix of charter fishing boats operate from Leigh, Sandspit and Mangawhai, 
ports in the vicinity, offering overnight or longer trips out to the islands, Little and 
Great Barrier, Cuvier, Mercury, Mokuhinaus or the 'Hen and Chicks' or even 
further afield to the Three Kings with parties ranging from three or four to as 
many as ten. These were not explored in this research, since the commercial fleet 
was still of considerable scale compared with the other two communities studied. 
They probably offer a similar experience to that from Waiheke and Coromandel 
with the additional opportunity of deeper water fishing. 
COMPANIES: LEIGH FISHERIES 
Of the three, Leigh is the community studied here where there is still a fishing 
company operating (See Figure 21). Leigh Fisheries would be the ―largest private 
company left … involved in the snapper fishery if you take out Moana and 
Sanford though, the quota they own and control would probably be more than 
those two companies‖ (Informant 3)  
Market New Zealand‘s (n.d.) Company Overview states Leigh Fisheries, under 
the brand name Lee Fish airfreights premium NZ seafood species daily to 
overseas markets serviced through subsidiaries in America (Lee Fish USA) and 
Europe (Lee Fish Europe).  
Leigh Fisheries does not own its own boats. Instead it has around 87 
contract boats, primarily long-line day boats that fish on its behalf. The 
livelihood of these independent fishermen depends upon the quality of 
their product - that is, they don't get paid unless the catch is top quality. … 
caught to order so there's no waste and juvenile and older fish are avoided. 
[The company relies] on excellent relationships and communication 
between … the fishers, factory workers, truck drivers, freight forwarders, 
airlines, importers, customs agents and clients (Market New Zealand). 
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Even so fleet numbers have declined rapidly compared with 71
121
 contract boats 
supplying the company in 2005 (Seafood NZ 2005 17), they were ―down to about 
18 out there [Leigh] … (but) I‘ve got 100 boats out there fishing around New 
Zealand.‖ (Greg Bishop Leigh Fisheries CEO).  Northcote (2005) indicates even 
with a company as concerned for their fishermen and their employees as Leigh 
Fisheries, it is difficult for the fisherman:  
The challenges faced by fishers that contract to Leigh will mean that many 
of them will have to decide whether they want in or out of the business. If 
they stay, Greg [Bishop] says, they'll need to get bigger. ‗In 1986 they 
could quite comfortably catch 20 tonne a year and live the life of Riley, 
today they have to catch 100 tonne a year.‘ Dave Moore has been working 
with Leigh for almost 25 years, as a longline fisher and more recently 
coordinating … [three] boats, mainly targeting snapper and a mix of other 
inshore species. He thinks it's as tough in the industry now as it's ever 
been. ‗My fishers and I have seen drops in income. It's a bit of a catch 22, 
you can try to increase volumes to maintain your income but you've got to 
put in more effort for the same money at the end. We have lost relativity‘ 
(Northcote 2005 15). 
The company started about 1957
122
 with 90 per cent of the fish caught by Leigh 
fishermen. It got into the chilled fish around about 1980 exporting predominantly 
iki snapper to Japan but when the QMS was introduced in 1986 because Leigh 
Fisheries was a pack house it didn't received quota. Like other New Zealand 
fishing companies it realised that to ensure access to fish it needed quota and 
therefore acquired all it could and tendered for orange roughy quota that was then 
exchanged with Sanford for snapper quota. Subsequently Leigh Fisheries acquired 
450 tonne of snapper quota. In addition to quota Leigh Fisheries is approximately 
worth about $50 million dollars (Greg Bishop Leigh Fisheries CEO).  
                                                 
121
  Estimates of boat numbers fluctuate widely. 
122
  Leigh Fisheries was incorporated 06 Feb 1958, now has 3 CEOs including Greg 
Bishop and many but not all shareholders live in the vicinity of Leigh or have names with 
long association in the district. New Zealand Companies Register, 
http://www.business.govt.nz/companies/app/ui/pages/companies/56407 (Accessed 19 
September 2010).  Company composition and structure is generally outside this research 
but see Titchener (1981) and Rees (2004; 2006) for details of Sanford, the largest Hauraki 
Gulf fishing company.
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Figure 21: Leigh Fisheries 
In 1995, most Leigh fishermen owned their own quota  (Northland Tour). Leigh 
Fisheries is still the major employer in the town and most households were 
connected directly or indirectly to the company so it means Leigh is a company 
town. Yarwood (2000) asserted  ―one in five of the fishing village's population‖ 
were employed by Leigh Fisheries about 30 people filleting, sorting and packing 
(Lee Fish Europe AG). In turn the Leigh Fisheries acknowledges its role in the 
community. ―We are the work force of Leigh. … for Leigh itself, I  have about 33 
staff. On top of that there's contracted 10 truck drivers... all the fishermen and all 
their skippers and all their crews [about 60 fishermen on 30 boats]‖ (Greg 
Bishop).  
It meant that since the companies, and especially the corporates, bought up 
virtually all the quota fishermen became dependent on and obligated to quota 
owners. The companies had to match quota ownership to their markets and 
therefore market requirements rather than seasonal availability had strong 
influence on fishing. They therefore said they "farmed" the Gulf by imposing such 
restrictions as bin limits fish when appropriate for export market, and, sometimes 
notoriously, told fishermen where to fish and what sizes the market required. Thus 
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under the QMS fishing became driven by international market requirements than 
by seasonal, species, marine and climatic conditions. 
As a smaller "community company" with limited quota Leigh Fisheries had to 
maximise returns by maintaining top quality, niche marketing through 
relationships with key companies in the international market; hence the evolution 
of the Lee Group. 'Branding'; getting an identity for the product was part of that. 
The Waiheke Co-op had used the same strategy aiming to become recognised to 
the extent they could personalize the transaction by putting the name of the 
fisherman and the boat from which it was caught on the packaging. Leigh 
Fisheries strategy was to get more quota when possible and leverage the local 
pride in the product and company:  
'Wild fish and natural' - is our catch phrase and we've trademarked the 
name. We're very proud but…. Leigh's Archiles heel is quota. … I wish 
Sanford, Aotearoa or these guys would buy Leigh Fisheries but leave it 
like it is to give it access to their quota which they waste. If we had … 
[their] quota base …just for the inshore, the company would make more 
money, the fishermen would make more money, the shareholders would 
make more money. …. Sanford  …got the quota because they were using 
their own boats and stuff. So really there's no real reason why Leigh 
[Fisheries] should be here …  but no one can touch us.  
I tried to put Leigh out of business when I was with Fletchers. I came up 
here with trucks and took some boats. I was down at the wharf and the 
manager here back in the 80s said: ―I'll shoot you if I see you again.‖ 
Why?  Now that I'm here I understand.  No one can touch Leigh because 
of the pride, the passion to do the job (Greg Bishop).  
He attributed this to an egalitarian ethos where the CEO could work and process 
with the staff until both recognised the expertise of the other.  
I always believe I must earn … [their] respect first and to get the support. 
… so my  door's  always open. … If I had the door closed they wouldn't 
ask - it‘s not that they can't do the job but it's fantastic to know that if they 
see something wrong with the quality, if they're putting fish somewhere 
else that they'll ask. … It's important the people here are 'family' with the 
boats - some of them.  
If we get a new boat that boat must unload and all its crew and owner 
must walk through with the fish. Not so that we can show them the quality 
but all my staff, instead of identifying with a boat number say, ―Ah that's 
… [name] from the … [vessel]. … I had a beer with him. He's a good guy.  
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            It's not about putting fish in a box and sending it. … We work with people. 
We find the right people. ... we're at the arse end of the world ... so find 
and recruited enthusiastic and passionate local managers in the countries 
where they are marketing (Greg Bishop). 
The company's promotion told the personal story of the commodity chain since  
[Snapper is] everywhere. Snapper is the wrong name. It's not even a 
snapper. So to market the fish overseas you have to be competitive. You 
have to be consistent and you have to have quality and so we were going 
into new markets and competing with other people's product and nine 
times out of ten you're competing with price so what we've done is - we've 
set up our own companies in Europe and in the States where we have 
direct access to markets. 
To gain and maintain their market Leigh Fisheries has diversified their supply and 
now get fish from Nelson in the south to Houhora in the north. Under the 
restrictions of the QMS and with the opportunities of globalization Leigh 
Fisheries has expanded from one local company to the internationalised Lee Fish 
Group with companies both in New Zealand, Leigh Fisheries at Leigh, Lee 
Lobster and Associates, at Auckland International Airport and Priority Fresh, an 
International Freight company specialising in temperature sensitive perishables. 
Overseas, the product is distributed by Lee Fish Europe Ag in Switzerland to 
Europe and UK supermarkets, by Lee Fish USA in Los Angeles and there are new 
operations in the Manila, Jakarta and now Ho Chi Min (Viet Nam) and also the 
Maldives. (Market New Zealand; Lee Fish Group DVD:  Lee Fish Group Ag).  
Under the tighter Quota restrictions on catch volume, fishermen and companies 
are no longer able to earn more by catching more. They therefore have to improve 
quality and add value through branding and niche marketing. Leigh Fisheries 
strategy has been to ensure supply by imposing bin limits to optimise their use of 
quota to fit the market, improve quality through better handling and efficient 
processing by utilising local feeling and relationships by fostering an ethos  of 
community participation both with factory staff and fishermen. By branding what 
would otherwise be a ubiquitous product (snapper) then having it marketed by 
companies run by personally picked enthusiasts the Lee fish group claims to 
maintain the feeling of personal community relations while gaining the greater 
profits of the international market. 
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With its international structure and contemporary business practices as a result of 
globalisation and the QMS, Leigh Fisheries is a corporate, as considered in this 
dissertation. It is also, however, concerned for employment and its role in the 
local community. The priorities of the export market and LFR obligations, 
however, militate against its meeting the nutritional requirements of local 
residents and visitors and therefore it‘s being a ―full‖ community company. 
FAMILIES 
Although fishing families now are probably much as they were, under the QMS 
the internal dynamics must fit a tighter regulatory regime and the costs of more 
expensive levies, more controlled catch and landing schedules, more stringent 
vessel survey requirements and, if the wife keeps the books much more 
demanding accounting.  
For Greg Hayes, who is still fishing and his wife Michaela, herself a daughter of 
an extensive fishing family, their three sons and their sons' friends are often crew. 
While the oldest is now crewing different boats, the younger two are ―not too bad. 
They're all good really. I mean I'm really happy to take those two out there - runs 
really well - know exactly what they're doing.  They're quite smart‖  (Greg 
Hayes). 
Despite being in the same family each of the members had different attitudes and 
abilities to the sea and the job. As Michaela said: 
You [Greg] miss the sea and … [Oldest son][- when he's on land he misses 
the sea.  He heads out there all the time. He just needs to go to sea. It's like 
a drug and they need to go and do it. It's not as though they're great in the 
water. I mean I love being in the water. Greg can't stand being in the water 
- he's got to be on top of the water and likewise … [oldest son], he's the 
same. Whereas …  [the other two] who are not the fishermen, love being in 
the water. 
For youth dreaming of becoming commercial fishermen being part of a fishing 
family could assist.  Although:  
If you're encumbered with too much debt - it will be difficult for anyone 
coming into the game.  Whereas with (oldest son), he's quite blessed in 
that he can  - if he proves to us that he can take over the boat - then one 
day it will happen so he will walk into  an established business.  They can 
still do it with their boats  (Michaela).  
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Given the interest and aptitude it is still possible for sons and, more so now than 
previously, for daughters, to succeed to their father's occupation. Skippers 
(especially younger) who fished before the QMS could now have children 
reaching 'skipper' age but the additional need for funds to buy quota or ACE 
means it is that much harder for children to take over the family operation.  
Just as before there were strains on relationships. Indeed the QMS provided new 
opportunities and new difficulties. Some informants gave the impression that 
being a family fisherman was easier before the QMS.  
Well it was easier because you could make more money quicker and so 
you could still spend time at home. I mean, I was in that position then and 
I … paid off a boat in a year. The first steel boat I had. I paid that off 
because I got stuck in, worked hard, catch as much fish as you wanted and 
now with the return - unless you are in a freehold position. If you have 
kids and stuff it would be terrible (now) because when the weather's right 
you'd have to go for a week at a time and that's not fair on them.  You may 
as well not be married. As I say you may as well sell your family before 
you go to sea because you won't have one when you get back, same as the 
tuna. It can be a very selfish thing, fishing, if you're not careful  (Greg 
Hayes). 
Aware of this situation Greg Hayes was doing trips of two or three days rather 
than seven or eight. Essentially he had become a new part-timer (See: New Part-
timers page 307) because:  
I've engineered it like that you see. I look at it intelligently and say, ―What 
can the family handle?  And what will leave me not too worn out that can't 
give them time.‖  So as I say to the company ―I'm only really a part-time 
fisherman. … I do this because I see it's important to spend that time with 
the family so  - yeah I go on a Sunday so I have the weekend here. I mean 
that's a luxury that a lot of fishermen who are trying to pay off a boat and 
a house and stuff couldn't afford. Otherwise [it's] very strenuous on the 
family‖ (Greg Hayes).  
Otherwise a lot of relationships break up because of the strains of the fishing 
occupation, with absences from home, the demands of boat maintenance.    
Oh heck yeah. The love affair with the boat becomes greater than with the 
family and with the wife and that is something … I've seen that and I work 
around it. All of these things are part of the whole equation and that's why 
I could have gone tuna longlining years ago (but didn't) when there was 
money in it  (Greg Hayes).  
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Quite apart from the changes in the fishing regime the QMS had implications for 
families. The prospect of large sums of money from selling quota opened 
opportunities that they hadn't had to consider previously and in some cases led to 
marriage dissolution. Quota then became part of the property settlement as Greg 
Hayes explains in relation to an earlier relationship  
Oh well I had to sell out (quota), half anyway, because of what I was 
allocated.  What I was left didn't seem like enough. My wife back then 
left, that virtually took the half that I had allocated to me then in paying 
her out.  So what I had then didn't seem enough to survive on - not 
knowing how things were going (Greg Hayes).  
If quota had not been available for the settlement and the couple could not reach 
agreement between themselves, then some 50 per cent of assets under the 
provisions of the Matrimonial Settlement Act would have applied. 
COMMUNITIES 
Under the QMS and globalization the international market seems most compelling 
for the corporates and therefore most of the catch is exported. Consequently fresh 
and especially locally caught commercial fish has been diverted from all these 
Hauraki Gulf communities. 
Fresh fish can be regarded from alternative perspectives; the length of time out of 
the water before it reaches the customer, secondly the distance and number of 
steps, the ease and consistency, in the commodity chain and thirdly the 
implications for community identity. Retailers appreciate the second. One 
informant felt the system worked well from a retailer‘s perspective as he only had 
to deal with his purchasing agents rather than several irregular fishermen. Island 
residents have a different perspective. 
Waiheke 
Virtually all the quota on Waiheke had been sold and generally fish sold through 
restaurants, island wholesale or retail outlets is bought from a range of Auckland 
suppliers, purchasing agents and the Auckland fish market and shipped over on 
the ferries (Nat Upchurch, Informant 23, Gulf Island Foods).  Informants were in 
complete agreement on the demand for fresh fish and the belief that there would 
be a bigger local market, especially for tourists, if the product was caught and 
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landed by Waiheke fishermen direct to the Island. Snapper currently sells at 
relatively high price due to the costs of transportation and middlemen.   
Waiheke Sentiments 
There is considerable concern on the island that the QMS has meant that fresh 
locally caught fish is not available. Fish had been intrinsic to Waiheke's identity as 
an island and part of basic nutrition. One senior fisherman: ―I don't know why 
they can't - why they can't let us have fish on the island and everybody fishing. 
They had to send it to Auckland and they get it back second hand‖ (Informant 5). 
A former fisherman, food Co-op organiser and fruit and vegetable seller observed 
that:  
[T]he result of … [the QMS] is  - that a community like this - surrounded 
by sea can't  even get  fresh fish. … The community just does not have 
that good quality food. …  What is so popular now … is the local produce. 
Where ever you go in New Zealand or overseas, … people want the local 
produce, whether it be vegetable or whatever. It is so much promoted! 
Isn't it?  - local produce (Informants 6). 
The very sad thing is that you've got an island surrounded by ocean and 
people cannot buy fish caught around here. … I … work[ed] in a shop 
after the Co-op disbanded that bought fish from Seamart. It came over 
from the fish market in town on the boat and some people actually bought 
it and took it back to town thinking it was local Waiheke fish. It was just 
bizarre. And it was really sad but the other side is that it gave the fish a 
rest (Informant 8). 
Angry at the change from before the QMS, one informant asserted: ―We used to 
be able to buy fresh fish that had been caught that morning. We used to be able to 
buy all sorts of fish, piper, creamfish, butterfish... and cheap. Now we can't!‖ 
(Anne Elder). Another stated, ―It‘s disgusting - we're an island and the fish in the 
supermarket is just not fresh‖ (Informant)! 
―We certainly used to eat quite a bit of fish…. and the family came over from 
town and like eating fish.  It's all part of the whole thing‖ (Informant 8). Fresh 
locally caught fish was part of Waiheke's identity; part of the experience of being 
on Waiheke. 
Mike Cotterill, former commercial fisherman in a letter to the Gulf News was 
concerned:  
Waiheke is a rundown little island with little to offer but wine and olives 
which your average tourist can buy anywhere in the world. … When an 
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island doesn't even have a fishing fleet with local fare available to all on the 
island you know we are in the crap (Gulf News 9 September  2007). 
There were and indeed still are takeaway shops selling fish, typically hoki, but 
also depending on availability snapper, trevali and tarakihi. In addition there have 
occasionally been other outlets for fresh fish sourced from the Auckland Fish 
Market or Auckland wholesalers. For a while one of the butchers, for example, 
tried to sell fish but reached the point of frustration because when it was available 
his customers didn't want it, but when they wanted it he couldn't get it. ―It's a pain 
… the fact you can't buy it from those who go out. … The customers say 'But 
you're surrounded by fish - why can't we buy it?  Have to go through a wholesaler 
don't you'‖  (Informal interview). The situation now is that ―There is never enough 
… [fish] from the point of view of a customer, you have to pay export prices for 
top grade fish which is why snapper consistently sells at $29.95 a kilo‖ (Informant 
23). 
After the introduction of the QMS the main sources of retail fresh fish were the 
Co-op fish shop which continued after the demise of the Co-op, and now Oneroa 
Fish and Chips (OFC), the Tahi Rd Butcher which is now Te Matuku Bay Oysters 
Ltd. and Woolworths Supermarket.  Speaking from his experience of both 
catching and selling Informant 7 noted that the  
The fish that you get from the shop now can be anything up to three days 
old before it gets to the shop. It could be even longer … [and] probably is. 
You'll never get it as fresh as what the community can provide it itself.  … 
Basically that's what the system has done - it‘s destroyed community. We 
can't buy fish here anymore. We have to buy it from Auckland. It's too 
expensive to actually set up a fish shop or anything like that without going 
through the red tape to actually look after your own little tiny community.  
To be able to supply a community like Waiheke Island you'd need a 
million dollars worth of quota and then you've got to go through all the 
portfolio you know of licences, hygiene regulations, hawker's licence if 
you like, staff, MAF all those things - you know.  
All that's red tape. It‘s cost cost cost. The quota system's been in here now 
for 20 odd years, right? The costs of fishing have gone up in that time 20 
years. The price of fish has not gone up.  And just to add insult to the 
whole thing now we see a huge increase in price of fuel coming our way. 
That's just going to be the top - the icing on the cake.  Icing on the cake - 
fishermen can't really afford to go out there and catch fish like they used 
to. In fact I think they have to catch twice as much fish as they used to 
make a living today as they did yesterday. That's no good  … So you get 
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small communities like Waiheke Island who could well do with a good 
fish shop and supply of fresh fish to the restaurants on the island. It's just 
not going to happen (Informant 7). 
A shortcoming of the system is that fish has to be landed to Licensed Fish 
Receivers [LFRs] and since there are none on Waiheke, fish caught in the Gulf 
have to go to Auckland to be processed, then purchased and shipped to Waiheke 
to be sold. The complication is:  
the distribution chain. We're at the end of a very long link. …  The bill 
with Fullers  [ferry company] is $300 per month [2007] and most of it is 
fresh fish and that's off my bottom line. If I could land it here! …it's a very 
very clumsy system. [He] ordered fish through the Ngai Tahu
123
 company 
Pacific Catch in Auckland and it came over on the ferry daily. Most of 
their fish came from Ngai Tahu's own boats but some from the Auckland 
Fish Market auction when they are in short supply. ―So they are the 
wholesaler, the middlemen in some instances, and in some instances they 
are the direct source‖ (Informant 17).  
Fish sold locally by one outlet comprises snapper (twice as many sales as the 
other species), Tarakihi, gurnard and hapuku with hoki for fish and chips. Tarakihi 
came from Hawkes Bay or Christchurch the bluenose [administratively classified 
as hapuku] from boats operating out of Whangarei while hoki was caught by 
Sanford offshore in deep water. All the fish was frozen skinned and boned fillets 
in 10 kilo boxes ready for sale and that eliminated processing waste problems. 
Through the winter the fish and chip shop sold 50-60 kilos of 'fresh' fish a week 
and 50-80 kilos of frozen hoki and two or three times that amount in summer.  
A seafood café was opened in 2007 (Waiheke Marketplace 9 May 2007) reflecting 
the view that Waiheke ―is a holiday destination. When people come over here 
they want to eat fish‖ (Informant 17).  The Woolworths supermarket offers ―280 
items for 'fish' across different shelves‖ including six species fresh fish ―seafood 
bar fish fillets‖ most skinned and boned ranging from red cod at $14.65/kg to 
snapper at $33.99/kg. The website does advise that ―the product range and pricing 
you see may differ to what is available in your area‖ (Woolworths website date 5 
December 2007).  
 
                                                 
123
  This is a Maori tribe based in the South Island. 
282 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of fish prices (NZ$/Kg) 
Retail 
The retail market is not static (See Table 4). Te Matuku Bay Oysters Ltd needed 
processing space in 2008 for oysters from their aquaculture operation so bought 
the butcher's shop in Tahi Rd
124
 for its factory and  ―inherited‖ the shop. They had 
the oysters to sell to the public and knew the dissatisfaction with the supermarket 
                                                 
124
  The main (light) industrial area of Waiheke. 
 
Comparison of fish prices (NZ$/Kg) 
Te Matuku Bay Oysters on Waiheke (1July 2009) 
 Trevali Gunard Tarakihi Snapper 
Fillets $18.99 $27.99 $27.99 $38.99 
 
OceaNZ, Botany Downs Shopping Centre, Auckland (June 2009) 
 Trevali Gurnard Tarakihi Snapper 
Green $9.95 $9.95  $15.95 
Fillets  $27.95 $24.95 $36.95 
Meat: 
Pak „n Save Supermarket, Botany Downs Shopping Centre, Auckland 
NZ$/Kg (June 2009) 
From memory, before the QMS meat was (cut for cut) generally twice the price of 
fish. 
Beef Mince(Special) Rump Scotch Fillet Eye Fillet 
Packed $5.99 $11.99  $24.99 
unPacked  $11.99 $25.99 $39.99 
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―fresh‖ fish so kept the shop going with complimentary  ―specialty & essential 
products‖, smoked seafood and the then small, fresh fish operation. The 7 May 
2009 issue of Gulf News had a full page advertisement for ―Fresh Fish Daily‖. 
They too buy their fish from the Auckland market by ringing their purchasing 
agents each night with their order. The fish is bought about 2.00am filleted and 
delivered on the 9.00am ferry (Nat Upchurch, Director). 
Most of the finfish comes from the Hauraki Gulf, tuna from the South Pacific and 
mussels from the Marlborough Sounds. Upchurch claims there is:  
great demand. It‘s being an island too, people have grown an affinity for 
the sea and sea food is a real part of the diet  … During the week we get a 
lot of retired people coming in but in the weekend it‘s - so everybody. The 
wealthy are probably a large section because we cater for the gourmet end. 
Like we're not a cut price warehouse. I think just the quality - the people 
who are prepared to pay just that little bit extra for the fish then treat 
themselves every now and then.  You do [get] … a cross section of the 
island (Nat Upchurch). 
Te Matuku considered becoming Licenced Fish Receivers but space was limited 
and processing fresh fish carried the risk of contamination with their core business 
of oysters.  Besides, 
For me as a fish purchaser … a retailer… instead of dealing with 4 or 5 
local fishermen supplying their product irregularly, it's a case of me 
making a phone call once a night and getting fish just as fresh over on the 
first boat at pretty much the same price - or cheaper and processed 
already. So the whole rationalisation of the industry has really aided that 
side of it.  … We probably go through … maybe 150-200kgs wet fish a 
week.‖ (Nat Upchurch).  
The complexity of becoming a LFR, having sufficient quota in terms of amount 
and species to cater efficiently for the Waiheke market, the reporting and health 
and safety requirements are such that none of the outlets for fresh fish on the 
island have been able to comply. 
 
Restaurants 
Waiheke was always a holiday and visitor destination, but now instead of a 
scattering of visitor, tourist and hospitality establishments, a formalised visitor 
industry has been developed since the mid 1990s.  Fish is still a significant 
component at Waiheke restaurants. 
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One chef asserted:  
[Fresh locally caught fish is] really important. People come to the island 
and they want - because it's an island - the seafoods are a major draw card 
so that and you have to have that. Every restaurant has to have fish on the 
menu somehow or other. … It's sometimes a bit of a struggle to get fish 
and keep it fresh because it all has to be brought in from Auckland so its 
all got to be packaged up in styrofoam boxes and ice and freezer packs 
and shipped over and with freight costs and things like that - you've got to 
watch how many packages you bring over. … At the moment we get it 
through New Zealand Wholesale Seafood and we have someone who goes 
to the markets early on Thursday morning. … Well, he buys the whole 
fish and gets it cleaned and everything - filleted for us and sends it over. 
… but usually when we buy through  Wholesale Seafoods it's all fillet and 
stuff anyway and we pay for cleaned price while he's  paying … green - 
they call it? Green and then get it filleted and sent over. …All the 
restaurants use fish and they probably all have their gripes and things 
about supply and having to get it shipped over and everything (Informant 
15). 
Front of house staff told him that clients ask every day for locally caught fish. 
There is considerable demand and he felt:  
Locally caught… [fish] would be a major draw card … if you could have 
it on your menu like  'Locally Waiheke caught', 'Waiheke Fresh'. … You 
could possibly even charge a bit more for it or something (Informant 15). 
Community Resistance 
In summing up the fresh fish issue it is important to bear in mind the broader 
socio-cultural expressive context of the changes happening for Waiheke as it 
moved from a somewhat rural self- governing island to a commuter suburb and 
tourist playground of Auckland. Politics has always been hard fought and loss of 
access to fish for livelihood or nutrition was one issue among many that 
engendered resistance.  This was epitomised in a public meeting over a planning 
issue Dick Hubbard, the Auckland City mayor, put a positive spin on Islanders' 
complaints and dissatisfaction, by branding them ―feisty‖ (Dick Hubbard, Public 
Meeting Ostend Hall Monday 26 September 2005). The term feisty has 
subsequently been added to island discourse signifying the struggle for resilience 
in the contest to assert and retain the community's distinctiveness and identity. 
The threat from neoliberal governance such as being imposed on Waiheke on a 
number of fronts and the change to its lifestyle epitomised what was at stake for 
communities.  It wasn't just fish.  
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Coromandel 
Like Waiheke by comparison with the situation before the QMS relatively little 
fresh locally caught fish is available now.  Most of that little is sold at the 
takeaway fish shop and sourced from OPC in Whitianga where Coromandel boats 
land much of their product. On rare occasions rather than having fish trucked from 
Whitianga, the shop can get fish directly from a boat at the Coromandel wharf but 
the transaction will have been arranged through OPC or another company. They 
have little choice in what fresh fish is supplied or when. At the takeaway shop 
selling fresh fish, I was told that:  
[U]sually there is no choice they just take what we're given. In June/July 
2004, for example, there was no snapper. We get the seconds - the rest is 
exported. Sometimes we do pick it up direct from the local fishermen but 
it's been arranged through the factory. Otherwise we have to get it from the 
Fish Mart in Auckland.   
In the cool display cabinet on the counter there were two plates, one of fillets and 
the other labelled ―Boneless snapper $28/kg  (Coromandel Kliss Trip 30 
September - 2 October 2006).  
Coromandel with a much smaller population is also on the tourist and domestic 
holiday route and emphasised local product through tourist oriented stores, 
including a specialty smoked fish store. The presence of many aquaculture 
farmers operating in the area may have provided synergies that facilitated this and 
reports on a Waiheke community social trip (Gulf News 17 March 2005) indicated 
a degree of envy from the islanders at the range of fresh fish product. 
The locals are disenchanted and resent having to pay tourist prices, in a town 
where wages are low, so have to go without or catch their own (See Box 18). 
 
Box 18: Coromandel attitudes 
Sandra Watson, for example, said:  
You feel like it‘s your right, like you know - you've worked in the area, you've lived in 
the area, you've kept the area, you've kept the place going in the winter months when it‘s 
quiet and next minute away it goes - boom - everything in town jumps up in price and 
that included.  We have to pay the same price put up for the tourist. All those nice  [fish] 
on the menus - all those nice scallops and crayfish and snapper we just can't really afford 
to go out and have a meal of them. If you do it's not very often.  
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Like also living in a small town the wages here are not very good. We don't pay good 
wages in small towns. … People of course aren't able to go out and treat themselves to 
snapper and they've got to go and sit on the rocks all day and the next day for a week to 
try and catch a fish (Sandra Watson).  
 
Leigh 
Despite the reasonable expectations of visitors and tourists to such a fishing 
village, even in Leigh where the fish factory still operates in the town local shops 
are unable to sell fresh locally caught commercial fish. Though, as with 
Coromandel, sometimes, the fish itself may come from the factory or even the 
boats. 
Sarah Davies, Proprietor of Leigh Café wanted to get fish from her husband, Nick 
Torkington, who was running a longliner. It would have made good sense to keep 
both catching and marketing in the family, in the same way her parents, a well 
known fishing family had by getting fish more directly. To do that under the QMS 
they would have had to own quota and be Licensed Fish Receivers that made it 
―impossible‖.  As with the other two communities there is a lot of demand for 
fresh locally caught fish among the public.  She explained the situation they have 
to operate:  
I buy my fish, for the shop, from Auckland but I pick it up direct from the 
[Leigh] Fisheries. But I actually buy it through South City Seafoods in 
Auckland because they're not able to sell us wholesale. It's to do with the 
Quota Holders. … My parents  [who owned another shop ten years earlier] 
used to buy it direct from [Leigh] Fisheries and we didn't have a problem 
getting fish but now I can only get fish when it's available.  Yeah - when 
they've got the excess basically. … Yeah we just get all their crap fish 
basically. … If they've got a bin limit on and they've got too many bins then 
we get it.  
It's a bit ridiculous…. It comes from all over the place. We get fish - when I 
pick my fish up from there we get fish from up north. We get fish from 
down south. Whatever fish they've got left over we get. So it's not 
necessarily off the boats in Leigh or - yeah from anywhere (Sarah Davies) 
We get people coming in constantly wanting to buy wet fish off us but we 
can't just sell it to them because we don't get enough of it to supply that and 
for our own cooking needs, … you send them to New World [the 
supermarket in Warkworth] to buy wet fish because we just can't get it. But 
it's the same - people come out here and say:  ―Leigh's a fishing town - must 
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be able to get all sorts of sea food‖. They expect scallops and everything 
else. … we buy in frozen  scallops because we can't get them  fresh - you 
know? …It‘s funny: ―Yeah the harbour and all the boats - your fish must be 
so fresh get it every day.‖ No we've got to buy it from Auckland  (Sarah 
Davies). 
Jennifer Cockayne, the present proprietor of Leigh Fish-N-Chips, had investigated 
becoming LFR but the costs were prohibitive to become a Licensed Fish Receiver 
would cost her ―nearly  $1,800, a one off, and then [a minimum of] $280 / month 
to fill in the forms. So for a place like me it's really not worth it. Which is a 
shame" (Jennifer Cockayne).  She had worked for the Council for 16 years so was 
not unfamiliar with bureaucracy but still found the reporting requirements 
onerous.  
[To be a LFR]:  I would have to buy under a basic company name and 
then sell it to Leigh Fish-N-Chips otherwise I'd have to get peoples' 
names and addresses of where it's going. So and you have to break down 
any guts and frames you have to sell and have it all weighed and then 
each month you have to put in the quotas - … the amount brought in - in 
kilos, the amount you've sold as fillets, the amount you've sold as frames, 
the amount you've sold as this - as cat fish or whatever. … It's very 
complicated. If you put it in … by mail it costs you $300 and something 
per month and if you put it in over the Internet it costs you so much but 
you have to put it in. But even if you get a nil return, you don't buy any 
that month, you have to put it in and it still costs you $280  (Jennifer 
Cockayne).  
Jennifer Cockayne said that there would be significant advantage in being able to 
sell fish straight off the boats:  
You can just hold up two bits of fish [fillets] and you can just see…the 
fresh one is luminous. … You can really see the difference and the 
difference between line caught and seine caught too because most of the 
ones out here are line caught. You can see the difference between really 
fresh fish - caught the same time and the difference between line and seine. 
Yes, I've learnt a lot since I've been here. You can really pick it just from 
the luminosity of the fish (Jennifer Cockayne).  
Since the fish has to come through the product chain: 
It's at least a week old before you get it… I have a standing order [with 
Leigh Fisheries] for 20 Kg of gurnard, 20 kg of snapper per week. Last 
week I got the 20 kg of snapper and 7 kg of gurnard. This week so far I 
haven't had anything because of the storms. They've got to fill their other 
orders. … The first couple of months of the new quota while people are 
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settling down - the prices are sky high and in the last months you might 
not get any fish at all. Because - yeah - they've used up their quota and 
they can't go out and fish - and it‘s frustrating because this place is based 
on the export fish and the fresh fish and the hassles I have sourcing. … 
And of course they keep their quotas [orders] up in Auckland first instead 
of supplying locals. But they're doing their best for me. If there's any fish 
to be had I do get it. … Yes - they are great in that way.  If they can get it 
for me, they do but their hands are tied with the quota in Auckland  
(Jennifer Cockayne). 
Sales of Locally Caught Fish 
When this research was carried out there were no LFRs in any of the communities 
studied so there were no regular outlets for the direct sale of locally caught fish in 
these communities. There were, however, limited wharf sales in Coromandel and 
Leigh but none (until October 2009 see Worthy 2009) in Waiheke. In 2007/2008 
428.52 kg of snapper were sold in wharf sales around the Hauraki Gulf out of a 
total of 60,818.566 kg for all fish sold this way in New Zealand (MFish) and these 
appear to be declining (see Table 5). 
Snapper catch sold at wharf (kg) 2001-2008
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Table 5: Annual wharf sales of snapper in Hauraki Gulf areas 2001-2008) 
(Source:  MFish data) 
 
The MFish database of wharf sales in the Hauraki Gulf includes 113 landings 
around New Zealand of which I identified 39, including misspellings, as being in 
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the Hauraki Gulf. Since the amounts of fish sold at some of these landings was 
such that the annual income of some fishermen could be identified
125
, this 
information would breach confidentiality these landing places were therefore 
clustered into the east coast  (the west coast of the Coromandel peninsular, 
including Whitianga on the east coast), the south coast  (including the Viaduct 
Basin) and the west coast (East Coast Bays, Hibiscus Coast etc.) of the Hauraki 
Gulf. By comparison with Gulf Island Foods orders of 400kg/month frozen hoki 
the volume of snapper sold in Hauraki Gulf wharf sales is infinitesimal. 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Access to information is the flip side to reporting. Previously outside observers 
had ready access to overviews of the fishing industry performance through such 
annual publications as the FIB Economic Review. User pays now means that 
services that used to be covered by general taxation are now charged specifically. 
A change of formats that has occurred which makes a real appreciation more 
difficult. Before the QMS, for example, the interested public had reasonable 
access to overview information and often more particular data was readily 
available. The NZ FIB Economic Overviews were available bi-yearly then 
intermittently and are now replaced by less comprehensive (no vessel data for 
example) information seemingly for public relations or maybe school projects.  
Comprehensive information, subject to confidentiality is still obtainable but often 
at considerable cost, essentially restricting it to the industry and those with 
research contracts. For this research, for example Fishserve willingly provided a 
list of all LFRs (named businesses) but no indication of locality or data on export 
or domestic disposal. MFish estimated 50 of those 229 were the big export 
companies and helpfully, at the other end of the scale, willingly extracted the 
number of boat sales by landing place in the Hauraki Gulf but, to ensure 
confidentiality, had to cluster thirty nine into just three or four regions
126
. It seems 
                                                 
125
  I suspect this accounts for the much higher values in East Hauraki Gulf. 
 
126
  These clusterings were the East coast to which I added Whitianga, the South 
coast including Auckland and the West coast of the Hauraki Gulf. Unfortunately I 
misidentified one west coast landing spot as south coast. These clusterings were identified 
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increased data reporting requirements may enable better control but public benefit 
remains uncertain and the fishery, the industry and management are less 
transparent and accountable than before the QMS. 
SUMMARY 
For the communities the QMS has meant a general loss of access to the fisheries, 
and therefore to a source of livelihood, nutrition and in consequence of a 
significant aspect of community identity
127
. Fishermen and crew, those in the 
community of occupation miss out directly but others such as the engineers, 
mechanics, boat repairers, fish shop retailers and consumers do also indirectly. 
Despite the changes, and the emphasis on the export market, the fishery seems as 
or even more marginal for small operators and community members than it was 
before the introduction of the QMS and economies of scale and ownership of 
quota are increasingly important.  
                                                                                                                                     
from a list of landing places involving misspellings and local names. Without further 
information it is at best an estimation. 
 
127
  This is a global issue.  See, for example, the World Forum of Fisher Peoples 
(WFFP), International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) and the International 
Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC) intervention on small-scale fishermen‘s 
and community rights to the FAO Committee on Fisheries, 2009. 
http://icsf.net/icsf2006/uploads/resources/statements/pdf/english/statements_other/123623
5734085***Intervention_on_Small-scale_Fisheries_COFI_FAO.doc (Accessed 10 
March 2009) 
 
  
291 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
"The law doth punish man or woman that steals the goose from off the common, 
 but lets the greater felon loose who steals the common from the goose. 
-- Anonymous 
This dissertation is concerned with the social implications of government policies 
for fishermen and their communities; a change foreshadowed by "think big" 
attitudes to rights based fisheries management in New Zealand. Chapters 5 to 7 
(pre-QMS, QMS implementation/transition, QMS now) reported the empirical 
findings in the context of the original objectives and expectations of the QMS  
(Chapter 2) and findings elsewhere in the literature (Chapter 4).  This chapter 
refutes the usual perspective on the "crisis in coastal fisheries" then discusses 
social implications of the neo-liberalism QMS, privatization, market forces and 
deregulation for the various industry components but particularly for Hauraki Gulf 
fishermen, then for their communities. Some issues are dealt with from more than 
one perspective.  
CONTEXT 
Before humans New Zealand had fish. Then Māori came, settled round the coast 
and utilised the kaimoana (seafood) for sustenance and, later as communities 
evolved and the population increased, for trade and ceremonies. Legend asserts 
New Zealand was born from fishing (Waitangi Tribunal 1988 31-56). Certainly 
with a paucity of animals and indifferent soils, fish were an essential part of 
community diet. Pakeha came, likewise established around the coasts and utilised 
the fish resources. Included in the influx were ―imports‖ of fishermen and their 
families from countries with long fishing traditions who set up or merged their 
own fishing communities around the coast: Shetlanders, Greeks and Italians in 
Island Bay, and Makara (both near Wellington) for example, Dalmations on the 
Kaipara Harbour and in Auckland (See: Johnson and Haworth 2004 163-171; 
Makarios 1996; 1997; 1999) and provided for their communities and for a 
growing urban population.  
As the country changed socially and culturally fishermen established co-
operatives beginning the fishing industry and some of these generationally deep 
292 
 
fishing families established companies
128
. Indeed as Rees suggested (pers com 
June 2005) the New Zealand fishing industry is based on families setting up 
companies, the Talleys for example establishing Talley‘s Fisheries & Amaltal, the 
Velas Velas‘ Fisheries now Watties and, though slightly different, Albert Sanford 
from a sailing rather than fishing background set up Sandford and there were 
others. 
With a neoliberal ideology and the advent of the EEZ enclosing the deepwater 
fishery, the New Zealand fishing industry globalised to meet the increasing 
international market. These companies became increasingly corporatised and 
bought the ‗big boats‘. Though inadequate for the deepwater they did establish 
fishing history on the coast that later translated to quota, and, with the loan 
schemes, facilitated the inshore crisis that justified the QMS. 
Crisis 
The introduction of the QMS was a change of regime in response to a 
manufactured crisis. The government had already allowed the corporate ‗big 
boats‘, bought for the deepwater, to fish on the coast not only adding to the 
pressure that depleted the stocks but also gaining catch history and later quota. 
Government policy had, therefore, compounded the impacts on a depleting coastal 
fishery and, in effect, facilitated corporate access over coastal fishermen and the 
rights of the communities they supported. As demonstrated in Chapter 4 the 
government was aware of this.  
The additional catch of the ‗big boats‘ threatened the livelihoods and economics 
of the coastal fleet.  To protect the interests of ‗bona fide‘ fishermen and the hope 
of adequate compensation, part-timers were demonized as the Federation 
persuaded the Government to exclude them. By allowing the ‗big boats‘ to fish 
prime species in the coastal fishery the government facilitated Hardin's 'open 
access', in effect constructing the crisis, and then aggravated it by making grants 
and easy loans available for fishing vessels and processing plants, increasing 
capitalization of the fishery. The degree to which this was initially accidental or 
deliberate is not clear. Concern to "professionalise" the fishery was explicit and 
                                                 
128
  While outside the focus of this research, I suspect the process in New Zealand 
would have been similar to that reported by Palsson (1991 105-110) for Iceland. 
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some of the components were jockeying for position to take advantage.  
Consequently when the neo-liberal oriented Labour government came to power in 
1984 there was already a crisis in the coastal fishery and, as Yandle (2001 113) 
found, as early as 1974 elements of ITQs were being considered. Thus MAF, in 
accord with Treasury advice and in an exemplar of the strictures of Friedman 
(―only a crisis - actual or perceived - produces real change‖ (Klein 2007 6)) and 
his Chicago School, implemented the Shock Doctrine (See Klein 2007) with the 
neo-liberal QMS using ITQs. 
Given that New Zealand's coastal fisheries were to be managed by quota, three 
alternatives were available:  boat based quota, community-based quota and 
individual quota. With the notable exception of the Chatham Islands (Marshall 
2000), communities lacked 'voice' so appear not to be considered as a general 
approach. By identifying the boat owner rather than the skipper or the boat for 
quota allocation, neo-liberal rights-based management reinforced the trend toward 
transactional  (market- forces) relations and facilitated quota aggregation to the 
corporates. The choice of quota owner is indicative of valuing the mortgagable, 
capital asset over the human and social capital of skippers' knowledge, skills and 
community relationships. 
The outcome is increased corporatisation and corporate control of the fisheries, 
―absentee‖  (Pinkerton and Edwards 2009 6) (distanced) or investor ownership of 
quota, bureaucracy and, as this research confirms, considerably increased controls 
over the fishermen. An unforeseen consequence, perhaps, has been the reduction 
in availability of fresh locally caught fish in the coastal communities and the 
impact of the rise of tourism. Communities such as Waiheke with tourist 
industries may be able to sustain a niche market for the higher prices of fish 
available but it is at the expense of more basic local food supply. Rights-based 
fisheries management in New Zealand has meant the loss of many rights for 
coastal and inshore fishermen and their communities. 
An overview of the formal relations between the components discussed in this 
research are sketched in Figure 22. Of particular note, fishermen are no longer as 
closely linked occupationally within their communities. The Waiheke community 
is now divorced from the fishing industry. 
294 
 
 
Figure 22:Overview of relationships between the components 
GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 
Since from the early 1900s the amount and complexity of regulation and the 
bureaucracy to support fisheries management increased but from 1986 neo-
liberalism's third plank, deregulation, became relevant.  One of the objectives of 
the introduction of rights-based management was the reduction of government 
involvement but, Sissenwine and Mace (1992 147), for example, assert 
―Government regulation has not been reduced‖. The Fisheries Act 1996, 
supposedly simplified the QMS, but the increase from 82 pages and 108 sections 
in the1983 Act, to 386 pages and 370 sections in the 1996 Act indicates the reality 
(See: Figures 23, 24, 25). Instead the QMS initiated a raft of legislation with 
constant amendments compounding an increasingly complex regime. No longer 
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can fishermen just get a boat, obtain a licence, meet basic requirements of area, 
gear and reporting; now they have to comply with a greatly increased 
bureaucracy, levies, quota, and a reporting and compliance regime. Yet the 
Ministry feels they are now getting the system right and the continued 
amendments are ―tweaking rather than lurching‖ (Russell Burnard, pers com, 15 
October 2008).  
In the meantime, the confusion of regulations has criminalised fishermen and 
local people for exercising what used to be their community rights of propinquity 
and usufruct. Penalties can be draconian by comparison with those in other 
sections of the economy, with loss of the means of production, quota, boats, 
vehicles and/or fines. This is exemplified by informants' ―stories‖ such as that of a 
Licensed Fish Receiver allegedly being fined for eating three dead 'doggies' 
(dogfish bycatch) for which he didn't have quota. 
 
Fishermen: Traditional (Pre 1983)
Need
Fishing permit
Boat
Boat License
Gear
Obligations
Reporting
Background: Beach seining Waiheke Island 
Fishing Grounds
Local Bays & Coast
Market
Local Clients and Fishshops
 
Figure 23: Bureaucracy: Traditional. Pre-1983. 
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Fishermen: Before the QMS
Need
Fishing permit, Skippers‟ Ticket
Vessel, Vessel Licence
Gear
Obligations
Reporting
Fishing Grounds
Hauraki Gulf
Market
Fishshops
Company buyers / Co-op
Background: Waiheke longliners gearing up
 
Figure 24: Bureaucracy before the introduction of the QMS. 
 
 
Fishermen: Now
Need
Vessel
Vessel Licence,  Maritime Safety Survey:
Mandatory safety gear
ACE
Own Quota: Derive ACE
Don‟t own quota: Buy ACE from Company / Owner / Broker
Fishing Grounds
QMA (QMA1: Cape Rienga to Cape Runaway)
Market
Licensed Fish Receiver: 
NEEDs MFish / Health & Safety / Monthly reporting / etc.
Obligations
Daily reporting & Catch/Landing Returns
Own quota: Levies: 
Background: FV Tungsten (longliner) 
unloading at Leigh wharf
Gear
Fishing Permit, Skippers‟ Ticket
Registration Fishserve
 
Figure 25: Bureaucracy now. 
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Change of Regime 
Ideologically, "think big" was a forerunner of neo-liberalism catering for the 
(BIG) market and its players (corporates) externalising detriments to the  
―bottom‖ - part-timers. Restructuring of the fisheries with the QMS went further 
with a change from fisheries management using input controls to a neo-liberal, 
property rights-based management system with ITQs. MAF knew the significance 
of the rural /urban spit in part-timers and now know the exclusion was a failed and 
unnecessary policy (Crothers, pers com, 21 November 2006). Coastal fishermen 
through the Federation were struggling for their share also and sacrificed the part-
timers so they could get buybacks. This exclusion, charged against those least 
responsible for the crisis was neither morally nor in practice the cost of bringing 
in the new system.  Had the ‗big boats‘ been restricted to the deepwater or 
'translated' into vessels more appropriate for the deepwater there may have been 
no need to restructure the coastal fleet so radically! Part-timers may have been 
numerically difficult to administer but the amount of fish they caught, although 
crucial for their communities, was comparatively infinitesimal. They could have 
been excluded from the QMS - like Recreational and Maori fishermen or overseas 
precedents such as Chile where artisanal or inshore fishermen are managed 
separately from industrial. Given the increase in number of Mfish staff required to 
administer the QMS
129
, part-timers could have had their own QMS if necessary!  
Restricting the ‗big boats‘ more tightly to the deepwater or less-preferred species 
might have been a compromise! 
The QMS left the Hauraki Gulf regime of exclusion lines, input controls and 
regulations in place but while aggregation of quota has virtually resolved the 
allocation issue between the companies and the communities it has meant serious 
though varying social implications for the those in this study. As such, my 
research tends to support arguments that changes resulting from the QMS, in 
economic, political, social and cultural and other factors, impinge on ―localised 
systems of common pool resource use and the adaptive responses of the users‖ 
                                                 
129
  Allegedly with the highest staff/catch ratio required to administer any fisheries 
management system (c.f. Australian administration costs (McDonald Fishfolk 31 October 
2007)). . 
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(van Ginkel 1999 24). My research also supports other New Zealand research 
(Holmes 1998, Baines 1999) that in New Zealand, response to crisis reconstructs 
the economic, cultural and political relationships between and within communities 
and varies between communities. 
Despite the QMS having been developed and promoted largely by the Federation 
of Commercial Fishermen, the corporates were early recognisers of the 
implications of the new approach. They deliberately and aggressively sought to 
quickly secure the new property right to harvest fish (the Individual Transferable 
Quota) that was fundamental to control of the fishery.  In the communities 
studied, only Leigh with Leigh Fisheries, integrated into a relatively fishing-
dependent community, was able to resist the larger corporates, but to survive it too 
has had to take on many of the trappings of those corporates, becoming a 
vertically integrated, globalised company with fishing operations expanded 
throughout the country and prioritising export fish contracts.  Despite these 
changes, it has managed to retain its connections with the community and remains 
the company of first choice for independent fishermen in the Gulf. 
The QMS advantaged the vertically integrated companies as Rees (2004) and 
Taylor et al (1999) have noted, though the bottom line benefits seem not as great 
as claimed (Rees 2004 4). My research also supports the view of Taylor et al 
(1999 4) that changes such as the QMS centralised economic development with 
benefits accruing to the administration (here MAF/MFish) and the vertically 
integrated companies, but the impacts were borne by the regions and 
communities. 
The result of the change of regime has been that for a comparatively brief time 
fishers owned most of the coastal quota and had the ability to maintain parity with 
buyers. They had an asset that gave them negotiating power in first sale of fish 
but, since many were not accountants, economists or lawyers, already struggling 
with paper work and just wanting to fish, were not aware of their strengthened 
position. On the other hand ITQs, economic instruments arising from neo-liberal 
economic theory, in keeping therefore with the drivers of corporates were grist to 
the mill of corporate lawyers and accountants. The corporates, increasingly 
embedded in the global market and therefore influencing and influenced by 
globalization, were quite aware of the asset and therefore responded by buying the 
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quota from fishermen and smaller companies. In consequence, rather than 
fishermen being empowered through ownership or even gaining parity, the 
corporates reinforced their traditional dominance as the ―Mr. Bigs‖ of the fishing 
industry (See: Stuster 1980). In addition, quota is regarded as an investment and 
so accumulated by  ―Queen St Fishermen130‖ and quota brokers, "absentee" 
owners creating an additional layer of profit for themselves and costs for the 
fishermen.   
For MFish although the system is not perfect they believe it has been considerably 
improved and deserves its global reputation. Russell Burnard stated:  
Have we got a perfect system? No! Is it a better system than most 
jurisdictions in the world? I think so. Do New Zealanders still have access 
to fish? Generally yes! Is it completely fresh? It depends where you are in 
terms of location and that's a factor of our quite massive coastline in 
relation to our population. From the government's point of view we don't 
make those choices. We provide a framework that allows people to make 
those choices and we think we've reduced the cost of entry for most 
people to allow them to undertake their activities reasonably‖ (Russell 
Burnard pers com 15 October 2008).  
Many fishermen have a different perspective. McCormack and Crothers (2008) 
found: 
The ownership of quota by non-fishers and the consolidation of quota is 
described by a fisher as 'morally obscene'. Further, the privatisation of 
fishing rights is believed to have 'pushed the market price right through 
the floor'. The main problem that we have difficulties with the quota 
system was when they put a value on the quota everyone wanted it, even 
though they didn't want to fish it, they just wanted to own the quota. 
(Commercial fisher)‖  (McCormack and Crothers 2008 38).  
Consequently, as Holmes (1998 34) noted, fishermen's participation in the 
fisheries was reduced.  These regimes are underpinned by different social 
                                                 
130
  Queen St is the core of Auckland‘s Central Business District (CBD) so 
symbolically the location of investors, brokers and bankers. 
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constructs appropriate for different people. The older system emphasised the 
individual fit with ecosystems and the face-to-face relations of cooperative or 
conflicting social reciprocity. The QMS puts emphasis on more generic units in 
the production machine analogous to the factory floor. Now to become 
independent fishermen skippering their own boat, they need not just the boat but 
business or financial skills and also quota.  Alternatively they must be content 
working for the few companies still running a fleet or become ACE dependent 
contractors struggling to stay afloat and with little hope of a nest egg for 
retirement. 
Quota 
To ensure supply the companies operating in the Hauraki Gulf have largely 
aggregated the quota and therefore have significant control over the harvesting of 
the fish. Under the growth imperative of neoliberalism, because the QMS capped 
the volume of fish with the TACC, the companies had to increase their profits by 
maintaining quality and adding value to maximise the return on the resource. Neo-
liberal ideology promoted the best price and globalization of the market meant 
that invariably the international market could offer more than the local domestic 
market. Companies, such as Leigh Fisheries, sought the best profits available by 
promoting increased quality and niche marketing in an apparently insatiable 
international market.  The quality of fish declines from the time it is caught, 
cannot be increased and at best only maintained. Cultural requirements of 
international markets, such as the Japanese attitude to iki jimi for quality that New 
Zealanders might otherwise have considered excessively exacting, provided 
incentives but along with the other inspections for food and safety, also added 
costs.  Consequently considerable attention, in technology, marketing, scholarly 
research and industry education, was given to what was variously known as the 
―cool chain‖, the ―quality chain‖, the  ―commodity chain‖ (e.g. Seafood NZ 1994 
66-74).  
The QMS demands accountability and depends on the paper trail of catch landing 
logs (fishermen's) matched with LFR (buyers', corporates') returns (See: Clark et 
al. 1988b). Since the paperwork and reporting requirements for fishermen and 
LFRs are comprehensive and strict larger fishing companies have accountants and 
clerical staff with abilities and qualifications to deal with them effectively. But, 
  
301 
for fishermen reporting has been an issue since the QMS was introduced. Indeed, 
MAF officers contended that this was incentive for many fishermen to sell their 
quota to companies. The distress I saw, however, when a fisherman did not get 
―quota‖ he believed he had been promised, when conditions were ideal for 
fishing, seemed to contradict the claim that fishermen would in fact assign control 
of their operation to the companies over paperwork  (Duncan, L. 1993 21, 22).  
The reality is, whether they fish their own ACE or company ACE, fishermen are 
still responsible for reporting their catch (Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 Section 
189); filling out catch landing returns before midnight of the day of the catch. 
These requirements have meant more onerous form filling, greater surveillance 
and stress.  
A comparison of the pre QMS and current (2008) reporting areas for the Hauraki 
Gulf (See Figures 26 and 27) indicates the increase in complexity. Contemporary 
electronic technology such as GIS, chart plotters and chart overlays on sounders 
might well simplify this chore but the extent to which these administrative 
boundaries relate to fishermen's conceptual mapping of the Gulf and fishing spots 
(e.g. the Ahahas, The Blocks (Viaduct Research)) is open to question. 
 
Figure 26: Auckland Fishery Management Areas (Hauraki Gulf) showing 005, 
006, 007 for reporting before the QMS. (Source: Paul n.d.). 
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Figure 27: Hauraki Gulf reporting areas 2008. (Source: MFish, reprinted with 
permission, www.fish.govt.nz). 
Licensed Fish Receivers (LFRs) 
Under the QMS fish must be landed to Licensed Fish Receivers (LFRs), a low 
profile but intrinsic part of the QMS, as a cross check on fishermen‘s returns for 
compliance purposes and for control over the resource. Most LFRs were larger 
companies and with company closures and consolidations and increasing vertical 
integration there are fewer fish buyers. Increasingly, the majority are exporting 
overseas or value-adding for supermarkets.  
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Compared with fishermen's perhaps more personal relationships with their buyers 
before the QMS, control over fishermen is now greater since many are dependent 
on the company for ACE and therefore tied more formally by contractual 
relationships. The company sets both the price for ACE and the landed price for 
fish. Fishermen are no longer free to shop around, select their buyer and have 
become price takers all year round. They tend not to have alternative buyers so the 
companies have more control over price and conditions and can pick and choose 
among would-be fishermen and even those already well established.  
Local LFRs selling to the public seem few and far between so fresh locally caught 
commercial fish is generally not available in communities directly from 
fishermen. LFRs add another level of bureaucracy between the fishermen and the 
consumers. The more stringent policing by compliance staff takes up whatever 
slack or flexibility that may have been in the system so allowing for personal 
circumstances, and has created a tension and change in the relationship between 
fisheries officers and the fishermen. 
Before the QMS most coastal towns had one or more fish shops selling fresh 
locally caught commercial fish and fish was also easily available in virtually every 
other town in New Zealand.  Now, emphasis was on the export market, LFRs 
making fresh locally caught commercial fish available to the public seem scarce.  
Before the QMS there were many more outlets selling locally caught fish directly 
to the public
131
. After the QMS Fishserve stated there were 229 LFRs in New 
Zealand in 2008 but determining the current distribution of fresh locally caught 
fish was hindered by their refusal to disclose location. Russel Burnard of MFish, 
estimated that of these 229 LFRs about 50 were the big export companies. Many 
of the remainder (179) might sell their fish direct to the public but there is no 
evidence of this in the communities covered by this research. In addition the 10Kg 
wharf sales allowed do make limited amounts of fish available in those ports still 
servicing the dwindling number of independent fishing vessels. These sales also 
appear to be decreasing.  
                                                 
131
  Boyce, Martin and Stringer (1987) do not indicate the number of fish shops or 
outlets selling fish from local fishermen to the public before the QMS. They do show 
three ports for landing in the Hauraki Gulf, Auckland, Thames and Coromandel (Boyce et 
al. 1986 32) with a total of 23 licensed fish packing houses (Boyce et al.  1986 10) but 
this includes Whitianga and omits Waiheke and Leigh. 
304 
 
CORPORATES 
The neo-liberal QMS by privatising catching rights with quota ownership and 
user-pays ethos has impacted the structure, the costs and relationships of fishing 
enterprises in the Gulf. Where previously fishermen ostensibly controlled the 
catch now quota ownership means corporates have the control, inverting the 
previous structure. In addition the extra cost of harvesting has been externalised to 
fishermen through levies, more detailed surveys, and the need to buy ACE.  
Other researchers (e.g. Belgrave et al 2000 8; Mansfield 2001; Rees 2004; Rees 
2008 172; Townsend 1998 205; Winder 1997) imply the larger, especially 
vertically integrated corporations have financial and marketing advantage. Larger 
companies, already with specialist staff dealing in law, accounting and 
international marketing, were better aware of financial markets, quota ownership 
and market opportunities. Smaller more localised companies working face to face 
in domestic markets or owner-operators whose prime speciality was as top 
fishermen were mainly concerned about boat handling and fishing to maintain 
catch rates. While corporates focus on competitive profitability, ―growth dynamic: 
revenue-seeking strategies and  … cost-driven strategies‖ (Barrett 2001 6), 
smaller fishermen's attentions tend to be on fish as elusive quarry. Their 
communities dealt with the day-to-day exigencies of existence. In a transition to a 
new neo-liberal ideology favouring privatisation and market-forces, the big 
companies, already vertically integrated, corporatised and market-oriented, were 
poised to compete in the quota market and an increasingly neo-liberally globalised 
arena. 
In facilitating corporate aggregation of quota the QMS has arguably resolved the 
―race for fish‖ but replaced it with the 'race for companies' and the 'race for ACE'. 
With the quota market, investors, quota brokers, non-fishing quota owners, 
(together the so-called 'Queen St Fishermen'), the system has added a level of 
bureaucracy to maintain the quota market and greatly expanded the work required 
for compliance purposes. To get the best from their quota, companies have 
restricted the fishermen, and manage them tightly to ensure they get just the 
needed product. The concomitant emphasis on economies of scale, efficiency and 
quality has lengthened the local distribution chain and greatly increased costs to 
the local consumer.  
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FISHERMEN 
Fishermen who sold their quota had opportunity to set-up an alternative livelihood 
and some did. Some of them regret the loss of the lifestyle and the opportunity to 
pass that fishing enterprise on to their children. Those who were crewing and 
those who were supporting the operation with goods or services have little to 
show for the change. Some former fishermen who leased out their quota found the 
market uncertain and the reporting onerous so sold. Others found dependable 
clients and maintain a satisfying lifestyle. ACE-dependent fishermen tend to be 
marginalised. The comparative few ―new part-timers‖, debt free, with passion for 
their work, with detailed ecological knowledge of their species and fishing 
grounds, can easily catch the fish their market requires, meet increasingly 
stringent company requirements and still enjoy their boats and the marine 
environment. 
Before the QMS aspiring fishermen had the option of becoming ‗deckies‘ for 
experienced fishermen, likely to be a relative or neighbour and from the same 
community of place. There were opportunities for those, the rebellious or 
idiosyncratic, whose skills weren't oriented toward the strictures of school or the 
authorities. Thus they learnt the necessary skills in a familiar context by example, 
virtually by osmosis rather than formal teaching. They fitted the community of 
occupation and learnt the intricacies and quirks of the local ecosystem and fishery. 
Now, in the more formalised regime of the QMS there are fewer opportunities for 
deckhands. There is less certainty of on-going careers so although some who 
aspire to the vocation can start as deckies others are recruited through centralised 
maritime colleges. To advance they need to do their tickets so again are shaped 
not by local practice, which includes specific ecosystem and community 
requirements but by industry and head office curricula in a regime of formalised 
schooling and trade training for a generic fisheries occupation; the New Zealand 
coastal or deepwater fishery rather than the local Hauraki Gulf or the Bay of 
Plenty or the bays and islands of the North East coast.  Participation in the QMS 
demands an increased management component and costs which require new skills 
of the fishers, met through generic technologically based training with the 
expectation the skills are generic.  
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For fishermen the QMS has meant a change of ethos, a tighter regime and more 
―micromanagement‖ through, for example, phone calls each day, welcomed by 
some since they implied company concern and communication but deplored by 
others since they implied surveillance, interference and control. For many it has 
meant more economic marginalisation and reduction in their sense of freedom 
‗out there‘. Indeed the QMS has not resolved the fishermen's perennial suspicion 
that they are being exploited by the companies. Nor has it resolved some safety 
issues, since quota owners driven by the market dictate conditions, not fishermen 
deciding when and where to fish, including that they go out in bad weather, so the 
QMS does not necessarily mean that fishing is safer or more flexible for the 
fishermen. 
In consequence commercial fishermen have moved from being community-based 
to selling to the fishing companies, which process, distribute and market both 
domestically and internationally. The findings support those of St Martin's (2006) 
for New England (USA) that fishermen were removed from the give and take 
reciprocity of community relations. The community loses and the role of social 
relations per se is minimised (Helgason and Palsson 1997 460). In some of the 
Hauraki Gulf communities, fishermen's direct involvement and the communities‘ 
commercial linkage with the sea was lost by selling or leasing their quota. In 
addition community relations became transactional rather than social and 
reciprocal. 
As Pinkerton and Edwards (2009) demonstrate, the leasing of quota has profound 
implications for one of the fundamental assumptions of the ITQ system namely 
that the ownership (rights-based) aspect is an incentive for conservation. It 
doesn‘t. The decisions relevant for conservation of for example, where and how to 
fish, how much to catch or over-catch, are made by fishermen. The owners of 
most of the quota, corporates, are removed from direct influence on such 
decisions that are generally outside their expertise and interest. Also, generally, 
the companies are of commercial necessity more focused on meeting market 
demand and the ‗bottom line‘. Quota (ACE) is bought (colloquially ‗leased‘) for 
the duration of a year. The costs involved ensure that the major incentive for 
ACE-dependent fishermen is to cover their expenses and maximise their return. 
For non-quota owning fishermen economic necessities ensure that concerns for 
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longer term consequences for conservation, while not necessarily absent are of 
lesser immediate concern.  
Arguably the QMS may have reduced the ―Race for fish,‖ but since getting ACE 
can be uncertain, fishermen now have to race for companies, and for ACE. As 
noted above, this may negate the claim that ITQs improve fishermen's safety, 
since generally international markets not climatic or social conditions (e.g. 
Christmas) determine company requirements and can override fishermen's 
seafaring prudence. In the present research the race was for the more sympathetic 
company, Leigh Fisheries.  Many of the directors or board members had been 
fishermen or still have kin ties to fishermen or own fishing vessels and so tend to 
have closer personal relationships and empathy with fishermen.  Indeed, this 
company has a reputation for treating their fishermen better than the bigger 
Auckland corporates. Yet, under the QMS regime restrictions such as bin limits 
still had to be imposed to ensure catch was both within quota and matched their 
markets effectively. 
Despite the added costs of levies and surveys fishermen are now paid little, if any, 
more for their catch than they did before the QMS. Reporting and commercial 
requirements mean less literate, but often expert, and conservational fishermen 
have been excluded. Discussions with fishermen and observations of the state of 
the boats at other wharves around the country confirmed that the coastal fleet is in 
decline and particularly ACE-dependent fishermen are generally marginalized 
(See: Ingram 2010 2,3). Recruitment now is even more difficult for aspiring 
fishermen. Where previously cost of the boat and gear was the biggest hurdle, 
now, in addition they incur training costs to get the necessary tickets and quota or 
ACE.  For many remaining fishermen, their ethos has changed from being 
enterprising owner-operators with relatively egalitarian relationships with buyers, 
to being ACE-dependent fishermen. They have, in effect, become contractors, 
with all the costs and responsibilities but none of the privileges and little hope of 
realising on their investment in boat and gear, either now or at retirement. They 
have lost their sense of independence and freedom. "Fishing was one of the least 
regulated [industries] now it‘s going 'over the top'" (Anonymous informant). 
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Typology: Identity / idiosyncratic 
Even before the QMS neither the fishermen nor the local community controlled 
the fisheries. Fishermen were ideologically diverse. Some were conservationist, 
while others were more content to ―get as much as possible‖ and driven by their 
own needs at the time and these varied according to lifecycle (pay off the house, 
and/or debts, retirement needs), seasons (winter / schooling season), the natural 
variability of snapper and other alternative commercial stocks (e.g. gurnard, john 
dory, rig), year, class variability and market demand. Needs and opportunities 
varied. Fishermen were driven variously by an idiosyncratic mix of passion, on 
the one extreme, and economic exigencies on the other. Fishermen shared and 
influenced community ideologies. Perhaps, if communities were relative isolates 
from the pressures of national and international economies, local Hauraki Gulf 
fishermen would have been more conservative but even in the relatively insular 
1970s - 1980s these communities could not be described as predominantly 
conservative.  
Many of the typologies in the literature imply clear or distinct boundaries that may 
be borne out in the everyday life of fishermen. A typology can be conceived for 
New Zealand's fishermen based on the degree to which they are relatively 
independent. This research suggests that current key distinguishing variables are 
ownership of tangible assets (e.g. boats) or rights (e.g. Annual Catch Entitlement 
or ITQs). This enables a typology that is a distinctive consequence of a rights-
based fishery (See Table 6).  In developing this typology it must be recognised 
that fishermen may never neatly fit one or other of the categories and that personal 
characteristics may override or subvert any levels of empowerment that might be 
thought attributable to fishermen who outwardly appear to fit a particular 
category. 
An important crosscutting change has occurred in the construction of the meaning 
of ―fish‖. Whether this is due to the introduction of the QMS as a mechanism of 
change and meaning or as an outcome is unclear. Once, for the fishermen, those 
elusive living quarry 'fish' meant a livelihood, a challenge, risk and drudgery, the 
means of supporting a family, or at least one's self. They meant work outdoors in 
the big marine environment; at times overwhelming, at others uplifting. They 
meant skill; those special abilities of boat and gear handling in small moving 
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spaces at unusual unrelenting hours.  They meant exhilaration and frustration; a 
sense of identity. Not everyone could survive the job and not all of those who 
could, made good fishermen.  
 
Fishermen Security 
Fishing knowledge / skill High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Low 
 
Debts paid off 
LFR 
Own boat 
Own quota 
Lease some ACE 
ACE-dependent 
Lease boat 
New Entrant 
Table 6: A continuum of Fishermen security under QMS 
Certainly, individual informants were rugged individualists, some with more 
business acumen or more innovativeness or more concern for conservation than 
others. ACE-dependent fishermen, however, had less room for individual choice 
so were of necessity more utilitarian than they might otherwise have been, but 
these are tendencies that are contextual and vary from one individual to another 
and from season to season. Fishermen now are generally no longer hunters, 
catching an elusive quarry whenever they could. The QMS selected for different 
individuals - business oriented and financially competent and often eliminated 
conservationists, the less literate, and the un-academic. While cuts were ostensibly 
to ensure sustainability those eliminated were sometimes the more 
environmentally concerned leaving the more financially ambitious with perhaps 
less personal commitment to the conservation objective even when economic 
exigencies allow. This appears to run contrary to standard Hardinian theories of 
vested interests in quota-ownership leading to long-term sustainability. 
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Although remaining fishermen manage the stocks in the sense of not deliberately 
damaging the habitat or taking too much at any one time they didn't ―fertilize‖ or 
―dag‖132, or whatever the equivalent task would be in the marine ecosystem, so 
they also were not farmers. Nor are they employees of  'the company', but since 
they own and operate their own boats they are contractors at the beck and call of 
the companies to catch a particular amount, at a particular time, of the right 
species, the right size and colour and still had to fill out increasingly detailed catch 
landing returns. More than ever they are in debt (if not financially, in terms of 
operability) to the company and with a more stringent compliance regime, under 
the thrall of MFish. No longer rugged individualists they are now serfs (cf Pálsson 
and Helgason 1995 140).  
Commercial fishing was now a lifestyle with passion, traditions, a desire to work 
in a marine environment and appreciation of being out there, not a viable job! The 
system was not paying proper wages and depended on people being willing to 
work for lifestyle, what Courtland Smith (1981 182) termed,  'satisfaction bonus', 
was being exploited.  
Reasons for Selling 
Rights-based fishing brought opportunities and problems. It changed commercial 
fishing from strategising how best to catch and benefit from selling the fish to 
having to deal with far more bureaucracy, surveillance and compliance. Some 
fishermen sold their quota, willing sellers to willing buyers and got a ―windfall‖. 
Others sold to simplify the expanding paper work, believing they could lease 
quota or buy ACE and fish as before. Maybe they did, for a while, but then 
buyers' requirements were different or the price they were offered for fish was 
lower or the conditions tighter or ACE was less available. Fishermen hadn't seen 
the implications and therefore lost or at least reduced their control over their 
operation. Others sold, paid off their house mortgage and other debts, tried to 
continue fishing for a year or two but found such difficulties too great and now 
regret the loss of their chosen occupation both for themselves and for their 
children. Some, on the other hand were getting near to retirement or tired of 
fishing, tried to retain their quota but found it difficult to lease out and reporting 
                                                 
132
  Routine farming chores. 
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requirements such as monthly nil returns too taxing so sold. For others 
capitalising on their efforts was a good way to get out but as Dawson noted a few 
who sold ―pissed their asset away against pub walls133‖ (Fishfolk 15 May 1999).   
For some fishermen the devaluing of the previous freedoms and satisfactions was 
something they had to put up with. For others it was a handing over of irksome 
responsibilities. For some members of Waiheke and Coromandel communities it 
meant the loss of a vibrant industry that had contributed to their economic and 
social wellbeing. Some got rid of a grotty often smelly occupation and allowed the 
gentrification and upmarketing of desirable marine infrastructure for recreational 
or tourist purposes. Generally, then, those who sold their quota fit Stewart et al.'s 
profile of exiting fishermen (2006 7).  In hindsight, however, a significantly 
higher number of my informants, than Stewart et al. imply, regretted selling and 
feel bitterness and a sense of betrayal that they expressed explicitly in several 
interviews.   
Certainly it can be said that in capitalizing on the value of the asset, Waiheke 
fishermen were at least partially complicit in the dispossession of the 
community‘s historical fishing rights. For many fishermen the increased 
complexity and bureaucratic change of the QMS created a situation of uncertainty 
that changed the ethos and character of the occupation. In a situation fraught with 
misunderstandings and misconceptions some sold because they wanted the 
money, some to get what they could before the possibility they lost out more 
seriously, some because the job was no longer what they wanted or since others 
had sold the clique would no longer function and some because they didn‘t trust 
the regime. The social implications were not apparent and the Waiheke 
community was not part of the decisionmaking.  
Even if those who sold and then invested in new businesses, such as arborist, or 
landscaper, the tourist or visitor industries, or waste disposal and are now 
employing as many crew and provide other support to the community, lost the 
cogent values of relating to the sea. From being primary producers at least 
potentially, contributing to community food security, these people moved to 
secondary or service industries.  
                                                 
133
  Squandered it in the pub or on other consumer products. 
312 
 
Under the Thumb 
Stuster's seminal paper "Under the Thumb," explains the dynamics of the 
relationship that resulted between fishermen and their buyers or in the present 
case, corporates:  
In relationships with fish buyers, fishermen incur along the way a host of 
incidental debts both financial and intangible. Sometimes 'loans' are 
solicited by fishermen and sometimes they are extended by buyers, as if 
altruistically. These include borrowing a vehicle, prompt payment for fish, 
accepting a difficult-to-sell species or a fish in marginal condition, a  
―break‖ on price  (higher than the going rate), or an actual loan of money 
or fishing gear.  Even when extended in  ―friendship‖ both parties 
recognize the nature of these transactions and the degree of indebtedness 
incurred. … The general condition of fishermen in the traditional 
relationship with buyers is referred to as ―being under the thumb‖ of the 
markets  (Stuster 1980 6). 
Daryl Sykes, former fisherman, Federation Field Officer and now CEO of the 
New Zealand Rock Lobster Industry Council, suggested to me that before the 
QMS, buyers and companies maintained their access to fish through such covert 
ties to fishermen. Now since they own the quota and therefore supply the 
necessary ACE, the relationship is more transparent but the Fishermen are no less 
tied  (Daryl Sykes pers com June 2005). ACE means that Fishermen are 
contractually tied to the ACE provider which can then be utilised to ensure 
catching is more in accord with market requirements. 
The need for quota and ACE is also part of a managerial bureaucracy that 
overrides the New Zealand  ―do it yourself‖ attitude, and reified ―Kiwi identity‖. 
Big companies can have specialised staff to handle it whereas the hassle it creates 
rules out smaller companies and communities. For NZ fishermen, the costs of 
leasing quota (buying ACE) takes finance that might otherwise be used to 
maintain their boats and upgrade their gear. 
Many of the remaining fishermen complain that the price they receive for their 
fish now is no more than they were getting twenty years ago. They are aware that 
the cost of fish to the consumer has risen considerably and for many is priced off 
their menu. This mark-up from the landed value they receive and the cost to the 
consumer includes company profits and the cost of the commodity chain but 
seems exorbitant especially as all fishermen's costs: running a boat and making a 
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trip, the cost of ACE, NZFIB levies, DOC levies, Maritime Safety levies, safety 
gear requirements, fuel, ice, groceries are considerably more now than they were 
before the QMS. Most of the levies are paid by quota owners but fishermen say 
these are passed on in the ACE prices and are additional to ACE and the costs of 
vessel safety requirements. Many fishermen are, therefore financially marginal. 
As most own their own boats they are in effect contractors, struggling to keep up 
the maintenance and meet the standards of the annual survey. As contractors, 
fishermen bear the costs and risks. For ACE dependent fishermen quota owners 
have externalised most of the costs involved in harvesting. So, concurring with 
Holmes (1998 65, 80), extra benefits go to the authorities, the administration, the 
companies and their shareholders benefit
134
 but the small-scale fishermen are 
increasingly marginalised.  
Further, for ACE-dependent fishermen Pinkerton and Edwards (2009 5) note that 
―While processors characterize these skipper lessees as ''desperate'', the situation 
of crew or deckhands is equally or more precarious…. [In addition] skippers who 
are desperate will take greater risks and fish earlier in the season when prices are 
often higher and weather less predictable‖. My research supports that view, 
although it is not necessarily early-season fishing, but fishing at the direction of 
the quota owners and their market needs that may place local ACE-dependent 
fishers at risk. Although the QMS might be expected to have modernised and 
empowered fishermen and moved them away from the traditional buyer-fishermen 
power structure, this research indicates that, if anything, they have become more 
under the thumb.   
New Part-timers 
Some fishermen among my informants have benefited from the QMS and 
generally they straddle both systems. They tend to have learnt the skills, 
accumulated the essential ecological knowledge and fished before the introduction 
of quota. Perhaps most importantly they have a passion for the sea, for their boats 
and the vocation. Some sold quota and paid off debt and set up alternative 
businesses but have been able to get back into fishing with their own boats. Now 
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  It could be argued that retailers also benefit but since some 90 percent of fish is 
exported and there are fewer retailers selling a more expensive product directly to the 
public than before the QMS the issue is not clear. 
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with well developed knowledge and skills they can reliably catch the fish the 
companies require so have some security in getting ACE if needed. Since they are 
debt free they no longer have to work long and hard so can pick their trips to suit 
themselves and their families. They retain the ―freedom‖ and ethos enjoyed before 
the QMS so are in effect the new part-timers.  
Greg and Michaela Hayes exemplify the attitudes of the new part-timers  
If you love the sea and you love fishing then all right, go fishing. Don't go 
fishing for the money. Go for the passion. If you go because it‘s your 
passion then you might make money but if you go for the money you'll 
never do it. And that is the secret. If it is your passion and you just love the 
sea. I mean, I've been on the boat and I belong out there.  
They enumerated those of their colleagues who were financially comfortable and 
all were enthusiastic; fishing was more than a job ―They've got a passion. They've 
got a passion for the sea and they are very good. They're bright. They are really 
bright men. It‘s interesting. But people would look at them and think 'Oh you're 
just commercial fishermen‖. These new part-timers, are passionate for the sea and 
their job, have cleared their debts, own their boats, have skills and are 
knowledgeable and, unlike many have been able to work the QMS to their 
advantage so retain some of the pre-QMS freedom.  
COMMUNITIES 
By privatising catch rights (quota) the QMS, in effect, changed the concept from 
fish being a community resource to being primarily an internationally tradeable 
commodity that has then been aggregated to the corporates. For the communities 
in this study this reallocation of their rights of propinquity and usufruct impacted 
in terms of nutrition, livelihood and identity. Where once fish was a staple diet 
and provider of food security, supplied by local community members, it is now 
scarce and expensive. The fish that is available has traversed a considerably 
lengthened supply chain. Fish caught off Waiheke, for example, that once 
supplied the community directly, is now exported or, at best goes through the 
Auckland Fish Mart and could be bought there, fresh, by those privileged 
consumers able to get there. Fish otherwise comes from the Mart or another 
company through a wholesaler, filleters and a distributor. At Coromandel, during 
my research, the only fresh locally caught fish available to the public was fish that 
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had been rejected from export orders. While at Leigh, the fish may have been 
caught by a local fisherman but at least in terms of paperwork it has been through 
an Auckland retailer.  
The commodity chain for mussels from Waiheke is also indirect. Farmed on the 
island they go across the Gulf by boat to Coromandel then by truck to Auckland 
before coming back for sale on the island. Some New Zealand communities with 
LFRs who sell to the public may still have access to fresh locally caught fish at 
affordable prices but this is virtually not the case for those communities where the 
fish on offer is expensive, often of questionable quality, compared with what was 
previously available, and so has generally been priced off the average menu. The 
community now no longer has ready access to what once was a healthy dietary 
staple. The supermarket commodities that replace fresh fish may be more 
convenient but whether they are as nutritious is beyond my expertise.  
Compared with some New Zealand fishing communities, the fishing families in 
Waiheke, Coromandel and Leigh, have less generational depth and dynastic 
outlook, but perhaps stronger local aspirations since their fishing traditions and 
ideologies started in those localities, not in the ―old countries‖ (Greece, the 
Shetlands, Italy, England or others). Their concerns were supplying their local 
community and making a living, not establishing an industry or ―an empire‖. For 
those wives who dealt with the paper work, the increased requirements of the 
QMS have either enlarged the job considerably or excluded them from this aspect 
of the enterprise as professional, or alternative, help is required. For their children 
entering the workforce, doubtful future prospects, pessimism and uncertainty can 
mean a shortage of aspiring crew and therefore better chance for those who do 
wish to fish. For those who do not it adds to the pressure to help out struggling 
family enterprises in an occupation they would rather avoid. Generally though, the 
livelihoods that fishing once offered are no longer available. As an informant 
pointed out, the previous ability to divert obstreperous teens is no longer available 
to mitigate drug, alcohol or vandalism or such teen problems.  
For Waiheke and, to a lesser extent Coromandel, the QMS has meant community 
costs - lack of a system to pick up youth, lack of ability to buy fresh fish (with 
associated costs to image and health) unless an LFR is obtained, lack of 
connection with the biophysical environment, loss/change of identity, loss of 
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community power (to distant communities/corporations), change in boat types 
leading to loss of vessels from the community with related employment and 
diversity of readily accessible food alternatives (types of fish). These have had to 
be offset by further costs to the environment, landscape and community from 
expanding tourism and land development.  
Lien (2003 113) suggests that community identity is a response to outside 
pressure and the need to 'brand' oneself in contrast to similar others. This is 
certainly the case in response to the QMS. On Waiheke prior to restructuring
135
, 
people pursued their lifestyles apparently with little concern for establishing an 
externally recognizable identity since the ideological contention between 
'capitalists' and alternatives' was an internal community issue. Sustenance was 
available from local resources that included commercial fishing. Before the QMS 
commercial fishing was part of this identity. There was reassurance in seeing the 
lights of local fishermen working off the northern coast, knowing they were 
actively part of the symbiotic relationship between the social and marine 
ecosystems.  With virtually no quota owned on Waiheke Island, except for the 
wharf sales vessel, no operating commercial fishing boats are based on the island 
so this sign of a commercial relationship with the sea has gone and with it a 
significant component economy and identity. So for Waiheke from baches and 
bed-stays being an expression of a down-to-earth visitor and holiday island, now 
resorts and lodges backed by wineries and restaurants express a neo-liberal up-
market identity without the substantiation of locally caught fresh fish. Waiheke is 
missing an essential element of its former island life and for the island, the Gulf 
has moved from a productive fishing ground to a seascape for holiday snaps and 
postcards. 
Neo-liberalism has brought interrelated changes with globalisation, rights-based 
management and Auckland City governance supporting urban and resort 
development. In particular, after the QMS, the ethos and symbols of commercial 
fishing and fresh locally caught fish, fundamental features of islands, are no 
longer available for community identity. There has, therefore, been increasing 
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  That occurred generally as a result of the change of government in 1984, 
Rogernomics and particularly the Local Government Act 1989. 
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pressure on the communities to identify those 'unique' aspects of the island and its 
lifestyle that were economically, socially and emotionally significant to 
Waihekeans and defend them from developers and exploiters. Community 
economics increasingly meant attracting revenue to the communities from 
outsiders. With a thriving fishing industry in the Hauraki Gulf, visitors and 
tourists still expect fresh locally caught fish. The difficulty of sourcing such 
seafood has, however, meant that commercial fishing and seafood are not 
generally promoted as part of community identity. Instead even as an island in the 
middle of what was once the biggest coastal fishery by value and volume in New 
Zealand, fresh fish caught by locals is not commercially available. Because these 
local resources for subsistence and livelihood have been increasingly restricted 
there has been the need to construct an identity and 'sell' Waiheke Island's other 
attractions and services.  
Coromandel, however, with a strong marine aquaculture industry and gold mining 
history has recently seen the transition to a tourist oriented 'fishing town' image 
through the shops, while the 'wild' commercial fishery has dwindled to 
marginality. Leigh, with marginally better infrastructure and arguably fewer 
resource and livelihood alternatives appears to be significantly different with its 
processing plant, prominent local fishing company (Leigh Fisheries) and fleet. 
However the fleet and number of people involved in the fishing has been severely 
depleted compared with those in the not too distant past. Leigh still identifies 
itself and is identified as a fishing community. Since Waiheke, Coromandel and 
now Leigh could expand their restaurant, wine, visitor and tourism industries they 
are still viable. It remains to be seen to what extent they will remain so under 
tighter financial and possible fuel restrictions following peak-oil. .  
These three communities have good access to local fishing grounds, but access to 
infrastructure and transport is more difficult for Waiheke (as an island), 
Coromandel (with winding roads on a long peninsular) than for Leigh. Leigh has 
highways and a location that enabled servicing vessels in communities on the 
North East coast and to urban supply centres (Whangarei and Auckland) with 
Auckland international airport giving ready access to international markets. With 
the QMS quota aggregation, the corporates have centralised so the fleet previously 
based at Waiheke is now virtually non-existent and those at Coromandel and 
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Leigh severely reduced. Consequently Waiheke is no longer involved in the 
fishing industry and Coromandel is marginal though Leigh is still a fishing 
village. The strategic location for the remnant fleet and both domestic urban and 
international markets explains Leigh's continued and indeed expanding 
involvement in the fishing industry under the QMS. 
Waiheke has survived at the cost of greater dependence on commuting to 
Auckland for employment, expansion of other aspects of the tourist and visitor 
industry, the fortuitously expanded productivity of viticulture and the demand for 
coastal lifestyle blocks; features which facilitate a viable neo-liberal economy, but 
to the detriment of self-sufficiency. On Coromandel the profits from leasing out 
quota have contributed to the development of aquaculture and other enterprises 
including the tourism and visitor industry so the capture fishery persists, but is 
marginal. Conditions for aquaculture have provided a replacement marine 
industry with a local product that contributes to identity and nutrition. At Leigh, a 
greater number of fishing families with longer traditions of fishing, it‘s location 
on main road transport and fewer alternative resources have resulted in a different 
outcome. Leigh Fisheries survived as a Co-op and found a niche in the 
international fresh chilled fish market to increase its strength as a company, 
although still threatened with takeover by larger corporates. There has been a 
reduction of the local fleet and availability of fresh fish to the community but with 
Leigh Fisheries the community has met the challenge through its company. Leigh 
is still a base for fishing operations and is a 'fishing community' but even here the 
LFR requirements and the demands of the international market mean fresh locally 
caught fish is scarcer for local residents and visitors than the locality and activity 
would suggest. 
In all three communities charter fishing and boat chartering have provided a few 
jobs in the recreational sector for former fishermen which meant some could still 
use their boats and skills working in the marine environment and revel in the 
different relationships with their clients. For others chartering meant a loss of the 
solitude and familiar work adjustments to known or casual crew and a form of 
sociability outside their comfort zone such that it wasn't a viable alternative in an 
already well catered market. 
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Politically and economically Coromandel has been marginalised and Waiheke 
generally excluded from the fishing sector's contribution to employment, fresh 
food, income and related mechanisms that reinforce community and social capital. 
Now they are much more dependent on secondary industries and highly 
vulnerable in the present global financial crisis and unpredictable fuel prices. 
Communities are stakeholders, in the marine environment and fisheries, and 
should be recognised as such. Individuals may submit to FMPs but communities 
are not represented in consultations. Instead the issue is left to market forces. 
The resources and processes of community cohesion have been reduced as the 
basis of them has been socially captured by the corporates. Relations in the 
community are now more transactional than previously and consequently the 
community is now less expressive, more instrumental and utilitarian which 
substantiates Symes (2000 3) claim that the more centralised concentration of 
fishing  (rights-based fishing) creates, ―virtually unsurmountable obstacles to new 
entrants. … the implied threats to the survival of the small boat sector which 
generates considerable employment, and the unique socio-cultural characteristics 
of the artisanal fishermen. … the development of capitalistic relations within the 
fishing industry‖ (Symes 2000 3).  
This research therefore confirms the findings reported by others: 
 Quota aggregated to corporates (Stewart and Callagher, 2002). The QMS 
provided corporates opportunity to break their dependence on fishermen 
by aggregating the quota and thus catch rights over commercial fishing. 
As a result there was a major reduction in the numbers of owner-operators 
and fishermen (Stevens 1999a, 1999b; Holmes 1998) 
Some fishermen, those who retained quota have done OK and now 
depending on their personal ideology own several boats or become ‗New 
Part-timers‘. 
 Corporate ownership took wealth out of the community (Yandle 2001 29). 
Since corporates controlled the fishing through corporate ownership of 
quota and hence ACE meant fishermen had to land to them not through the 
community. The international market was more profitable hence fish that 
would have been utilised by the community was either exported of greatly 
increased in price thus taking wealth out of the community.  
 Crew being disadvantaged (Yandle 2001 30). The reduced fleet meant 
crew had fewer berths while the costs of training, tickets and quota or 
ACE greatly increased the difficulties of entering the industry. 
 Unemployment (Palsson and Petursdottir, 1997 53). Greater 
unemployment was mitigated by payments received from selling quota 
enabling recipients to establish other businesses offering se employment 
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and in these communities development or expansion of the aquaculture, 
viticulture and tourism industries 
 Exacerbated equity problems within the community (Helgason and 
Palsson, 1997; Apostle et al. 2002). The buybacks and the sale of quota 
meant previous fishermen had capital not available to their peers in the 
community meant.  
 Changed fishing behaviour (Apostle et al. 2002 121; Boyd and Dewees 
1992 187). The corporates control of quota meant they could adjust fishing 
to suit international market requirements not necessarily the seasonal 
availability of fish thus rationing fishing effort. 
 Changed and additional pressures on family relationships (Davis 1996 
110). Money from buy-backs or quota sale on the one hand offered 
unanticipated alternatives the additional funds required for ACE, levies, 
surveys and increased costs in addition to more stringent reporting 
requirements add strains to family finances. 
 Loss of coastal fishing community authenticity (Jentoft, 1993). Without 
fishermen, fishing boats and fresh locally caught fish the island identity of 
Waiheke and the fishing community identities of Coromandel and Leigh 
have been badly depleted. 
THEORISING THE QMS 
The three features stressed by neo-liberal ideology, privatisation, market forces, 
and deregulation impact differentially on the components discussed in this 
dissertation. Neo-liberal ideology is embedded more explicitly in MAF/Mfish and 
given expression through the QMS therefore influencing fishermen and their 
communities. This is so-called rights-based since the core element, privatisation 
creates the property right with ownership overriding the human rights of 
communities and their fishermen on the basis of propinquity and usufruct. Mfish's 
brief is ―to ensure that fisheries are used in a sustainable way and that we have a 
healthy aquatic ecosystem. That way, all New Zealanders can get the best value 
from this resource‖ (Mfish136). MAF/Mfish ideology, 'think big' then neo-
liberalism seems to interpret "best value" as the maximisation of industry and 
export returns which are then captured mainly by corporates and their 
shareholders with the costs externalised to part-timers and their communities. 
For the corporates, market forces facilitated corporatisation and the globalisation 
of international trade on the one hand and, through the QMS access to fish shifted 
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 See: http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/default.htm  (Accessed 18 July 2008). 
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from owner-operators to the corporates and quota owners, enabling most to 
maximise benefit without concern for the well-being of communities, even those 
which had been significantly dependent on fish previously. The neo-liberal 
imperative for growth means that once the availability of fish is capped by the 
TACC, in order to "grow" profits harvesting costs must be reduced, processing 
added for value-added products and the resulting commodities distributed and 
sold to the highest paying market.  
Yandle's (2001 113) claim that privatisation was being discussed in Federation in 
the 1970s was at a time when 'think big' policies were developing the crisis. The 
issue, therefore, is more complex than just benefits for MAF /MFish and the 
corporates as fishermen through the Federation lobbied for the exclusion of the 
part-timers to the detriment of inshore fishermen and coastal communities. There 
are profound consequences from privatisation and deregulation for the fishermen 
under the rights-based QMS. Ownership of quota or ACE meant both 
considerable cost and restriction while, under deregulation, the imposition of 
levies, more stringent survey requirements, reporting and selling restrictions 
tightened the fishing regime. Even so some fishermen have benefitted from quota 
ownership (e.g. Dave Moore, TV1 Country Calendar 7 June 12.00AM) or service 
his own operation and provide quota for others (e.g. Tony Meulo, TV1 Country 
Calendar 113 February 2010 22:30) or alternative occupations but many others 
have become marginal or been forced out of the industry. 
Right-based fishing meant a change of ideological perspective from an ethos of 
flexibility, community relationship, cooperation and informal economy, an ethos 
of freedom where fishermen were self-employed, hunting, rugged individualists, 
with a "number eight wire Kiwi can do" attitude keeping the boats together, out 
there self- and clique-reliant, not part of the urban rat-race. To operate within the 
QMS fishermen became neo-liberal businessmen in a regime of privatised 
catching rights (quota), market forces and "de-regulation" that in reality increased 
regulation in an ethos of business / commercial, regulation and inflexible 
accountability. Just as the exclusion of the part-timers removed many legitimate, 
particularly rural pluriactive fishermen dependent on fishing for their livelihood 
so the QMS removed not just the ratbags but also many environmentally and 
socially responsible community fishermen.  
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At the level of personal ideology some fishermen were not "the sharpest knives" 
and just wanted to fish. Fishermen and those in the Co-op, for example, were 
oriented to fishing not business and therefore the added difficulties (reporting, 
paperwork, bureaucracy) were a problem not a challenge. Even before the QMS 
globalisation was having influence and Waiheke fishermen had begun to service 
the more lucrative Japanese Iki Jimi market in addition to the local market. 
Exports were beginning to take precedence over local subsistence. Fishermen are 
now embedded in a tighter bureaucratic regime. They can still enjoy the marine 
ecosystem, boats, camaraderie, cliques - out there - but quota restrictions mean 
corporate control and marginality for many.  
Some of the remaining fishermen who owned quota, may have become the new 
part-timers or others with the business acumen and such aspirations could 
leverage it to a small fleet operation. ACE dependent fishermen, however, became 
contractors, serfs for the companies, with many marginalised by the externalised 
costs of the system, levies, ACE lease, increased survey fees, to the extent they 
were lucky to keep their boats afloat for the duration of their careers; their boats 
and gear barely saleable on their retirement. In such a regime they lack the 
ownership and any incentive toward conservation. Instead their incentive is of 
necessity to squeeze the most money they can, by catching the product the market 
requires as quickly and cheaply as possible and maintain their operation and 
livelihood. While non-fishing quota owners have incentive to conserve the value 
of their financial asset they have only indirect effect on fish stocks and habitat 
destruction. 
The consequences of ideology in general and neo-liberalism in particular affect 
the community (e.g. See Palsson 1990 1991 54) with significant social 
implications. The rights of fishing communities are a global issue and New 
Zealand is no exception. In the Hauraki Gulf and, by extension, in other coastal 
communities, rights of propinquity and usufruct were overridden. Locally caught 
commercial fish is not readily available so fresh 'fresh' fish and an intrinsic part of 
Kiwi heritage has been lost to a combination of corporate export profits
137
 and 
                                                 
137
  On Waiheke Te Matuku Bay Oysters‘ expanding sales of fresh fish sales from the 
Hauraki Gulf goes some way to address this issue. These filets are however, at gourmet 
prices and not the basic, cheap and nutritional fresh fish supply the island once enjoyed. 
Some urban locations are better served (See: Table 2) 
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tighter, more costly more punitive administration that appears geared to both 
protect the sustainability of the fishery and the rights of those who hold harvesting 
rights. Such implications might not be as severe as for the communities of 
developing nations dependent on the fisheries for survival, they were, 
nevertheless, seriously deprived of a major resource that contributed to livelihood, 
nutrition, community identity and well-being.  
Symbolically and meaningfully fish have become commodities. Once sacred in 
some areas and some cultures, fish which were part of the exchange, for money or 
barter, between fishermen or fish shop keepers and community members, 
facilitating community relationships and the interrelationships which reinforced 
community solidarity and resilience are now mere commodities passed along an 
anonymous commodity chain. Where once community members knew, or could 
know just by asking, who caught the fish or which boat, now takeaway 
shopkeepers often know only the last company to have handled the product. 
Instead of eating natural foods distinguishable by appearance and taste consumers 
now depend on advertising, branding and labelling of an anonymous commodity. 
Consumer relationships with the fishermen, fish workers and the marine 
ecosystem have been lost to an increasingly globalised, corporate food industry. 
Before the QMS the livelihoods of fishermen operating from the community were 
dependent on community resources for services and contributed to community 
welfare. Now, since fishermen are more dependent on the corporates they are less 
embedded in the community. Fish had meant jobs supporting families directly and 
indirectly through repair work or other services to keep the boats running. For a 
few short years commercial fishing was the biggest industry on Waiheke Island. 
With the exception, for example, of one wharf fisherman selling at most only one 
night's catch per week, Waiheke, has lost its fishermen.  Fish once meant good 
fresh healthy food a chore and inconvenience to gut and cook, maybe, but caught 
by the neighbour or the guy down the road. For Waiheke now and to a lesser 
extent Coromandel, if not bought at the Fish Mart in Auckland, or gourmet items 
at limited outlets, fish are 'products' expensive fillets or boxed frozen 
commodities, sourced through long uncertain chains. Sometimes of questionable 
quality, generally 'fresh' is priced off the ordinary budget.  
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At Coromandel the few fishermen that remain are oriented to selling to Leigh or 
OPC at Whitianga. While even in a fishing community such as Leigh, 
conceptually landing to your mate driving your co-op truck is different to landing 
to the company truck though in practice it may be little different. In consequence 
loss the "perks" such as "home freight" and the criminalisation of the informal 
economy has meant the loss of ability to ensure those who need nutrition, such as 
the ill and struggling (young mothers), get the occasional feed of fish. The 
communities have been excluded from resource, from livelihoods, from the 
nutrition of cheap locally caught basic food. Instead of an ethos of cooperation 
and sharing has been replaced by greatly individualised cash transactions.  Now, 
generally, kids have lost the inheritance moving into a family run business. 
Community resentment and resistance contributes to Waiheke's identity as a feisty 
community.  
For the recreational fisher the fishing may have been improved with less 
commercial fishing around the island and more ―recreational‖ fish. The supply 
seems generally better but is still subject to yearly and seasonal variation, and 
there are opportunities for local and tourist charter fishing. 
Before the QMS community identity was not an issue. Now under neo-liberalism 
the incentive is not for a sustainable community from local resources. 
Consequently loss of direct access to fishery resources has meant loss of essential 
features of Island identity and the necessity to rebrand, to maximise wealth 
through coastal subdivision and business "growth". It has meant catering for a 
changing demographic with the influx of wealth expressed in mansions, lifestyle 
blocks, vineyards, fig plantations, investments and profits. In contradiction to a 
tourist publicity identity of "picturesque vineyards, beaches and laid back seaside 
villages" the remnants of the Alternatives struggle against being rated off the 
island and retain features of ecology, landscape and community. 
MFish were focused on the symptoms and ideological solution, not the causes of 
the decline in coastal fish stocks or social justice for the communities. The 
corporates were then and are now focused on profits from globalization and the 
global food industry so the remaining fishermen and their communities bore the 
brunt. If the rights of fishing communities are important as determinants of 
community entities, they have not been considered in the QMS and its 
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implementation. The social implications of rights-based fishery management has 
meant fishermen's and community rights to community resources have been 
transferred to the corporates with consequences for livelihood, nutrition and food 
security. In the Hauraki Gulf, and by extension in other similar coastal 
communities, rights of propinquity and usufruct were overridden. Individual 
fishermen, with the exception of the 'new part-timers' and  'fishing communities' 
such as Leigh have been marginalised economically and politically from the 
fishing industry. 
Future Research 
To what extent the findings for Hauraki Gulf fishermen and their communities are 
representative of other New Zealand fisheries needs investigation. The present 
research did not set out to study the exclusion of the part-timers and I was unable 
to locate any in the communities studied. The exclusion of Māori led to the 
fisheries claims to the Waitangi Tribunal and partially addressed. The real 
consequences for pakeha fishermen who had been dependent on the fisheries 
have, however, been largely ignored by other researchers. A more comprehensive 
assessment would research the files in MFish and SeaFIC to provide information 
on just who the part-timers were and go to the more remote, particularly Far 
North, ports to determine the social implications of their exclusion. This was a 
significant event in New Zealand history with long term consequences for social 
justice and warrants full investigation. 
Just how representative this research is other coastal communities in New Zealand 
needs investigating. Many, if not most fishing communities will have faced the 
same trends from social and reciprocal relations toward transactional, with 
marginalisation of fishermen, fleet depletion
138
 and loss of locally caught fish 
similar to those studied here. 
Māori and the Māori Fisheries Settlements were not included in this research 
despite profound social implications, both positive and negative of the QMS. This 
is a major field for further research. 
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  During a brief visit to Lyttleton Harbour , for example, in May 2008 one 
fisherman expressed similar concerns to my informants and about a third of local fishing 
boats at the wharf seemed to be for sale. 
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The present focus has been more heavily weighted toward fishermen and 
consumers in the community rather than the supply chain and the commercial 
implications. Determining whether or not coastal communities now get a more 
nutritional, healthier food from commodities through the contemporary supply 
chain as they did previously from their local fishermen requires different expertise 
from mine. Like fisheries, the food industry has also been corporatised with 
profound implications for communities and their members and warrants a more 
comprehensive investigation than has been attempted here. Research is needed 
into the costs at each step of the supply chain between catching and the final 
consumer to determine whether or not factory jobs and benefits to corporates and 
their shareholders are of greater benefit to the nation than those for owner-
operators and direct consumption in communities. 
Fisheries were not the only resource privatised in a way that excluded many from 
their preferred livelihoods. A real accounting of the benefits should be balanced 
by evaluating the cost of externalising the loss of jobs, clients, unemployment, 
family strain, depressions and the contribution to such symptoms as drug use, 
graffiti and other symptoms of social resentment. 
With the benefit of hindsight, I would have explored the process and implications 
of ―leasing quota‖ for ACE-dependent fishermen in more detail. This is a critical 
issue on which the social success or failure of the QMS depends.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Fish, living marine species, once sacred in some cultures and societies, then 
community livelihood and food, are now mainly just value-added commodities  
in the frozen product sections of global food industry supermarkets. 
 
Through the extensive introduction in 1986 of the QMS, New Zealand has 
established a reputation as a leader in implementing rights-based fisheries 
management. This dissertation has explored some of the social implications at the 
fishermen‘s and community level and this concluding chapter draws the main 
threads of the dissertation together.  
Since the early 1900s there has been conflict between small locally based 
fishermen generally supplying their local community and the big company boats 
serving the mass local and export markets. There has been a trend to increasing 
legislation and bureaucracy imposing more reporting, monitoring and control on 
fishermen. The change with rights-based management has not been a 
simplification but an exponential expansion of bureaucracy, costs and 
corporatisation that has shifted allocation of fish from community and coastal 
fishermen to the corporates. From having fish and importing fishermen to supply 
a local market, New Zealand now deprives much of the local market of fresh 
locally caught prime fish species and instead exports it to service a predominantly 
international market mitigating the loss to communities with convenience 
commodities.  
Following the declaration of the EEZ MAF‘s allowing the ‗big boats‘ imported 
under ―Think Big‖ to fish prime coastal species aggravated consequences of Rural 
Bank and Financial Corporation loans and created the crisis that the QMS 
addressed. In its implementation MAF did show some recognition of pre-existing 
rights and social justice but the social implications of the quota buyback schemes 
and the QAA process in the transition to the QMS for fishermen their families 
were stress, frustration and uncertainty. In due course for some it meant financial 
benefits as the companies bought up their quota but for other fishermen and 
families, there remained only the stress and uncertainty of a tortuous process and 
the uncertainty of being able to continue their chosen livelihood.  Consequently 
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the number of fishermen has been reduced considerably. Fewer fishermen based 
in the community with different boat types and methods changed the scope of 
fishermen politics so there is now less scope for cliques, the rivalries and 
cooperation. Fishermen may remain rugged individualists at sea but are now more 
formally contracted to companies and of necessity utilitarian.  
MFish now implements a more stringent compliance system policing the quota 
requirements, while registration, boat survey requirements and inflating costs all 
add occupational restrictions. For the companies, marketing opportunities but 
more restricted quota has meant a tighter, even micro management regime for the 
fishermen from ACE distribution, bin limits and daily phone calls. From the 
flexible ―give and take‖ of an occupation embedded in the coastal communities 
and local industry, with the QMS the fisheries became much more regimented, the 
ethos of freedom has been curtailed and of necessity fishermen are now far more 
utilitarian than before.  
Aggregation of quota has meant the corporates now have direct control over 
access to their product. Fishermen are more beholden to the companies from 
which they obtain ACE. With little increase in the landed price for fish over the 
past 20 years, deduction of the price of ACE, increased costs for goods, services 
and levies, more of the remaining fishermen are economically marginalized in a 
new system that demands rigorous accountability and primarily services the 
export market.  
Commercial fishing is now no longer an occupation of either last resort nor does it 
offer an optimistic career path for the capital strapped new entrant. Where before 
the QMS those who aspired to the becoming commercial fishermen with the 
freedom of working in the marine environment chasing an elusive quarry needed 
to develop boating and hunting expertise now, in addition, they must have 
technological and business skills, a much different skill set and aspirations. 
Fishermen now, aware of the occupational uncertainties; tighter management 
regime and increasing costs, tend to discourage their children into more certain 
career directions. For their children who do have the skill set and commitment, 
those of the new part-timers for example, the opposite may be true so they may be 
inducted into the family enterprise. 
The requirement to land to LFRs and the bureaucracy involved for local retail 
outlets in becoming and being a LFR meant fishermen were generally no longer 
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able to land distribute fish to community outlets and thus residents in most coastal 
communities were deprived of fresh locally caught fish an issue, at best, only 
redressed byWharf Sellers Licences. Communities were, therefore, deprived of 
fresh fish.  
Under the neoliberal ideology, rights-based fisheries management in New 
Zealand, aggregation of quota by the companies generally transferred control over 
access to fish from the fishermen to the companies, especially the corporates. In 
keeping with corporate minimization of costs the landed price of fish to the 
fishermen remained at pre QMS levels and ACE-dependent fishermen were 
increasingly marginalized. Corporate control of quota also transferred the food 
and nutrition of fresh locally caught fish from the community to international 
markets. The financial benefit went to corporates and their shareholders. In return 
communities lost livelihoods and got expensive processed commodities.  
The main social implications for Hauraki Gulf Fishermen are a tightened regime 
with greatly increased bureaucratic requirements. With the exception of the few 
new part-timers there is a reduced ethos of 'freedom'. Many fishermen are ACE-
dependent contractors under tight company control. As anticipated allocating 
economic rights is critical in a neo-liberal system. Following Deetz (1994), I 
expected to find hegemony and hegemonic change in fishermen's work expressed 
the new economic and employment arrangements; change in fishing ethos from a 
dominant freedom hunting 'out there' to a more structured and accountable 
supplying seafood commodity to meet corporate interests. Consequently the basis 
of competitive relations between boats changed from fishing skill to commercial 
skills between quota owners and also between ACE-dependent. Quota ownership 
reinforces the hierarchical relationship between skipper and crew shifting 
emphasis from prime focus on fishing skills to quota acquisition ability in a more 
dominantly commercial market. Rights-based fishing meant the loss of the 
community rights to fish through usufruct and propinquity. The property rights-
based management system, has taken fisheries in New Zealand from an expressive 
system in which fishermen experienced an ethos of ―freedom‖ and serviced local 
communities, the domestic and the export markets to a far more instrumental and 
utilitarian system. 
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The social costs of the QMS were, therefore externalized to the fishermen, 
especially ACE-Dependent, their families through increased uncertainty and stress 
and financial pressure and to their communities through the loss of fresh locally 
caught fish. Although Waiheke has essentially been excluded and Coromandel 
marginalized from the fishing industry the development of alternative resources, 
tourism, coastal development, wine and figs has meant both have shifted to 
dependence on external markets but have survived. Other more fishery dependent 
communities may not have been so lucky. Perhaps when Peak Oil bites or 
international markets collapse from the financial crisis or concern for ―oil miles‖ 
and sustainability, the trend will reverse. Then if the traditional, ecological or 
fundamental knowledge of fishermen is still extant, local youth and coastal 
communities can face the challenge of the marine ecosystem and again provide 
fresh fish caught by locals. 
  
331 
Bibliography 
Agrawal, S. 2002: Restructuring Seaside Tourism: The Resort Lifecycle. Annals 
of Tourism Research, 29(1), 25-55. 
Agrawal, Arun and Clark C. Gibson, 1999: Enchantment and Disenchantment: 
The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation. World 
Development, 27(4), 629-649.   
Akroyd, J. M., C. J. Batstone, B. M. H. Sharp, and K. A. R. Walshe, 1999: 
Monitoring the Performance of Commercial Fisheries Policy. Akroyd 
Walshe Ltd., Auckland. 
Akroyd Walshe Ltd., National Research Bureau Ltd. Eclectic Energy, 2002: 
Subsistence Fishers in New Zealand. Project SEC 2000/02 Akroyd 
Walshe, National Research Bureau Ltd and Eclectic Energy.  Prepared for 
Ministry of Fisheries, April 2002.   
Allen, Robin, Assistant Director, FRD, 1983: Perspectives in fisheries 
management: Growth has led to conflict. Catch '83, June 23, 23-25. 
Allison, C.J., editor, 1988: Women Fishermen in the Pacific Northwest. Institute 
of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 
St. John's, Newfoundland Canada. 
alphaDictionary.com, n.d.: http://www.alphadictionary.com/goodword/word/ethos 
(Accessed 8 March 2010). 
Andersen, Roul, editor, 1979: North Atlantic Maritime Cultures: Anthropological 
Essays on Changing Adaptations. Moulton Publishers, The Hague. 
Anderson, Eugene N.1984: Fish as Gods and Kin. In Dyer, Christopher L. and 
James McGoodwin, editors, Folk Management in the World's Fisheries: 
Lessons for Modern Fisheries Management, University Press of Colorado, 
Colorado U.S.A. 139-159. 
Anderson, L. C., 2002: Plenary Speakers were to summarize their sessions and 
suggest research topics for the future. IIFET2002 Conference, 19-22 
August, Victoria University, Wellington.  
Annala, J.H. 1996: New Zealand's ITQ system: Have the first eight years been a 
success or failure? Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 6 43-62 
Annala, J.H., K.J. Sullivan and C.J. O'Brien, compilers, 1999: Report from the 
Fishery Assessment Plenary, April 1999: Stock assessments and yield 
estimates, (Unpublished Report held in NIWA Library, Wellington), 
Ministry of Fisheries, May 1999.  
Anon. 2002: How not to get caught in the unethical fish trap. BBC News, World 
Edition. London.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2012515.stm 
(Accessed 23 February 2009). 
332 
 
 Apostle, R., B. McCay and K.H. Mikalsen, 2002: Enclosing the Commons: 
Individual Transferable Quotas in the Nova Scotia Fishery. ISER Books, 
St. John's, Newfoundland. 
Appadurai, Arjun, 1986: Introduction: commodities and the politics of value. In 
Arjun Appadurai, editor, The social life of things: Commodities in cultural 
perspective, Cambridge University Press, New York. 3-63. 
Arbuckle, G.A. 1971: The Chatham Islands in Perspective: A socio- economic 
review. Hicks Smith and Sons Ltd, Wellington. 
Arbuckle, M. and K. Drummond, 2000: Evolution of Self-Governance within a 
Harvesting System Governed by Individual Transferable Quota. In Ross 
Shotton, editor, Use of property rights in fisheries management. Volume 2. 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/2, Proceedings of the FishRights99 
Conference, Fremantle, Western Australia, 11-19 November 1999. 370-
382. 
Arnason, R., n.d.: ITQs in practice: an international review. 
http://statistics.defra.gov.uk/esg/reports/fishquota/chapter5.pdf. (Accessed 
10 February 2005). 
Arnason, R. 2002: CEMARE Report 58: A review of international experiences 
with ITQs. Future Options for UK Fish Quota Management. Annex to 
Future Options for UK Fish Quota Management. Report to the Department 
for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. CEMARE, University of 
Portsmouth, June 2002. 
Aslin, H.J., Connor, R.D. and M. Fisher, 2001: Sharing in the catch or cashing in 
the share? Social impacts of Individual Transferable Quotas and the South 
East Fishery. Bureau of Rural Sciences, Canberra. 
http://affashop.gov.au/product.asp?prodid=12918  (Accessed 24 February 
2009). 
Avery, Max, 1977: Firms expanded for zone. Commercial Fishing, November 
1977, 13. 
Ayling, Tony, and Geoffrey J. Cox, 1982: Collins Guide to the Sea Fishes of New 
Zealand. William Collins, Publishers, Auckland. 
Ayson, L.W. 1904: Report of Enquiry: Effect of the Prohibition of trawling in the 
Hauraki Gulf, Mesh of Nets, & Various Matters affecting the Industry. 
Chief Inspector of Fisheries, Chamber of Commerce, Auckland, 29, 30 
April. 
Ayson, L.W. 1915: Evidence taken by Chief Inspector of Fisheries at Auckland, 
13 October.  
Ayson, L.W. 1915b: Report of Enquiry held by Mr. Ayson, at Star Hotel 
Auckland, 13th October. Baigent, Gary, 1987: Good Fishing with the Co-
Operative. Gulf News, December 24 1987, 41-44. 
Baines, J. 1999: Resource Community Formation and Change: Fisheries Sector 
Review 1-26. Taylor Baines & Associates, Christchurch. 
  
333 
Baines, J. and W. McClintock, 2000: Resource Community Formation and 
Change: A Case Study of Moeraki. Working Paper No.25. Taylor Baines 
& Associates, Christchurch 
Barrett, Gene, 2001: Social Capital, Community, and the Dialectics of 
Globalization. Unpublished paper presented to a social science symposium 
on ‗Social capital and Globalization‘, organized by the Center of Local 
and Regional Development, Faeroe Islands. 28 August. 
http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:0TdVAjH3zgAJ:www.region.fo/Smar
it/Smarit_7_2001.pdf+barrett+Jentoft+McCay&hl=en (Accessed 6 May 
2005). 
Barry, C.A. 1988: Choosing Qualitative Data Analysis Software: Atlas/ti and 
Nudist Compared. Sociological Research Online 3(3), 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/3/3/4.html (Accessed 31 
August 2004). 
Bartleby, 1995: Roget s II: The New Thesaurus, (3
rd
 ed.). Bartleby.com Thesauri. 
http://www.bartleby.com/thesauri/ (Accessed 5 October 2006). 
Bartleby, 2000: The American Heritage, Dictionary of the English Language (4
th
 
ed.) http://www.bartleby.com/cgi-
bin/texis/webinator/sitesearch?FILTER=col61&query=ethos&x=6&y=9 
(Accessed 9 December 2008). 
Batstone, C., J, and B. M. H. Sharp, 2003: Minimum information management 
systems and ITQ fisheries management. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 45(2): 492- 504. 
Bavinck, Maarten, 2001: Marine Resource Management : Conflict and Regulation 
in the Fisheries  of  the Coromandel Coast. Sage Publications, New Delhi.   
Bavington, Dean, 2007: Comment on Management and Aquaculture Feeds. 
Fishfolk, Thu, 29 Nov 2007 16:22:45 - 0500. 
Bazeley, P. and L. Richards, 2000: The NVivo Qualitative Project Book. Sage 
Publications, London. 
Becker, H.S. 1998: Tricks of the Trade: How to think about your research while 
you're doing it. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London. 
Belgrave, M. J. C. 1983: Future Policy for the Inshore Fishery: A Discussion 
Paper. NAFMAC, National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee. 
Belgrave, M.J., 1983b: National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee: 
Report to the Minister of Fisheries on Future Policy for the Inshore 
Fishery, NAFMAC, Wellington. 
Belgrave, M.J.(Chair), M.N. Berry, K.M. Brown and E.M. Coutts, 2000: Decision 
No. 388, Determination pursuant to the Commerce Act 1986 in the matter 
of an application for clearance of a business acquisition involving: New 
Zealand Seafood Investments Limited and Basuto Investments Limited, 
The Commerce Commission, 23 March. 
334 
 
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/publications/ViewDocument.cfm?Doc_ID=2
33 (Accessed: 17 August 2003).   
Bello, Walden, 2001: Crisis of Legitimacy: The Revolt Against Corporate-Driven 
Globalization.Talk delivered at Boston Research Center for the 21st 
Century, 2 February 2001. http://www.tni.org/archives/bello/revolt.htm 
(Accessed 4 November 1004). 
Ben-Yami, M. 2003:  Fisheries management: Hijacked by neoliberal economics. 
Post- autistic Economics Review, 27(9). 
http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue27.htm (Accessed 13 
September 2004). 
Berg, Lawrence D. and Michael M. Roche, 1997: Market metaphors, neo-
liberalism and the construction of Academic Landscapes In Aotearoa/New 
Zealand.  Journal of Geography in Higher Education, 21(2), 147-162.  
Berkes, F. and C. Folke, editors, 1998: Linking Social and Ecological Systems: 
Management practices and social mechanisms for building resilience. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Berlin, S. 1964: Jonah's Dream: A meditation on Fishing. Los Almos, California, 
William Kaufmann, Inc. 
Bess, R. 1999: Property Rights and their Role in Sustaining New Zealand's 
Seafirms' Competitiveness. Proceedings of the Fish Rights 99 Conference, 
Fremantle, Western Australia, 11-19 November 1999, Workshop 
presentations, FAO, Rome. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/X8985E/x8985e0d.htm#b4-
Property%20Rights%20and%20their%20Role%20in%20Sustaining%20N
ew%20Zealand%20Seafood%20Firms'%20Competitiveness%20R.%20Be
ss  (Accessed 23 August 2004). 
Bess, R. 2005:  Expanding New Zealand's Quota Management System. Marine 
Policy 29(4), 339-347.  
Beston, Anne, 2007:  National Story: A river runs through it: Wairoa. The New 
Zealand Herald, Monday January 01, 2007. 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=1041737
8 (Accessed 1 January 2007) 
Bestor, Theodore C. 2002: Supply- side sushi: Commodity, market, and the global 
city. American Anthropologist 103(1), 76- 96. 
Billington, Greg, 2000: Spindrift. Reed Publishing, Wellington. 
Block, Fred, 2001: Introduction to new edition. In Karl Polanyi,  Great 
Transformation : The  Political & Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston, 
MA, USA: Beacon Press, 2001. 
Blount, B.G. 2005: Small-Scale Fisheries In The Contemporary World: 
Adaptation And Management. Reviews in Anthropology 34 1-19. 
  
335 
Blount, Benjamin, 2007: Culture and Resilience among Shrimpers of the Georgia 
Coast (USA): Responses to Globalization. MAST- Maritime Studies 5(2), 
5-26. 
Bodin, O and Crona, B.I. 2008: Management of Natural Resources at 
theManagement of Natural Resources at the Community Level: Exploring 
the Role of Social Capital and Leadership in a Rural Fishing Community. 
World Development 36(12) 2874-2952. 
Boeri, David and James Gibson, 1976: "Tell it Good-Bye Kiddo": The Decline of 
the New England Offshore Fishery, International Marine Publishing 
Company, Camden Maine. 
Børresen, Torger, 2006: Editor's Column: Globalization. Journal of Aquatic Food 
Product Technology, 15(1), 1-3. 
Bolger, J.B. Minister of Fisheries, 1978: Industry expansion and opportunities. 
Commercial Fishing, July 1978 3. 
Bong, S.A. 2002: Debunking Myths in Qualitative Data Analysis. Forum: 
Qualitative Social Researching 3(2), http://www.qualitative-
research.net/fqs-texte/2-02/2-02bong-e.htm  (Accessed 28 August 2004). 
Bourdon, Sylvain, 2002: The Integration of Qualitative Data Analysis Software in 
Research Strategies: Resistances and Possibilities. FQS Forum Qualitative 
Research. http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/2-02/2-02bourdon-
e.htm (Accessed 10 January 2006). 
Boyce, Alistair G., Denis E. Martin and Barry L. Stringer, 1986: New Zealand 
Fisheries: a geographical perspective. New Zealand Fishing Industry 
Board, Wellington. 
Boyd, R.O. 1983: Resource management in the Hauraki Gulf and the Bay of 
Plenty. In J.L. Taylor and G.G. Baird, New Zealand Finfish Fisheries: the 
Resources and their Management, Proceedings of a conference organised 
by the Fisheries Research Division, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
held in conjunction with Fishex '83 in Auckland, April 1983, Trade 
Publications Limited. 63-66. 
Boyd, Rick O. and Christopher M. Dewees, 1992: Putting theory into practice: 
individual transferable quotas in New Zealand's Fisheries. Society and 
Natural Resources, 5:179-198. 
Brent, E. and P. Slusartz, 2003: "Feeling the beat", Intelligent coding advice from 
Meta Knowledge. Qualitative Research. Social Science Computer Review 
21(3), 281-303. 
Brookfield, Katherine, Tim Gray and Jenny Hatchard, 2005:  A comparative 
analysis of four UK case studies: Shetland, Peterhead, North Shields and 
Lowestoft. Fisheries Research 72(1), April 2005, 55-69. 
Brown, R.H. 1994: Reconstructing Social Theory after the Postmodern Critique. 
In: Simons, H.W. and M. Billig editors, After Postmodernism: 
Reconstructing Ideology Critique. Sage Publications, London 12-39. 
336 
 
Buck. Eugene H. 1995: Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management. 
CRS Report for Congress, redistributed as a Service of the National 
Library for the Environment. 
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Marine/mar-1.cfm Updated 
September 25, 1995 (Accessed 9 February 2005). Buck is Senior Analyst 
in Natural Resources Policy, Environment and Natural Resources Policy 
Division. 
 Burdge, R.J. 2004: The Concepts, Process and Methods of Social Impact 
Assessment: Social Ecology Press, Middleton, Wisconsin. 
Burke, Barry, 1999: Antonio Gramsci. Infed Encyclopedia. 
http://www.infed.org/thinkers/et-gram.htm  (Accessed 11 November 
2004). 
Burns, R.J. and Kerr, G.N. 2008: Observer effect on fisher bycatch reports in the 
New Zealand ling bottom long-lining commercial fishery. New Zealand 
Journal of Marine and Freshwater Research.  42: 23-32. 
Burton, O.V. 2002: Computing in the Social Sciences and Humanities. University 
of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago. 
Castells, Manuel, 1997: The Power of Identity. In Manuel Castells (ed), The 
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume II, Blackwell 
Publishers, Malden, Massachusetts. 1-67.  
Catterall, M. and P. Maclaren, 1997: 'Focus Group Data and Qualitative Analysis 
Programs: Coding the Moving Picture as Well as the Snapshots'. 
Sociological Research Online 2(1), 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/2/1/6.html (Accessed 7 September 2004). 
Catton, J. 1978: A case for the small- scale operator. In R.D. Elder and J.L. 
Taylor, 1978: Prospects and Problems for New Zealand's Demersal 
Fisheries: Proceedings of the Demersal Fisheries Conference October 
1978, 111-113.  
Census of Marine Life, 2003: How Many Fish In The Sea? Census of  Marine 
Life Launches First Report. ScienceDaily, October 24. 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2003/10/031024064333.htm 
(Accessed 8 January 2008). 
Checkland, P. 1981: Systems thinking, systems practice. J. Wiley, Chichester 
[Sussex]; New York. 
Checkland, P. and J. Scholes, 1990: Soft systems methodology in action. Wiley, 
Chichester, West Sussex, England; New York. 
Christensen, A.-S. and J. Raakjær, 2006: Fishermen's tactical and strategic 
decisions: A case study of Danish demersal fisheries. Fisheries Research 
81(2-3), 258-267. 
Chrysophrys Auratus, 2008: Snapper. Fishbase. 
http://www.fishbase.org/Summary/SpeciesSummary.php?id=6426  
(Accessed 30 August 2007) 
  
337 
Clark, I. 1993:  Individual Transferable Quotas: The New Zealand Experience. 
Marine Policy, 17(5), 340-342.  
Clark, I., P. Major and N. Mollet, 1988:  Development and Implementation of 
New Zealand's ITQ management system. Marine Resource Economics 5: 
325-349. 
Clark, I., P. Major and N. Mollet, 1988b: Development and Implementation of 
New Zealand's ITQ management system. In: R.A. Neher, Philip A. Major 
and Nina Mollett, editors, Rights-based Fishing. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, London, 117-145. 
Clark, I. N. and A. J. Duncan, 1986:  New Zealand Fisheries Management 
Policies - Past Present and Future: The Implementation of an ITQ- 
Management System. In Nina Mollet, editor, 1986: Fishery Access 
Control Programs Worldwide, Fairbanks University of Alaska, Sea Grant 
College Program.  
Cleaver, F. 2002: Men and Masculinities: New Directions in Gender and 
Development. In: F. Cleaver, editor, Masculinities Matter! Gender and 
Development. Zed Books, London,  
Clegg, S. 1979: The Theory of Power and Organization. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, Boston, Henley. 
Clegg, S.R. 1989: Frameworks of Power. SAGE Publications, London. 
Clement, G. 2000: The Orange Roughy Management Company Limited - A 
Positive Example of Fish Rights in Action, In Ross Shotton, editor, Use of 
property rights in fisheries management. Volume 2. FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper 404/2, Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, 
Fremantle, Western Australia, 11-19 November 1999. 254-257. 
Coad, Brian W. and Don E. McAllister, 2008: Dictionary of Ichthyology. 
Revised: 04 January 2008. http://www.briancoad.com/Dictionary/F.htm  
(Accessed 7 January 2008). 
Coffey, A., B. Holbrook and P. Atkinson, 1996: Qualitative Data Analysis: 
Technologies and Representations. Sociological Research Online 1(1), 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/1/1/4.html  (Accessed 7 September 2004). 
Cohen, A. 1969: Political Anthropology: The Analysis of the Symbolism of 
Power. Man (N.S.) 4(2), 215-35. 
Cohen, A.P. 1982a: Blockade: a case study of local consciousness in an extra-
local event. In A.P. Cohen, editor, Belonging: Identity and social 
organisation in British rural cultures. Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 292-321. 
Cohen, A.P. 1982b: A sense of time, a sense of place: the meaning of close social 
association in Whalsay, Shetland. In: A.P. Cohen, editor, Belonging: 
Identity and social organisation in British rural cultures. Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 22-49. 
338 
 
Commercial Fishing, 1976: Comment - A surprise package? Commercial Fishing, 
15(8) 5. 
Commercial Fishing, 1977: There is a future … but stop foreign plundering, 
Commercial Fishing, 16(3) 4, 5. 
Commercial Fishing, 1977: Government is committed to expansion of industry. 
Commercial Fishing, 16(7) 8, 9. 
Commercial Fishing, 1977: Waugh: Inshore demersally caught stocks fully 
fished. Commercial Fishing, 16(9) 17. 
Commercial Fishing, 1977: Special fishing boat loans. Commercial Fishing. 16(9) 
41. 
Commercial Fishing, 1977: Problems between large NZ trawlers & inshore fleet? 
Commercial Fishing, 16(11) 15. 
Commercial Fishing, 1977: Early trials with Fifeshire & Whitby indicate success, 
Commercial Fishing, 16(11) 31. 
Commercial Fishing, 1977: Association angry with part-timers. Commercial 
Fishing, 16(12) 17. 
Commercial Fishing, 1980: Policy 'falling apart' - MP. Commercial Fishing, 19(6) 
5. 
Commercial Fishing, 1980: Price smoothing option. Commercial Fishing, 19(6) 5. 
Commercial Fishing, 1980: Trawlers lost $11,201 on one trip. Commercial 
Fishing, 19(6) 7. 
Commercial Fishing, 1982: Effort Reduction Scheme. Commercial Fishing, 21(7) 
8, 9. 
Commercial Fishing, 1983: This is war, commercial fishermen say. Commercial 
Fishing, 22(9) 3. 
Commercial Fishing, 1984: Eighty "part-timers" lodge licence loss appeals. 
Commercial Fishing 23(1) 15. 
Commercial Fishing, 1984: Fishermen heavy losers as licence losses mount. 
Commercial Fishing, 23(3) 23. 
Commercial Fishing, 1984: Second woman skipper for port of Mahia. 
Commercial Fishing 23(6) 11. 
Commercial Fishing, 1985: Sharefishermen view ITQ‘s with suspicion. 
Commercial Fishing, 24(5) 8. 
Commercial Fishing, 1985: Far south fishermen reject ―blue book‖ proposals. 
Commercial Fishing, 24(5) 11. 
Commercial Fishing, 1985: Social impact of effort reduction under examination. 
Commercial Fishing, 24(8) 5.  
  
339 
Commercial Fishing, 1985: ITQ opposition mounts on the coast. Commercial 
Fishing, 24(9) 3. 
Commercial Fishing, 1985: CF: Around the Ports: Protest. Commercial Fishing, 
24(11) 18. 
Commercial Fishing, 1985: CF: Around the Ports: Napier: ‗last ditch to stop ITQ 
system‘. Commercial Fishing, 24(11) 19. 
Commercial Fishing, 1986: CF: News: progress to ITQs. Commercial Fishing, 
25(2) 3. 
Commercial Fishing, 1986: Sanford threatens inshore layoffs. Commercial 
Fishing, 25(2) 7.  
Commercial Fishing, 1986: Federation president talks ITQs. Commercial Fishing, 
25(2) 22, 23.  
Commercial Fishing, 1986: CF Profile: With Taffy Martin in Whangarei. 
Commercial Fishing, 25(2) 24-26. 
Connor, R. 2000: Trends in Fishing Capacity and Aggregation of Fishing Rights 
in New Zealand under Individual Transferable Quota. In Ross Shotton, 
editor, Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management. FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper 404/2, FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, Rome. 267-278. 
Connor, R. 2001a: Are ITQs Property Rights? Definition, Discipline and 
Discourse. In: Ross Shotton, R. editor, Case Studies on the allocation of 
transferable quota rights in fisheries. FAO, Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United States, Rome.  
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y2684E/y2684e21.htm#P0_0 
(Accessed 23 August 2004). 
Connor, R. 2001b: Initial Allocation of Individual Transferable Quota in New 
Zealand Fisheries. In: Ross Shotton, editor, Case Studies on the allocation 
of transferable quota rights in fisheries. FAO Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Rome. 222-250. 
Copes, P. 1986: A critical review of the individual quota as a device in fisheries 
management. Land Economics 62:278- 91. 
Copes, Parzivale, 1996: Social Impacts of Fisheries Management Regimes Based 
on Individual Quotas, In, Gisli Palsson and Gudrun Peturdottir, editors, 
Social Implications of Quota Systems in Fisheries, Proceedings of a 
Seminar held in the Vesterman Islands in May 1996, Nordic Council of 
Ministers, TemaNord 61-90. 
Copes, P. 1999: The Threat of ITQs to Fisheries Conservation and to Artisinal 
Fishing Rights in Chile. Proceedings of the Invited address to Workshop 
on Fisheries Management: Vision and Perspective for the Next Century, 
Sponsored by Greenpeace- Chile, Ecoceanos and by CONAPACH, 
representing the artisanal fisheries of Chile. Conference, 20, October 1999, 
Santiago, Chile 99-105.  
340 
 
Copes, P. 2002:  A Normative Analysis of Rights-Based Fishing. IIFET2000 
Conference, Victoria University, Wellington Unpublished Paper. 
Copes, P. 2002: A Normative Analysis of Rights-Based Fishing. Institute of 
Fisheries Analysis and Centre for Coastal Studies Simon Fraser 
University, Burnaby,  
Cordell, John, editor, 1989: A Sea of Small Boats. Cultural Survival Report 26, 
Cultural Survival, Inc. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Coriolis, 2005: Mapping the Structure of the New Zealand Food & Beverage 
Industry. Report Prepared for the Food and Beverage Taskforce, 
November 2005. http://www.nzte.govt.nz/section/13685.aspx (Accessed 2 
January 2008) 
Cormack, S. and J. Orwin, 1997:  Four generations from M¯aoridom : the 
memoirs of a South Island kaumatua and fisherman. Dunedin, N.Z. 
Cornwall, Andrea and Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, 2004: Putting the 'rights-based 
approach' to development into perspective. Third World Quarterly, 25(8) 
1415-1437. 
Coromandel Town History Research Group Incorporated, 2002: In Search of the 
Rainbow: The Coromandel story. Coromandel Town History Research 
Group Incorporated, Coromandel. 
Cox, Marilyn, 2001: Catching Fish is guaranteed. Gulf Islander, November, 5-8. 
Cozens, Peter A. 2001: Development of the New Zealand Fishery and the 
influence of the Japanese 1959-86. A Thesis submitted for the Degree of 
Master of Arts in Economic History at Victoria University of Wellington. 
Crean, K. and D. Symes, 1996: Sailing into Calmer Waters? In: K. Crean and D. 
Symes, editors, Fisheries Management in Crisis. Fishing News Books, 
Oxford, 197-205. 
Crothers, S. 1988:  Individual Transferable Quotas: the New Zealand experience. 
Fisheries 13(1): 10-12. 
Crothers, S. 2000: Administration of Enforcement Mechanisms for Rights- based 
Fisheries Management Systems. In Shotton, Ross, editor, 2000:  Use of 
Property Rights in Fisheries Management. Proceedings of the 
FishRights99 Conference, Fremantle, Western Australia, 11 - 19 
November 1999, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/1. 89-94 
Cullen, R. and P.A. Memon, 1990: Impact of The Exclusive Economic Zone on 
the management and utilisation of the New Zealand Fishery resources. 
Pacific Viewpoint, 31 (I): 44-62. 
Danowski, F. 1980: Fishermen's Wives: Coping with an Extraordinary 
Occupation. NOAA/ Sea Grant Marine Bulletin 37. Kingston, RI: 
University of Rhode Island, Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology. 
Reports on the roles of fishermen's wives in supporting the activities of 
commercial fishermen in the Port of Point Judith, Rhode Island. 
  
341 
Davies, N.M. 1992: Fisheries Management - A New Zealand Perspective. In: 
A.I.L. Payne, K.H. Brink, K.H. Mann, and R. Hilborn editors, Benguela 
Trophic Functioning. South African Journal of Marine Science, 1069-
1077. 
Davis, Anthony, 1991: Insidious Rationalities: The Institutionalisation of Small 
Boat Fishing and the Rise of the Rapacious Fisher. MAST, 4(1), 13-31. 
Davis, A. 1996: Points of View: Barbed wire and bandwagons: a comment on 
ITQ fisheries management. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 6: 97-
107. 
Davis, A. and C. Bailey, 1995: Common in Custom, Uncommon in Advantage: 
Common Property, Local Elites and Alternative Approaches to Fisheries 
Management. Society and Natural Resources 9 251-265. 
Davis, Antony and Svein Jentoft n.d.: Ambivalent Co-operators: Organisational 
Stack and Utilitarian Rationality in an Eastern Nova Scotian Fisheries Co-
operative. St Georges Bay Project,  
http://www.stfx.ca/research/gbayesp/ambivalent_report.htm (Accessed 21 
July 2008). 
Davis, Anthony and John Wagner, 2006: A right to fish for a living? The case for 
coastal fishing people‘s determination of access and participation. Ocean 
& Coastal Management 49, 476–497.  
Davis, D.L. 1988: "Shore Skippers" and "Grass Widows": Active and Passive 
Women's Roles in a Newfoundland Fishery. In: J. Nadel- Klein and D.L. 
Davis, editors, To Work and to Weep: Women in Fishing Economies. 
Memorial University of Newfoundland, St.John's. Newfoundland, Canada, 
211-229. 
Dawe, Stephen, 2002: Talleys Fisheries Ltd v Cullen & Ors. Overseas Investment 
Commission, Report Number 48. 
http://216.239.39.100/search?q=cache:4lej3GPHewEC:www.oic.govt.nz/t
alleysjud.doc+NZ+court+case+Ministry+Fisheries&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 
(Accessed 12 August 2002). 
Deetz, Stanley, 1994: The New Politics of the Workplace: Ideology and Other 
Unobtrusive Controls, In Herbert W. Simons and Michael Billig, editors, 
After Postmodernism: Reconstructing Ideology Critique, Sage 
Publications, London 173-199. 
Degnbol, P., Gislason, H., Hanna, S., Jentoft, S., Raakjær Nielsen, J., Sverdrup- 
Jensen, S. and D.C. Wilson, 2006: Painting the floor with a hammer: 
Technical fixes in fisheries management. Marine Policy, 30(5), 534- 543. 
Department of Statistics, 1979, 1985-86, 1987-88: Fisheries. New Zealand 
Official Yearbook, Government Printer, Wellington. 
Department of Lands and Survey 1978:  Coastal Reserves Investigation and 
proposals - Waiheke County. Auckland, Department of Lands and Survey. 
342 
 
Dewees, C., M. 1987: New Zealand's Early ITQ Experience: Analysis of Fishing 
Industry and Management Agency Perceptions of Benefits and Problems. 
Thesis, University of California, Davis. 
Dewees, Christopher M. 1989: Assessment of the Implementation of Individual 
Transferable Quotas in New Zealand‘s Inshore Fishery. North American 
Journal of Fisheries Management 9, 131-139. 
Dewees, Christopher, 1997: Fishing for profits: New Zealand fishing industry 
changes for "Pakeha ―and Maori with individual transferable quotas, In, 
Gisli Palsson and Gudrun Peturdottir, editors, Social Implications of Quota 
Systems in Fisheries, Proceedings of a seminar held in the Vesterman 
Islands in May 1996, Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord 96-106. 
Dewees, Christopher M. 2007: Summary of Interviews with New Zealand Fishing 
Industry Participants in the Auckland and Nelson Regions, 2005-6: 
Preliminary Findings.  Marine Fisheries Specialist, Wildlife, Fish and 
Conservation Biology Dept., University of California, Davis Unpublished 
paper. 
Dewees, Christopher M. 2008: Attitudes, Perceptions, and Adaptations of New 
Zealand Commercial Fishermen during 20 Years of Individual 
Transferable Quotas. In Marie E. Lowe and Courtney Carothers (Editors), 
Enclosing the Fisheries: People, Places, and Power. American Fisheries 
Society. http://www.afsbooks.org/54068p.html (Accessed 26 January 
2009).  
Dicken, P. 1997: Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy. Peter Chapman 
Publishing, London. 
Dicken, P., J. Peck and A. Tickell, 1997: Unpacking the Global. In: R. Lee and J. 
Wills editors Geographies of Economies. Arnold, London, 158-166. 
Dictionary.com, n.d.: ―Ethos‖. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ethos 
(Accessed 8 March 2010). 
Dilley, Patrick, 2004: Review Essay: Interviews and the Philosophy of Qualitative 
Research. The Journal of Higher Education, 75(1), 127-132,  
DiMaggio, W.W. and P.J. Powell. 1991: The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Dixon, Grant, 2009: Candid Comment: The Great NZ Fishing Scandle. New 
Zealand Fishing News, September 9. 
Director-General, MAF, 1983: Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
for the year ended 31 March 1983. P.D. Hasselberg, Government Printer, 
Wellington, New Zealand.  
Douglas, Roger and Louise Callan, 1987: Roger Douglas: Toward Prosperity, 
David Bateman, Auckland. 
  
343 
Dubbink, W.W. 2003: Assisting the Invisible Hand: contested relations between 
market, and state. Kluwer Academic, 2003, Dordrecht [Netherlands]; 
Boston . 
Duncan, A. 1983: Individual Transferable Quota Explained. Newsletter, New 
Zealand Fishing Industry Board, Wellington. 
Duncan, L.S.W. 1970: Crime by Polynesian in Auckland: An analysis of charges 
laid against persons arrested in 1966. Master‘s Thesis, Anthropology 
Department, University of Auckland. 
Duncan, L. 1982: Fishermen's views on how the Hauraki Gulf should be 
managed. Report no.10, Auckland, Sociology Department, University of 
Auckland.  
Duncan, L. 1993: ITQs in New Zealand: A Critical Appraisal. Mini-Symposium 
On: Justice and the Environment: Common Property, Indigenous Rights 
and Inequities of Access, Department of Economics, University of 
Auckland, Department of Economics Unpublished report 
Duncan, L. 1993b: ITQs: a critical appraisal. Washington D.C., Greenpeace USA. 
Unpublished report. 
Duncan, L. 1995: Ding dong carry on: Individual Transferable Quotas, Northland 
fishermen feel that the quota management system of New Zealand has 
failed to deliver. Samudra, 13, 16-18. 
Duncan, L. 1995c:  The Impact of ITQs on Northland. ECO (NGO Newspaper for 
UN Conference on Stradling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. New 
York. 
Duncan, L. 1997: ITQs in NZ: An Alternative View. Unpublished paper presented 
to Greenpeace Argentina meeting, Buenos Aires.   
Durrenberger, E. Paul, 1992: It’s All Politics: South Alabama’s Seafood Industry. 
University of Illinois Press, Chicago.  
Dwyer, Peter D., Roger Just and Monica Minnegal, 2003: A sea of small names: 
Fishers and their boats in Victoria, Australia, Anthropological Forum, 
13(1), 2003 
Easton, Brian, 1989: The Commercialisation of the New Zealand Economy. In 
Brian Easton (editor), The Making of Rogernomics. Auckland University 
Press, Auckland. 
Edwards, M. 2000: The Administration of Fisheries Managed by Property Rights. 
In Ross Shotton, editor, Use of property rights in fisheries management. 
Volume 2. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/2, Proceedings of the 
FishRights99 Conference, Fremantle, Western Australia, 11-19 November 
1999. 75-88.  
Eggert, H. 1999: Towards an integrated sustainable management of fisheries. 
Department of Economics, Goteborg University, Goteborg, Sweden,  
344 
 
Eggleston, Dr D. 1977: Foreign fishing around NZ. Commercial Fishing March, 
1977. 
Elder, R.D. and J.L. Taylor, 1978: Prospects and Problems for New Zealand's 
Demersal Fisheries: Proceedings of the Demersal Fisheries Conference 
October 1978. Fisheries Research Division, Occasional Publication No.19, 
1979. 
Emerson, R.M., R. Fretz and L. Shaw, 1995: Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes. 
Chicago, London, The University of Chicago Press. 
Fairclough, N. 1992: Discourse and Social Change. Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Fairgray, J. D. M. 1985:  Individual Quota Implications Study: First Report 
Northland Communities 1984. Wellington, Fisheries Management 
Division, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. McDermott, Associates, 
Wellington, N.Z. 
Fairgray, J.D.M. 1986: Fishery Management Planning: ITQ Implications Study - 
Second Report: Community Issues. FMP Series No. 20 McDermott 
Associates Ltd. Prepared for Fisheries Management Division, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington,  
Falloon, R. 1993: Individual Transferable Quotas: The New Zealand Case.  In 
OECD, editors, The Use of Individual Quotas in Fisheries Management. 
OECD, Paris 44-62. 
FAO, 2002: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. 
http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/005/y7300e
/y7300e00.htm  (Accessed 9 February 2005). 
FAO, 2006: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations, Rome 2007. 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/a0699e/a0699e.pdf  (Accessed 14 May 
2008) 
Feldman, Mark, 1998: Drowning by numbers. New Scientist  August  29, 46. 
FIB, 1990: Guide Book to New Zealand Commercial Fish Species. New Zealand 
Fishing Industry Board, Wellington (Revised edition). 
Finlayson, Alan Christopher, Thomas A. Lyson, Andrew Pleasant, Kai A. Schafft, 
Robert J. Torres, 2005: The ―Invisible Hand:‖ Neoclassical Economics and 
the Ordering of Society. Critical Sociology, 31(4) 515-536.  
Firth, R. 1936: We the Tikopia: A Sociological Study of Kinship in Primitive 
Polynesia. London: Alien and Unwin. 
Firth, Raymond, 1946: Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy. London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. 
Firth, Raymond, 1959: Social Change in Tikopia. Re-study of a Polynesian 
community after a generation. London, Allen.. 
  
345 
Firth, Raymond, 1966: Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy. W.W. Norton 
and Company, Inc. 
Fisheries Act 1908, 1932: Fisheries Act 1908, No.65. In The Public Acts of New 
Zealand (Reprinted) 1908-1931, Vol.3. Butterworth and Co. 344-376. 
Fishserve, n.d.:  http://www.fishserve.co.nz  (Accessed 19 October 2008). 
Fitzgerald, G., C.N. Taylor and W. McClintock, 2002: The Impacts of Resource 
Sector Restructuring on Occupational and Community Identity. 
Proceedings of the Paper prepared for IAIA '02, the Annual Meeting of the 
International Association for Impact Assessment Conference, 17-21 June, 
DenHaag, The Netherlands. 
Fløysand, A. and K.B. Lindkvist, 2000: Fishery Communities in Change. 
http://www.nhh.no/geo/gib/gib2000/gib238/gib238.pdf (Accessed 21 June 
2005). 
Frazer, E. 2000: Communitarianism. In: G. Browning, et al., editors, 
Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present. Sage, 
London, 178-190. 
Fritz, J.M. 1995: An Investigation of the Effectiveness of Open Hypertext 
Techniques for Qualitative Decision Support. Thesis, Department of 
Computer Science University of York, York. 
Froese, R. and D. Pauly, editors, 2007: FishBase. World Wide Web electronic 
publication. www.fishbase.org, version (07/2007). (Accessed: 30 August 
2007). 
Frost, B. 1991: Leigh: Then and Now. School and Districts Reunion Committee. 
Printing by Chappell Printing Ltd, Snells Beach. 
Gaffney, K.R. 1997: Property Rights-based Fisheries Management: Lessons from 
New Zealand's Quota Management System. Master‘s Thesis, Commerce 
and Administration Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington. 
Gereffi, G. and M. Korzeniewicz, editors, 1994: Commodity Chains and Global 
Capitalism. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut. 
Gibbs, G.R. 2002: Qualitative Data Analysis: Explorations with NVivo. Open 
University Press, Buckingham. 
Gibbs, Mark T. 2007: Lesser-known consequences of managing fisheries using 
individual transferable quotas. Marine Policy 31(2), 112–116. 
Gilbert, D. 1991:  Personal Submission to the Task Force for the Review of 
Fisheries Legislation. Wellington. 
Gilden, Jennifer, editor, 1999: Oregon's Changing Coastal Fishing Communities. 
Oregon State University. 
http://seagrant.oregonstate.edu/sgpubs/onlinepubs/o99001.html (Accessed 
2 November 2007). 
346 
 
Gill, Stephen, 2003: Gramsci, Modernity and Globalization. Prepared for the 
Conference: ―Gramsci and the Twentieth Century‖ Istituto Fondazione 
Gramsci, Sardinia, 15-18 April, 1997. International Gramsci Society 
Online Article, January 2003. 
http://www.italnet.nd.edu/gramsci/resources/online_articles/index.html 
(Accessed 10 August 2004). 
Gillespie, A. 2001: The Illusion of Progress: Unsustainable Development in 
International Law and Policy. Earthscan, London. 
Godfrey, G.C. 1929: Fisheries. In New Zealand Marine Department Annual 
Report 1927-28, 1928-29, 1929-30. In New Zealand Appendix to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives, Vol.3 H-I. Wellington.  
Gordon, H.S. 1954. The economic theory of a common-property resource: the 
fishery. Journal of Political Economy 62(2) 124- 142. 
Gramsci, A., 1971: Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
Greenspan, Alan, 2007: The age of turbulence: adventures in a new world.  Allen 
Lane, London. 
Gudeman, Stephen, 2001: The Anthropology of Economy, Blackwell Publishing, 
Melbourne. 
Gulf Islander, 2003: Waiheke. Gulf Islander: Free Monthly Guide to the Hauraki 
Gulf Islands, Pendragon Press, p5. 
Gulf News, 1976: Fish in the Family. Gulf News, 6 February 1976, 11. 
Gulf News, 1978: Island Fisheries Changes hands. Gulf News 3 March 1978, 9 
Gulf News, 1980: Tourist Potential in Gulf. Gulf News, 24 October 1980, 31,32. 
Gulf News, 1980: Fishery Controls, Gulf News 7 November 1980 15, 16. 
Gulf News, 1980: Ingenious Machine. Gulf News, 31 December 1980 5-7. 
Gulf News, 1982: Island Fishermen Concerned. Gulf News, 30 July, 30. 
Gulf News, 1983: Major Prize For Waiheke Chef. Gulf News, 22 July 1983, 14, 
15. 
Gulf News, 1987: No Fish For Hotel Dish. Gulf News, 20 March 1987, 25, 27. 
Gulf News, 2005: Irresponsible amounts of fish. Gulf News, 17 March 2005, 32, 
33. 
Gulf News, 2006:  Catch of the day? Gulf News, 18 May 2006, 6. 
Gulf News, 2007: Rundown Backwater. Gulf News, 6 September 2007, 7. 
Hall-Arber, M., C. Dyer, J. Poggie and R. Gagne, 2001: New England's Fishing 
Communities. 
  
347 
http://web.mit.edu/seagrant/aqua/cmss/marfin/MarfinFinal.pdf  (Accessed 
5 July 2005). 
Hamilton, Lawrence C. n.d.: Fisheries Dependent Communities: Propositions 
About Ecological And Social Change. 
http://pubpages.unh.edu/~lch/fisheries_propositions.pdf (Accessed 17 
September 2007). 
Hamilton, L. C., R. L. Haedrich, et al. 2004:  Above and Below the Water: 
Social/Ecological Transformation in Northwest Newfoundland. 
Population and Environment 25(3) 195-213. 
Hansen, Derek, 1997:  Sole Survivor, Harper Collins, Sydney.  
Hardin, G. 1968: The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162, 1244. 
Hargreaves, K. 1998: On the Next Tide: Portraits and anecdotes of New Zealand 
fishermen and women. Canterbury University Press, Christchurch. 
Harris, T.W.F. 1993: Hauraki Gulf Tideways: Elements of their natural sciences. 
Leigh Laboratory Bulletin No.29, University of Auckland. 
Harte, M. 2000:  Industry Perspectives: Taking the Initiative for the Managements 
of New Zealand's Commercial Fisheries, In Shotton, Ross, editor, 2000:  
Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management. Proceedings of the 
FishRights99 Conference, Fremantle, Western Australia, 11 - 19 
November 1999, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/1. 270-273. 
Harte, M. and R. Bess, 2000: The Role of Property Rights in the Development of 
New Zealand‘s Marine Farming Industry. In Shotton, Ross, editor, Use of 
property rights in fisheries management. Volume 2. FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper 404/2, Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, 
Fremantle, Western Australia, 11-19 November 1999. 331-342. 
Harvey, D. 2003: The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Harvey, David, 2005: A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Hazlehurst, Brian Leighton, 1994: Fishing For Cognition: An ethnography of 
fishing   practice in a community on the west coast of Sweden. PhD Thesis 
in Cognitive Science and Anthropology, University of California, San 
Diego. http://dcog.net/~brian/dissertation/dissertation.html (Accessed 18 
October 2006).  
Hassan, Tariq, 2003: Benefits of Corporatization. Speech by the Chairman, 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan at the Expert Advisory 
Cell, Islamabad, 20 November 2003. 
www.secp.gov.pk/ChairmanSpeeches/PDF/201103_EAC.pdf (Accessed 
12 May 2008). 
Haugh, Helen and Bill Pardy, 2000: Community Business Development in the 
Fisheries Dependent Communities of North-east Scotland. In David 
348 
 
Symes, Fisheries Dependent Regions, Fishing News Books, Blackwell 
Science. Oxford.184-194.  
Hawes, Peter, 2002: Royce, Royce, the People's Choice; the story of a young man 
and the sea.  A Vintage Book, Random House, Auckland. 
Hawkey, D. 1994: Property rights, ITQs and the slice of the fish pie: An Appraisal 
of fishery culture and conflict in the Northland Region. Research Essay, 
Economics Department University of Auckland, Auckland. 
Haworth, Jenny, 2008: Tides of Change: The story of the New Zealand Federation 
of Commercial Fishermen: The First Fifty Years 1958-2008. Wily 
Publications Ltd., Christchurch.  
Hazlehurst, Brian Leighton, 1994: Fishing For Cognition: An ethnography of 
fishing practice in a community on the west coast of Sweden. PhD Thesis 
in Cognitive Science and Anthropology, University of California, San 
Diego. http://dcog.net/~brian/dissertation/dissertation.html. (Accessed 18 
October 2006).  
Heberley, H. 1996: Weather Permitting: an autobiography. Cape Catley Ltd., 
Whatamango Bay, Queen Charlotte Sound, New Zealand. 
Heberley, H. 2005: Ordinary Women Extraordinary Lives: In the Fishing 
Industry. Cape Catley, Auckland. 
Hefford, A.E. 1928: Fisheries. In New Zealand Marine Department Annual 
Report 1927-28, 1928-29, 1929-30. In New Zealand Appendix to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives, Vol.3, H-I. Wellington. 
Hefford, A.E. 1929: Report on the Fisheries in the Hauraki Gulf, with special 
reference to the Snapper Fishery and the Effects of ―Power‖ Fishing 
(Trawling and Danish-Seining). Appendix I in Marine Department: Report 
on Fisheries: For the Year ended 31st March, 1929. W.A.G. Skinner, 
Government Printer, Wellington, 30-71. 
Hefford, A.E. 1930:  Fisheries. In New Zealand Marine Department Annual 
Report 1927-28, 1928-29, 1929-30. In New Zealand Appendix to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives, Vol.3, H-I. Wellington. 
Helgason, A. and G. Palsson, 1997: Contested commodities: the moral landscape 
of modernist regimes. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 3(3), 
451-471. 
Hersoug, Bjorn, 2002: Unfinished business: New Zealand's experience with 
rights- based fisheries management, Delft, Netherlands, Eburon. 
Holmes, N.J., 1998: The Quota Management System: The New Zealand 
Individual Transferable Quota System as Experienced by Small Fishing 
Dependent Communities. Masters Thesis, Department of Geography 
University of Waikato, Hamilton. 
Howarth, D. 2000: Discourse. Open University Press, Philadelphia. 
  
349 
Information Services for MAF's Fisheries Divisions, 1977: Assistance and 
Incentives For Fishermen. October Supplement, Catch '77, Wellington. 
Ingram, Keith, 2004: New Trawler to Embrace New Frontier, Professional 
Skipper, November/December, 4-9. 
Ingram, Keith, 2008: Creeping Death – Our Dying Fleet. Professional Skipper. 
July/August, 16-19. 
Ingram, Keith, 2010: Professional Skipper. January/February VIP Publications, 2, 
3. 
IASC, n.d.: International Association for the Study of the Commons. 
http://www.iascp.org/  (Accessed 14 May 2008). 
Jacob, S. and M. Jepson, 2000: Defining And Identifying Fishing- Dependent 
Communities In Florida. Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural 
Systems and World Economic Development 29(3), 221. 
Jaffe, JoAnn and Michael Gertler, 2006: Victual vicissitudes: Consumer 
deskilling and the (gendered) transformation of food systems. Agriculture 
and Human Values, 23, 143-162.  
Jamieson, Lynn, Gillian Munro and Maud Perrier, 2009:  Social Change in 
Scottish Fishing Communities: A Brief Literature Review and Annotated 
Bibliography Description. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/07/10100136/3 (Accessed 
18 June 2010).  
Jennings, F. 1999: Scaring the Fish: A critique of the NRC's justification for 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) and a systems analysis of their 
likely effects. Prepared at the request of Niaz Dorry, Greenpeace, US 
Oceans Campaign, Centre for Ecological Economic and Ethical 
Education., Washington.  
Jentoft, S. 1993: Dangling Lines: The Fisheries Crisis and the Future of Coastal 
Communities: The Norwegian Experience. ISER Institute of Social and 
Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, 
Newfoundland. 
Jentoft, Svein, 2000: The community: a missing link of fisheries management.  
Marine Policy, January, 24(1), 53-60. 
Jentoff, S. 2004: The Community in Fisheries Management: Experiences, 
Opportunities and Risks. In: B. Hersoug and P. Degnbol, editors, Fisheries 
Development: The Institutional Challenge. Eburon, Delft, The 
Netherlands, 93-129. 
Jentoft, Svein, 2006: Beyond fisheries management: The Phronetic dimension. 
Marine Policy 30(6) 671-680.  
Jentoft, Svein and Anthony Davis, 1993: Self and Sacrifice: An Investigation of 
Small Boat Fisher Individualism and Its Implication for Producer 
Cooperatives, St Georges Bay Ecosystem. 
350 
 
http://www.stfx.ca/people/gbayesp/selfsacrifice_report.htm (Accessed 2 
October 1999). 
Jesson, Bruce, 1989: Fragments of Labour: The Story Behind the Labour 
Government, Penguin Books, Auckland. 
Jodice, Laura W. and William C. Norman, n.d.: Interest In ―Virtual‖ And ―Real‖ 
Shrimp Related Experiences Among Coastal And Shrimp Festival Tourists 
In South Carolina, USA. Department of Parks, Recreation & Tourism 
Management, Clemson University. 
Johannes, R.E. 1978: Traditional marine conservational methods in Oceania and 
their demise. Annual Review of Ecological Systems, 9, 349-64. 
Johannes, R.E. 1981: Words of the Lagoon: Fishing and Marine Lore in the Palau 
District of Micronesia, University of Berkeley Press, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles. 
Johannes, R. E. and W. MacFarlane, 1991: Traditional Fishing in the Torres 
Strait Islands. Canberra: Australian Department of Primary Industries and 
Energy. 
Johnson, D. and C. B. J. Haworth, 2004:  Hooked: The story of the New Zealand 
Fishing Industry. Christchurch, Hazard Press. 
Johnson, D. 1996: On the Notion of Community as Text: Readings in the Study of 
Indian Community. 
http://www.uoguelph.ca/~rsphd/qualifying_exams/djohnson.htm 
(Accessed 5 August 2003). 
Johnson, Derek, Maarten Bavinck, and Joeli Veitayaki, 2005: Fish Capture, In Jan 
Kooiman, Maartin Bavinck, Svein Jentoff and Roger Pullin (eds), Fish for 
Life: Interactive Governance for Fisheries, MARE Publication Series, 
Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam. 71-91. 
Johnston, R.J., Derek Gregory, Geraldine Pratt and Michael Watts, editors, 2000: 
The Dictionary of Human Geography.  http://www.xreferplus.com  
(Accessed 29 July 2008). 
Kelle, U. 1995a: Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis: Theory, Methods 
and Practice. Sage, London. 
Kelle, U. 1995b: Introduction: An Overview of Computer-aided Methods in 
Qualitative Research. In: U. Kelle, editor, Computer- Aided Qualitative 
Data Analysis: Theory, Methods and Practice. Sage, London,  
Kelle, U. 1997: Theory Building in Qualitative Research and Computer Programs 
for the Management of Textual Data. Sociological Research Online 2(2),. 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/2/2/1.html (Accessed 7 
September 2004) 
Kelsey, Jane, 2003: Lessons from New Zealand: The Saga of the GATS and Local 
Content Quotas. Paper for the Conference on Cultural Diversity, Paris, 2-4 
  
351 
February 2003. http://www.arena.org.nz/gatspari.htm (Accessed 6 
November 2004). 
Kenton, B.J. 1977: President calls for growth and unity in the industry, 
Commercial Fishing, July 1977, 11. 
Kenyon, G. 1992: Making a Living from the Sea. Paper presented to the 
Conservation Authority Conference, University of Auckland, 1 May, 
Auckland. Unpublished paper. 
Kidd, D. 2000: A Minister‘s Perspective on Managing New Zealand Fisheries, In 
Shotton, Ross, editor, 2000:  Use of Property Rights in Fisheries 
Management. Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, Fremantle, 
Western Australia, 11 - 19 November 1999, FAO Fisheries Technical 
Paper 404/1. 136-141.  
King, Thomas, 2003: The Truth about Stories. 2003 Massey Lecture, CBC Audio, 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 
Kinsella, Jim, Susan Wilson, Floor de Jong and Henk Renting, 2000: Pluriactivity 
as a livelihood strategy and its role in rural development. Sociologia 
Ruralis, 40 (4), 481-496. 
Kingsnorth, Paul, 2003: One no, many yeses: a journey to the heart of the 
resistance movement. Free Press, London. 
Kitner, Kathi, 2006: Beeliners, Pinkies, and Kitties: Mobility and Marginalization 
in the South Atlantic Snapper Grouper Fishery. Human Organization., 
65(3),  294-307.  
Klein, Naomi, 1999: No Logo: taking aim at the brand bullies. Picador, New 
York. 
Klein, Naomi, 2007: The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Allen 
Lane, Penguin Books, London. 
K'Meyer, Tracy E. 1997: "What Koinonia was all about": the role of memory in a 
changing community. The Oral History Review 24(1), 1-22. 
Knight, Peter, 2007: Ownership and Belonging in the Bluff Oyster Fishery of 
New Zealand. MAST-Maritime Studies, 5(2), 55-76.  
Koenig, Thomas, n.d.: CAQDAS comparison. 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/research/mmethods/research/software/caqdas_com
parison.html  (Accessed 24 October 2006). 
Koenig, T., n.d.: Routinizing Frame Analysis through the Use of CAQDAS. 
Department of Social Sciences Loughborough University, 
www.lboro.ac.uk/research/mmethods/research/case_studies/hohmann/Fra
mes_and_CAQDAS.pdf  (Accessed 8 September 2004). 
Korten, D.C. 1995: When Corporations Rule The World. West Hartford: 
Kumarian Press; San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
352 
 
Kvale, St. (1996). InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research 
Interviewing. London: Sage. 
Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: The Metaphors We Live By. Chapter 10 In O‘Brien, 
Jodi, 2006: The Production of Reality: Essays and readings on social 
interaction. Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks C.A. 103-114. 
Law Commission, 1989: The Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Fisheries. Maitaitai: 
Nga Tikanga Maori Me Te Tiriri o Waitangi. Law Commission, 
Preliminary Paper No.9, March, Wellington. 
Law, John, 1992, 2001: Notes on the Theory of the Actor Network: Ordering, 
Strategy and Heterogeneity.  Centre for Science Studies, Lancaster 
University, Lancaster LA1 4YN. 
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/Law-Notes-on-ANT.pdf 
(Accessed 11 April 2005). 
Le Heron, Richard and Eric Pawson, 1996: Changing Places: New Zealand in the 
Nineties, Longman Paul, Auckland. 
Le Heron, R. 1996: Farms, fisheries and forests, in Le Heron, R and Pawson, E, 
Changing Places. Restructuring in New Zealand in the Nineties,  Longman 
Paul, Auckland. 
Lee Fish Europe AG, 2007: http://www.leefish.ch/index.jsp?nodeId=407  
(Accessed 22 November 2007). 
Lee Fish Group, n.d. (2006): The Lee Fish Group: Finest Sustainable Fresh 
Seafood. [Promotional DVD of Leigh Fisheries operations, catching, 
processing and marketing] 
Lee, R.M. and Fielding, N., 1996: Qualitative Data Analysis: Representations of a 
Technology: A Comment on Coffey, Holbrook and Atkinson'. 
Sociological Research Online 1(4). 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/1/4/lf.html (Accessed 31 August 2004).  
Leigh Fisheries, 2006: Leigh Fisheries EuropeAG. 
http://www.leefish.ch/index.jsp?nodeId=407 (Accessed: 24 August 2006) 
Lemke, J.L. 1998: Analysing Verbal Data: Principles, Methods, And Problems,. 
In: B.J. Fraser and K. Tobin, editors, International Handbook of Science 
Education. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, the Netherlands,  
Lemke, J.L. 1994: Semiotics and the Deconstruction of Conceptual Learning. 
http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/education/jlemke/papers/jsalt.htm  
(Accessed 27 August 2004).  
Levine, Hal B. and Marlene Wolfzahn Levine, 1987: Stewart Island: 
Anthropological Perspectives on a New Zealand Fishing Community, 
Victoria University Occasional Papers in Anthropology 1., Department of 
Anthropology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington. 
Levine, Marlene, 1987:  Exclusion and Participation: The Role of Women in a 
New Zealand Fishing Village. In Hal Levine and Marlene Levine,  Stewart 
  
353 
Island: Anthropological Perspectives on a New Zealand Fishing 
Community, Victoria University Occasional Papers in Anthropology 1., 
Department of Anthropology, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington. 33-49. 
Lien, Marianne E. 2003: Shifting Boundaries Of a Coastal Community: Tracing 
Changes on the Margin, In Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Globalisation: 
Studies in Anthropology, Pluto Press London, 99-121.  
Lovie, G.B. 1988: New Zealand Ships Illustrated 1988-89. Industrial Publishing 
Limited, Wellington.  
LPG Research Group, 2004: After Neoliberalism? New Forms of Governance in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. Conference hosted by the Local Partnerships & 
Governance Research Group, Conference Centre, The University of 
Auckland, Monday 13 December 2004. 
MacInnes, John, 2004: The sociology of identity: social science or social 
comment? The British Journal of Sociology 55 (4), 531-543.  
MAF FARDs New Zealand Fisheries Research Documents. N.Z. Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. 
MAF, 1984: Inshore Finfish Fisheries: Proposed Policy for Future Management. 
New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. [―The Blue Book‖] 
Makarios, E. 1996:  Nets, Lines and Pots: A history of New Zealand fishing 
vessels. Wellington, IPL Books in association with The Wellington 
Maritime Museum.  
Makarios, E. 1997:  Nets, Lines and Pots: A history of New Zealand fishing 
vessels. Vol.2, Wellington, IPL Books in association with The Wellington 
Maritime Museum. 
Makarios, E. 1999:  Nets, Lines and Pots: A history of New Zealand fishing 
vessels. Vol.3, Wellington, IPL Books in Association with: The 
Wellington Maritime Museum. 
Maloney, D.G. and P.H. Pearce, 1979: Qualitative rights as an instrument for 
regulation of commercial fisheries. Journal of the Fisheries Research 
Board of Canada 36, 859-866. 
Mansfield, Becky, 2001:  Thinking through scale: the role of state governance in 
globalizing North Pacific fisheries. Environment and Planning A 33, 1807-
1827. 
Mansfield, Becky, 2003: Spatializing Globalization: A 'Geography of Quality' in 
the Seafood Industry.  Economic Geography, 79(1), 1-16. 
Mansfield, Becky, 2004: Neoliberalism in the oceans: "rationalization," property 
rights, and the commons question. Geoforum,35(3), 313- 327. 
Mansfield, Becky, 2004b: Rules of Privatization: Contradictions in Neoliberal 
Regulation of North Pacific Fisheries. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 94(3), pp. 565–584. 
354 
 
Mansfield, Becky, 2006: Assessing market- based environmental policy using a 
case study of North Pacific fisheries. Global Environmental Change, 
16(1), 29-39.  
Mansfield, Becky, 2007: Privatization: Property and the Remaking of Nature - 
Society Relations Introduction to the Special Issue. Antipode 39(3) 393- 
405.  
Market New Zealand (n.d.): 
http://www.marketnewzealand.com/MNZ/Profiler/0/6822/leigh-fisheries- 
ltd.aspx?Buyer=true (Accessed 24 August 2006). 
Market New Zealand, 2004: Seafood Industry Profile. October 2004. 
http://www.marketnewzealand.com/MNZ/aboutNZ/sectors/14410/13759.a
spx (Accessed 24 August 2006). 
Marshall, S.J. 2000: Community, quotas and co-management: a case study of 
fishery management in the Chatham Islands. Master‘s Thesis, Department 
of Geography University of Waikato, Hamilton. 
Martin, N.D. 1987: Submission B71, Appendix: Exclusion of Part-Timers, 
Submission B71, Waitangi Tribunal, Te Hapua Hearing, Muriwhenua 
Claim. 
Martyn, Tamara, 1991: Kenneth Brown: New Zealanders. Pacific Way, 36-38. 
Massey, E. 2003: The Governance of Marine Management in New Zealand: 
Delaying the Transition from Single Species to Ecosystem Based 
Management? In J. Loggie, editor, Windows on a changing world. 22nd 
New Zealand Geographical Society Conference, School of Geographical 
and Environmental Science, The University of Auckland. 105-110. 
Massey, E.J. 2005: Confronting Barriers to Ecological Information Transfer in 
New Zealand's Fisheries Management System: Towards Developing a 
Trajectory for Trans-Disciplinary Inquiry. Doctor of Philosophy in 
geography Thesis, School of Geography and Environmental Science 
University of Auckland, Auckland. 
Massey, E. and E. Rees, 2004:  Sustainable Utilisation of Fisheries as 
Governmentality: Constraining the Potential for Ecosystem-Based 
Management? New Zealand Geographer 60(1): 25-35. 
McCarney, Joseph, 2005: Marx Myths and Legends: Ideology and False 
Consciousness. http://marxmyths.org/joseph-mccarney/article.htm 
(Accessed 19 February 2009). 
McCracken, G. 1988: The long Interview. Newbury Park, California, Sage 
Publications. 
McCay, B.J. 1995: Social and ecological implications of ITQs: an overview. 
Ocean and Coastal Management 28(1-2), 2-22. 
  
355 
McCay, B.J. and S. Jentoft, 1998: Market or community failure? Critical 
perspectives on common property research. Human Organization 57(1), 
21-30. 
McClintock, W. 2000: Resource Community Formation and Change: A Case 
Study of Riverton. Working Report No.24, Taylor Baines & Associates, 
Christchurch 
McClintock, W., J. Baines and N. Taylor, 2000: Fishing Communities and the 
Boom- bust Cycle. Seafood New Zealand December: 26-27. 
McClintock, W.L., J.T. Baines and C.N. Taylor, 2000: Retreat From the Frontier: 
Fishing Communities. In New Zealand Proceedings of the Paper prepared 
for the 8th International Symposium on Society and Resource 
Management Conference, June 17- 22, 2000., Western Washington 
University, Bellingham, Washington, USA. 
McClurg, Tom, 1997: Fish or Cut Bait: Bureaucratic Management Versus Private 
Property ITQs in New Zealand after Ten Years. The Fraser Institute, 
http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/chapterfiles/Bureaucratic%20M
anagement%20versus%20Private%20Property-06McClurg.pdf  (Accessed 
9 February 2005). 
McCormack, Fiona and Charles Crothers, 2008: Leigh: A Community of fishers? 
A Report commissioned [and funded] by the Ministry of Fisheries. 
Department of Social Sciences, AUT University, July 2008, Auckland. 
McEvoy, A. F. 1986. The fisherman's problem: Ecology and law in the California 
fisheries 1850-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McGinn, A.P. 1998: Rocking the Boat: Conserving Fisheries and Protecting Jobs. 
Worldwatch Paper 142, Worldwatch Institute, June 1998. 
McLean, G. 1986: Moeraki: 150 Years of Net and Ploughshare. Otago Heritage 
Books, Dunedin. 
McManus, Jenni, 1994: Official wrong doing righted with retrospective 
legislation, The Independent (Monthly Auckland Newspaper, ed Warren 
Berryman), 21 January 1994, 1,2. 
McNeill, Tony, n.d.: Lectures by Tony McNeill: Roland Barthes: Mythologies 
(1957). http://www.sunderland.ac.uk/~os0tmc/culture/myth1.htm 
(Accessed 26 August 2004). 
Memon, Pyar and Cullen, Ross 1992: Fishery Policies and their Impact on the 
New Zealand Maori. Marine Resource Economics, 7(3) 153-67. 
MFish, n.d.: Ministry of Fisheries: Te Tautiaki I nga tini a Tangaroa: 
newzealand.govt.nz. http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/default.htm  (Accessed 
18 July 2008). 
MFish, 1997: Towards Better management of New Zealand’s Commercial 
Fisheries: A Discussion paper on Proposals to Reform Management of 
New Zealand’s Commercial Fisheries. Ministry of Fisheries, Wellington. 
356 
 
MFish, 2004: Briefing for the Minister of Fisheries 5 March 2004. 
MFish, 2007: Draft Fisheries Plan for North-East FinFish Fishery. Ministry of 
Fisheries, December. http://www.fish.govt.nz. (Accessed 23 October 
2008). 
Ministry of Fisheries, 2007: Recreational Fisher’s Handbook June 2007 – 
September 2008. The Ministry of Fisheries, Wellington. 
Miller, M.L. and J. van Maanen, 1979: Boats don't fish, People Do: Some 
Ethnographic Notes on the Federal Management of Fisheries in 
Gloucester. Human Organization 38(4), 377-385. 
Miller, M.L. and J. van Maanen, 1982: Getting into Fishing: Observations on the 
Social Identities of New England Fishermen. Urban Life 11(1), 27-54. 
Mills, N.L. 1978: Why 30-m vessels for the New Zealand deep-sea fishery? In 
R.D. Elder and J.L. Taylor, 1978: Prospects and Problems for New 
Zealand's Demersal Fisheries: Proceedings of the Demersal Fisheries 
Conference October 1978, Fisheries Research Division, Occasional 
Publication No.19, 1979, 64-65. 
Minnegal, Monica, Tanya J. King, Roger Just and Peter D. Dwyer, 2003: Deep 
Identity, Shallow Time: Sustaining a Future in Victorian Fishing 
Communities, The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 14(1), pp53-71. 
Mitcalfe, Barry, 1980: Gulf. Coromandel Press, Coromandel, New Zealand. 
Mittleman, James H. and Christine B. N. Chin, 2000: Conceptualizing Resistance 
to Globalization. In James H. Mittleman, editor: The Globalization 
Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey. 165-178 
Monbiot, George, 2007: How Did We Get Into This Mess? The Guardian 28th 
August 2007. http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2007/08/28/how-did-we-
get-into-this-mess/ (Accessed 19 December 2007).  
Monk, G. and Hewison, G. 1994: A Brief Criticism of the New Zealand Quota 
Management System. In: K. Gimbel, editor, Limiting Access to Marine 
Fisheries: Keeping the Focus on Conservation. Washington, Centre for 
Marine Conservation and World Wildlife Fund. 107-119. 
Monin, P. 1992: Waiheke Island: a history. Palmerston North, The Dunmore 
Press, Historical Branch Department of Internal Affairs, Waiheke 
Community Board. 
Mulgan, J. 1949: Man Alone.  Paul‘s Book Arcade, Hamilton. 205pp 
Murray, Walter, 1987: Letters, Te Hapua hearings of the Muriwhenua Fishing 
Claim before the Waitangi Tribunal 2-6 March 1987. 
Mortimer, Peter, 2006: Last of the Hunters: Life with the Fishermen of North 
Shields. Five Leaves Publications, Nottingham.  
  
357 
Mouffe, Chantal, 1979: Gramsci and Marxist Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, Boston and Henley 
MSFCMA, 1976: Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. 
Public Law 94-265 as amended by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act, Public Law 109-479. 
In: 16 USC 1801 et seq. 
Murray, Walter, 1987: Submission to Waitangi Tribunal, Second Hearing, 
Muriwhenua Fisheries Claim, Te Hapua, 2-6 March 1987. 
Nadel-Klein, J. and D.L. Davis, 1988: To Work and To Weep: Women in Fishing 
Economies. ISER Press, St. Johns. 
Nadel-Klein, J. and D.L. Davis, 1988: Terra Cognita? A Review of the Literature. 
In: J. Nadel- Klein and D.L. Davis, editors, To Work and To Weep: 
Women in Fishing Economies. Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland Canada, 
18-50. 
NAFMAC, 1983: Future Policy for the Inshore Fishery: a Discussion Paper. 
National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee, Wellington, August 
1983.  
Newell, Richard, James Sanchirico and Suzi Kerr, 2005: Fishing Quota Markets, 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49 (2005) 437–
462. 
http://www.motu.org.nz/publications/search/results.php?pid=12&filteryear
=2005 (Accessed 19 October 2008). 
Newell, Richard, Kerry Papps and James Sanchirico. 2005: Asset Pricing in 
Created Markets for Fishing Quotas, Resources for the Future Discussion 
paper 05-46. 
http://www.motu.org.nz/publications/search/results.php?pid=12&filteryear
=2005 (Accessed 19 October 2008). 
New Zealand Professional Fisherman, 1990: Editorial II: A Bloody Rum Deal. 
New Zealand Professional Fisherman 4(2), April/May, 11. 
Nichols, Karen, 1999: Coming to terms with `integrated coastal management' 
problems of meaning and method in a new arena of resource regulation. 
Professional Geographer, 51(3), 388-400.  
Nielander, W. J. and M. S. Sullivan 2000:  ITQs - New Zealand and United 
States: Allocation Formula and Legal Challenges. In Ross Shotton, editor, 
Use of property rights in fisheries management. Volume 2. FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper 404/2, Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, 
Fremantle, Western Australia, 11-19 November 1999. 59-71. 
NMFS, 2001: Guidelines for Assessment of the Social Impact of Fishery 
Management Actions. NMFS Operational Guidelines – Fishery 
Management Process, Appendix 2(g). 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/OperationalGuidelines/OGsoci
al_impact_assess.htm (Accessed 1 November 2007). 
358 
 
Nooden, Lars, 1992: Animal Symbolism in Celtic Mythology. A paper for 
Religion 375 at the University of Michigan, 22 November 1992. 
http://www- personal.umich.edu/~lars/rel375.html (Accessed 16 January 
2007) 
Northcott, Rose, 2005: The Pride and Pain of Leigh Fisheries. Seafood New 
Zealand 13(7) 12-19. 
NZ Herald, 1981: Fishermen 'First Victims of Think Big Policy', The New 
Zealand Herald Thursday 28 May 1981. 
NZ Herald, 1983: Tales of Sprats and Mackerels, The New Zealand Herald, 7 
November, 1983, 5. 
O.E.D. 1973, 1993:  The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford. 
Olsen, M.E., D.G. Lodwick,.and R.E. Dunlap, 1992: Theoretical Framework. In: 
M.E. Olsen et al. editors, Viewing the World Ecologically. Westview 
Press, Boulder, CO, 13-32. 
Orbach, M.K. 1977: Hunters, Seamen and Entrepreneurs: The Tuna Seiner- men 
of San Diego. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. 
Ostrom, Elinor, 1990: Governing the Commons: The evolution of institutions for 
collective action. Cambridge University Press, (political Economy of 
Institutions and decisions), Cambridge. 
Ostrom, Elinor, 1999: Coping with the Tragedies of the Commons. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 2(1),493-536.  
Pacific Fishery Management Council, 2005: Information Sheet: Communities. 
http://www.pcouncil.org/facts/communities.pdf (Accessed 23 February 
2009). 
Page, P. 1994:  The Quota Management System: a study of the implementation of 
a property rights model. Thesis Master of laws, The Law Department, The 
University of Otago Dunedin,  
Pagrus auratus: Fishbase. http://filaman.ifm-
geomar.de/Summary/SpeciesSummary.php?id=6426 (Accessed 23 
February 2009). 
Palsson, G. 1990: The idea of fish: land and sea in the Icelandic world- view. In: 
R. Willis, editor, Signifying Animals: Human meaning in the natural 
world. Unwin Hyman, London, 119- 133. 
Palsson, Gisli, 1991: Coastal economies, cultural accounts: Human ecology and 
Icelandic discourse. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 54-83 
Palsson, Gisli and Agnar Helgason 1995: Figuring fish and measuring men: the 
individual transferable quota system in the Icelandic cod fishery. Ocean 
and Coastal Management, 28(1- 3), 117-146. 
Palsson, Gisli and Agnar Helgason, 1996: Property Rights and Practical 
Knowledge: The Icelandic Quota System. In Kevin Crean and David 
  
359 
Symes editors, Fisheries Management in Crisis, Fishing News Books, 
Oxford, 45-60. 
Palsson, G. and G. Petursdottir, 1997: Social Implications of Quota Systems in 
Fisheries: Proceedings of Seminar held in the Vesterman Islands in May 
1996, Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord,  
Pankhurst, E.E. 1985: Safe Haven: Riverton 1935-1985. Riverton Sesquicentenial 
Society (Inc.), Riverton. 
Parker, G. and J. Hufflet 1993:  The Northland Seafood Industry: Its Importance 
and Place in the Region. Wellington, Economics section, NZ Fishing 
Industry Board. 
Parkes, W.F. 1979: Poverty of a Different Kind. In G. Bryant, 1979: The 
Widening Gap: Poverty in New Zealand. Cassell Limited, Auckland, 95-
96. 
Parkland Institute, n.d.: Neo-liberal Globalism and its challengers: Sustainability 
in the semi- periphery. Parkland institute, University of Alberta, 
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. http://www.ualberta.ca/~parkland/mcri.html 
(Accessed 7 March 2001). 
Parkins, Keith, 2000: Globalisation - the role of corporations. 
http://home.clara.net/heureka/gaia/global05.htm (Accessed 25 August 
2008).  
Parsons, L.W.  1901: Statements by Fishermen. Transcription of shorthand notes 
of statements made to Mr Ayson by L.W. Parsons, Shorthand Reporter, at 
the Borough Council Thames, December 14-16.  
Paul, L.J. 1977: The Commercial Fishery for Snapper (Chrysophrys auratus 
(Foster), in the Auckland Region, New Zealand, from 1900 to 1971. 
Fisheries Research Bulletin No.15, Fisheries Research Division, the New 
Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington. 
Paul, L.J., n.d.: Marine Fish and Fisheries: The Snapper Fishery. FISHDEX, MAF 
Media Services, Wellington. 
Paul, L.J. and R.D. Elder, 1979: The Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery. In R.D. Elder 
and J.L. Taylor editors, Prospects and Problems for New Zealand's 
Demersal Fisheries Proceedings of the Demersal Fisheries Conference 
October 1978. Fisheries Research Division, Occasional Paper No 19. The 
New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington 1979. 
Peace, Adrian, 1991: Fishing, Drinking and the Construction of Identity in Rural 
Ireland. MAST- Maritime Studies, 4(2), 3- 16. 
Peace, R. 1998: CAQDAS / NUDIST: a geographical perspective. In Elaine Bliss, 
editor,  Islands, Economy, Society and Environment, Proceedings of the 
2nd Joint Conference of the TAG and NZGS Conference, University of 
Waikato. 382- 383. 
360 
 
Peacey, Jonathan, compiler, 1996: The New Zealand Seafood Industry Economic 
Review 1994-1996. Clement & Associates Limited, New Zealand Fishing 
Industry Board, Wellington. 
Peacey, Jonathan and Robin Connor, 2007: Objectives-Based Fisheries 
Management; Building on 20- years Experience with Individual 
Transferable Quotas. Invited Paper presented to the 51st Annual 
Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Society, Queenstown, New Zealand, 13-16 February, 2007  
Peacey, Jonathan, 1996: The New Zealand Seafood Industry Economic Review 
1994- 1996. New Zealand Fishing Industry Board, Wellington. 
Pearce, P. 1991:  Building on Progress. Fisheries Policy Development in New 
Zealand. A report prepared for the Minister of Fisheries. Wellington, 
MAF. 
Perkes, R. and A. Thompson, 2006: The Oral History Reader. Routledge, 
Abingdon, Oxon. 
Petras, J. and H. Veltmeyer 2003:  System in Crisis: The Dynamics of Free 
Market Capitalism. London, New York, Zed Books Ltd. 
Phillips, Lynne, 2006: Food and Globalization. Annual Review of Anthropology, 
35(1), 37-57.  
Picard, V. and P. Stephen. 1993: On Waiheke Island: a guide book. RSVP 
Publishing, Auckland. 
Pigneguy, Dee, 2001: Saltwater in Her Hair: Stories of women in the New 
Zealand maritime industry. VIP Publications Ltd. Auckland.77-81. 
Pinkerton, E. 1999: Factors in overcoming barriers to implementing co-
management in British Columbia salmon fisheries. Conservation Ecology 
3(2): 2. http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art2 (Accessed 28 June 2000). 
Pinkerton, Evelyn and Danielle N. Edwards, 2009: The elephant in the room: The 
hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas. Marine 
Policy, In Press.  
Polanyi, Karl, 1957: The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Powell, Paul, 1976: Fishermen of Fiordland, A.H. & A.W. Reed, Wellington. 
Power, N.G. 2005: What Do They Call a Fisherman? Men, Gender, and 
Restructuring in the Newfoundland Fishery. ISER Books, Institute of 
Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 
St.John's, Newfoundland. 
Ragin, C.C. 1992: Introduction: Cases of "What is a case?" In: Ragin, C.C., 
Becker, H.S. (ed) What is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social 
Inquiry. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1-18. 
Ragin, C.C. and H.S. Becker. 1992: What is a Case? Exploring the Foundations 
of Social Enquiry. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
  
361 
Ramsey, D. and B. Smit, 2002: Rural community well-being: models and 
application to changes in the tobacco- belt in Ontario, Canada. Geoforum, 
33(3), 367-384. 
Rees, Eugene, 2003: QMS Driven Productivity and Performance Gains in the 
New Zealand Seafood Sector: The Case for Success at the Industry Level, 
In, Jay Gao, Richard Le Heron and June Logie, Windows on a Changing 
World, Proceedings of the 22nd New Zealand Geographical Society 
Conference, School of Geography and Environmental Science, The 
University of Auckland, 6-11 July 2003. 
Rees, E.B. 2004: Performance and Productivity: The Case for QMS Driven 
Productivity and Performance Gains in the New Zealand Seafood Sector. 
MAST- Maritime Studies, 3(1), 67-91. 
Rees, E.B. 2006: In What Sense a Fisheries Problem? Negotiating sustainable 
growth in New Zealand fisheries. PhD Thesis, Geography University of 
Auckland, Auckland. 
Rennie, H.G. 1989, "Human resource development: What is it?" Development 
(April): 14-16. 
Rennie, H.G. 1993, "The coastal environment". In P.A. Memon and H.C., Perkins 
editors, Environmental Planning in New Zealand, Dunmore Press, 
Palmerston North, NZ. 150-168. 
Rennie, H.G. 1998: Geographical problems in implementing ITQ: New Zealand's 
Quota Management System. Proceedings of the 'Crossing boundaries': 7th 
Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common 
Property: Conference, June 10- 14, Simon Fraser University, University of 
British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada.  
Rennie, H.G. 2000, Coastal fisheries and marine planning in transition. In 
P.A.Memon and H. Perkins editors, Environmental Planning & 
Management in New Zealand.  Dunmore Press Ltd., Palmerston North, 
NZ. 215-222.  
Rennie, Hamish, 2000b:  Re: Charters & Guides. Fishfolk. 2000-04-27 3:12 PM, 
fishfolk@mitvma.mit.edu  
Rennie, H and J. Thomson, 2004: ‗Valuing the charter fishing industry (Part I: 
Establishing the nature and extent of the industry). Working paper 1: 
Review of literature and construction of a model‘ unpubl. Draft report 
prepared for the Ministry of Fisheries and Fishery Assessment Working 
Groups. May 2004. Mfish research project MOF2001/04. P. 80 
Rennie, H.G. and J. Thomson, 2007: ‗A Geography of charter boat operators in 
New Zealand‘ in M.Luck, M. Miller. A.Graupi, M.B. Orams and J. 
Auyong, editors, Proceedings of the 5th International Coastal & Marine 
Tourism Congress Auckland: NZ Tourism Research Institute, 467-485 
Rennie, H. and N. Holmes, 1998: Identifying fisheries regions in New Zealand: 
some conceptual difficulties. Unpublished paper presented to Canadian 
Association of Geographers (CAG) Conference, 2-6 June, Ottawa. 
362 
 
Riley, P. 1982: Economic aspects of New Zealand's policies on limited entry 
fisheries. In: Sturgess, N.H., Meany, T.F. editors, Policy and Practice in 
Fisheries Management. Canberra. Proceedings of the National Fisheries 
Seminar on Economic Aspects of Limited Entry and Associated Fisheries 
Management Measures, held in Melbourne, February 1980. Australian 
Government Printing Services, Canberra. 385-382. 
Royal Akarana Yacht Club, 1972: Coastal Cruising Handbook: A guide to the 
north-east coast of New Zealand and anchorages from the Bay of Islands 
to Tauranga. The Royal Akarana Yacht Club (Inc), Auckland. 
Ruddle, Kenneth, 1994: Local Knowledge in the Folk Management of Fisheries 
and Coastal Marine Environments, In Dyer, Christopher L. and James 
McGoodwin, editors, Folk Management in the World's Fisheries: Lessons 
for Modern Fisheries Management, University Press of Colorado, 139-
159. 
Russell, Khyla and Hugh Campbell, 1999: Capitalism, the State and Kai Moana: 
Maori, the New Zealand fishing industry and restructuring. In David 
Burch, Jasper Goss and Geoffrey Lawrence, editors, Restructuring Global 
and Regional Agricultures: Transformations in Australian agri-food 
economies and spaces. Ashgate, Aldershot, 113-130. 
Salmi, Pekka, 2005:  Rural Pluriactivity as a Coping Strategy in Small-Scale 
Fisheries. Sociologia Ruralis, 45 (1/2), April 2005, 22-36. 
Sanchirico, James; Daniel Holland, Kathryn Quigley and Mark Fina, 2005: Catch-
Quota Balancing in Multispecies Individual Fishing Quotas, Resources for 
the Future Discussion Paper 05-54. 
http://www.motu.org.nz/publications/search/results.php?pid=12&filteryear
=2005  (Accessed 19 October 2008). 
Sanford, nd: Company History, 
http://www.sanford.co.nz/mainpage_coHist.asp?category=coHist&current
Page=  (Accessed 1 November 2006). 
Scholte, Aart, 2005: The Sources of Neoliberal Globalization. Overarching 
Concerns Programme Paper Number 8, October 2005, United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development. 
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpPublications)/9E1C54C
EEB19A314C12570B4004D0881?OpenDocument (Accessed 2 
September 2008) 
Schirmer, Jacki and Anne Maree Casey, 2005:  Social Assessment Handbook: A 
guide to methods and approaches for assessing the social sustainability of 
fisheries in Australia. FRDC ESD, Reporting and Assessment 
Subprogram, Publication No. 7. Social Sciences Program, Bureau of Rural 
Sciences. Fisheries Research and Development Corporation and 
Commonwealth of Australia 2005. 
Scott, A. 1955. The fishery: the objectives of sole ownership. Journal of Political 
Economy 63(2) 116- 124. 
  
363 
Scott, A. 1988. Development of property in the fishery. Marine Resource 
Economics 5: 289-311. 
Scott, A. 1993. Obstacles to fishery self-government, Marine Resource 
Economics (8), 187-199. 
Scott, Gary, 2000: 'What Goes Around Comes Around': informal Activities and 
Reciprocity Networks in Westport, New Zealand. New Zealand 
Geographer 56 (1), 39- 45. 
Scott, W.R. 1995: Institutions and organizations. Sage Publications, London. 
Seafood NZ, 2005: The Leigh Fisheries picture. Seafood New Zealand, 17. 
SeaFIC, n.d.: http://www.seafood.co.nz/sc-business  (Accessed 10 November 
2008) 
SeaFIC, 1996: Te Mâra Moana : The Living Sea. 
http://www.seafood.co.nz/f388,11340/11340_livsea.pdf  (Accessed 27 
September 2007) 
SeaFIC, 2001: The Business Of Seafood: New Zealand Seafood Industry 
Economic Review 1997-2001. 
http://www.seafood.co.nz/news.cfm?SEC_ID=65&DOC_ID=342 
(Accessed 31 January 2002). 
SeaFIC, 2008: Business. The New Zealand Seafood Industry Council Ltd. 
(SeaFIC).  http://www.seafood.co.nz/sc- business (Accessed 19 May 
2008). 
Seafood NZ, 1994: Maintaining the Cold Chain: ―A Code of Practice for Frozen 
Seafood Exported by Container‖. Seafood New Zealand, October, 66-74. 
Seafood NZ, 2006: The importance of Seafood to New Zealand. Seafood New 
Zealand, May 2006, 13-31. 
Sealord nd: http://www.sealord.co.nz/xml/default.asp?globalPage=C_environment  
(Accessed 10 November 2008) 
Sellin, Thorsten and Marvin E. Wolfgang, 1964: The Measurement of 
Delinquency. John Wiley and Sons, New York. 
Shaik, Anwar, 2004: The economic mythology of neoliberalism. Forthcoming In 
Alfredo Saad-Filho, editor, Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader, Pluto Press, 
London. http://homepage.newschool.edu/~AShaikh/ (Accessed 2 
September 2008. 
Sharp, Andrew, editor, 2005: Bruce Jesson: To Build a Nation: Collected 
Writings 1975- 1999. Penguin Books Auckland. 
Sharp, B. M. H. 1997:  From regulated access to transferable harvesting rights: 
policy insights from New Zealand. Marine Policy 21(6): 301-517. 
364 
 
Sharp, Basil M. 1998: Fishing. In Pickford, Michael & Alan Bollard, The 
Structure and Dynamics of New Zealand industries, The Dunmore Press, 
53-86. 
Sharp, J.P., P. Routledge, C. Philo and R. Paddison, 2000: Entanglements of 
power: geographies of domination/resistance. In: J.P. Sharp, et al., editors, 
Entanglements of Power. Routledge, London, 1-42. 
Shotton, Ross, editor 2000: Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management. 
Volume 2. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/2, Proceedings of the 
FishRights99 Conference, Fremantle, Western Australia, 11-19 November 
1999.  
Shotton, R. editor, 2001: Case Studies in the Allocation of Transferable Quota 
Rights in Fisheries. FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, Rome.  
Simon, R. 1982, 1991: Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction. Lawrence & 
Wishart Ltd, London. 
Sinner, J. and A. Fenemor. 2005: The Adoption of ITQ for New Zealand's Inshore 
Fisheries. Ecologic Foundation, Nelson. 
http://www.ecologic.org.nz/content/documents/56.pdf (Accessed 19 July 
2007). 
Sissenwine, Michael P. and Pamela Mace, 1992: ITQs in New Zealand: The era of 
fixed quota in perpetuity, Fishery Bulletin, 90, 147-160. 
Slack, E.B. 1969: The Fishing Industry in New Zealand: A Short History, in E.B. 
Slack, editor, 1969: Fisheries and New Zealand: Proceedings of a Seminar 
on Fisheries Development in New Zealand, held at Victoria University of 
Wellington, May 21-23, 1968, 3-24. 
Smith, C., L. 1981:  Satisfaction Bonus from Salmon Fishing: Implications for 
Economic Evaluation. Land Economics 57(2): 181- 196. 
Smith, M.E. 1988: The Right to Choice: Power and Decision-Making. In: J. 
Nadel-Klein and D.L. Davis, editors, To Work and To Weep: Women in 
Fishing Economies. Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial 
University of Newfoundland,, St. John's, Newfoundland Canada, 279- 292. 
Spinks, Aroha and Shekar Bose, 2002: Factors affecting households' seafood 
purchasing decisions in Auckland, New Zealand: an empirical analysis. 
International Journal of Consumer Studies 26 (1), 62-70.  
Squires, D., H. Campbell, S. Cunningham, C. Dewees, R.Q. Grafton, S.F. Herrick 
Jr, J. Kirkley, S. Pascoe, K. Salvanes, B. Shallard, B. Turris, and N. 
Vestergaard, 1998: Individual transferable quotas in multispecies fisheries. 
Marine Policy 22(2), 135-159.  
Statistics NZ, n.d.: Quick Stats about a place. 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/census/census-
outputs/quickstats/aboutAPlace.htm  (Accessed 18 September 2008).  
  
365 
Statistics NZ, 2001 Census Community Profiles. 
http://www2.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/web/commprofiles.nsf/31ee49b
ea84378efcc256d090001b4b6/4368a495abb9d62ecc256d2b0072faee?Ope
nDocument (Accessed 14 August 2007).  
St. Martin, Kevin, 2001: Making Space for Community Resource Management in 
Fisheries, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 91(1). 122-
142. 
St. Martin, Kevin, 2006: The impact of ―community‖ on fisheries management in 
the US Northeast. Geoforum, 37(2), 169-184.  
St. Martin, Kevin, 2007: The Difference that Class Makes: Neoliberalization and 
Non- Capitalism in the Fishing Industry of New England. Antipode 
39(3)527-549.  
Stella, Leonie, 1996: No Place for Wimps: Working on Western Australian 
Trawlers. Anthropologica 38, 173-195. 
Stevens, P. 1999a:  The Lot of the Independent Fisherman. Seafood New Zealand, 
July 43- 44. 
Stevens, P. 1999b:  The Plight of the Owner Operator. Seafood New Zealand, 
November 29 
Stevens, P. 1999c: The Far North. Seafood New Zealand, August: 25-28. 
Stevens, P., 1999d: Gisborne the Fishing Port once bustling, now boutique. 
Seafood New Zealand, May: 31-34. 
Stevens, P. 1999e: Lyttelton - Christchurch. Seafood New Zealand, November: 
46-51. 
Stevens, P. 1999f: Napier - A Post QMS Review. Seafood New Zealand, 
February: 11- 14. 
Stevens, P. 1999g: Otago. Seafood New Zealand March: 36-40. 
Stevens, P., 1999h: The Port of Timaru - Not Pretty but Practical. Seafood New 
Zealand April: 29-32. 
Stevens, P. 1999i: Seafood Marlborough. Seafood New Zealand July: 33-37. 
Stevens, P. 1999j: Wellington - A Port in Limbo. Seafood New Zealand October: 
26-28. 
Stevens, Peter, editor, 1992: Quota Appeals: Did the System Work? What have 
We Learnt? Could it have been Better? Professional Fisherman, 5-7, 
September 1992. 
Stevens, P. 1992b: Living with ITQs.  Fisheries Outlook - National Agricultural 
and Resources Outlook Conference 1992 Conference, Australia. ABARE. 
Stevens, P. 2003: Legalised theft: The hypocrisy of property rights. Seafood New 
Zealand, 20-21. 
366 
 
Stewart, J.M. and P.D. Callagher, 2002: Trends in Ownership Structure in the 
New Zealand Fishery. IIFET2002 Conference, 19-22 August, Victoria 
University, Wellington.  
Stewart, James, Kim Walshe, Beverley Moodie, 2006: The demise of the small 
fisher? A profile of exiters from the New Zealand fishery Marine Policy 30 
328–340.  
Straker, G. and K. Kerr, 2002: A Regulatory History of New Zealand's Quota 
Management System. IIFET2002 Conference, 19-22 August, Victoria 
University, Wellington. Motu: Economic and Public Policy Research 
Trust. http://www.motu.org.nz/docs/database/MEL0283.pdf (Accessed 19 
October 2008) 
Stuster, J. 1980: "Under the Thumb" While "One Hand Washes the Other": 
Traditional Marketing Relations in a California Commercial Fishing 
Community. Anthropological Quarterly 53(4-11). 
Stutz, David, 2004: Some Implications of Software Commodification. 
home2barnsbookwriting. 
http://www.synthesist.net/writing/commodity_software.html (Accessed, 2 
November 2005). 
Symes, D. 1998: Property Rights, Regulatory Measures and the Strategic 
Response of Fishermen, Chapter 1. In Symes, David (ed), Property Rights 
and Regulatory Systems in Fisheries, Fishing News Books, Oxford. 3-16. 
Symes, David, 2000: Rights-based Management: A European Community 
Perspective. In Ross Shotton (Editor): Use of Property Rights in Fisheries 
Management.  Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, Freemantle, 
Western Australia, 15-19 November 1999, FAO Fisheries Technical 
Paper 401, Rome, 276-283 
Symes, D. 2001: Inshore Fisheries in Europe at the Turn of the Century. In: D. 
Symes and J. Philipson, editors, Inshore Fisheries Management. Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 3- 23. 
Symes, D. and J. Phillipson, editors, 2001: Inshore Fisheries Management. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. 
Talley, P. 2000: Fishing Rights - Industry Perspective ITQs and Fishermen's 
Attitudes: The Change from Hunter to Farmer. Proceedings of the Fish 
Rights 99 Conference.  In Ross Shotton (Editor): Use of Property Rights in 
Fisheries Management.  Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, 
Freemantle, Western Australia, 15-19 November 1999, FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper 401, Rome. 247-273. 
Taylor, Nick, Gerard Fitzgerald and Wayne McClintock, 1999: Resource 
community formation and change in New Zealand, Paper presented at the 
International Symposium on Society and Resource Management, 
Brisbane, Australia, July 7-10, 1999. 
The Coromandel Smoking Co., 2007: http://www.corosmoke.co.nz/ (Accessed 5 
December 2007) 
  
367 
Thompson, A. 1992: Sustainable Fisheries: What's the Catch? Law Faculty. 
Wellington, Victoria University: 1-56 + Appendices. 
Thompson, A. 1992b:  Sustainable Fisheries: Theory and application. Law 
Faculty. Wellington, Victoria University: 1-24 + Appendices. 
Thompson, P., T. Wailey and T. Lummis. 1983: Living the Fishing. Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London. 
Titchener, Paul, 1981: The Story of Sanford Limited: The first one hundred years. 
Sanford Limited, Auckland. 
Townsend, Ralph E., 1998:  Beyond ITQs: property rights as a management tool. 
Fisheries Research 37(1-3), 203-210.  
Trimble, Joseph E. and Ryan Dickson, 2005: Ethnic Identity. In C. B. Fisher & 
R.M. Lerner, editors, Applied Developmental Science: An encyclopedia of 
research, policies, and programs. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~trimble/ethnicity_identity.htm (Accessed 18 
October 2006). 
Urquhart, Cathy, 2000: Strategies for Conversation and Systems Analysis in 
Requirements Gathering: A Qualitative View of Analyst-Client 
Communication. The Qualitative Report, 4(1/2),  
van Dijk, T.A. n.d.: Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis. 
http://www.discourse-in- 
societyorg/OldArticles/Discourse%20analysis%20as%20ideology%20anal
ysis.pdf.  (Accessed 18 August 2005). 
van Dijk, Teun A., 1998: Ideology: a Multidisciplinary Approach, Sage 
Publications. London, 263- 276. 
van Ginkel, Rob, 1996: Cooperating competitors: Texel Fishermen and their 
Organisations. Anthropological Quarterly, 96(2), 51-65. 
van Ginkel, Rob, 1999: The Dynamics of Fisheries: A Sensitising Framework. In 
David Symes, editor, Europe's Southern Waters: Management Issues and 
Practice, Fishing News Books, Oxford, 19-32.  
van Vliet, Martijn, 2000: Confronting Globalisation: The need for reskilling 
fishermen. In David Symes, Fisheries Dependent Regions, Fishing News 
Books, Blackwell Science. Oxford. 157- 163. 
Vela, n.d.: Vela Fishing Limited. 
http://www.velafishing.co.nz/pages/index.php?page=our_future_vision  
(Accessed 10 November 2008) 
Waitt, Gordon and Hartig, Kate. 2000: Ecologically sustainable fishing in theory 
and practice: individual transferable quotas in Australia's South East 
Fishery. Australian Geographer, 31(1), 87-114.  
Waitangi Tribunal, 1988: Muriwhenua Fishing Report. Report Number Wai22, 
New Zealand Department of Justice, Wellington,  
368 
 
Waitangi Tribunal, 1992: Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report. Report Number 
Wai27, New Zealand Department of Justice, Wellington,  
Wallace, Cath., 1995: Managing Resources in New Zealand. Australian and New 
Zealand Society for Ecological Economics, Inaugural Ecological 
Economics Conference, Coffs Harbour, NSW, November 19-23. 
Wallace, Catherine, 1997: New Zealand's Fisheries Quota Management System 
Assessed, School of Business and Public Management, Victoria University 
of Wellington.  
Wallace, C. 1998: Marine management and the Quota Management System. 
unpubl. Paper presented to Seaviews Conference, Wellington, NZ, 11-14 
February, 1998.  
Wallace, Catherine, 1998b: Tradeable Quota in Practice: Decision making, 
Institutions and Outcomes - the New Zealand Experience over 11 years, in 
Arne Eide and Terje Vassdal, editors, Proceedings, Ninth biennial 
conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and 
Trade, Tromso. 636-648. 
Wallace, C. and B. Weeber, 2003: The Devil and the Deep Sea - Economics, 
Institutions and Incentives: the theory and the New Zealand quota 
management experience in the deep sea. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/a0210e/a0210e0s.htm#bm28 (Accessed 26 
February 2009).  
Watkinson J.G. and R. Smith, compliers, 1972: New Zealand Fisheries, Marine 
Department, Published in conjunction with the Fifteenth Session of the 
Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council, held at Wellington, New Zealand, in 
October 1972. Government Print, Wellington. 
Weaver, T. and P. Atkinson, 1994: Microcomputing and Qualitative Data 
Analysis. Avebury, Aldershot. 
Weeber, Barry, 2002: MSC Hoki appeal shows fishery should never have been 
certified. Forest & Bird.  
http://www.forestandbird.org.nz/mediarel/02OcttoDec.asp (Accessed 2 
March 2004).  
Whatmore, S. 1995: From Farming to Agribusiness: The Global Agro-food 
System. In Johnston, R.J., Taylor, P.J. and Watts, M.J. editors, 
Geographies of Global Change, 36-49. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Whatmore, Sarah and Lorraine Thorne, 1997: Nourishing Networks: Alternative 
geographies of food. In David Goodman and Michael J. Watts, 
Globalising Food: Agrarian questions and global restructuring, 
Routledge, London. 286-304. 
Wheeler, D. B., (Chairperson), D. J. Bradford, et al. 1991: Fisheries Legislation 
Review: Public Discussion Paper. Fisheries Task Force December. 
  
369 
Wiber, Melanie G. 2000: Fishing Rights as an Example of the Economic Rhetoric 
of Privatization: Calling for an Implicated Economics. Canadian Review 
of Sociology & Anthropology, 37(3), 267- 289. 
Wiber, Melanie, Anthony, Charles, John Kearney and Fikret Berkes, 2008: 
Enhancing community empowerment through participatory fisheries 
research. Marine Policy, 33(1), January 2009, Pages 172-179. 
Wikipedia, n.d.: Corporatization, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporatization. 
(Accessed 12 May 2008). 
Wikipedia, n.d.: Environmental Impact Assessments. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_assessment  
(Accessed 10 November 2008). 
Wikipedia, n.d.: Ministry of Fisheries New Zealand. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Zealand_Ministry_of_Fisheries 
(Accessed 18 July 2008). 
Wilson, John, 2006: What if Muldoon's 'think big' energy projects had succeeded? 
In Steven Levine, editor, New Zealand as it might have been, Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 161-176. 
Winder, G. 1997: Building Fishery Corporations and Selling Quota in Atlantic 
Canada and New Zealand. In Elaine Bliss, editor, Islands: Economy, 
Society and Environment. Second Joint Conference, Institute of Australian 
Geographers and New Zealand Geographical Society, University of 
Tasmania, Hobart, Tasmania, NZ Geographical Society, Auckland. 
Winder, G. and Eugene Rees 2010: Fish and boats: Fisheries management issues 
in Northland. Research Article, New Zealand Geographer 66, 152–168.  
Wolf, Richard and Stephen Barnett, 2007: Classic Kiwiana : an essential guide to 
New Zealand popular culture. Penguin NZ. 
Woolworths, 2007: https://www.woolworths.co.nz/HomeShopping/default.aspx 
(Accessed 5 December 2007). 
World Bank, (nd): World Fisheries: Coping with a Global Crisis The importance 
of the fisheries sector in coastal developing countries. 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/ardext.nsf/11ByDocName/WorldFish
eriesCopingwithaGlobal/$FILE/fish.pdf. (Accessed 9 February 2005). 
Worthy, Diana, 2009: Fishy Fridays become a fixture. Waiheke Marketplace, 28 
October. 
Wyatt, N. 2000: Why Recover Costs? Cost Recovery and Property Rights in New 
Zealand, In Shotton, Ross, editor, Use of property rights in fisheries 
management. Volume 2. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/2, 
Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, Fremantle, Western 
Australia, 11-19 November 1999. 402-404. 
Yandle, Tracy, 2001: Market-Based Natural Resource Management: An 
Institutional Analysis of Individual Tradable Quotas in New Zealand's 
370 
 
Commercial Fisheries. PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science and 
the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, USA. 
Yandle, T. 2002:  The Challenge of Building Successful Stakeholder Groups: 
New Zealand's experience in Developing a Co-Management Regime. 
IIFET2002 Conference, 19-22 August, Victoria University, Wellington.  
Yandle, Traci, 2003: The challenge of building successful stakeholder 
organizations: New Zealand's experience in developing a fisheries co-
management regime, Marine Policy, 27(2), 179-192. 
Yandle, T. and C. M. Dewees, 2000:  Privatizing the Commons ... Twelve Years 
Later: A Study of New Zealand's Market-Based Fisheries Management. 
Presented at International Association for the Study of Common Property 
Resources Conference, Bloomington, Indiana. 
Yarwood, Vaughan, 2000: Between Coasts: From Kaipara to Kawau. David 
Bateman, Auckland. 
Young, Iris. Marion. 1990: Justice and Politics of Difference. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
Yow, V. 2006: 'Do I like them too much?' Effects of the oral history interview on 
the interviewer and vice-versa. In: Perks, R. and A. Thompson, editors, 
The Oral History Reader. Routledge, London, 44-53. (Accessed 29 Nov. 
2006). 
Zulaika, Joseba, 1981: Terranova: The ethos and luck of the deep-sea fishermen. 
Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia. 
  
371 
Appendices 
Appendix 1. Abbreviations and Glossary 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ARA  Auckland Regional Authority 
ARC  Auckland Regional Council 
Federation New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen 
FIA  New Zealand Fishing Industry Association 
FIB  New Zealand Fishing Industry Board 
FishServe Fisheries Registration Service 
FMA  Fisheries Management Area 
FMP  Fisheries Management Plan 
GPS  Geographical Positioning System 
ITQs  Individual Transferable Quota 
LFR  Licensed Fish Receiver 
MAF  Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
MFish  Ministry of Fisheries 
NAFMAC National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee 
QAA  Quota Appeal Authority 
QHA  Quota Holders‘ Association 
QMA  Quota Management Area 
QMS  Quota Management System 
Rights-based Property rights-based 
SeaFIC Seafood Industry Council 
SNA  Snapper stock species code 
SNA1  Stock code for snapper in QMA1  
TAC  Total Allowable Catch 
TACC  Total Allowable Commercial Catch 
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MAORI WORDS USED 
Hapuu  sub-Tribe 
Iwi  Tribe 
Kaimoana Seafood 
Manuka Ti Tree 
Pakeha  non-Maori New Zealander 
Whanau Family 
GLOSSARY 
ACE   Annual Catch Entitlement 
―ACE is a property right, which gives the holder the right to take a certain weight 
of a fishstock during a fishing year. Quota shares generate an amount of ACE at 
the beginning of each fishing year. This means that each person who owns quota 
shares will be allocated an amount of ACE at the beginning of each fishing year. 
The amount of ACE that is allocated for a fishstock will be determined by the 
TACC (Total Allowable Commercial Catch) for that Fishstock. There are 100 
million quota shares for each quota stock, and ACE is allocated as a proportion of 
that‖. http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/ace/index.aspx (Accessed 3 August 
2008) 
Fishing Permit 
―Any person or company wishing to fish commercially in New Zealand waters 
must hold a fishing permit. If you are not already a client of FishServe you should 
submit your client application form with your permit application. On the permit 
application you need to state whether you are applying for a permit to take quota 
and non-quota stocks, and or Schedule 4C stocks, where you are intending to land 
your catch and the stock code and fishing methods for any Schedule 4C stocks 
that you are applying for. Please note that only a handful of fishers have a 
moratorium exemption to catch Schedule 4C stocks‖. 
http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/permits/index.aspx (Accessed 3 August 
2008). 
LFR  Licensed Fish Receiver 
―Only those persons licensed as Fish Receivers are permitted to receive fish for 
the purpose of sale from commercial fishermen. Section 191 of the Fisheries Act 
1996 restricts the disposal of commercially taken fish, aquatic life, and seaweed 
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by commercial fishermen‖. http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/lfr/index.aspx 
(Accessed 3 August 2008) 
ITQs  Individual Transferable Quotas 
Quota Shares 
―Quota shares are a property right that represents the quota owner‘s share of a 
fishery. There are 100 million shares allocated for each fishstock. Please note: 
There are restrictions in the Fisheries Act 1996 which controls the ownership of 
New Zealand quota by overseas persons or companies‖. 
―Owning quota shares does not allow you to take fish. The amount of quota shares 
owned determines the amount of Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) that is 
generated each year. ACE is allocated at the start of each fishing year‖. 
http://www.fishserve.co.nz/information/quota/index.aspx (Accessed 3 August 
2008). 
FISH SPECIES MENTIONED 
Albacore     Thunnus alalunga 
Baracouta     Thyrsites atun 
Bluefin (Southern)    Thunnus caccoyii 
Crayfish Rock lobster   Jasus edwardesii 
Creamfish Leatherjacket   Paruka scaber 
Dogfish     Squalus acanthias 
Gurnard     Chelidonichthys kumu 
John dory     Zeus faber 
Hapuku Gropers:  Bass,   Polyprion americanus 
Groper,  Polyprion oxygeneios 
Bluenose Hyperoglyphe antarctica 
Hoki      Macruonus novaezelandae 
Kahawai     Arripis trutta 
Kina  Sea egg   Evechinus chloroticus 
Kingi  Kingfish   Seriola lalandi 
Ling      Genypterus blacodes 
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Mackerel Jack mackerel   Trachurus declivis 
Snapper     Chrysophrys auratus 
Swordfish 
Tarakihi     Nemadactylus macropterus 
Trevaly     Pseudocaranx dentex  
Warehou     Seriolella brama  
  
 
3
7
5
 
Appendix  2. ITQs Author Affiliations 
NAME AFFILIATION Discipline / Status DOMINANT OCCUPATIONAL PERSPECTIVE EVIDENCE: PUBLICATION   
Allen, Robin MAF / Assistant Director Fisheries Research 
Division 
 Fisheries Research Allen 1983   
Annala, John Biologist / MAF / NIWA / Chief Scientist at the 
Ministry of Fisheries  
 Fisheries Science Annala 1996; Lead author annual  
Stock Assessment Reports. 
  
Arbuckle, M. MAF / Challenger Scallop Enhancement 
Company 
 Industry Arbuckle and Drummond 1999   
Batstone, C.J. Faculty of Business, Auckland University of 
Technology (AUT) 
Biology Academic Economist Batstone and Sharp 2003   
Belgrave, M.J. NAFMAC Public servant Public Servant Belgrave 1983; Belgrave et al.  
2000 
  
Bess, Randal School of Business Nelson Polytech / Mfish Fisheries / Business Academic / Mfish Bess 1999; 2005   
Billington, Greg F.I.B. Gear consultant  Industry? Billington 2000   
Boyd, Rick MAF Auckland Manager  MAF Management Boyd 1983; Boyd and Dewees  
1992 
  
Clark, Ian MAF then FIB  Economics Clark and Duncan 1986;  
Clark, et al. 1988b 
  
Clement, George MAF / Consultant / CEO Orange Roughy 
Company 
 MAF / Industry Clement 1999; 2000   
  
 
3
7
6
 
Connor, Robin Bureau of Rural Sciences and Centre for 
Resource and Environmental Studies, The 
Australian National University / MFish 
Resource management 
student / MAF Policy 
analyst 
Academic / MFish Connor 2001abc; Aslin et al. 2001   
Crothers, Stan;  MAF / Mfish  MAF / Mfish Crothers 1988; 1999   
Cullen, R Economist  Academic economist Cullen and Memon 1990   
Davies, N.M.  South Africa / MAF Auckland  Mfish Davies 1992   
Dewees, Christopher Marine Fisheries Specialist Sea Grant Anthropology / Geography Social research Dewees 1987; 1989; 2007   
Drummond, K. Biologist / MAF / Challenger Scallop 
Enhancement Company 
 Industry Arbuckle and Drummond 1999   
Duncan, Alex FIB then MAF Economic Geographer Economist Duncan 1983; Clark and Duncan  
1986, later a key player in the  
unsuccessful attempt to  
establish FMPs 
Duncan, Leith Sociology Dept U of Auckland / Deckhand / 
Greenpeace / PhD student U of Waikato 
Anthropology / Geography Anthropologist / Environmentalist Duncan 1982; n.d. (1993); ;   
Edwards, Mark MAF  Biologist / Fisheries 
scientist / Manager Stock 
Assessment 
MAF / Mfish Administration Edwards 1999   
Fairgray, J.D.M. McDermott Associates Ltd Social scientist Socio-econ Consultants Fairgray 1985;1986   
Falloon Treasury / MAF Economics Economics Falloon 1993? dateFAO??   
Feldman, Mark Recreational Fisher / Trauma Doctor  Recreational Fisher Feldman 1993   
Fenemor, A, Integrated Catchment Management, Landcare  Planning Sinner and Fenemor 2005   
  
 
3
7
7
 
Research, Nelson 
Gaffney, K.R. Economics Department University of Auckland Economics student  Gaffney 1997   
Gallagher, Peter D. UNITEC Institute of Technology  Analyst Stewart and Gallagher 2002   
Hansen, Derek Novelist  Community / fishermen's Hansen 1997   
Hargreaves, Kirk Oral Historian  Fishermen's Hargreaves 1998   
Harte, M. SeaFIC Economic Geographer Industry Harte 1999   
Haworth, Jenny SeafoodNZ Journalist / Writer  Fisherman's Haworth 2008   
Hawes, Peter Novelist  Community / fishermen's Hawes 2002   
Hawkey, David Economics Department, University of Auckland Economics student Social Research Hawkey 1994   
Heberley, H. Wife of Fisherman, Farm owner   Fishermen's / Family Heberley 1996; 2005   
Hersoug, Bjorn Norwegian College of Fisheries Science, 
Tromso / Mfish 
Fisheries science Fisheries Scientists Hersoug 2002   
Hewison, Grant Greenpeace Lawyer Conservation Monk and Hewison 1994   
Holmes, Nicola Jane Geography Department, University of Waikato Geography student Community Holmes 1998; Rennie and  
Holmes 1998  
  
Hore, A.J.  MAF / NIWA Fisheries Science Fisheries Scientists    
Hufflet, J NZFIB Economist Industry Parker and Hufflet 1993   
Johnson, David Management Studies, University of Auckland Historian Industry Johnson and Haworth 2004   
Kerr, K. Motu Economic and Public Policy Research  Economic and Public Policy Consultants Straker and Kerr 2002   
  
 
3
7
8
 
Le Heron. Richard Geography Department, University of Auckland Economic geographer Research    
Mace, Pamela M. MAF / National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS). NOAA. / NIWA 
Fisheries science Fisheries Scientists Sissenwine and Mace 1992   
Major, Philip,  FIB then MAF Management MAF / Neoliberal Clark, et al. 1988b   
Marshall, S.J. Geography Department, University of Waikato Geography student  Marshall 2000   
Martin, Bob (Taffy) President, Federation Fisherman Fishermen's    
Massey, Edwin Geography Department, University of Auckland  
/ MFish 
Geography student / MAF 
Policy analyst 
Geographer / Planner Massey 2003; 2005; Massey and  
Rees 2003; 2004 
  
McClurg MAF / Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission Biology? / Management Neoliberal McClurg 1997   
Memon, Ali Otago / Lincoln University Geography Geography / Planning Cullen and Memon 1990   
Monk, Grant Greenpeace Lawyer Conservation Monk and Hewison 1994   
Neilander, W.J. University of Tulane / Fisheries Management 
Consultancy International, Ltd 
 Lawyer Neilander and Sullivan 1999   
Newell, Richard Resources for the Future, Washington   Economist Newell et al. 2005   
Page, P.  Law Department, University of Otago Law student  Page 1994   
Parker, G. NZFIB Economist Industry? Parker and Hufflet 1993   
Peacey, Jonathan F.I.B. / Mfish  Economist Peacey 1996; Peacey and Connor 
 2007 
  
Pearce, Peter Emeritus Professor University of British 
Columbia 
Economics Academic economics Maloney & Pearce 1979; Pearce  
1991 
  
  
 
3
7
9
 
Rees, Eugene Geography Department, University of Auckland / 
MFish 
Economic geography 
student / MAF Policy 
analyst 
Geographer / Planner Rees 2004; 2006   
Rennie, Hamish D.O.C./ University of Waikato / Lincoln 
University 
Geography Geographer / Planner Rennie 1993   
Sanchirico, James N   Resources for the Future, Washington      
Sharp, Basil M. Economics Department, University of Auckland Economics  Sharp 1997; 1998   
Sinner, J. Ecologic Foundation   Sinner and Fenemor 2005   
Sissenwine, M.P. NMFS / MAF consultant / NMFS Fisheries science  Sissenwine and Mace 1992   
Stevens, Peter Trawlerman / Federation Sec. Fisherman Fishermen's Stevens 1992; 1999;..    
Stewart, James M.. UNITEC Institute of Technology   Stewart and Gallagher 2002   
Straker, G. Motu  Economic & Public Policy Research Straker and Kerr 2002   
Sullivan, Kevin MAF / NIWA Fisheries Science Fisheries Scientists Annala, Sullivan and Hore 1991   
Sullivan, Michael S.  University of Washington / Fisheries  
Management Consultancy International, Ltd 
 Neilander and Sullivan 1999   
Talley, Peter  CEO Talleys/ Amatal  Corporates Talley 1999   
Thompson, Andrea  Law Department, Victoria University Law Student  Thompson 1992   
Townsend, Ralph E. Department of Economics, University of Maine / 
now Mfish 
Economics  Townsend 1998   
Wallace, Catherine School of Business and Public Management,  
Victoria University of Wellington / ECO 
Academic  Economist / Conservationist Wallace 1997; 1998   
  
 
3
8
0
 
Walshe, Kim MAF Auckland / Ackroyd Walshe Ltd./ Academic Fisheries manager Administration Akroyd Walshe Ltd. 2002;  
Stewart, Walshe & Moodie 2005 
  
Weeber, Barry Biologist / Forest & Bird Environmentalist Conservationist Wallace and Weeber 2003   
Wheeler, Brent Public servant / Director Economic Geography Geography / Corporate Finance, Law, 
Economics, Governance 
Wheeler et al. 1991   
Winder, Gordon Canadian University / University of Auckland Economic geography Geographer / Planner Winder 1997   
Wyatt, N. Mfish   Wyatt 2000   
Yandle, Tracy Indiana University / Emory University  Political Science  Yandle 2001; 2002; Yandle and Dewees 2000   
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Appendix 3. NZ Legislation and Management 
Timeline 
NEW ZEALAND FISHERIES LEGISLATION AND 
MANAGEMENT TIMELINE 
Maori [1000 AD] 
Maori started fishing
139
 (p15) 
1769 Captain Cook 
Was impressed by Maori fishing – 120 different species with nets, hooks, lines, rods, 
traps. 
1790 on  
Maori supplied whalers traders and new settlers 
1860s 
First colonial regulations. 
1866 Oyster Fisheries Act 1866  
First government move to control fisheries. There were more Acts over the next 2 
decades. 
1877 
Fisheries Protection Act. Provided for fish reserves, seasons, gear restrictions (P17) 
1885 Fisheries Encouragement Act.  
Provided land for fisheries townships and bonuses for fish canned and cured for export. 
(P16) 
                                                 
139
   Unless otherwise stated page references refer to Hersoug 2002 which is the main source 
for this timeline. 
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1886 
Fisheries Auction Act. Fishers could sell fish at any hour of the day or night. (P17) 
1894 Sea-Fisheries Act and Licensing 
1892, 1897, 1903 
Amendment Acts (P17) 
1903 Amendment Act. Fishing Vessel Licensing & Reporting 
All fishing vessels to be licensed & statistical returns 
1908 
Fisheries Act 1908. Consolidated all previous and passed responsibility to Marine 
Department and the Minister of Marine. 
1911 
First signs of local over-fishing. The Chief Inspector of Fisheries started questioning the 
effects of trawling on near-shore local fishing grounds. 
1914 
Canadian Commissioner of Fisheries, Professor Prince visited NZ and reported. His 
recommendations (included) territorial borders and cold storage. 
Despite discouragement Auckland City Corporation started trawling with 5 steam 
trawlers. Dunedin and Wellington established public fish markets. 
1919 
Government set up a Fisheries Commission – groundwork for the Fisheries Promotion 
Act. Provided $NZ 25,000 per annum for fishing boats, processing plants and cold 
storage. Implementation of Act delayed so little of the money was invested in fisheries 
but the fleet consisted of steam trawlers and smaller net and line boats (P18). 
1926 
Inspector: ―The principle object of scientific administration is to regulate exploitation so 
that it doesn‘t cut too deeply into the reserve that must be maintained to ensure adequate 
stocks for the future‖ (P18). 
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1930s 
Depression. Then exports to Australia boomed and there was concern about over-fishing. 
(P18) 
1937 
House of Representatives Commission of Enquiry to investigate the state of fisheries. Sea 
Fisheries Investigation Committee visited 38 harbour, interviewed 500 operators, 
produced 3102 pages of written evidence and 200 recommendations. The mood was 
conservative and cautious. Suggested dispense with fish trade. 
1937 April 
Licensing to limit participation in catching, wholesaling and retailing. During the war 
there was more conservation concern. 
1945 
Amendment Act 1845, regulations. Licensed fishing vessels could only operate out of 
and land their catches in specific ports, prescribed in the licenses. Number of vessels 
down to 1000, 1413 men employed at sea, 16,600 tonnes catch. Fish exports tiny – 0.24% 
NZ total exports. By 1945 government regulated all aspects of fishing. 
1950  
Fisheries (General) Regulations. 114 separate regulations. 
1957 
Fishing Industry Advisory Council with representatives of fishers, wholesalers, retailers 
but a government nominated chairman. Conservationist views prevailed. Canadian 
expert, Professor Richardson at University of Victoria who lead doubt in the regime 
(P19). Fisheries Inspector: ―Conservation of our fisheries resources through restrictive 
licensing is no longer effective‖ (Slack 1969 14). Richardson claimed there was scope for 
expansion. Hersoug implies New Zealand disregarded his advice (Hersoug 2002 19). 
Japanese fished to within 3 NM limit. There was pressure on politicians. 
1961 
Select Committee to inquire and report on the fishing industry of New Zealand. 
1961 
Fisheries Amendment Act 1961 opened entry into catching sector to any individual 
resident of NZ and companies with more than 50% NZ ownership. Set standards and 
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requirements and established the Fisheries Research Division of the Marine Department. 
New technology from Norway demonstrated (trawling and Danish seining). 
1965 
Supplementary Loans and Mortgage Guarantee Scheme … to provide finance for 
independent fishermen to buy new fishing vessels. 
During the next 20 years the government provided harvesting industry with $NZ 50.9 mil 
in loans, processing sector with $15 mil, export subsidies $1.5 mil. 
Fleet increased from 1727 vessels in 1963 to 5178 vessels in 1973. Landings increased 6-
7% per year from 1963 – 1983. Fishing Zone [the Territorial Sea] expanded from 3 NM 
to 12 NM (P19). New Zealand‘s total catch was 58,000 tons compared with South 
Africa‘s 470,000 tons, Iceland‘s 1,240,000 tons and  Norway‘s 2,850,000 tons (P20). 
1972 
Responsibility for fisheries administration transferred from the Marine Department to 
MAF (P19). 
1975 
NZ catch 90,000 tons. Clear signs that the inshore resources were depleted. ―Vessels 
acquired to fish offshore waters were used to fish prime inshore species, competing with 
steadily increasing coastal fleet of full-timers as well as part-timers‖. In waters outside 
New Zealand catches by Japan, Korea, Soviet Union and other Distant Water Fishing 
Nations (DWFNs) increased. By 1977 (year before 200NM EEZ declared) it was 
estimated foreign vessels were responsible for 90% of the demersal catch of 475,600 
tonnes (Sharp 1997 508). 
1977 
Amendment Act 1977  Controlled Fisheries 
granted Minister and ministry discretionary power to declare ―controlled fisheries‖  
(Hersoug 2002 24; Sharp 1997 507) 
1978 The 200NM New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
declared.  
It was fourth largest in the world, more than 5 million square kilometres, twenty times the 
New Zealand landmass, but not as productive as others with 75% of the EEZ deeper than 
1000m (>500 fathoms).  
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1982 Moratorium on inshore fisheries  
(Hersoug 2002 24; Sharp, 1997, 507) 
1983 
Formation of National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee (NAFMAC) 
August 1983 
NAFMAC report laid out the inshore problems in detail 
1983 Fisheries Act   
(Hersoug 2002 26) 
1982-83 season 
The  declared catch of 2000 fishers was less than 750tons. MAF concerned about 
potential capacity in these 2000 licenses (Hersoug 2002 25). 
1983 August 
National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee (NAFMAC) Report laid out the 
inshore problems in detail (Hersoug 2002 26). 
1983 Exclusion of the part-timers. 
1984 
Government‘s Inshore Fisheries Management Discussion Paper (The Blue Book cited as 
MAF 1984) offered three alternatives: 
Business as usual 
Attrition with competitive TACs 
ITQs 
End 1984  
Consultation with fishermen begins industry to gain info and feedback on ITQs (Hersoug 
2002 30) 
1984 
Moratorium on new lending for inshore fishery projects (Sharp 1986 512) 
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Unused permits were removed from the fishery (Sharp 1986 512). 
1985 May Decision on ITQs 
1985 
1800 fishers received initial allocation based on best two of three years. But under 
reporting so 1400 reviewed. 6 objection committees heard most cases by mid 1996. But 
there was still possibility of appeal to QAA (Hersoug 202 31) 
1986 QMS introduced 1 October. 
1987 Quota Appeal Authority 
1989 “The Accord”  
Absolute quota in perpetuity changed to proportional quota. 
1991 
The Government invited Dr Peter Pearse, Canadian Fisheries Economist, to review whole 
of QMS. ―Not surprisingly, Pearse (1991:25) concluded that the ―quota system is a better 
way of managing fisheries and should be retained.‖ But he had a number of critical 
remarks…‖ 
Deficiencies:  
―environmental concerns are not well handled 
―users are given too little responsibility for management of the resources, and 
the need for a thorough reform of the whole legislative framework (Hersoug 2002 39). 
1991 August 
New minister. ―In August 1991 the Minister appointed a Fisheries Task Force, headed by 
Dr. B. Wheeler to review all fisheries legislation and to develop a coherent, practical and 
integrated management regime‖. The Taskforce produced a comprehensive review of the 
QMS which showed how the new Fisheries Act could be constructed with ―sound 
environmental management‖ by giving environmental concerns a greater role using 
market incentives and a rights-based regime. Some environmental groups argued 
―strongly for a revival of state interference (sic) and government regulations to curb the 
commercial fishing industry‖ (Hersoug 2002 40 – 42). 
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1996 Fisheries Act  
After 10 years of QMS operation and 5 years of reviews and debate. The Fisheries Act 
1996 brought significant changes: 
ecosystem based approach 
provides for input and participation from Maori (Treaty of Waitangi and Settlement Act 
(Fisheries Claims) 
Recognises NZ‘s international obligations – more enabling allowing administrators more 
flexibility to achieve outcomes. 
1996 Act provides for utilisation of resources while protection is explicitly taken care of  
by other acts and agencies. Increased stakeholder participation and involvement in 
decision-making process, purchase of services and devolution of services. Consultation 
mandatory. Possibility of Fisheries Plans. Commercial stakeholders got concessions on 
participation and devolution and Minister more discretionary power obtaining different 
outcomes (Hersoug 2002 45). 
1997 
An Mfish discussion paper proposed reforms (Mfish 1997). An  independent review of 
the Fisheries Act 1996 was started by Wheeler, former leader of Task Force, then by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and reported to the Minister July 1998 (Hersoug 2002 45). 
Fisheries Amendment Acts 1998, 1999 
These ―reforms aimed at better definition of roles and rights, a simplification of the 
present regime, improving flexibility and participation in decision-making. 
Introducing Fisheries Plans 
Devolution (especially registry services) 
More efficient cost recovery scheme, based on principles more acceptable to industry 
More flexible balancing regime (ACE) 
Alternative ways to set TAC especially taking bycatch into consideration 
Simplified offenses and penalties regime 
Technical amendments to simplify original Act (Hersoug 2002 46).  
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But the fishing industry felt that ―in spite of certain simplifications, the  overall QMS has 
become more and more complex over the years, and this applies even more so if we 
include the complete management system, to the extent that the industry now talks about 
the ―Maximum Sustainable Frustration Level‖ (Talley 2000 250) 
2001  
With 105 species still under non-ITQ management the Minister promised 50 new would 
be added to the  QMS. ―Within industry views are mixed, where many would prefer 
certain species permanently kept out of the QMS‖ (Hersoug 2002 39). 
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Appendix 4: Gulf News: Waiheke Based Commercial 
Fishing  
The Gulf News, Waiheke Island‘s now prize winning local weekly news media has, since 
its inception in the mid 1970s, consistently provided detailed accounts of local events and 
significant issues of interest or relevance for the Waiheke community. Since Waiheke is 
an island, maritime matters in particular get good coverage. Not only those of general 
interest, such as the periodic finding of rare beaked whales or dolphins washed up on 
Onetangi Beach or the presence of seahorses in Enclosure Bay but also commercial, and 
recreational fishing and events. 
From a smattering of articles in the mid 1970s until 1992, when virtually all commercial 
fishing from the island ceased, Gulf News, provided good coverage to the local industry 
particularly of the nature of fishing in the period before the QMS and issues in the lead 
up to the introduction of ITQs. 
MID 1970S 
Those early issues dealt with the Marine Department research vessel Ikatere’s snapper 
survey in the Hauraki Gulf (Gulf News 31 July 1975), an application to sell fish from a 
refrigerated van by father and son fishermen who had done similar successfully in 
Auckland some years previous (Gulf News 6 February 1976), concern at trends in 
fisheries exports and foreign fishing (Gulf News 1 January 1977), a councilor taking over 
the Oneroa fish shop (Gulf News 10 June 1977) and stirrings at over-fishing with 
fishermen calling for better surveillance in the Hauraki Gulf (Gulf News 16 December 
1977). 
As commercial fishing based on Waiheke expanded in 1978 news coverage increased 
reporting the sale of the fish shop so the owner could devote more time to council work 
and assess the support for a fish plant on the island (Gulf News 3 March 1978 9), 
fishermen hit by thefts of gear from their boats (Gulf News 2 June 1978), a Danish seine 
skipper in court for poaching too close to the island (Gulf News 2 June 1978).  
Formation of the Association 
The Gulf News devoted several articles to the formation of the Waiheke Commercial 
Fishermen‘s Association with reports of the intention to meet (Gulf News 23 June 1978 
4), coverage of the meeting of 33 fishermen (Gulf News 30 June 1978 5) and their 
application to council to establish a fuel tank on the wharf at Matiatia (Gulf News 7 July 
1978 10,11). Murray Bromiley, fisherman, County councilor and recent fish shop owner 
was reported as saying he had been asked to call a meeting to initiate an association or 
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co-operative. ‗"There's about $140,000 worth of fishing boats at Matiatia," he said, "and 
many of them have been put into the water within the last three months -- so we're 
dealing with a fairly big industry and one that brings a lot of money onto the Island". 
With ―37 registered fishing boats on the island‖, some though part-timers, with a co-
operative working, ―they could get supplies cheaper and they'd also have more bargaining 
power in selling their catches,‖ they wanted an ice locker on the wharf and there was a 
security aspect (Gulf News 23 June 1978 4). The meeting elected a steering committee, 
decided on the name, Waiheke Commercial Fishermen's Association and determined that 
the a condition of membership was holding a  current commercial fishing license but 
allowed for the possibility for associate membership (Gulf News 30 June 1978 5). It was 
soon realized that having both ice and fuel available on the wharf was important but were 
angered by Council‘s list of conditions in response the application was withdrawn (Gulf 
News 1 September 1978 3). 
The not untypical recruitment of one fishermen was reported. ―Ken Thompson ha(d) been 
a panel beater at Ostend for six years - and ―working in fibre glass dust and paint fumes‖ 
was beginning to affect his health so, after trips with friends who were fishing 
commercially, he had bought and was fitting it out as a long-liner‖  (Gulf News 4 August 
1978 5).  
By the end of the year, spokesmen for the association, Chris Dunne, the secretary and 
Murray Bromiley were expressing the association‘s concern at the peril to the Gulf from 
trawlers and seiners poaching in the 007 area (See: figure 27) – that part of the inner Gulf 
designated for long-liners and gill netters. Dunn noted that Hauraki Gulf Snapper 
Advisory Committee Government was wrongly blaming the depletion of fish in the 
Hauraki Gulf on recreational fishers when it wasn‘t doing enough to prevent poachers. 
Instead, expressing the fishermen‘s perspective, the Government seemed ―interested only 
in increasing exports and at present fish is a big export earner‖. Further, he felt ―The 
Government brings in these enormous boats used by Sanford and Jaybell [‗big boats‘ See 
Chapter 4.] which are 12 times more efficient than normal boats and they fish the old 
grounds around Barrier, often in pairs or even threes dragging huge nets; they're taking 
36 times the fish a normal boat would take. When they're a third full, the catch is put into 
one boat which shoots off back to town and the other pair carries on. They work them 
non-stop‖ (Gulf News, 1 December 1978 13-15). 
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Map:. Hauraki Gulf Reporting Areas before QMS. (From, Supplement to Catch ‘80, 
MAF, October 1980. 
Since there were fewer articles the following year the fishing seems to have proceeded 
more routinely. The plans of Mr. Tomczyk, a relatively newcomer to the Island, to 
establish a fish processing plant did make the news. ―‘There were 49 registered fishermen 
on the island and it was a state of idiocy that at present they were required to take their 
catch to town‘, he said‖. ―Stringent town planning and health requirements‖ intervened, 
however, ―since a conditional use on an industrial property does not allow either 
processing, cleaning, gutting or disposal of wet fish on site‖. "The Waiheke County 
Council… agreed ‗in principle‘‖. Despite obvious benefits to the island from employment 
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since ―fish processing is a labour intensive industry, with a lot of work (gilling, gutting, 
filleting, etc) done by hand‖ and  ―The fish manure process required machinery for 
processing the gut, but otherwise plant machinery costs were negligible‖ (Gulf News 17 
August 1979 cover story), but the health regulations proved too much and the project 
lapsed. 
An alternative application from the Association for a chiller on the vehicular ferry wharf 
at Kennedy Point aroused considerable concern from nearby residents. The closest 
objected because there was ―no notification, effluent, melting ice, no septic tank or 
drainage‖ and there would be an increase in heavy traffic from the wharf. Again the 
project was stymied by planning regulations (Gulf News 16 November 1979 13).  
While the Island community was generally supportive of the fishermen residents did not 
want the detriments of the occupation like, refrigerator or truck noise intruding on their 
backyards or lifestyles. Though later my informants remembered the support, but there 
were also conflicts at all levels; with Council over regulations, with residents over noise 
and locality of the infrastructure with inconsiderate part-time and new fishermen from 
elsewhere. 
The year ended with the obituary for ―Jimmy‖ Ngapo who had come to Waiheke with his 
family in the mid 1950s after ―long and distinguished war service with the Maori 
Battalion‖ and in the Marine Department in Coromandel, and Tauranga as District 
Inspector of Fisheries. As Inspector of Fisheries for Waiheke and a fisheries officer with 
MAF he was one of the island identities and held in very high regard by many including a 
number of my informants (Gulf News 21 December 1979; & pers com). 
1980 
Problems of disposal of food scraps and waste were being discussed early in 1980 with 
the food shops concerned they were being blamed "for the appearance of decaying food 
scraps in Council rubbish bins.‖ In a letter to the editor, Malcolm Sheppard, owner of one 
of the fish shops asserted "We can only speak for ourselves, but all our organic wastes, 
fish offal, potato peelings, etc, are composted in line with the County Chairman's 
recommendation, and the cardboard fish cartons returned to our fishermen for recycling.‖ 
(Gulf News 25 January 1980). 
For her May column, Aileen Belcher, one of the many local artists sketched the fishing 
boat Pip-Kim
140
 and outlined how it had taken Bruce Prattley, its owner-operator, a 
                                                 
140
  For significance of fishing vessel names see Dwyer, Just and Minnegal who argue:  
the initial private acts but public conventions of naming, fishers recreate on the water, 
through the personalisation of boats, the on-shore attachments and connections entailed 
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former builder four years to build before launching it three and a half years previously. 
Naming it for his two daughters symbolized the family attachment. His then three years 
of fishing were far more satisfying than building. The article gave the essence of his 
fishing ethos: his love of fishing, shifting the boat from the local bay even at midnight to 
the shelter of Matiatia when a northerly came in, the seasonal variation in fishing and 
maintaining contact with his family. "Bruce says he will never go back to building. He 
loves fishing and is sometimes away for a whole week or longer if the weather is 
contrary. He keeps in touch with his family with a C.B. radio, his wife having a base set‖ 
(Gulf News 9 May 1980 26). 
All sectors were beginning to feel the lack fish. Local fishermen had a lot of support in 
the community but there was strengthening opposition to commercial fishing in favour of 
tourism. A charter skipper claimed ―`Commercial fishermen are "raping" the Hauraki 
Gulf and slowly destroying an area that has the potential of becoming New Zealand's top 
tourist attraction‘‖ and argued that ―`that a fish caught by a tourist from a boat is worth 
hundreds of dollars more to New Zealand than a fish commercially caught and sold 
through the export markets in Japan‘‖ (Gulf News 24 October 1980 31, 32). 
Moratorium 
MAF was also concerned and in October the Gulf News announced the moratorium on 
new commercial fishing licenses, various gear restrictions such as increased mesh size 
and a quota of 3,500 tonnes on the snapper catch. The Regional Fisheries Officer felt 
"The moratorium would have a "dampening down" effect on the pressure on the Hauraki 
Gulf fishery reserves: in the last 25 years there had been a substantial erosion of the 
amount of water available for commercial units
141
 and the number of boats had tripled, he 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the names carried by those boats. What each person who  names a boat may 
achieve for himself is ultimately an accomplishment for all others in the community of 
fishers to which he belongs. Second, named and personalised boats mediate 
relationships among all who have been and are associated with those boats. Each boat, 
in its own right, is secured through its name to the relationships embodied in that name; 
an umbilical connection to home and hearth. All of those boats, collectively, through the 
individuals who have been and are linked through the names, socialise the sea; they 
give it dimensions it would not otherwise have, and establish the sense of both time and 
place (Dwyer, Just and Minnegal 2003 19) 
 
141  The Fisheries Act 1983 defines ―Fishing unit‖ in relation to a controlled fishery license, means the 
vessel or vessels used by the, license holder in carrying out the business of fishing together with all gear 
and equipment used in association with that business; and includes any employee of the license holder 
engaged in that business (Fisheries Act 1983, 5)  
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said. "There are more units and more work and that must throw the pressure on." A few 
of the commercial fishermen on the island were not catching snapper but once the quota 
for the Gulf was caught the ―bulk of the 36 registered fishermen on Waiheke -- will have 
to fish outside the boundaries of 005, 006 and 007‖ (Gulf News 10 October 1980 8, 9). 
In November an article spread across two issues of Gulf News informed the community 
that the Moratorium was a prelude to the Hauraki Gulf becoming a controlled fishery 
before 1982 with further restrictions and detailed the reasons and anticipated restrictions 
(Gulf News 7 November 1980 15,16; 14 November 1980 15-17). 
The final issue for December gave an inkling of community involvement in commercial 
fishing and also of how innovation arises in the fishery. One fisherman was have gear 
difficulties ―the "hockey clips" on his long lines -- the clips were prone to slip from the 
line, were hard on cold, wet hands, and had the potential of tangling the traces when the 
line was wound in. ... a brainstorm and three months work from an island engineer…and 
some finance from a Waiheke businessman, the new clip is being manufactured in a 
totally island enterprise‖ resulted in an ingenious mechanical device patented on Waiheke 
and marketed further afield (Gulf News 31 December 1980 5-7). 
1981 
By 1981 the increasing numbers of Waiheke fishermen and their growing sense of their 
industry was reflected in an increased number of articles. 
In anticipation of a controlled fishery the local fisheries officer warned that there would 
be increased enforcement of fisheries controls. "'There is a lot of flounder fishing going 
on at the moment and, as seems to happen every year, fishermen are using illegal nets and 
are often letting them go dry. People should be aware of the regulations because if the 
nets are set wrong, are too long or are not marked correctly, they are almost certain to be 
picked up by fisheries officers‘‖ (Gulf News 16 January 1981 19). 
Fishermen were part of the community, were aware of community support and in turn by 
organizing a fishing contest for children both contributed to community life and raised 
their profile. The Gulf News reported on "The Waiheke Fishermen's Association fishing 
contest for children at Matiatia was held for the second time last Sunday with 125 
entries.‖ The contest was supported by ―predominantly Waiheke businesses‖ which was 
indicative of community support and, at the wharf, arranged to fit between ferry times 
(Gulf News 30 January 1981 11).  
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The moratorium was controlling the number of fishermen but not the increase in fishing 
effort in response to depleted stocks. With more public interest and awareness a Gulf 
News reporter took a trip with the fisheries patrol launch to hear official concerns first 
hand. "From time to time the public read of another trawler arrested at sea and charged 
with a breach of the fishing regulations ... what many may not realise is that each arrest is 
backed up with an extensive exercise run to near military precision by teams of Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries officers.‖ Both the patrol boat and some fishing vessels were 
painted a naval grey, the reporter saw the efforts made to avoid detection. When a 
fisherman was apprehended ―it was all ‗Hail fellow, well met‘ with both the officers and 
the fishermen being reasonably cordial. … (though that) was not always the case, but 
most of the time the fishermen were very gentlemanly about a "fair cop". That is not to 
say they are not past trying every trick in the book to wriggle off the hook if it is at all 
possible‖ (Gulf News 27 February 1981 29-31. 
The new controls came into force on 1 March with a snapper quota of 3800 tonnes, new 
minimum gear sizes and area prohibitions on larger vessels. They also banned pair 
trawling by smaller boats but significantly in terms of the issue in relation to the ‗big 
boats‘, not from boats over 19 metres. Vessels of this length were, however, pushed into 
the deeper water of the outer Gulf and, once the quota was reached the Director of 
Fisheries could ban all commercial fishing. If it was not reached the remainder could be 
carried over to the following year (Gulf News 6 March 1981) 
The Gulf News noted increasing concerns for energy use by all sectors of the fishing 
industry, "Concern is expressed for the industry's, and in particular the fish catching 
sector's, heavy and increasing reliance on diesel fuel which comprises 62 percent of the 
total energy used. The rapid expansion of the domestic catching industry which is 
forecast to occur up to the mid-80's will increase its diesel requirement from 2 percent 
(1978) of the total supplied to all New Zealand industries to over 15 percent by 1983‖ 
(Gulf News 10 April 1981 26).  
Formation of the Co-op 
At a meeting over the weekend, sixteen full-time commercial fishermen put ―forward 
equal cash contributions‖, ordered an ice plant and appointed the initiator and one of their 
number, Doug Hamilton as manager of a cooperative. Details of the enterprise; ―the finer 
points of just how the co-operative would form - whether as a company or what - were 
still being discussed with legal and accountancy advisers. Essentially the group had 
decided in principle to go ahead at the weekend meeting. ‗We have 16 fulltime 
commercial fishermen who have all fronted up with the cash to get this off the ground 
and that's the main thing. They will all be equal shareholders in the company and will fish 
in to the company facilities on the island‘‖ instead of having to steam to the Viaduct 
(Gulf News 14 August 1981, Cover & 4). Since Waiheke was in the middle of the long-
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line fishing grounds, servicing the fleet on the island saved extra fuel, time and running 
costs. 
By December Mr. D.W. Hamilton, the managing director of  ―The Co-op‖, officially 
Waiheke Sea Products Co-op Ltd, outlined their plans to the Waiheke County Council. In 
doing so he also presented the salient features of Waiheke commercial fishermen‘s role in 
the fishing industry. "The company set up by 23 Waiheke commercial fishermen …wants 
to use Matiatia wharf to offload catches bound for the company's proposed cool store at 
Ostend‖ The first stage of the operation was .‖an ice plant, chilled holding facilities and 
trucking facilities‖ … (employing) ―two people‖. Second stage was developing ―a 
licensed whole fish packing house which would provide work for six to twelve people‖. 
They aimed to ―service the Waiheke fishing fleet at Waiheke instead of in Auckland. He 
predicted a saving of $60,000 a year to shareholders from the reduced unloading costs‖ 
(Gulf News 18 December 1981 17-19). 
With the Gulf becoming a controlled fishery most (local) fishermen applauded the 
restrictions. Mr. Hamilton said co-op members ―‘contribute roughly 40% per cent of 
Auckland's 'Jap Pack' export snapper, we collectively have a reasonable say in the gulf's 
management.‘" And ―the 'Jap Pack' trade was worth about $1.5 million annually. The fish 
handled were top quality, long-line caught, and were exported air freight, whole and 
chilled. The shareholders' boats were in the 26 foot to 35 foot range and were set up with 
semi- automatic longline gear and icing down facilities.‖ Time in getting the snapper to 
the market was critical their ―aim is to have the fish on the auction floor in Japan within 
two to four days of being caught. '"Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and Fishing 
Industry Board studies have shown that this type of fishing returns the highest price per 
kilogram of fish for each unit of energy (fuel and labour) used. So, while a lot of larger 
companies with trawlers and seine boats are in difficulties over rising costs, the longline 
fishing is booming‘‖ and ―‘Because of this type of catching method, conservation is 
guaranteed as small fish are returned to the sea alive and feeding grounds are not 
damaged‘‖ (Gulf News 18 December 1981 17-19). 
They wanted moral support from the council. Use of the Matiatia wharf between ferry 
operations, to use a suitable truck and hoped to discuss the siting a diesel pump on the 
wharf with Council, in return for paying reasonable wharfage and their cooperation (Gulf 
News 18 December 1981 17-19). 
1982 
With even greater coverage the major issues addressed by the Gulf News were the 
demand for marine farms in prime commercial fishing and recreational areas around the 
island, the depleted fishery, Co-op operations and growing uncertainty over licensing. 
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The New Zealand Companies Register reports that Waiheke Sea Products Co-op Ltd. 
Was registered 19th January 1982 with six directors (all of whom I know to be  
fishermen) and Nominal Capital   $62,400.00. The Co-op was struck off the register 10 
February 1994.  
Marine Farming 
All the sites in the Waitemata Harbour and Inner Hauraki Gulf that would support marine 
farming had been identified and disseminated for public consultation. The extensiveness 
of such possible aquaculture alarmed many including a large proportion of Waiheke 
residents and their opposition was widely reported in the Gulf News. 
The Waiheke Commercial Fishermen's Association‘s submission as reported indicates 
that the fishermen‘s concern was not just for their economics or their operation but was 
much wider and included community issues. Mr. Chris Dunn, the secretary wrote to the 
Ministry, ―saying that on the basis of being residents some 24 families are represented 
and they would "strenuously object" to any use of Oneroa, Mawhitipana or Onetangi 
Bays‖ which were three of the major and the most publicly used beaches on the island, 
―for marine farming on aesthetic grounds as these are recreational areas whose beauty 
"adds greatly to the charm of the island". Also ―As commercial fishermen they would 
actively oppose many of the areas indicated, including closure of: Man O'War Bay and 
Waiti Bay as these are necessary anchorages that provide good shelter in winds from the 
west through north to northeast. There is also good winter fishing in these areas and they 
provide somewhere to work in northerly conditions when the Firth of Thames is too 
rough. The area from Kauri Point south to Waiti Point, an "invaluable shot" in northwest 
conditions during winter. From Te Whau Point to Pie Mellon Bay, a rich area of scallops 
and snapper in winter and easily worked in easterly or southerly conditions‖ (Gulf News 
15 January 1982 17). Public outcry was such that the future applications were dealt with 
on an individual basis but the process did alert residents to other demands to use the Gulf. 
Snapper depletion 
The decline of fish, mainly snapper in the Gulf was a major concern, that arose from 
MAF‘s study for marine farming in the area, and even led ―Waiheke County Council to 
find out what action they can take halting this trend‖. The Council and indeed many 
fishermen were worried that in the schooling season there were ―fishermen galore taking 
out fish that are full of roe. They are destroying their own future
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." Some councilors 
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  Fishermen‘s and scientific views were different. Fishermen used the analogy of a farmer 
killing his breeding stock opposed fishing during the spawning season. They did because they 
couldn‘t afford not to and if they didn‘t fish, everybody else did anyway (Viaduct research). 
Scientists on the other hand argued at since each female snapper ejected hundreds of thousands of 
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suggested closure for the period and another referred to marine reserves (Gulf News 
December 1982 10 19). The fishermen responded with their perceptions of MAF, power 
fishing part-timers and the issue: MAF "who purportedly spend hundreds of thousands on 
researching the Gulf, are totally ignorant of the complex ecosystems out there. We 
fishermen, who also study the Gulf full time, love further information, so if Waiheke 
ratepayers have a quarter of a million for further research we would welcome the 
findings‖. 
"The problems of the Gulf are: 
(i) Re-introduction of pair trawling in the Gulf during the breeding season. 
(ii) Blatant (often daylight) poaching by Seiners (one good catch would equal the total  
catch of the Waiheke fleet for seven working days). 
(iii) Trebling of fishing effort by part-timers when the fish are trying to school.  
"Against this formidable array of horsepower, the local fleet plugging away at nighttime 
to make up for winter losses is but a 'drop in the ocean'‖ (Gulf News 17 December 1982) 
Leith Duncan noted that "The problem of declining fish catches is complex. There are no 
obvious or easy solutions. Indeed there are almost as many views as there are fishermen. 
Perhaps the only consensus among them … is that the Gulf should be closed to all 
fishing, including recreational fishing during the spawning season‖ (Gulf News  24 
December 1982 19-21). 
Co-op development 
"(T)he purpose of the plant was to safeguard the livelihoods of the fishermen on the 
island‖ (The number involved seemed to fluctuate but) ―There were 19 in the co-
operative and about 25 full time committed fishermen on the island‖. The co-op manager 
―didn't think the restriction on licenses would adversely affect the operation of the plant. 
"'Most of the guys here are established fishermen," he said. "They all have a commitment 
to fishing. It is not like in town where you can go and get other work - it's a full time 
commitment‖. By contrast "'In the Western Viaduct in Auckland half of the boats are tied 
up in the winter time and they
143
 only go out in the school fish season and rape the gulf. ‗I 
think any committed fisherman would be fully behind what they are trying to do‘. ‗They 
                                                                                                                                                 
eggs, the number of snapper recruiting to the fishery 4 or 5 years did not depend on the number of 
fish spawning but on predators and other environmental factors. 
143
  Part-timers and those who registered their pleasure craft so they could berth there and sell 
―recreationally‖ caught fish.  
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are looking after the resource and it is in the interests of the co-operative that we have 
this protection‘‖ (Gulf News 18 June 1982 28). 
Early in December the Gulf News reported that "After one year of negotiation, 
organisation and hard work, Waiheke's fishing co-operative has received official sanction 
for an operation that could prove to be one of the island's biggest industries. "So far the 
co-operative has 19 shareholders, and is looking at an optimum membership of 25. For 
the 17 boats now operating from the island, the sound of ice from their Ostend plant 
sliding down the chutes at Matiatia wharf is a particularly welcome sound‖ They 
calculated ―it was costing our members about $75,000 a year just in the physical 
expenses of going up to town to unload, …"without counting the cost of wasted fishing 
time." By operating from centre of Gulf so fresher, quicker turnaround, better price, 
particular Japanese market, improved quality, better bargaining position. (N)ineteen 
shareholders put in  capital for their $90,000 Ostend ice plant, which was built with the 
help of the Rural Bank and Development Finance loans‖. Since "'There's a lot of varied 
expertise in the group and that has cut a few corners.‘ It also saved a bit of money - 
market buyers were surprised they had done it for under $130,000‖. Their spokesman, 
Chris Dunn, noted "Much of the organising, financial knowledge and diplomacy 
(fishermen being and individualistic lot) was provided by Doug Hamilton …. Other 
members of the co-operative spent long hours working on the plant, as well as keeping up 
with their fishing‖ (Gulf News 3 December 1982 19). 
With the ice plant working the co-op was anxious to start the next stage and open a 
packing shed. It was hoped that the Rural Bank, which had helped with finance for the ice 
plant  would assist. "At the moment the co-op's fish is contract packed in Auckland, an 
operation that loses both time and money, according to (spokesman) Chris. At peak times 
the Auckland sheds are unable to cope with the volume of fish from co-operative 
members. With the Waiheke Co-op now providing about a third of the good fish coming 
into Auckland, he thinks that the Auckland sheds will not be enthusiastic about this 
proposed venture. 'But it‘s essential for our viability to have the fish packed here on the 
island. It's the only way to realise the full quality and value for the fish - and I believe we 
are committed to going ahead with the proposal" (Gulf News  February 18 1983 1,4) . 
Commercial Fishing Licenses 
Rick Boyd, of MAF anticipated that less than half of the 1000 fishermen who might 
apply to continue fishing in the Gulf would get licenses. A licensing board was being 
established to review applications and conduct hearings. "Those who were informed that 
the authority intended to decline a license also had the right to attend a hearing and state 
their case‖. Those still not satisfied could appeal to the High Court. "He said that the 
main grounds for the granting of a license would be a history of fishing in the Gulf and a 
reliance on it. The criteria ―usually meant that at least 80 per cent of income was derived 
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from fishing‖. '"In a fishery like the Hauraki Gulf where there are too many fishermen, 
part timers are likely to get the short end of the stick," he said. "But there will be some 
people who do rely on fishing on a seasonal basis and the licensing authority has plenty 
of options open to it to allow these people permits but they will be second best to the full 
timers‖ (Gulf News 11 June 1982 5).  
The prospect of licensing
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 created considerably uncertainty for Waiheke fishermen. 
Newcomers were worried because they needed a fishing history and an economic reliance 
on the fishery. This was a big issue for Waiheke fishermen "At the moment there are 
upwards of 1000 licenses in the Gulf, but according to  Waiheke co-op fisherman, Doug 
Hamilton, only about 150 of these are full-time fishermen, while perhaps only 70 fish all 
year in the Gulf. "A recent survey carried out by the Combined Fishermen Association 
show that of this 150, 30 are seiners, 30 trawlers and 90 are small boat fishers. These 
operate in an area from Leigh down to Thames, including the Coromandel, Waiheke and 
Great Barrier Island‖ (Gulf News  30 July 1982 30).  
The issue was that ―"In the past licenses have been granted readily, with the result that 
'fly-by-night" fishermen have taken advantage of the good money to be made in  the 
schooling season - often dumping cheap fish on the market at a time of the year when 
year-round fishermen are starting to recoup winter losses. Several local fishermen 
mentioned the North Shore company directors who take two months off to reap the 
benefits of the lucrative summer season‖. Chris Dunn had fished from Waiheke for six 
years was critical of the way MAF had handled the situation "'They gave 2 1/2 years 
advance warning, and have invited applications from practically everyone. Even people 
as far North as Whitianga who don't normally fish in the Gulf." As a result many part-
timers were becoming full-time ―and the numbers of boats fishing in the Gulf has 
increased three-fold‖. ―In spite of a national moratorium of licenses he has heard that 
they are still being issued‖ (Gulf News 30 July 1982 30).  
If the concern was for conservation he felt long-lining would be the preferred method 
since it was more selective, caught only feeding fish and did not cause the habitat damage 
like trawling. Long-lining also caught higher quality fish for the Japanese market. ―They 
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  There is confusion between ―licences‖ and ―permits‖. Fishermen talked about licences 
but Walter Murray was told by his lawyer ―We have also noted in your correspondence and your 
discussions with us that you have referred to the issue of ―a licence‖ when what you seek is a 
―permit‖. A licence relates to ―controlled fisheries‖ where permits are issued as a necessary 
prerequisite for carrying on a commercial fisheries operation under the Act. We observe section 
49 of the Fisheries Act makes provision for appeals in relation to ―licences‖ but we can find no 
corresponding provision under the Act for appeals in respect of ―permits‖. (See: J.W. WATSON 
letter, 11 Sept 1985 From Watson to Murray, Re: Fishing Permit Application In Murray 1986).  
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pay good money for top quality, but they won't pay anything for substandard produce. 
‗It's better to have 100 small guys getting a high quality product, and good export receipts 
from the Gulf, than trawlers getting a lower grade product which the companies cannot 
always find a market for.‘" While MAF‘s stated reasons for the policy were conservation 
fishermen were concerned the real reasons were political and in favour of the big 
companies. That by not policing what long-line fishermen saw as rampant poaching, by 
seiners and trawlers, more aggressively and allowing the ―repugnant‖ pair trawlers into 
the Gulf at all, local fishermen felt MAF‘s policy was the "sort of approach as favouring 
the entrepreneurial fisherman rather than those who were working steadily throughout the 
year maintaining a market stability for the fishing industry. Indeed ―One reason behind 
the formation of the fishing co-operative is that 'individuals have no say'‖ (Gulf News 30 
July 1982 30). Small-scale fishermen had felt powerless and that by forming the Co-op 
they would have more ―voice‖. 
Controlling the number of boats was a start but poaching by trawlers and seiners was rife 
and policing that was harder. The major worry was ―for the snapper stock in the warm 
and shallow waters of the Gulf. "They're prolific breeders - and if the pressure was taken 
off now they'd bounce back within five years‖ (Gulf News 30 July 1982 30). 
The proposed policy was having an effect on fishermen‘s attitudes and the fishing ethos. 
Chris Dunn noted ―"When I came here (Matiatia) six years ago, I was welcomed into the 
harbour. There were only about three boats here then. Information on the best fishing 
areas is still exchanged among those who have fished alongside each other for years, and 
helped out when things were difficult. But now they do not chat openly on the radio. 
Competition is too keen and the information is eagerly swallowed by those who would 
never dream of returning the favour‖. Cooperation and fellowship was giving way to 
competition and mistrust. "'Now its just survival out there‖ (Gulf News 30 July 1982 30). 
The established fishermen were feeling threatened by increasing numbers chasing a 
depleted stock. 
Part-timers 
Hoping the Waiheke County Council would support them, Councilor Delamore put the 
case for the part-timers. ―Part-time fishing on Waiheke is an important income 
supplement for people who can't get full employment here.... (F)ishing from Waiheke 
was more capital and fuel efficient than from Auckland, and that fishermen here were 
mainly long-liners and more conservationist. "'The emphasis is on local fishermen, … 
part-time fishermen in Auckland have more employment opportunities.‖ Others didn‘t 
share the view. Their main concern was full-timers. Councilor Hillman felt ―encouraging 
part-timers here would probably have the effect of bringing people from Auckland to fish 
part-time here.‖  While for Councilor Murray ―‘The idea of legislation is to cut out 
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seasonal fishers who threaten the livelihood of the full-timers." Consequently the motion 
was lost (Gulf News 3 September 1982). 
1983 
Early in 1983 the Gulf News reported that the feasibility study for the co-op packing shed 
was still proceeding (Gulf News 18 February 1983 1,4) and since a co-op spokesman had 
suggested there should be more research on the current issues in the Gulf, Duncan 
outlined his research (Gulf News 4 February 1983 38,39,41) and also expressed concern 
at the damage to wetlands would have consequence for the food chains of commercial 
fish species (Gulf News 11 March 1983 32-33).  
Marine Farms 
The really big issue in 1983, with six articles, was the prospect of numerous marine farms 
around the island (Gulf News 11 March 1983 17; 18 March 1983 1,13,14; 29 April 1983 
1. 14,15; 8 April 1983 19; 27 May 1983 25-27; 9 September 1983). 
Gulf Protection 
In April Gulf News reported the Regional Fisheries Officer, Neil Macdonald‘s response 
to a letter from the Waiheke Council to MAF about ―the possibility of a closed fishing 
season to protect snapper stocks‖. The Ministry had taken a number of steps which they 
believed ensured the future of the fishery. These included a snapper minimum size and 
quota and ―a reduction in the number of boats licensed to fish in the Gulf, from 1100 in 
1982 to the 320 granted permits as from March 1 of this year. The Gulf fishery was 
important to New Zealand's export earnings, so that ―any closure of the Gulf would, …be 
unacceptable to the 17 members of Waiheke's fishing co-operative, who were authorised 
to fish in the Gulf‖ (Gulf News  22 April 1983 27). 
FIB – Auckland Star Prize 
Epitomising the significance of commercial fishing for the island and the visitor industry 
the 22 July issue trumpeted "Waiheke's Onetangi Hotel reeled in the prizes during last 
weekend's presentations for the NZ Fishing Industry-Auckland Star Restaurant 
Competition 1983‖. Recipient, Chef Peter Rowland, informed the community that 
―Apparently the quality of the fresh fish was everything the judges expected it to be - 
they were delighted when the waitress told them it had been caught that afternoon… ‗I 
don't think there's any other restaurant around that can collect their fish supply directly 
from a fisherman just a 50 metre walk away down the beach,‘…Their ‗private‘ 
fisherman, local resident Farley Scott, has been fishing Gulf waters for many years and, 
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says Peter, brings back just what the hotel orders. "'If we want so many kingfish or 
terakihi, he just goes out and gets it' (Gulf News 22 July 1983 14,15) . 
Thefts 
By contrast a November issue reported serious theft from fishing vessels moored in 
Matiatia. Fishermen were tightening security since ―thieves from the mainland were 
disturbed while loading stolen property into a boat at Matiatia‖. The risk was serious 
since high premiums meant the boats were not insured.  One 33 foot, $45,000 fishing 
launch had even been hijacked and was found the following morning drifting off ―Wash 
Rock, Rakino Island‖ missing fish, gear, tools and electronics. The skipper informed just 
as he was leaving home at 3.00am to go fishing, notified the police. He was told two 
hours later his boat had been spotted by a Waiheke fisherman and it was towed back by a 
third (Gulf News 4 November 1983 5). The issues were indicative of the tensions in the 
fishery as a result of the depleted stocks on the one hand and exclusions on the other. 
1984 
The marine farm issue was still ‗hot‘ and the cover of the first issue for the year reported 
―Parts of the Hauraki Gulf deemed suitable for marine farming have been reduced to a 
total of about 140 hectares, of which nearly a third lies off the coast of Waiheke Island‖ 
(Gulf News 6 January 1984 1). 
Tagging Surveys 
In February MAF asked Waiheke Islanders to report any tags from their Bay of Plenty 
tagging program to determine snapper movement in any of the fish they caught (Gulf 
News 6 January 1984 20). Then later in September  Gulf News reported ―Thousands of 
snapper in local fishing grounds will soon become the subjects of a scientific survey to 
find out more about their living habits‖ and there would be prizes for the return of tags 
(Gulf News 21 September 1984 46,47). 
Also in September an irate letter to the editor complained about delays to the ferry which 
the editor explained had been caused by an ―unexpectedly large consignment of 46 
cartons of fish on the Iris Moana had to be unloaded, keeping her at the wharf until 
4.55pm and delaying the arrival of the Baroona off the Devonport service‖ (Gulf News 9 
November 1984 10). 
Schooling Season 
To celebrate the return of fish for the schooling season after the winter ―starve‖, the Gulf 
News reported on the year for the fishermen and for the co-op. The local fleet had 
worked hard for the past fortnight as the Gulf was ―teeming with snapper as the fish 
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"return" for the start of the annual spring schooling season. The fishermen wished they 
knew where the snapper went to in Winter, because they were ―as rare as a wealthy 
fisherman in August‖. "That is the Waiheke fleet's worst month. The boats might bring in 
a total of three and a half tons during the whole month. Over the past couple of weeks, 
they have been landing about two tons a day. ... In the last financial  year, snapper caught 
by Waiheke boats earned $2 million, of which a quarter was injected into the island's 
economy. Most of the Waiheke catch goes to Japan. After the boats unload at Matiatia 
the fish are packed on ice and sent to the city, either in the fishing co-op's truck on 
Subritzky's barge or atop the Iris Moana. In Auckland, it is prepared for export by Kia 
Ora Seafoods Ltd and taken to the airport for flight to Tokyo. Oversized snapper remains 
at home for sale in city markets (Gulf News 2 November 1994 36-38). 
Despite the scarcity of winter fish the ―Waiheke fishing Co-op has become one of the 
island's most successful businesses and is believed to be the only viable co-operative in 
the country‖. The co-op had opened in October the previous year, currently had 19 
members, with 16 boats which was three more than  previously and a $90,000 ice plant. 
―Over the past fortnight the boats have been almost constantly as sea as the fishermen 
take advantage of the schooling season's abundance to make enough money to carry them 
through the lean times‖ (Gulf News 2 November 1994 36-38). 
Co-op Manager Retires 
In December, after three years planning, setting up and operating the co-op, Doug 
Hamilton retired. He had ―helped to turn what was no more than a dream into a 
successful export business expected to turn over $1 million this year‖. The co-op was 
―going extremely well. Because of devaluation, it is in a very good financial situation.‖ 
Membership had fluctuated. The co-op had started with 19 members but dropped to 14 
with the shortage of fish over winter but with increased catches membership had risen to 
22. ―95% of its catch to markets in Japan, Australia and America‖. To put the export 
business on a more substantial footing …. Rijyo Sea Products, a company in which the 
co-op has a 20% shareholding, opened … in Auckland last May. ‗We are now assured of 
a market in Japan and in the last fortnight we also started exporting to Australia and 
America‘. 
The season was now exceptionally good ―‘Our catch for this October was equal to the 
total amount caught in the previous six months. In August we exported 3.7 tonnes of fish 
- it was a terrible month. During October we were unloading the same amount in one 
day." With globalization and bureaucratization, the task in the last three years had 
―become increasingly administrative‖ so the ―new manager will probably have less 
contact with those who work the fishing boats.‖ Much of Doug Hamilton‘s job had been 
―to educate the guys to think as a co-operative and not just to do their independent thing. 
I think that's been achieved. ‗This year the Co-op will turn over in excess of $1 million‘‖ 
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(Gulf News 21 December 1984 23, 24). The same issue of Gulf News advertised for a 
General Manager 
1985 
The proposed introduction of the quota system (QMS) was the big news for 1985. 
  
ITQs proposed 
The Gulf News reported that "A quota system is being proposed…to reduce the size of 
the fishing industry and increase the number of fish in New Zealand waters…. ―limits 
will be placed on the total catch from each fisheries area with individual fishermen 
contributing a share under a quota system.‖ The Minister of Fisheries, Colin Moyle was 
quoted as saying the prime species had been over fished.  
For example, ―national commercial landings of snapper which dropped from 17,660 
tonnes in 1978 to 8,729 tonnes in 1983. ‗There is widespread agreement that the 
consequences of continuing along the present course will be that some fisheries will 
suffer economic collapse and the recreational fishery will continue to decline,' …(to) at 
least the levels of "commercial extinction", according to a report from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. "For example, the TAC for snapper in the Auckland Fishery 
Management Area (including the Hauraki Gulf Controlled Fishery) is 5,300 tonnes - 
2,480 (32%) less than the 1983 catch…. The TACs for each species in each area will then  
be allocated among owners of fishing vessels. Their allocations will be based on catches 
for each vessel in past years - probably an average from 1981-83.‖ Fishermen were, 
however, promised ―financial assistance to fishermen who voluntarily decided to leave‖ 
but further discussions would be held before the system was implemented (Gulf News 3 
May 1985 16-?). 
Also in May,  Ian Toddun‘s appointment as the new co-op manager was announced (Gulf 
News 10 May 1985 23) and inviting the community to be involved, a competition opened 
to the community to design a logo for the co-op (Gulf News 31 May 1985 29) 
Fishermen response to ITQs 
By June fishermen were uniting to oppose the ITQ system. Ian Toddun, the new co-op 
manager ―described the meeting of forty long-line fishermen from Waiheke, Great 
Barrier, Leigh and Kawakawa Bay as a group of ‗fragmented, rugged individualists 
coming together for united action …. to express their concern at a change in the proposals 
for the introduction of the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system.‘‖. They had 
learnt that ITQs were proposed without the additional controls they regarded as crucial to 
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save the fishery, that had been included in the Fisheries Management Plans and the 
controlled fishery restrictions for the Hauraki Gulf would also be removed. "Speaking 
early in the meeting, Ian Todden expressed shock that the ITQs were to be introduced in 
isolation, with neither the controls nor the management plan which  had been proposed in 
the discussion document of 18 February. ‗We have cabled the Minister of Agriculture of 
Fisheries, the Hon. Colin Moyle And Ray Dobson
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 the architect of the scheme, to say 
we are not interested in ITQs unless the management plan of 18 February is introduced,‘ 
Mr. Toddun said, speaking on behalf of the Waiheke fishing co-operative. Fishermen saw  
"'The lack of plans for the gulf and coastline means our livelihood and way of life is 
affected.‘" Quite wrongly in the event "The president of the Combined Fishermen's 
Association, Ken Brown, said that the ITQs were just an administrative measure‖ but did 
admit, "'We have not got a lot of confidence as to its effectiveness. … 'The individual 
fisherman, because of his limited range, is most at risk. I cannot really see the ITQs will 
be the measure which will save the fisheries. ‗We cannot afford to see overall 
management removed. There is no way that the small fisherman can compete with pair 
trawling.' Ken added that the management plan was a necessary protection for the gulf. 
The representative at the meeting from one of the big companies, David Belton from 
Fletcher Fisheries had a different perspective and spoke in favour of ITQs alone.‖‘ We do 
not agree with extra management measures which will make catches by trawl fishermen 
any more difficult,' he said. 'Nothing should change, apart from ITQs'.‖ But he did add ― 
If the gulf remained a closed fishery,… this would enable the more effective assessment 
of the values of ITQs.‖ "The feeling of all other speakers was strongly against the MAF 
proposal. "The main concern was that there would be increased fishing effort within the 
gulf. One fisherman was concerned that the proposal was general and ignored local 
issues. "'We're sick and tired of seeing the resource ruined willy-nilly. 'We're out there 
every day of the week, and we see what happens…. "'Fishermen will come into the gulf, 
long-liners, set nets, pair trawlers ...' "'The management plans seemed exceptionally good 
and now we don't know what to believe and who to believe. We have commitments, and 
we want proper measures,' he said. Ken Brown summed up ―the gulf is presently being 
fished co-operatively by all sorts of methods under proper management and that people 
were able to earn good livelihoods. 'The gulf is being made a scapegoat for the Bay of 
Plenty.' he said‖ (Gulf News 28 June 1985 pp29,30) . What he didn‘t know at that stage 
was that the quota many of these fishermen would receive would be sold to the 
companies and while they had cash, they‘d no longer have a fishing livelihood. 
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  Ray Dobson, Deputy Director of MAF Fisheries Management Division in early-mid 
1980s. (Skinner and Fenemor 2005 6).
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Local Fishermen  
In a lighter vein one of the Gulf News reporters, Vicki Jayne wrote a human interest 
account of one of the two prominent fishing families on the island, father and son 
fishermen Farley and Phil Scott. Farley had always loved fishing and when they‘d moved 
from a farm at the ―bottom end‖ to Onetangi he had fished full-time for ten years. Then 
the fish disappeared so he went shearing for ten years before going back to the fishing 
and supplied the neighbouring hotel and the local community. His son Phil (and indeed 
another brother but not on the island) followed in his footsteps. In a side bar it was 
reported that the Quota system had been delayed, the Co-op was making submissions and 
assisting individual fishermen make their own but ―Reaction to the ITQ system so far 
seemed to be one of ‗tacit acceptance‘‖ (Gulf News 20 September 1985 24-29) 
. 
The final item on the fisheries for the year announced that "This season's fishing has been 
the best yet for Waiheke Sea Products Co-op, according to Co-op manager Ian Toddun‖ 
(Gulf News 20 December 1985 10,11). 
1986 
In 1986 the Gulf News published several general interest stories related to commercial 
fishing. Scott Gordon, son of the second prominent fishing family caught a large bronze 
whaler shark which resulted in the loss of several hundred dollars for the net and catch 
(Gulf News 14 November 1986 p19). Debate over the name for a new road on nearby 
Rakino Island occasioned an account of Albert Sanford‘s fishing from Rakino, rowing 
the catch to Auckland and the beginnings of Sanford Ltd. One of New Zealand‘s oldest 
and biggest fishing companies (Gulf News 28 February 1989 45).  
The same issue of Gulf News devoted a long article to Waiheke Personality Mavis Scott 
who had been born into the Gordons, the other prominent fishing family and the only 
family of original landowners still farming on the island, before marrying Farley Scott 
from an adjacent farm. It also told how one son, Phil, had been born on the deck of the 
naval supply launch Philomel in a storm just before I reached the Ferry Buildings. Such 
was the nature of life on an Inner Gulf island in those days (Gulf News 9 May 1986 24-
30). 
Run up to ITQs 
In the run up to the introduction of ITQs, the cover of the Gulf News indicated the 
vehemence with which local fishermen regarded the new management system ―‘Incomes 
Threatened‘ ‗Privacy Invaded‘ New Rules Anger Local Fishermen‖. Fishermen saw the 
new regulations as a threat to their livelihood and would be ―a "gross invasion of their 
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civil liberties". In a letter to government they described ―the new controls on their 
industry… as "unfair" and "heavy handed". The Gulf News outlined the ITQ system 
noting that quotas would be allocated on catch history between 1982 - 1984, that "An 
ITQ represents "ownership" of a certain amount of fish [as popularly conceived of not as 
a catching right], and it can be traded through a tender system with the Fishing Industries 
[Sic] Board acting as broker. Fishermen were concerned that ostensibly a conservation 
measure they saw it as ―a way for the Government to gain more control over their 
industry, charge them extra taxes, invade their privacy and destroy their lifestyles‖. 
"Fishing is a lifestyle, not just a job, and as individuals we feel we are being squeezed out 
by this legislation in favour of larger and more efficient companies‖. They blamed ―the 
previous government for exploiting the country's fisheries with cheap loans which, they 
say, led to over capitalisation, more boats, increased competition and a diminished 
resource. Despite using long-lining,  the least exploitative method, Waiheke fishermen 
felt they were being penalized and were ―sick of being blamed by this present 
Government and other for the 'pillage of the seas'" (Gulf News 18 April 1986 1,16-18). 
More specifically to Waiheke, Ian Toddun the co-op manager believed "The formula for 
setting individual quota also worked against Waiheke fishermen. Basing quotas on the 
1982-84 period caught island fishermen at a time when they were concentrating on  
establishing their co-operative and building it into the million dollar a year business it is 
now. As a result, some fishermen had been allocated quotas below their current 
potential‖. The fishermen themselves had taken time out in order to construct the 
buildings and install the ice plant. In addition there would be extra levies FIB and ―a 
"resource rental" tax of $3 per tonne - a levy on ownership of fish stock‖ together with 
the cost in time and money for the extra paperwork involved in Catch Measurement Logs 
and Quota Management Report books required to monitor the new system (Gulf News 18 
April 1986 P1,16-18). This raises the question of whether this was increased 
bureaucratization, acknowledgement of the public ownership of the resource or good 
ecosystem accounting. Which ever it was it resulted in more pressure on the fishermen. 
The fishermen were concerned that they already provide statistics so "'This extra amount 
of paperwork, combined with GST, will take considerable time and we are wondering if 
the Government is considering paying us compensation. 'Also, failing to satisfy the MAF 
requirements will mean an immediate loss of quota." There was also concern that MAF‘s 
existing right to search boats would be extended to homes setting a dangerous precedent 
for other government departments. Likewise they feared ―that rigid policing will interfere 
with a skipper's ability to give away a few fish to family, friends and crew. 'To add insult 
to injury, it has always been the traditional prerogative of fishermen to give some part of 
their catch away without the interference of government busybodies. 'With such stringent 
legislation surrounding this tradition we feel it can only lead to breaking the law‘". 
Concerned about ―the future of their industry, Waiheke fishermen fear the effective de-
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regulation of the Hauraki Gulf fishery will follow the introduction of ITQs. Anyone with 
an ITQ will be able to enter gulf waters to fish. Also, the sale by tender of ITQs will open 
up the fishing industry to anyone who can afford to buy in.‘ This causes us a great deal of 
concern because not only does it set fishermen against fishermen in the competition for 
limited quota to maintain or improve our livelihood, but also it introduces the ―Queen 
Street fishermen‖ element,‘ they say. They were not the only fishermen to oppose the 
system; ―In Napier, a Fisheries Officer was thrown off a wharf by angry fishermen and a 
recent visit to Waiheke by a Fisheries Officer from Auckland aggravated, rather than 
allayed, local concerns‖ (Gulf News 18 April 1986 P1, 16-18). On the one hand 
fishermen saw the threat of again facing open-access as quota owning ―outsiders‘ pulse 
fished their ―patch‖ and on the other non-fishing quota owners controlling the fishing 
without understanding either the ecology of the fishery nor the social and political 
dynamics of the industry.  
The co-op, quite rightly as it turned out, was pessimistic about the effects of the new 
system on both its members and the Waiheke community. Indeed "Waiheke could lose up 
to three quarters of a million dollars per year as a result of the government's new 
policy…. For the 15 members of the Waiheke Fishing Cooperative, the policy could 
mean a substantial reduction in income. What has provided them with a full income in the 
past, may have to become a part time job. Some boat owners have already had to cut back 
on their crew with a policy of non-replacement‖ and in turn would have consequences for 
the island economy. "The bulk of the money earned goes back into the community. Our 
members are people with homes and families. They support our school and local 
businesses. Their boats are maintained here. (T)here was the possibility of some members 
pulling out of the co-op because they expected commercial fishing to become 
uneconomic.‖ (Gulf News Sun 4-Sep-2005). In effect this might reverse the policy that 
led to the exclusion of the part-timers although MAF‘s expectation which was correct in 
the event was that uneconomic packages of quota would be sold to companies or ―more 
efficient‖ fishermen who valued them more highly.  
Co-op fish shop 
To diversify operation the co-op wanted to change the ―"no retail" condition from their 
original planning consent‖ and ―sell locally-caught fish from its Tahi Road ice plant has 
run into opposition from three other fish retailers on Waiheke‖. While the planner saw no 
reason not to grant the application the three other retail fish outlets on the island were 
opposed (Gulf News 26 September 1986 9). In the event the application was granted. 
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1987 
Hotel Raided 
In a sequel to the Onetangi Hotel‘s prize in the FIB Auckland Star Fish Dish competition 
the Gulf News reported that two fisheries officers had ―confiscated 58 kilograms of fish 
from the Onetangi Meat and Sausage Mart and 14 kilograms from the Onetangi Hotel. 
Auckland regional Fishery Officer, Neville Buckley, told Gulf News that prosecutions are 
‗likely‘" since they were alleged to be contravening the ITQ system. The immediate 
effect of the system had been "dramatic reduction in the amount of fresh fish on the local 
market as fishermen, especially long-liners with quotas restricting their annual income, 
concentr5ate on the more lucrative export market.‖ Indeed ―(a)ccording to recent reports, 
some Auckland fish and chip shops are buying New Zealand fish from Japan to stay open 
and the price of once-common species of fish had reached $20 or more a kilogram‖. "On 
Waiheke, as elsewhere, a regime designed to achieve conservation has not only affected 
local consumers but also the type of fisherman who poses the least threat.‖ Both "(t)he 
butcher and hotel at Onetangi have traditionally bought from local fishermen. Now they 
need a license. The hotel applied for a fish receiver's license last December; butcher Peter 
Rowland, says he asked for application papers only days before the fisheries officers 
arrived on his doorstep. Hotel licensee, Heather Riley, says her application has been 
before the Ministry since Friday 12 December. Both she and Peter Rowland were 
surprised to hear that they might be prosecuted‖ (Gulf News 20 February 20 1987 5-7). 
Subsequently "An application by Onetangi Hotel proprietors, Ian and Heather Riley for a 
fish receiver's license for their restaurant has been declined, and they still face possible 
prosecution for receiving fish without a license‖. They were informed that ―the Ministry 
did not agree that the applicants' business was "sufficiently unique" to justify granting a 
license, and was not satisfied the applicant would "conduct fish receiving operations in a 
proper manner." (Gulf News 20 March 1987 pp25,27). If being on the beach, almost 
adjacent to their fisherman‘s home and gaining a national prize was not "sufficiently 
unique", then clearly MAF was not concerned with local communities nor local 
fishermen. MAF administered the Fisheries Act. The operative act at the time was the 
Fisheries Act 1983 which was to consolidate and reform the law relating to the 
management and conservation of fisheries and fishery resources within New Zealand and 
New Zealand fisheries waters. The 1996 Act tasks MAF more clearly:  the purpose was 
―to provide for the utilization of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability‖. 
―Ensuring sustainability‖ meant (a) ―Maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to 
meet reasonable foreseeable needs of future generations; and (b) Avoiding, remedying, or 
mitigating any adverse effects on the aquatic environment‖ while ―Utilisation‖ meant 
―conserving, using, enhancing, and developing fisheries resources to enable people to 
provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being‖ (Section 8, Fisheries Act 
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1996). The present case seemed contrary to both natural justice and the definition of 
―Utilisation‖ here. 
Call for ban on Gulf Fishing 
Allan Brewster, parks' chairman of the Auckland Regional Authority,  
Asserted that ―commercial fishing trawlers operating in the Hauraki Gulf were "'Piranhas 
disguised as goldfish" and called for a ban on commercial fishing in the Gulf. He was 
―seeking the support of local authorities in the Auckland region to lobby Government for 
legislation banning all trawl fisheries in the area of the Hauraki Gulf behind an imaginary 
line drawn from Orere Point, in the Firth of Thames, across to Takatu Point, north of 
Kawau Island‖. While the Waiheke Council had mixed feelings and the planning 
committee was prepared to support the call in principle (Gulf News March 20 1987) some 
councilors recognized that it would be the final nail in their coffin for Waiheke 
fishermen. Trawlers were already banned in that area although Brewster claimed many 
were still poaching, and the co-op had already taken a 43% cut so Council was divided. 
On the one hand it was concerned about the conservation of the Gulf but on the other ―it 
must also protect the livelihood of local fishermen and the fishing rights of Maori people 
included in the Treaty of Waitangi‖ (Gulf News 24 April 1987 p22,23). "Waiheke Fishing 
Co-op manager, Ian Toddun, (felt) … the local fishing industry had already been hit by 
legislation limiting fish catches. ‗The quota system has worked but its left a lot of 
disgruntled fishermen, our through-put has dropped by 76% ... now we're looking at 
further management controls being brought in by another body. It seems a bit ridiculous." 
(Gulf News 25 September 1989 27). 
By September Allan Brewster‘s call for a ban had been changed to a concept for a 
Hauraki Gulf marine park "which would take in Waiheke's northern shores, Rakino, The 
Noises, and Tiritiri Matangi‖. "He said the concept would not affect Waiheke residents, 
and that the proposed designation was that of a marine park - not a reserve. It would help 
control any commercial exploitation of the area. While he claimed ―a lot of support 
within the Auckland regional Authority‖ it was not endorsed (Gulf News 25 September 
1989 27)though it had gained support from about half of the regions local authorities 
(Gulf News 24 April 1987 22,23). 
 
In April The Gulf News noted that the old Anzac Bay Jetty would be removed. A 
makeshift jetty of manuka poles and timber. "The jetty has had a number of owners and 
until recently was being used by the local Fishing Co-op for servicing their boats.‖ but 
this use stopped about two years ago and the jetty has fallen into disrepair‖ (Gulf News 10 
April 1987 33). 
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Co-op and Fishing reviewed 
At the end of 1987 the well known boating journalist Gary Baigent reviewed the status of 
the fishing and the co-op in a two part article. The business of fishing was erratic, 
―dependent on the wind, weather, tides and the migratory habits of fish. However it is an 
adventurous life and although fishermen can become despondent at times when catches 
are low, when the fish move in and the lines are tight, living is good.‖ The quota system 
meant that (just a year after its introduction) ―the boom time was over. Now of the 
original 20, only five fishermen remain and Ian said that the co-op, which handled over a 
million dollars in fish sales before ITQ, suddenly dropped 50%.‖ [So essentially, from 
my perspective, commercial fishing on Waiheke had been decimated.]  Despite the 
difficulties and the threat of ‗big boats‘ setting large amounts of line gear, the signs were 
good and ―the co-operative is looking to the future and wants to see islanders enjoy 
buying fish from the retail shop in Tahi Road‖. The co-op hoped the council approved the 
application, ―they are not after handouts, just a [P43] fairer assessment of what the co-op 
is trying to do in the community. They export by themselves and purchase fish from all 
registered fishermen on the island, regardless of whether or not they are members the co-
op. With this attitude he hopes the co-op will acquire more fishermen as the island 
community expands. The iki jimi method allows up to a week‘s travelling time to Japan 
although usually it takes only three days; the fish are never frozen but chilled and they 
keep better this way.‖ So he felt the ―island's fishing potential is very good‖ (Gulf News 
24 December 1987 41-44). 
For the second part of his article Gary Baigent went out with one of the fishermen and 
wrote about the ethos and process of the job, "Squid, octopus and kahawai are used as 
bait, sliced with thin … then deftly hooked onto the 700 odd traces which are stacked 
away. But once the long line has begun to be laid, the traces are then clipped onto this 
large spooled nylon length….. (and set). "Whether solo or double handed, fishermen have 
a number of tasks to accomplish once they begin lifting their lines and the snapper are 
coming over the transom. To accommodate this the boats are ingeniously set up and (the 
skipper) can steer, engage and disengage gear, guide the incoming line, remove fish and 
traces, plus perform a number of other operations, all from the same working area on the 
port side of the cockpit. 
The Waiheke Fleet 
Most of the fleet are ―old designed wooden planked, traditional launches that have been 
fitted out for fishing and which operate from Matiatia. .... Ronomor, Tuatea, Galatea, 
Tawhara and Manakura, along with the newer alloy boats, all carry ice boxes.‖ In the 
past fish were tossed into the bilges to die but iki jimi snapper ―are killed by spiking and 
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placed into a … a slurry that immediately chills the fish to zero degrees Celsius.‖ ―When 
everything is rolling - and there are rarely hitches - the whole process is rhythmic to 
watch. (The skipper) says it is like getting a factory underway …. Although both he and 
(his crew) make the task look easy, I know from experience that it isn't. Skills and 
alertness are required and one can see by the lack of scratches or spike marks in their 
hands that their competence and efficiency has come from many hours of sea work….The 
sea can be a depressing and cold place at times and when the catches are few, it can seem 
an unrewarding occupation.‖ Fishermen often face prejudice but ―really they are just 
making a living and are ordinary people. The difference is they do extraordinary things‖ 
(Gulf News 31 December 1987 29-33). 
1988 
Despite the reduction in the number of members, the catch handled and amount it 
contributed to the community the co-op was still optimistic but Gulf News coverage of 
commercial fishing was beginning to taper off. 
Others were beginning to look at other uses for the Gulf so beginning to reduce the 
favourable perception of local fishermen. 
While the ARA Regional Parks Committee Chairman, Allan Brewster‘s call for a ban had 
not been heeded mooting a marine park was under consideration. An initial report by 
Henry van Roon, the ARA‘s senior planning officer, Henry van Roon stated that 
"Establishing a recreational park in the Hauraki Gulf  would not necessarily mean 
banning commercial fishing in the area‖ (Gulf News 16 September 1988 11). Fishermen 
and the co-op were skeptical. 
1989 
Other changes and technologies were in the offing. Accountant Tim Hubbard took over 
from Ian Toddun as co-op manager and the Japanese live fish market offered "Enormous 
Implications For Waiheke". Polar Products, one of the Auckland companies Waiheke 
fishermen had fished to especially before the co-op had bought the technology for 
exporting live snapper from the Department of Industrial and Scientific Research (DSIR). 
It involved packing four fish to a box in separate compartments of a polystyrene crate 
with circulating water and a proprietary component producing oxygen and allowed 
sufficient time for the 27 hour flight and exigencies such as an air controller‘s strike. 
Waiheke‘s location in the middle of the fishing grounds and fast transport to Auckland on 
the Quickcat‘s meant local fishermen were well place to participate. "Polar Products is 
offering fishermen $20 a kilo for live snapper - double the return they get on the current 
top of the market product iki jime. Like iki jime, live fish need to be caught on long lines 
and handled with care. Damage to scales or scars made in a net can mean a big drop in 
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market value. It is particularly important to avoid contact with the fish's eyes. Even a 
slight brush can damage the eye membrane causing it to cloud over and Japanese 
apparently don't like eating blind fish‖ (Gulf News 4 August 1989, pp22-24). It was a 
niche market involving very high quality and specific Japanese cultural values and 
although promising the market did not take off like the iki jimi method to the extent that 
it saved the co-op (Gulf News 4 August 1989 22-24). 
Co-op fish shop 
By November the co-op was sufficiently confident its application to sell fresh fish locally 
was at a stage where they could place the following advertisement in the Gulf News: 
―Waiheke Sea Products Co-op Ltd. … Fresh Whole Snapper only $6.00 KG 
Flounder, Gurnard, Trevalli, Hoki fillets, Squid bait, pet food. Specialty seafoods now 
available; Scampi, Whitebait, Crabsticks, Smoked Fish, Oysters. Hours: Thurs & Fri 
9.30-5pm Sat 9-12.30‖ (Gulf News 17 November 1989) 
The following month the Gulf News announced that that the co-op had finally ―won 
permission from the Waiheke Planning Committee to sell scaled and filleted fish at its 
Tahi Rd packing centre and shop.‖ It was becoming clear that changes as a result of the 
ITQ system and the Japanese market meant the co-op was not as economically viable as 
previously.  ―Fishing co-operative member Greg Hayes told the committee that 
processing some of the local catch to sell on Waiheke was both a matter of economic 
necessity and public demand. He said Waiheke's long line fishermen were now 
competing on the Japanese market with trawler and seine boat operators. The Japanese 
market had been over-supplied this season and prices were low. The Tahi Rd shop 
opened three days a week and already sold whole fish caught by island fishermen and 
frozen sea food from Auckland. Mr. Hayes said customers repeatedly asked to buy fresh 
fillets or smoked fish‖. While final approval had required a specified departure from the 
district scheme there was also competition within the island‘s commercial sector. 
―Malcolm Shepherd, owner of Waiheke Fisheries in Oneroa… (said) he didn't mind the 
competition from the co-op, but …. said it was inappropriate to fillet and smoke fish 
alongside the smells and smoke of other industries and dust from the unsealed road‖ 
(Gulf News 22 December 1989 15).  
As final fishing news for the year MAF a fisheries plan suggesting further restrictions on 
recreational fishing in the Auckland region and opened it for public submissions (Gulf 
News 29 December 1989 11). 
1990 
1990 was a thin year for commercial fishing news coverage. 
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The island‘s voluntary fishing officer resigned. He said ―(H)e had been 'given to 
understand there would be an honorarium of up to $1000 per year to cover expenses‘. But 
after spending many hours checking fishing spots, giving warnings and issuing 
information, he had received only $100‖. But, from MAF‘s perspective, it was a 
voluntary job and ―‘(s)ome of them have been with us for 30 years and they put in many 
hours of voluntary work without regard for payment‘" (Gulf News 16 March 1990 28). 
The following month MAF officers seized half a tonne of fish and a net from one of the 
commercial fishing vessels moored in Matiatia and were likely to prosecute since ―nets 
used commercially in the Hauraki Gulf must not have a mesh of less than 125 mm 
square‖ (Gulf News 12 April 1990 18). 
The 3 August issue reported that just after the crew had checked the boat, a storm had 
swept  the 11 metre fishing vessels Santa Maria onto rocks near the entrance of Matiatia 
Bay. Apparently an anchor fluke had broken. ―A local fisherman said the vessel had an 
Auckland owner but was being fished by ‗four Waiheke men who did not wish to be 
identified. They have families and it was their livelihoods,‘ he said‖ (Gulf News 3 August 
1990). Interestingly the Santa Maria is currently up on the Boat Club hard at the 
Causeway for major maintenance. 
1991, „92 
Late in the year a new honorary fisheries officer was appointed so that Waiheke now had 
two (Gulf News 9 August 1991 31) and the Waiheke Rod and Line Club was not fazed 
by MAF‘s intention of lowering the recreational bag limit for snapper to 30 fish per day 
(11 October 1991 35) – which is, by comparison, 3 times the present limit (Ministry of 
Fisheries 10). Early in 1992 when MAF suggested the limit should be 3-4 fish per day the 
reaction was different. Club members were so angry some were suggesting protest 
demonstrations and ―a delegate to the NZ Recreational Fishing Council, said a 
nationwide campaign was underway to mobilise recreational fishers‖ (Gulf News 14 
February 1992 30-31). 
The same issue also reported that with the suggested appointment of Waiheke beach 
wardens, as honorary fisheries officers, the island would soon have a full compliment 
(Gulf News 14 February 1991 33). 
Fishing boats often worked close to rocks and rocky shores so  accidents were always a 
possibility but when they occurred, regardless of their fisheries sector, boaties 
cooperated. The Gulf News reported that the old vessel Taranui II being fished, not by the 
owner but two locals, was holed when it hit rocks and towed back to Matiatia escorted by 
the local fisheries patrol vessel (Gulf News 19 February 1992 16). 
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Co-op demise 
In terms of commercial fishing the big news of the year was the change co-op ownership. 
According to the New Zealand companies register of the Ministry of Economic 
Development, Waiheke Sea Products (1992) Ltd. on 24th September 1992 and operated it 
until, twelve years later, on 14th December 2004 it was struck off the register 
(http://www.companies.govt.nz). Its directors were the two remaining fishermen active in 
the Co-op and their wives. While, from the register, the Co-op itself was not struck off 
until 10 February 1994. The Gulf News, however, reports that Waiheke Sea Products Co-
op Ltd., the co-op became Waiheke Sea Products (1992) Ltd, a private company. 
In an interview with Mr. O‘Grady, one of the two active fishermen remaining, the Gulf 
News reported that ―The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries reduce(ed) the total 
allowable catch of 1100 tonnes for Snapper Area One, an area from Cape Rienga to East 
Cape.‖ As a result four of the six remaining members were no longer fishing and the co-
op became a family business owned by two fishermen and their wives‖. Although the 
export market was depressed the local fish shop was not affected. The two fishermen had 
their own quota but others had to lease quota from Auckland companies. Mr. O‘Grady, 
one of the owners in effect encapsulated the fisheries system at the time by saying, ―Polar 
Products … have really looked after us and do their best for Waiheke fishermen'…. "But 
they are having to deal with an 18.1 per cent reduction and it‘s the small non-quota 
holders who are the first to be hit. The cuts come on top of an unusually cold winter in 
which fish 'weren't biting'. … (T)here was a lot of resentment in the industry toward the 
amateur fishing association which had lobbied hard to get the commercial quota 
reduced‖. Indicating, in essence, the relationships between stock status and seasonal 
variation, the nature of fishermen company relations as a result of quota ownership, the 
competition between recreational and commercial fishermen, and MAF‘s response. He 
summed up  "'Especially for long-liners there's a feeling that with half a million amateur 
fishermen in the Auckland region who are not really accountable, the impact they are 
having on the fish stocks is being underestimated…. it was the hardest time for Waiheke 
fishermen in 15 years. 'Low prices in summer and bad weather in winter‘‖ (Gulf News 9 
October 1992 37). 
 
1993,‟94 
The Hauraki Gulf was not immune from detrimental events that had occurred on other 
parts of the coast and in August of 1993 an algal bloom decimated the scallop beds in the 
Hauraki Gulf to the extent that official had difficulty finding sufficient shellfish for 
testing purposes (Gulf News 20 August 1993). 
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Likewise exigencies ashore impacted on the community and a fisherman, on his way to 
check his nets, at 5.45 am on a Sunday morning rescued a sleeping man from a burning 
house after suspected arson (Gulf News 1 October 1993, 13,15-17). 
The last two articles in Gulf News before Waiheke fishermen ceased being involved,  
concerned MAF‘s seizure of  a small boat and ―outboard motor, a commercial sized net, 
500 metres of rope and a hydraulic winch with a total value of $8,000…. (T)he ministry 
believed some, fish had been sold locally and also as far away as south Auckland. It is 
believed fish were being taken which were not accounted for. (The MAF officer) said the 
vessel was a properly registered fishing boat which had not been registered for the current 
year‖ (Gulf News 11 February 1994 15). From an outside perspective it seemed small 
fishermen were having to resort to illegal activity to remain economically viable. 
A follow up article indicated that two small boats had been seized after a year‘s 
investigation following tip-off by local residents but the decision to prosecute still hadn‘t 
been made (Gulf News 18 March 1993). Fishing activity that had been perfectly legal 
before the introduction of ITQs, had become an offense serious enough a year‘s 
surveillance. The community‘s access to commercial fishing, was by this time, marginal.  
 
